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Executive Summary
Introduction
1. The issue of lookalikes is one that has been on the policy and business agenda for 
at least two decades. Well-known brands, and brand-owners’ groups, have long 
advocated specific and adequate protection against lookalikes under United Kingdom 
(UK) law, particularly in the context of possible business-to-business harm. More 
recently, the issue has also become more prominent on the agenda of the European 
Union (EU) both in the context of so-called “free-riding” in relation to trade mark law, 
and with respect to possible unfair commercial practices. 
2. This report uses a working definition of a lookalike in the following terms: a lookalike 
product is a product sold by a third party which looks similar to a manufacturer brand 
owner’s product and, by reason of that similarity, consumers perceive the lookalike to 
share a greater number of features with the manufacturer brand owner than would be 
expected simply because the products are in the same product category. This report 
further defines own brand in this report as a product sold under a retailer’s brand 
name (whether or not is it also a lookalike), and a manufacturer brand as a brand 
controlled by an entity that manufactures the products itself, rather than applying its 
own branding to something manufactured by a third party.
The literature review
3. The literature suggests that innovation leads to growth in consumer markets. Further, 
brands provide consumer security as brands need to retain consistent quality to 
survive. The literature also indicates that large brand owners, who manufacture and 
design their products, innovate more than non-manufacture brands rivals.
4. The existing literature suggests that own brand products have an evolutionary life 
cycle with lookalikes existing in the later stages of that cycle. It also indicates that 
own brands are more successful in low innovation product categories. Accordingly, 
incremental innovation by manufacturer brand owners makes it more difficult for own 
brand to penetrate the market. This in turn might be a driver for manufacturers to 
innovate.
5. There is little empirical evidence on whether own brand affects innovation. Further, in 
the food sector it has been found that the existence of own brand has had no effect in 
Europe (except in Spain). Nevertheless, it has been suggested that lost sales caused 
by own brand would lead to less money being spent by manufacturers on research 
and development
6. The literature postulates certain types of business harm which might be caused by 
lookalikes. This includes lowering the level of innovation, wasted rents on packaging 
changes, brand followers being pushed out of the market place and an adverse effect 
on advertising. In addition, it suggests that there is a need to protect the investment in 
market research to obtain new consumer insights.
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7. The existing consumer evidence suggests that in the absence of the brand leader, 
products that look similar to that leader are better received by consumers than those 
that look distinct. In addition, when a lookalike is on the shelf at the same time as 
the brand leader the lookalike might be used for comparison purposes. Further, the 
presence of lookalikes will reduce a consumer’s reaction time in selecting a product 
and may (under time pressure and outside the normal shop environment) increase the 
chance of mistaken selection.
8. There have been numerous consumer surveys on the issue of similar packaging for 
fast-moving consumer goods. These studies demonstrate a high level of consumers 
making mistaken purchases. The reasons for these mistakes include similar 
packaging such as cues of colour, shape and size. Additionally shelf position is 
reported as a factor.
9. Previous consumer surveys show that consumers have a perception that own brand 
goods have a common origin with manufacturer brand owner products (irrespective of 
packaging) and when packaging is similar there is an increased perception of common 
origin. Additionally, those surveys suggest that consumer perceptions of own brand 
are generally good with at least a quarter (and possibly three-quarters) of consumers 
perceiving own brand to be as good as the manufacturer brand owner’s products.
Research findings 
10. The present research was divided into three parts. The first part comprises interviews 
with stakeholders in the fast-moving consumer goods market. The second part of 
the research comprises two consumer surveys: one considering whether there is 
a lookalike effect; and the second addressing the advantages and disadvantages 
perceived by consumers across three jurisdictions. The final part of the research 
involved the analysis of sales figures for certain brand leading products to see the 
impact, if any, of a lookalike entering the market.
11. The study found a small, but statistically significant, lookalike effect leading consumers 
to believe that similar-looking products have similar product characteristics and similar 
origin. The effect is greater, however, in those consumers who do not use products 
within a particular product category (and so the effect is lower in relation to the 
persons most likely to buy the product). This is consistent with the existing literature 
which suggests consumers are confused when packaging is similar.
12. It was found that that a high number of UK households reported that the accidental 
purchase of lookalikes disadvantages them very much (1.68 million) or somewhat 
(9.92million). Conversely, a substantial number of households reported such a 
purchase to advantage them very much (0.99 million) or somewhat (8.99 million). This 
suggests that some consumers suffer detriment from the mistaken purchase whilst 
others find it to be a positive experience. However, the research did not investigate 
why some consumers perceived the purchase to be a good or bad experience.
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13. The study revealed that a substantial majority of consumers had deliberately 
purchased a lookalike and, of those consumers, most of them found the experience to 
be advantageous. The research did not analyse why some consumers perceived the 
purchase to be advantageous.
14. The research found that there is a fine line between confusing packaging and using 
generic cues to provide useful signals to consumers.
15. The study found limited evidence to support the suggestion that lookalikes spur 
manufacturer brand owners to innovate as it is the best way to maintain the price 
differential. Such an effect, however, might disappear in markets where market share 
(more precisely, sales) has declined so much that the cost of research cannot be 
recovered. 
16. It was not found that lookalike products directly cause brand manufacturers to make 
additional (and wasteful) changes to their packaging.
17. The literature suggested that lookalike packaging causes a greater loss of sales (or 
market share) than distinctive competitors. However, in interviews with the research 
team only one of the manufacturer brand owners reported this finding; the others gave 
a mixed picture.
18. The statistical analysis of the sales figures showed that in a very limited number of 
product categories, an association was found between a reduction in the sales of 
the brand leader and an increase in the sales of the lookalike. This could have been 
caused by numerous factors, one of which is the similarity of the packaging (the 
lookalike effect at work). Such associations did not appear to relate to consumers’ 
relative perception of packaging similarity or common production origin and also did 
not generally appear to exist within the particular supermarket selling the own brand. 
The evidence is therefore inadequate to determine whether lookalike packaging 
generally diverts sales or if the effect of that packaging is negligible.
19. In relation to advertising spend, there were differing responses by manufacturer brand 
owners when a lookalike enters the market. Accordingly, no meaningful conclusions 
can be drawn as to the effect on advertising spend when a lookalike enters the 
market.
20. The discussions with manufacturer brand owners, reviews of the literature and the 
surveys suggest that if there were to be a statutory definition of a lookalike it could 
be: “goods which by virtue of their name, shape, colour, packaging or labelling or any 
combination thereof, are similar in overall appearance to the goods; but excluding any 
of those things where they are descriptive, functional or commonplace.”
21. Manufacturer brand owners reported that lookalikes enabled competitors and retailers 
to take unfair advantage of the manufacturer brand owner’s research into consumer 
insights and packaging design.
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Legal analysis
22. In none of the three jurisdictions examined - the UK, Germany and the United States 
– was the legal position of lookalikes particularly clear. Nevertheless, at the interim 
stage, there is a perception that a claimant is more likely to be successful in the 
favourable German forum than in either of the other two countries. 
23. It is probable that the prevention of certain lookalikes is within the scope of the Unfair 
Commercial Practices Directive (2005/29/EC). Under this assumption, the United 
Kingdom may not be free to legislate to further prevent lookalikes save in business-to-
business transactions. However, it would also mean that certain lookalikes are already 
unlawful under the Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations 2008.
24. Accordingly, if there is a restriction on legislation in relation to lookalikes, a private 
right of action under the Consumer Protection from Trading Regulations 2008 would 
be permitted under the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive.
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Chapter 1: The Question of 
Lookalikes
1.1 Introduction
The issue of lookalikes is one that has been on the policy and business agenda for at least 
two decades.1 Well-known brands, and brand-owners’ groups, have long advocated specific 
and adequate protection against lookalikes under United Kingdom (UK) law, particularly in 
the context of possible business-to-business harm. More recently, the issue has also become 
more prominent on the agenda of the European Union (EU),2 both in the context of so-called 
“free-riding” in relation to trade mark law, and with respect to possible unfair commercial 
practices. It is therefore timely and important to undertake a study into the possible effects of 
lookalikes on consumers and business. 
The Intellectual Property Institute (IPI) was commissioned by the Intellectual Property Office 
(IPO) to obtain empirical evidence on the effect of lookalikes on consumers and on the market 
place. The purpose of the research was to attempt to find the balance of costs and benefits 
between manufacturer brand owners and retailers and what, if any, lookalike effect 
might exist. 
1.1.1 The Scope of the Research
What is the possible effect of lookalike packaging/products on the market?
The research has both a legal element and an evidence-based element. The legal element 
examines how three jurisdictions deal with the issue of lookalikes – the UK, Germany and the 
United States – and considers whether there are any constraints on the UK legislating on 
lookalikes if it so chooses. The second element is to collect and evaluate evidence so as try 
and answer four questions: 
a. what is believed by interested parties to be a “lookalike”; 
b. whether there is a lookalike effect; 
c. whether consumers suffer detriment by reasons of lookalikes; and 
d. whether there is any business harm suffered. The consumer research was   
 undertaken by i2 Media Research and the data analysed for the purposes of   
 assessing business harm was provided by Kantar Worldpanel.
1  See Annex I.2.1 which discusses the issues during the passage of the Trade Marks Act 1994.
2  See in particular, paragraph [4.2].
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1.1.2:  Lookalikes and the Value of Brands 
The benefit individual firms and individual consumers achieve from trade mark, trade dress 
and branding has been widely studied.3 There have been fewer attempts to identify the 
macro-economic effect of brands, but those that have attempted such work have found 
evidence supporting the fact that the large brand owners who manufacturer and design their 
own products more actively innovate than their rivals4 and that such innovation leads to 
growth in consumer markets.5 A brand, and its guarantee, also provides security to consumers 
as it means that a brand owner wishing to move to a new market must ensure there is high 
or consistent quality in the new product so as not to risk the existing value in the brand (so 
called brand equity).6 One report suggests that in 2006 the investment made in developing 
brands in the United Kingdom was £15.85 billion, which is made up largely of brand 
development, advertising and market research.7 It will therefore be accepted for the purposes 
of this report that brands as such are valuable to brand owners, consumers and to the wider 
economy.8
1.1.3 The complex relationships in the supermarket
The issue of lookalikes is part of a very complex relationship between retailers and those 
who make branded products. The traditional view of retail is that the retailer decides which 
products to stock in its shop and at what price. The retailer would then display the products 
on the shelves in such a way as to maximise sales based on its own experience. The role of 
the supplier and manufacturer of the product would be to fulfil orders from retailers and to 
promote their product in the wider marketplace. This simple view has not been the case for 
decades. 
The modern retail relationship is far more complicated. Most retailers now appoint one of the 
brand leaders (often on competitive tender) as a so-called “category captain” and different 
retailers may have (or demand) a different category captain. The category captain may 
advise on any one or more of the following: shelf arrangement (the planograms); shelf-space 
management; and which products to stock (including competitors and own brand) to maximise 
3 In terms of trade mark law, one of the most famous example being William Landes and Richard Posner 
“Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective” (1987) 30 Journal of Law and Economics 265 and a shorter 
version (without the equations) at (1988) 78 Trademark Reporter 267.
4 See Kamran Kashani, Joyce Miller and Tony Clayton, A Virtuous Cycle: Innovation, Consumer Value and 
Communication (AIM 1998).
5 Tony Clayton and Graham Turner “Brands, Innovation and Growth: The Role of Brands in Innovation and 
Growth for Consumer Business” in Joe Tidd (ed) From Knowledge Management To Strategic Competence 
Assessing Technological, Market and Organisational Innovation (3rd Ed, Imperial College 2012).
6 Ibid, 5
7 Peter Urwin et al “Valuing Brands in the UK Economy” (British Brands Group, 2008), 22-23.
8 However, some commentators argue that the development and protection of brands (rather than just protecting 
against consumer confusion) is wasteful potentially encouraging “irrational” brand loyalty as well as creating 
barriers to entry: see Ralph Brown “Advertising and the Public Interest: Legal Protection of Trade Symbols” 
(1948) 57 Yale Law Journal 1165, 1181-3; Glynn Lunney “Trademark Monopolies” (1999) 48 Emory Law 
Journal 367; Mark A. Lemley and Mark P. McKenna “Owning Markets” (2010) 109 Michigan Law Review 137, 
176 and Barton Beebe “Search and Persuasion in Trademark Law” (2005) 103 Michigan Law Review 2020.
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overall sales for the retailer.9 This means one brand leader, as category captain, can have an 
impact on the sales and product placement of another brand (including own brand), but they 
must remain “honest” to retain the coveted position. Nevertheless, the retailer, either locally 
or nationally, can decide to depart from the category captain’s advice if it chooses. In addition 
to this role, brand owners may pay retailers for better shelf placement (such as end of aisle) 
to try and increase exposure of the brand. They will also be required by the retailer to run a 
certain number of promotions each year to increase volume sales for both retailer and brand 
owner. The cost of these discounts is usually, but not always, absorbed by the supplier and 
not the retailer. This is but the tip of a large iceberg, which is substantially outside the scope 
of this report. However, throughout this report these complex interdependent relationships 
must be borne in mind. 
1.1.4 Lookalikes in other contexts
The present research is concerned only with lookalikes within fast-moving consumer goods 
by reason of the research brief. Nevertheless, it is apparent that the relevant “practices” and 
marketing “norms” can be recognised in a wide range of other industries. 
Private Eye ran a feature of “bookalikes”10 where 
the front covers of a series of books were printed 
to point out the apparent similarity between them 
as they all included half-a-face, as can be seen 
from the images on the right.11 Although there are 
clear distinctions there is a common theme in the 
cover design. As the name given makes clear 
these are books that “lookalike.”
9 A explanation of the role and a discussion of the competitiveness can be found in Sanjay Dhar, Jagmohan 
Raju, Upender Subramanian and Yusong Wang “The Competitive Consequences of Using a Category 
Captain” (2010) 56 Management Science 1739.
10 Those from 2011 are: Private Eye, Issue Number 1279, 7th – 20th January 2011, 29; Private Eye, Issue 
Number 1280, 21st January – 3rd February 2011, 28; Private Eye, Issue Number 1281, 4th – 17th February 
2011, 27; Private Eye, Issue Number 1283, 4th -17th March 2011, 27; Private Eye, Issue Number 1283, 4th 
-17th March 2011, 27; Private Eye, Issue Number 1286, 15th – 28th April 2011, 26; Private Eye, Issue Number 
1289, 27th May to 7th June 2011, 28; Private Eye, Issue Number 1291, 24th June - 7th July 2011, 26; Private 
Eye, Issue Number 1296, 2nd – 15th September 2011, 24; Private Eye, Issue Number 1298, 30th September 
– 13th October 2011, 27; Private Eye, Issue Number 1301, 11th – 24th November 2011, 27; Private Eye, Issue 
Number 1308, 28th January to 24th February 2012, 28. 
11 Private Eye, Issue Number 1297, 16th - 29th September 2011, 27. The book covers are taken from Amazon.
co.uk.
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The research team also saw common themes and cues being used in other cultural industries. 
The DVD covers for Iron Lord and Ironclad share many common features. Iron Lord was 
released 1 August 2011, three weeks after Ironclad, released 11 July 2011. It is clear that 
these share many elements and could well be seen as a lookalike.12
The general prevalence of common themes 
or ideas in packaging design and marketing 
is outside the scope of this research. 
However, at the outset it is important to 
demonstrate how packaging and design are 
commonly influenced by other similar 
products and practices already in the market 
place, thus building an agreed “language” to 
signify a particular product. This becomes 
more controversial where that “language” is 
used to signify particular qualities that may 
be attached to a leading product (a possible 
“lookalike” effect). 
Therefore, if there is a “lookalike” effect it is not necessarily limited to fast-moving consumer 
goods. However it is this to which the present research is confined. Nevertheless, while only 
fast-moving consumer goods and their packaging are being considered, it may be that the 
conclusions reached in relation to these goods will have much wider application, both socially 
and commercially. It is also clear that packaging alone may not be the only factor making 
something more or less a lookalike.
1.2:  Terminology: “lookalike”
1.2.1 Inconsistent Terminology
The issue of lookalikes is caught up in a torrent of conflicting terminology, which also 
potentially compromises the clarity of the debate and the existing information and literature. 
This is a problem which has long been acknowledged in marketing discussions.13 In each 
case the central issue is largely the same, but the words used to describe it may vary greatly, 
posing significant problems for achieving consensus in definition and approach. 
Therefore, in order to achieve some consistency with respect to the subject matter and 
definition, the term lookalike will be used throughout this report. Nevertheless, it should be 
noted that alternative terms of copycat or parasitic product are also used in much of the 
literature.14 These terms will be used only in direct quotes or where it would not accurately 
reflect the context to use lookalike. 
12 Subsequently similar pieces were run in Private Eye. The images are taken from Amazon.co.uk.
13 Michael Halbert, The Meaning and Sources of Marketing Theory (2nd Ed McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1965), 
53; also see Thomas Schutte “The Semantics of Branding” (1969) 32 Journal of Marketing 5, 6.
14 There are some countries which have parasitic copying as an act of unfair competition.
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1.2.2. Working Definition
It is therefore necessary to introduce and agree at this stage the working definition of lookalike 
that is the basis of this study before dealing with the surrounding context of terminology that 
informs that definition.
A lookalike product is a product sold by a third party which looks similar to a 
manufacturer brand owner’s product and by reason of that similarity consumers 
perceive the lookalike to share a greater number of features with the manufacturer 
brand owner than would be expected by reason of the products being in the same 
product category alone.
There have been other attempts to define what amounts to a lookalike and these have 
contributed to this working definition.15 A discussion of this context is therefore important in 
understanding this definition.
1.3. Other terminology issues
1.3.1 Own Brand
The term own brand16 will be used to refer to products sold under a retailer’s brand name 
(whether it is also a lookalike). There are other terms in common use, such as private label 
or own label, but these do not reflect the fact that retailers invest heavily in their brand.17 This 
is because retailers’ brands, in the same way as manufacturers’ brands, require significant 
development.
1.3.2 Manufacturers and Brand Owners
A further difficulty is with the terminology often used in relation to lookalikes for manufacturers’ 
brands. They are often simply called brand owners. The view of this report is that brand 
owner does not take proper account of the fact that retailers are also (albeit different) brand 
owners. Accordingly, any reference to a manufacturer brand owner should be taken to mean 
a brand controlled by someone who primarily manufactures the products itself or under its 
direct control,18 rather than applies their own branding to something manufactured by a third 
party.
15 For a further discussion of the etymology of the term “lookalike”, including attempts at a legal definition, please 
refer to the more detailed discussion in Annex I.
16 For a list of all the terms that have been used to describe such products see Thomas F Schutte “The Semantics 
of Branding” (1969) 32 Journal of Marketing 5, 6.
17 Leslie de Chernatony and Gil McWilliam “Clarifying the Difference between Manufacturers’ Brands and 
Distributors’ Brands” (Summer 1988) Quarterly Review of Marketing 1, 3.
18 This is meant to cover outsourcing of manufacturer. However, in practice the making of own brand could be 
seen as outsourcing. The purpose of the definition is to try and exclude own brand.
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Summary Points Chapter 1
SP 1.1: Lookalikes and the Value of Brands
• Large brand owners who manufacturer and design their products innovate more 
than non-manufacturer brands rivals;
• Innovation leads to growth in consumer markets;
• Brands provide security to consumers;
• Brand value demands maintenance of quality (high or consistent).
SP 1.2 “Lookalike” – Working Definition
• A lookalike product is a product sold by a third party which looks similar to a 
manufacturer brand owner’s product and by reason of that similarity consumers 
perceive the lookalike to share a greater number of features with the manufacturer 
brand owner than would be expected by reason of the products being in the same 
product category alone.
SP 1.3:  Other Definitions
Own Brand
• Product sold under a retailer’s brand name (whether or not is it also a lookalike).
Manufacturer Brand
• A brand controlled by an entity that manufactures the products itself, rather than 
applying its own branding to something manufactured by a third party.
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Chapter 2:  Summary of 
Current Landscape
2.1 Introduction
Keeping in mind the significant limitations with respect to terminology and definitions outlined 
in Chapter 1 and Annex I, this Chapter outlines the current legal landscape. 
To understand the context of the current research, and the mechanisms for responding to 
that research, it is necessary to consider the laws that might currently apply to lookalikes. 
There is a multitude of laws which might be relevant in this regard including: copyright; design 
law; trade mark law; passing off; and various consumer laws. This discussion surveys the 
approach the law takes in three target jurisdictions: the UK; Germany; and the United States. 
In relation to these jurisdictions, only the primary mechanism used to prevent lookalikes will 
be considered. These are: passing off (UK)1; unfair competition law (Germany); and trade 
dress protection (United States). This is not to suggest that other laws, in particular other 
intellectual property laws, are not equally important in preventing lookalike packaging. 
However, it is necessary to restrict the scope as described.
Annex II provides a more detailed examination of the legal frameworks in each of the selected 
jurisdictions, however a working outline is provided here. Annex IV provides further information 
with respect to cases involving lookalikes in the courts of each jurisdiction. 
2.2 United Kingdom
There is no general law of unfair competition in the UK, although on occasion it has been 
suggested otherwise.2 The law of passing off is traditionally what has been used to deter 
traders from using similar trade dress to their rivals.
There are three basic elements that must be established for a claim of passing off to be made 
out: goodwill in the get-up of goods; a misrepresentation leading the public to believe the 
goods supplied by one trader are those of another; and damage caused by reason of the 
erroneous belief.3 If these elements are shown then the second trader’s state of mind is 
irrelevant.4 A major limitation for the application of passing off in preventing lookalikes is the 
1 In the discussion of UK law, English modern terminology will be used even if it was not so used in the original 
literature. Therefore, reference will be made to claimants, applications, and interim injunctions, rather than 
plaintiffs, motions and interlocutory injunctions. The Scots have always used different terminology: e.g. 
pursuer for claimant; defender for defendant; interdict for injunction and so forth. Northern Ireland has retained 
the traditional terminology.
2 See Annex II.2.
3 Reckitt & Colman Products Ltd v Borden Inc (No 3) [1990] RPC 341, 499; also see the five elements identified 
by Lord Diplock in Erven Warnink BV vJ Townend & Sons (Hull) Ltd (No 1) [1979] AC 731, 742.
4 Gillette (UK) Ltd v Edenwest [1994] RPC 279, 289–94. 
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fact that the requirement for a misrepresentation (customer confusion) is central to the 
action.5 This is often found to be too difficult to establish as courts perceive that consumers 
can tell the difference between a lookalike and the manufacturer brand.
In Annex II an argument is explored which suggests that because so called extended passing 
off protects against misrepresentations which erode goodwill, the acid test being the need for 
some damage to goodwill. If this premise is right then there is an avenue for passing off to 
cover lookalike claims based on the loss of exclusivity of distinctive get-up. To date this view 
has not been tested before the courts.
2.3 Germany
In Germany, lookalikes are usually dealt with under conventional intellectual property laws, 
but there is specific provision in unfair competition law to prevent parasitic copies (Gesetz 
gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb6 (UWG) §4 no 9). Nevertheless, where cases have been 
reported, there has been mixed success and there appear to be particular problems proving 
competitive individuality in relation to own brand (i.e., distinctiveness of get-up which informs 
the public of its origin or characteristics).
There is a perception that the German courts are more willing to provide a remedy against 
parasitic packaging than other countries including, in particular, England. At the behest of the 
British Brands Group, (BBG) Hogan Lovells made enquiries with the German courts regarding 
the number of cases relating to lookalikes.7 These enquiries were made of the IP Chambers 
in Hamburg and Cologne. They reported that there were about 350 cases in Cologne involving 
packaging, 188 cases in Hamburg, and estimated that for all courts there would be 800 
cases. These cases did not divide out claims based on copyright infringement and design 
infringement from those under the UWG. 
After reviewing this memorandum, the research team conducted its own research and 
contacted the judges of the IP chambers at Braunschweig, Munich, Dusseldorf, Mannheim, 
Frankfurt and Cologne. It was indicated by one of the judges that interim relief is actually 
quite difficult to obtain in relation to lookalikes under the UWG8 (the difficultly of proving the 
competitive individuality). Most of the judges were not able to provide specific numbers, but 
it appears that in Frankfurt about 30 cases were based in some part on UWG §4 no 9. It was 
widely reported amongst the judges that Cologne was perceived as claimant-friendly (and 
this was accepted by the Cologne judge). In general, the judges were not able to give very 
precise details as to the number of cases which were successful under UWG §4 no 9 alone 
(rather than successful in a claim based on trade mark, design or copyright infringement and 
5 The misrepresentation must be made either to customers or end consumers (i.e., on the packaging) of the 
other’s goods (Erven Warnink [1979] AC 731) and it should be judged against how the relevant goodwill was 
acquired in trade. But confusion per se is not sufficient to found such an action: see My Kinda Town Ltd (t/a 
Chicago Pizza Pie Factory) v Soll and Grunts Investments [1983] RPC 407, 418.
6 The German Unfair Competition Law.
7 Memorandum by Hogan Lovells, Parasitic copying – No. of injunctions in Germany (request from John Noble, 
British Brands Group of 24 May 2012) (1st June 2012) (copy with researchers and Intellectual Property 
Office).
8 Particularly following the following the decision of the BGH in TUV (2011) GRUR-Prax 228 (this requires the 
claims to be better particularised and remedies to be linked to the relevant claim).
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UWG §4 no 9). 
As the substantive law of trade mark and design law is entirely harmonised across the EU, in 
theory (although for various reasons connected to procedure and evidence, not always in 
practice) a trade mark or design infringement case should reach the same conclusion in both 
Germany and the UK. Furthermore, the law of copyright is substantially harmonised across 
the EU and so many, although not all, infringement cases should reach the same result.9 
Thus, a claim being successful under UWG §4 no 9 and one or more of trade mark, design 
or copyright infringement (without specifying which) is not a particularly useful comparison 
for other member states. 
Nevertheless, the judges mentioned that attorneys had problems proving elements required 
under UWG §4 no 9, although it was suggested that experienced German Attorneys using 
Cologne, who knew what the court was expecting, would have some success obtaining relief. 
Furthermore, there appear to be many more lookalike cases started in Germany than in the 
UK and brand owners have more success in Germany than in the UK at the interim stage 
(although it may be there are actually fewer successes than perceived to be the case). 
Neither Hogan Lovells nor the research team found results sufficient to determine whether 
this greater (perceived) success in Germany is because of a different judicial attitude, 
procedural or evidential differences, or different substantive law (i.e. the existence of UWG 
§4 no 9).
2.4 United States
In the United States, lookalikes are dealt with as part of trade dress law, which is essentially 
part of trade mark law.10 Trade dress must be distinctive to be considered a trade mark 
(registered or unregistered). This distinctiveness can be either inherent or acquired.11 
Functionality (aesthetic or utilitarian) cannot be protected under trade dress. Therefore, 
packaging dictated by function or custom (with respect to colour, for example) may not 
necessarily be protected. Trade dress is protected both against other traders adopting 
confusingly similar dress and against being diluted under the Federal dilution statute.
There is a divergence between the circuits as to the effect of a retailer’s name appearing on 
the packaging. In any event, most cases still tend to fail due to the absence of confusion.
9 The scope of this harmonisation has only really become apparent to many practitioners and courts in the last 
year or two. 
10 There are difficulties in relation to aesthetic and utilitarian functionality.
11 Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition, §, 13 (1995); also see Wal-Mart Stores v Samara Brothers, 529 
US 205, 210-211 (2000). 
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2.5 European Union (EU)
It has been perceived by some commentators that the concept of “unfair advantage” as set 
out in relation to trade mark infringement (dilution) may be of particular relevance to lookalikes. 
However, many forms of trade dress are difficult to register as they are not inherently 
distinctive and so require time in the market place to acquire distinctiveness. Furthermore, 
the continually evolving nature of Court of Justice jurisprudence means that it is unclear 
whether dilution would apply to lookalikes as such things may or may not fall within the 
meaning of “mere imitation”. It must be remembered that where the EU leads, either through 
legislation or decisions of the Court of Justice, Member States (including the UK) must follow.
It appears possible that lookalikes fall within the scope of the Unfair Commercial Practices 
Directive (UCPD) although this is subject to the view of the Court of Justice. A full discussion 
of this matter is in Annex III. If lookalikes do fall within the scope of that Directive then:
• the law of passing off (and UWG §4 no 9), as it applies to lookalikes, may be affected 
and may have been narrowed in scope;
• Member States may be restricted in enacting sui generis laws to prevent lookalikes;
• Some instances of lookalikes may already be unlawful in the United Kingdom under 
the Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations 2008 (which implement the 
Directive);
Notwithstanding the above, creating a private right of action under the 2008 Regulations 
would be compatible with the UCPD and would not make anything further unlawful, rather it 
would make it easier for manufacturer brand owners to bring an action in relation to (any) 
presently unlawful conduct.
Impact of Lookalikes 
19
Summary Points Chapter 2
SP 2.1:  “Lookalikes” in the UK
• Passing Off: requirement of customer confusion limits application of passing off 
in prevention of lookalikes;
• Unfair Competition: no straightforward misappropriation, or general unfair 
competition law;
• Extended Tort of Passing Off: where a misrepresentation erodes distinctiveness 
of mark, this potentially bringing lookalikes within passing off.
SP 2.2:  “Lookalikes” in Germany
• Unfair competition laws: specific provision under UWG §4 no 9;
• Competitive individuality: difficult evidentiary burden;
• Interim stage: greater success in Germany than before the English courts (but 
often not as much success as commonly believed and the results vary greatly 
between IP Chambers).
SP 2.3:  “Lookalikes” in the United States
• Trade dress: essentially the same protection as for trade marks;
• Functionality will not be protected: therefore, protection may not include 
packaging determined by product, or features (such as colour) determined by 
custom;
• Confusion (or absence of) usually a deciding factor.
SP 2.4:  “Lookalikes” in the European Union
• Unfair advantage it is not clear whether lookalikes would fall within the scope of 
dilution protection;
• Unfair Commercial Practices Directive (UCPD) may also make lookalikes 
unlawful in some instances;
• A private right of action under the Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading 
Regulations 2008 would be compatible with the UCPD.
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Part I:  Literature Review
Chapter 3: The Lookalike 
Effect
3.1 Introduction
There is extensive literature on the issue of lookalikes. The momentum behind lookalikes 
began in the 1990s and by the end of the decade the International Trademark Association 
(INTA) complained that English law still failed to protect against “unfair competition violations 
such as free-riding of misappropriation…inherent in the creation of so-called “look-alike” 
product packaging”.1 More recently, the European Parliament Committee on the Internal 
Market and Consumer Protection described “copycats” as an unacceptable practice which 
should be addressed without delay.2 Yet this is not the only side of the story as others have 
suggested that prohibiting lookalike packaging would unduly restrict competition.3 
3.2 Background
The history of lookalikes is just one of the areas of potential conflict between the manufacturers 
and own brands which continues to take place on the supermarket shelf.4 This conflict is not 
new5 and over time the relative strength and positions of the parties have radically changed:6 
“Power has ebbed and flowed in the grocery trade over the past century. Before the First 
World War it was the food wholesalers that called the shots, using sheer size to screw 
down small suppliers on the one hand and get top prices from small retailers on the other. 
1 See Lucy Harrold “Beyond the well-trodden paths of passing off” [2006] European Intellectual Property Review 
304, 307.
2 Report (2010/2109 (INI)), A7-0217/2011, [31].
3 See Mark A. Lemley and Mark P. McKenna “Owning Markets” (2010) 109 Michigan Law Review 137 and 
Ansgar Ohly “The Freedom of Imitation and Its Limits” (2010) International Review of Intellectual Property and 
Competition Law 506.
4 An excellent summary from a lawyer’s perspective is found in Belinda Mills (Issacs) “Own label products and 
the ‘lookalike’ phenomenon: a lack of trade dress and unfair competition protection?” [1995] European 
Intellectual Property Review 116.
5 The first own brand was probably Cremos launched by J. Sainsbury in the 1890s (it had to be renamed soon 
thereafter due to regulatory changes). 
6 Patrick Husking “Inside Story: Superstores Stalk the Superbrands” Independent on Sunday, 20th February 
1994; also see Leslie de Chernatony and Gil McWilliam “Clarifying the Difference between Manufacturers’ 
Brands and Distributors’ Brands” (Summer 1988) Quarterly Review of Marketing 1.
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Between the wars, the manufacturers were on top. By developing strong, desirable 
brands, they persuaded customers to demand their products in what academics now term 
a ‘pull through’ strategy. The retailers were squeezed. 
In post war years, wholesalers withered away and retailers came to the fore, developing 
their own names as brands themselves -- sufficiently convincing to make own label 
acceptable. Their sheer size gave them colossal negotiating clout.”
In 1970, own brand accounted for about 20% of the overall retail market, but in the decade 
that followed - with its sustained recession,7 the ending of price controls and market restraints 
- own brand came into its own.8 Technology also made a difference, as The Economist9 
explained nearly twenty years ago:
“Armed with bar-code scanners and ‘smart’ shopping trolleys and a host of other high-tech 
gadgets, supermarkets have been studying who is buying what, when and for how much. 
This information provides them with a competitive edge over manufacturers in deciding 
which new products to launch and then testing them on consumers. It also allows them to 
identify poorly performing brands easily.”
Over recent decades the power has shifted from the big manufacturers to the retailers10 and 
the success of own brands is particularly pronounced in Europe.11 Indeed, retailers have 
been described as ‘double agents’ in that they act both to sell branded goods to consumers 
and also to develop their own brand for consumers as a substitutable alternative for branded 
goods.12 This strong market power is something which repeatedly arises in the discussion of 
lookalikes. Furthermore, it now appears that the market has evolved in such a way that the 
brand loyalty the manufacturers fought to obtain is no longer as significant in the marketplace. 
A little over ten years ago it was suggested that only 30% of consumers are committed to 
particular manufacturer brands,13 leaving the remaining 70% for the taking. Nevertheless, 
brand loyalty still exists - it applies to the loyalty customers have to manufacturer’s products 
as well as to their retailer. Indeed, the loyalty to the latter may now have precedence over 
other brand loyalties.14 It is these conflicting loyalties which are at the heart of lookalikes. 
7 There is literature on the effects of the present economic downturn.
8 Belinda Mills (Issacs) n. 4,117.
9 “Cut-price retailers are causing havoc on the High Street” The Economist, 4 December 1993, 5.
10 Jan Benedict Steenkamp et al, A Global Study into Drivers of Private Label Success (AIM 2004), 23-4.
11 Steenkamp n. 10, 25-28; DG Enterprise and Industry, The Impact of Private Labels on the Competitiveness 
of the European Food Supply Chain (January 2011), 17.
12 DG Enterprise and Industry n. 11, 39.
13 Carlson Marketing Group, Marketing (June 2001).
14 London Economics, Competition in Retailing (Research Paper 13, OFT).
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3.3 Own Brand
In the context of lookalikes, it is important to provide some background on own brand and 
how these products function in the marketplace. At the moment, across the EU as a whole 
own brand now has about 23% share of the groceries market.15 
Own brand products are normally cheaper than the manufacturer’s brand, by about 31%;16 
however, this pricing differential varies between product goods and, in some categories, the 
own brand is actually more expensive. Price is but one of the reasons for own brand success. 
According to a report to the European Commission there are three different reasons for own 
brand products to exist:
a. to fill gaps in product categories that are not served by branded products (e.g.   
 generic or low cost brands not presently served);
b. to provide direct alternatives to brands (same quality but lower price); or
c. to pioneer new products and categories. 
Similar reasons for own brand have been presented by retailers in that own brand can be 
seen to be “broadening the product ranges”, “enhancing product markets” and providing 
“unique products”.17 Retailers, as an umbrella brand,18 have an advantage as the use of their 
mark can signal over a number of brands.19 This has resulted in specialist ranges being 
established by most major retailers. By way of example Tesco’s ranges including the following: 
“Tesco Organics”, “Tesco Free From”, “Tesco Health Living”, “Tesco Carb Control”, “Tesco 
Fair Trade” and “Tesco Kids”.20
The present discussion of own brand will consider: (i) the lifecycle of a product; (ii) innovation 
in the own brand/manufacturer brand owner competitive space; (iii) the timing of market entry 
for own brand; (iv) the issues of market power intrinsically linked with own brand products; 
(v) the perception of quality (or otherwise) in relation to own brand; and (vi) the business 
strategies that can be (and are) used by manufacturers to address own brand competitors. 
These each have implications for the special case of lookalike own brand products and are 
relevant to the discussion in Part 3.
15 See DG Enterprise and Industry n. 11, 11.
16 AC Nielson, The Power of Private Labels 2005: A Review of Growth Trends Around the World (Nielson 2005), 
5; DG Enterprise n.11, [3.4.1].
17 Steve Burt and Shiona Davis “Follow My Leader? Lookalike Retailer Brands in Non-Manufacturer-Dominated 
Product Markets in the UK” (1999) International Review of Retail, Distribution and Consumer Research 163.
18 Manufacturers can also develop umbrella brands and are increasingly doing so: see Unilever Press Release 
2nd March 2009: “Signature corporate branding on product”: available at: www.unilever.co.uk/media-centre/
pressreleases/2009/ubrand.aspx. 
19 DG Enterprise and Industry n. 11, 35-36.
20 AC Nielson n. 16, 7 and 20.
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3.3.1 Lifecycle 
The modern retailer21 now sells its own brand products, which they claim are often of equal 
and sometimes even better quality than manufacturers’ products.22 An own brand or lookalike 
will usually start life as a cheaper version of the brand leader with emphasis on price, rather 
than quality.23 Subsequently more money is spent on quality until the own brand or lookalike 
becomes a brand in its own right.24 This was explained by McKinsey in its study in 199325 in 
terms of four generations of own brand26 evolution:
First Generation (Generic) – low volume, functional product, technology lagging behind 
market leader, perceived lower quality/inferior image, price necessary to attract customers;
Second Generation (Quasi-brands) – large volume one-off product, technology lagging 
behind market leader, average quality (but perceived as lower), price is a major criterion for 
purchase, national manufacturers, partly specializing in private label;
Third Generation (“Umbrella brand of trade”) -  Big category products, expand the number 
of SKUs,27 technology closer to market leader, quality/image in line with leading brands, 
quality and price as criteria for purchase and national manufacturers, mostly specialising in 
own brand;
Fourth Generation (Segmented private labels: shaped brand) – image-forming groups, 
many SKUs, but with small volume, innovation technology, quality/image equal or superior to 
leading brands, better products as criterion for purchase, international manufacturers, mostly 
specialising in private label. 
The particular generation of own brand will depend on the country and the product category. 
Lookalikes are most likely to be adopted in the Third and Fourth Generation of products.
21 Some retailers, like Marks & Spencer, have always adopted this approach.
22 See Nirmalya Kumar and Jan-Benedict Steenkamp “Brand verses Brand” (2007) 7 International Commerce 
Review 47, 48.
23 See Kumar and Steenkamp n. 22, 48.
24 Shantanu Sahay “Piracy of Trade Dress and the Law of Passing Off: National and International Perspectives” 
(2006) Journal of Intellectual Property Rights 201, 203.
25 Francois Glémet and Fafael Mira “The brand leader’s dilemma” (May 1993) McKinsey Quarterly.
26 They called it private label.
27 Stock-keeping units.
Impact of Lookalikes 
25
3.3.2 Innovation
Relative Innovation in the Market: The general evidence shows that own brand is more 
successful in product categories where there is low innovation.28 This is why own brand is 
less successful (although still growing) in personal and health care, but much more so in food 
and beverages and home care.29 It further appears that where there are incremental 
improvements by manufacturers it is more difficult for own brand to enter the category 
(whether a lookalike or not) as the manufacturer’s product is essentially a moving target.30  
Pressure to Innovate: This drive to stay ahead means that own brand might actually lead to 
more product innovations by manufacturer brand owners31 through the increased pressure 
they face, something which at least one manufacturer in a previous study accepted.32 
However, some manufacturer brand owners reported that the loss of sales to own brand 
meant that they felt obliged to cut their spending on advertising of, and research into, new 
products. This could lead to a vicious circle with lower innovation and advertising leading to 
a drop in sales and these drops leading to less spending on those things.33  It has been 
hypothesised that competition with own brand might lead to “over-investment” which is where 
products are adapted for the sake of adaption and change alone.34 This might be given some 
support by some older empirical evidence which suggests that brand managers are 
preoccupied by incremental innovation, rather than radical innovation, despite the benefits 
that come from the latter.35 
Relative innovation: The existing evidence seems to suggest that manufacturer brand 
owners invest more in innovation than so called “non-branded” producers (this is assumed to 
include own brand), rather than “non-branded” producers are not investing in innovation at 
all.36 This is partially contradicted by the interviews conducted with manufacturer brand 
owners during the research conducted by the European Commission, where manufacturers 
were strongly of the opinion that most retailers make no direct contribution to innovation (with 
the exception of multinationals).37 A similar view was reflected in a twenty-year old study by 
28 See Kumar and Steenkamp n. 22, 51 (the figure of 56% more successful is used although it is unclear what 
the basis of this figure is); Steenkamp n.10, 51-52;  Glémet and Mira n. 25.
29 Steenkamp et al n. 28, 36-37.
30 Kumar and Steenkamp n. 22, 51.
31 DG Enterprise and Industry n. 11, 92 (this does not mean that any of those innovations is a quality innovation 
as such).
32 Ibid, 114.
33 Ibid, 114.
34 Paul Dobson and Arvind Yadav Packaging in a Market Economy: The Economic and Commercial Role of 
Packaging Communication (UEA for British Brands Group, 2012), 60.
35 See Kamran Kashani, Joyce Miller and Tony Clayton, A Virtuous Cycle: Innovation, Consumer Value and 
Communication (AIM 1998).
36 Tony Clayton and Graham Turner “Brands, Innovation and Growth: The Role of Brands in Innovation and 
Growth for Consumer Business” in Joe Tidd (ed) From Knowledge Management To Strategic Competence 
Assessing Technological, Market and Organisational Innovation (3rd Ed, Imperial College 2012), 76.
37 DG Enterprise and Industry n. 11, 112.
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McKinsey which proposed a certain number of experience based beliefs,38 including one that 
own brand retailers do not innovate.39 
Number of innovators and innovations: The biggest problem identified in the interviews 
conducted for the European Commission was not for brand leaders, but brand followers, in 
that own brand pushes them off the shelf and so prevents investment. In terms of the actual 
effect on innovation caused by own brand (and so by implication lookalikes) the recent 
evidence is sparse. The best recent example being the finding that in the food sector the 
existence of own brands has not reduced innovation in the food supply chain within Europe 
(other than in Spain) as the number of new products still increases both for manufacturers’ 
brand and own brand.40
3.3.3 Timing of entry
The timing of the entry of the own brand (or a lookalike) onto the market can be very important. 
Early market entry with an own brand tends to give it a larger market share,41 but such entry 
is clearly taking more risk. It also appears that own brand is more likely than a rival 
manufacturer brand to launch a competing product to a brand leader; and to do so more 
quickly.42 
3.3.4 Perception of Quality
It is apparent that own brand goods are more successful where consumers perceive the 
quality gap between the manufacturer’s and own brands to be small. This had led to the 
suggestion that where a small quality difference is perceived between the manufacturer’s 
brand product and own brand, the own brand will be as much as 54% more successful.43 
Similarly, where there is perceived to be a low performance risk with a product, own brands 
have a higher than average share of the market.44 Therefore, own brand will be more 
successful where the consumer trust in the manufacturers’ brands is quite low, but own brand 
will suffer where there is high consumer trust in the manufacturers’ brands.45
38 The evidence put forward by McKinsey supports lack of penetration of private label in innovative markets, 
rather than direct empirical evidence as to lack of innovation by private label.
39 Glémet and Mira n. 25. 
40 DG Enterprise and Industry n. 11.
41 Christina Brown and James M Lattin “Investigating the Relationship Between Time in Market and Pioneering 
Advantages” (1994) 40 Management Science 1361; Lenard Huff and William T Robinson “The Impact of 
Leadtime and Years of Competitive Rivalry on Market Share Advantages” (1994) 40 Management Science 
1370.
42 Ian Clark Sinapuelas and William T Robinson “Entry for Supermarket Feature Me-too Brands: An Empirical 
Explanation of Incidence and Timing” (2009) 20 Marketing Letters 183, 194.
43 Jan Benedict Steenkamp et al n. 10, 47-48.
44 Ibid, 49 (+44% share).
45 Ibid, 49-50.
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3.3.5 Business strategies
Manufacturers’ brands can still attract high price premiums over own brand goods;46 
accordingly own brand market share is much lower in heavily-advertised product categories47 
and where there is a well-managed promotion strategy.48 Hoch identified six strategic options 
open to a manufacturer brand to respond to an own brand: (1) increase the distance from the 
own brand by offering new and improved products; (2) increase distance from own brand 
through offering “more for the money”; (3) reduce the price gap; (4) formulate a “me too” 
strategy by introducing a value-flanker (meaning a value range); (5) wait and doing nothing; 
or (6) make premium or regular own brand.49 Dutch research suggests that brand leaders do 
not normally use price reductions or value-flankers to address own brand, but rather focus on 
trying to distance their brand from the own brand by way of advertising and product 
innovations.50 This was also found to be the best strategy.51 Additionally (or alternatively) a 
strategy has been suggested that brand owners need to “develop a reputation for aggressively 
pursuing retail copycat violators”.52  
3.4 Potential business harm
There is a range of potential business harm caused by lookalikes proposed in the literature. 
This includes (i) lowering innovation; (ii) wasted rents on packaging changes; (iii) lost sales; 
(iv) loss of brand followers; and (v) an adverse effect on advertising. 
3.4.1 Lower innovation
If manufacturer brands attract lower revenues because of lookalikes this might affect the 
investment that can be made into product development; because such investment might not 
be recoverable through sales.53 Therefore, although in the short term consumers may gain 
from lower prices, they lose out in the long term because of lower product investment. 
46 Ibid, Ch 8. 
47 Ibid,  51-52.
48 Cf Kumar and Steenkamp n. 22, 52.
49 Stephen J Hoch “How should National Brands think about Private Labels?” (1996) 37 Sloan Management 
Review 89.
50 Peter Verhoef, Edwin Nijssen and Laurens Sloot “Strategic Reactions of National Brand Manufacturers 
towards Private Label” (2002) 36 European Journal of Marketing 1309, 1323.
51 Ibid, 1323.
52 Kumar and Steenkamp n. 22, 52.
53 Paul Dobson “The Competition Effects of Look-alike Products” School of Management and Finance Papers 
1998 VIII, 4.
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3.4.2 Packaging wasting costs
There could also be wasted costs caused by the manufacturer brand owners constantly 
changing their packaging to avoid lookalikes.54 The argument is that such changes are 
socially wasteful and manufacturers’ brands are forced into rent-seeking behaviour to stay 
ahead of lookalikes55 what could be terms “over-innovation”.56 There is some evidence in the 
market place of manufacturer brand owners (rent seeking behaviour) changing their 
packaging only for those changes to be followed by competitors. Paul Dobson, in his report, 
notes how Proctor & Gamble’s product Flash was rebranded in 1986, 1992 and 1994 and 
each time the new packaging was followed by competitors soon thereafter.57 Similarly, if one 
examines another Proctor and Gamble product, Head and Shoulders, it appears that similar 
tracking existed. The photographs below show the product in the 1990s (far left), the 2000s 
(middle) and it most recent (right).58 In each case, a change in packaging by the brand leader 
was followed by others in the market place.
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1
3.4.3 Loss of sales
The literature implicitly recognises that the arrival of a lookalike might adversely affect the 
volume sales of the manufacturer brand owner. The data so far has not looked at sales as 
such, but rather things like the prevalence of lookalikes in stores. For example, it has been 
stated that in the United States half of store brands were similar to the brand leader’s 
packaging at least in colour, size and shape,59 and that clear package imitation has occurred 
in one third of seventy-five product categories.60 In relation to the United Kingdom, it was 
estimated by Interbrand in 1998 that lookalikes accounted for 2% of the UK grocery market 
or £1.5billion per year.61 That said, and as outlined in the Introduction and Annex 1, much of 
the research has suffered from imprecise terminology and methodology and, for those 
reasons, presents some limitations and must be viewed with caution. 
54 An additional problem is that retailers need six months’ notice of any change of packaging: Tony Durham, 
Shopper Behaviour: How Choices are Made (Presentation by Proctor & Gamble, Oxford 25th May 2012).
55 Dobson n. 53, 4.
56 Dobson and Yadav, n. 34, 60. 
57 Ibid, 4, fn 3.
58 This is based on Durham n. 54 and the images are taken from the PowerPoint presentation.
59 Fiona Scott-Morton and Florian Zettelmeyer “The Strategic Positioning of Store Brands in Retailer-
manufacturer Negotiations” (2004) 24 Review of Industrial Organization 161, 173-4.
60 Serdar Sayman, Stephen J Hoch and Jagmohan S Raju “Positioning of Store Brands” (2002) 21 Marketing 
Science 378. 
61 Referred to in Paul Dobson n.53; no further source given in the paper to support this figure.
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Implicit in much of the literature is the suggestion that the introduction of lookalikes will lead to 
loss of volume in sales (although it is often expressed in terms of market share).
3.4.4 Loss of brand followers
It has been suggested that lookalikes particularly adversely affect brand followers as the 
lookalike enjoys a particular market advantage. Other brand followers are unable to compete 
fairly and so ultimately are put out of business.62 This could either be due to the inability to 
make the necessary innovations to packaging or product to compete with the own brand or 
alternatively as a result of de-listing (being replaced by the own brand). In due course, the 
failure of brand followers leads to less consumer choice and reduced diversity in the market 
place.
3.4.5 Effects on advertising
Brands invest in their own trade dress to establish and retain strong, favourable and unique 
brand associations to make recognition and recall easier.63 Traditionally, retailers have tended 
to advertise the shop as a whole, concentrating on highlighting particular special offers for 
individual products; it being unusual for retailer to run an advertising campaign for a normally 
priced product category.64 Furthermore, actions addressing the perceived value of a brand 
through advertising and promotions tend to draw customers from rival brands rather than own 
brand.65 However, the retailers advertising could benefit from lookalikes as the retailer can 
free-ride on the brand leader’s advertising. 
3.4.6 Protection of “Investment”
It is arguable that manufacturer brands should be protected so as to protect the investment in 
the brand. It costs a lot of money creating and maintaining brands in terms of market research 
into consumer desires, advertising and promotion of the product, as well as the internal 
development costs of the brand itself. It was estimated that between £1.9 and £3.7billion66 was 
spent in 2006 on this sort of research for the purpose of developing brands.67 Indeed, the 
wider values of brands are now well-recognised in European trade mark law with the 
acknowledgement of the non-origin functions of a trade mark being protected, in particular, as 
the advertising function and the investment function.68 It appears therefore that there has been 
some recognition and acceptance of the role of investment in branding and this might support 
its wider application elsewhere, including as part of the policy rationale for introducing 
mechanisms for protecting that investment.
62 Ibid, 5.
63 Kevin L Keller “Conceptualizing, Measuring and Managing Customer-based Brand Equity” (1993) 57 Journal of 
Marketing 1, 9.
64 However, recently Aldi has changed its tactics and has been running a series of comparative advertisements 
based with the price of the brand leader and then the price of the Aldi product emphasising they are comparable 
but Aldi is cheaper. These adverts are available on http://www.aldi.co.uk/en/entertainment/as-seen-on-tv/.
65 George Baltas, Peter Doyle and Paul Dyson “A Model of Consumer Choice for National v Private Label Brands” 
(1997) Journal of Operational Research Society 988, 993-4. 
66 This does of course show a large scope for the margin of error of the calculations.
67 Peter Urwin et al, Valuing Brands in the UK Economy (British Brands Group 2008), 23.
68 C-487/07 L’Oreal v Bellure [2009] ECR I-5185, [2009] ETMR 55.
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3.5 Consumers and Product Interaction
An important question is why consumers might purchase a lookalike over a branded product 
(or over a distinctive own brand product). There has been a significant amount of research 
into consumer perceptions of packaging in general, some of which can be highlighted. A 
basic view is that by using lookalikes the retailer benefits without incurring the innovation and 
marketing costs.69  According to the British Brands Group, a lookalike can distort consumer 
behaviour in three different ways:70 
a. the consumer can tell the copy from the brand but believes, due to the similar   
 packaging, that both are made by the same manufacturer and come from the same  
 factory;
b. the consumer can distinguish the copy from the brand but believes that the quality  
 is the same or closer to the brand than they would assume were the packaging   
 more different;
c. shoppers not paying full attention may buy the copy in error, mistaking it for the  
 brand (the product in such packaging are normally low value, low engagement   
 purchases).
3.5.1 Familiarity and Contrast
The first principle is that lookalikes reduce consumer doubt or uncertainty about unfamiliar or 
new products as similar packaging will communicate similar features.71 This uncertainty 
clearly plays a central role in consumer choice.72 Feelings of familiarity in consumers arrive 
after their repeated exposure to a product,73 which can in turn lead to a consumer preference 
for that product.74 This would suggest that the familiarity of packaging, even on a different 
(lookalike) product, will lead to more positive feelings towards it and so an increased likelihood 
of purchasing. 
Familiarity: Where consumers are uncertain about a product they look for familiar cues. 
Because lookalikes imitate the look and feel of a leading brand some of those familiar cues 
are recognised. These cues can be transmitted in many different ways, including through 
brand names, price, packaging and advertising.75 
69 Dobson n.53, 3.
70 British Brands Group, Priority Regulatory Outcomes response to LBRO Consultation: Briefing.
71 Dobson n.53, 5.
72 Amna Kirmani and Akshay R Rao “No Pain, No Gain: A Critical Review of the Literature on Signalling 
Unobservable Product Quality” (2000) 64 Journal of Marketing 66, 66; Raanan Lipshitz, and Oma Strauss 
“Copying with Uncertainty: A Naturalistic Decision-making Analysis” (1997) 69 Organizational Behaviour and 
Human Decision Process 149.
73 Robert B Zajonc “Attitudinal Effects of Mere Exposure” (1968) 9 Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 
1, 23-24. 
74 Chris Janiszewski “Preattentive Mere Exposure Effects” (1993) 20 Journal of Consumer Research 376, 390.
75 E.g. Niraj Dawar and Philip Parker “Marketing Universals: Consumers’ Use of Brand Name, Price, Physical 
Appearance, and Retailer Reputation as Signals of Product Quality” (1994) 58 Journal of Marketing 81.
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Contrast: Similar packaging can also evoke contrast feelings, leading consumers to compare 
the characteristics of the brand leader and the lookalike.76 
3.5.2 Interaction with Lookalikes
It was found by van Horen, after conducting a number of experiments, that high similarity 
lookalikes were received less favourably than moderate similarity lookalikes when the brand 
leader was present.77 But where the brand leader was absent, high similarity lookalikes were 
rated higher than less similar products78 as they reduced consumer uncertainty.79 
Themes: Van Horen concluded that imitating abstract themes was far more effective than 
imitating distinctive perceptual features. Accordingly, theme-based lookalikes are better 
received than feature-based ones.80 The research went further and found that it extended to 
evaluation of choice. In other words, consumers were more likely to buy lookalikes which 
copied themes than those which copied features. 
Therefore, the effect of lookalikes is context-dependent. In other words, when consumers are 
fully aware of the differences between the products, familiar packaging in unfamiliar 
surroundings might be desirable for consumers as they can seek out these cues.
Colour and other factors: A number of factors attract consumers to products. One of the 
most important is colour and this example will be used to illustrate the broader issues. Colour 
can attract consumers’ attention and have an impact on the evaluation of products. However, 
some colours are not believed to be acceptable in certain cultures81 and it is possible that 
certain colours can distract from the writing on labels enabling incorrect conclusions to be 
drawn82 and therefore raising the likelihood of mistaken purchases. Nevertheless, it must be 
borne in mind that consumers will only accept a certain range of colours within a particular 
product category, resulting product-specific restrictions on the scope to distinguish.83 There 
are certain colours which have particular common perceptions such as quality or freshness.84 
76 Femke van Horen Breaking the Mould on Copycats: What Makes Product Imitation Strategies Successful (Ph. 
D Thesis, Tilburg University 2010), 22.
77 Femke van Horen and Rik Pieters “When High Similarity Copycats Lose and Moderate Copycats Gain: The 
Impact of Comparative Evaluation” (2011) Journal of Marketing Research 83.
78 Ibid.
79 van Horen n. 76, 116.
80 Ibid, 88.
81 Anthony Grimes and Isobel Doole “Exploring the Relationship Between Colour and International Branding: A 
Cross-Cultural Comparison of the UK and Taiwan” (1998) 14(7) Journal of Marketing Management 799; 
Thomas. J Madden, Kelly Hewett and Martin Roth “Managing Images in Different Cultures: A Cross-National 
Study of Color Meaning and Preferences” (2000) 8(4) Journal of International Marketing 90, 91; Randi P. 
Gossman and Jospeh Wisenbilt “What we know about consumer’s colour choices” (1999) 5(3) Journal of 
Marketing Practice 78.
82 Paula Fitzgerald Bone and Karen Russo France “Packaging graphics and Consumer Product Beliefs” (2001) 
15(3) Journal of Business and Psychology 467, 485-6.
83 Randi P. Gossman and Jospeh Wisenbilt “What we know about consumer’s colour choices” (1999) 5(3) 
Journal of Marketing Practice 78.
84 Olga Ampuero and Natalia Vila “Consumer Perceptions of Product Packaging” (2006) 23(2) Journal of 
Consumer Marketing 100.
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Similar issues arise in relation to aspects of packaging other than colour, such as shape and 
size, the graphics and so forth.85
3.5.3 Identification of “Lookalikes”
Blurring experiments: The factors of packaging identification have been used in studies to 
try and determine similarity of products. For example, Kapferer86 conducted an experiment 
with 45 consumers as subjects, each of whom was shown a sequence of pictures of brand 
leader products and lookalike products. The sequence began with a very blurred photograph 
and as the sequence of 15 photographs continued the photograph became more in focus.87 
He found that consumers tend to identify products first by reference to colour, then by shape, 
then by dominant images and finally by name. Similar sorts of experiment have found similar 
results. 
Heuristic research: In recent years, there has been some research into the heuristics of the 
purchasing decision. It was found by Clement88 that there a number of phases underlie the 
purchasing decision. First, the pre-attention phase where visual impact of the packaging on 
the shelf catches consumers attention. Secondly, the succeeded attention phase where the 
packaging design builds up in the consumers mind – it is the critical phase. Thirdly, the 
tipping point where consumers actually reach out to pick up the product, which is followed by 
the fourth phase the physical action phase which results in the purchase. There then follows 
a post-purchase phase where interactions with the product will assist with the future 
development of each of these phases. This breaking down of the shopping experience into 
phases is a useful way of thinking about lookalikes. For example, it might be suggested that 
lookalikes have a much greater impact in phase one of the process than subsequent phases. 
Others have reported how consumers usually only remember no more than five things about 
a particular product.89 
Mountainview: The importance of phase one was demonstrated by recent research 
conducted by Mountainview90 in which they presented a sample of people with six images of 
similar consumer products. They did this under three conditions. The first condition had a 
brand leader and no own brand brands. The second condition had a brand leader, a lookalike 
and other non-own brands. The third and final condition is where there is a brand leader, a 
lookalike and a distinctive own brand. In each of the three conditions, the participants were 
asked to identify a particular branded product from a group. The reaction times for the first 
and third condition were similar (224 ms and 220 ms), but there was a statistically significant 
difference when the lookalike was also present (233ms). Further, they found that there were 
the most mistakes were made in selection when the lookalike was present (3.8% mistakes) 
compared to where no lookalike was present (1.4 and 1.7%). 
85 See generally, Dobson and Yadav n. 34, [2.2].
86 Jean-Noël Kapferer “The Brand and its Double” (1997) 1 Internationales Markentechnikum 18.
87 This sort of study was thought not to be particularly helpful in United Biscuits v Burton Biscuits [1992] FSR 14, 
22-23 and Laura Ashley Ltd. v. Coloroll Limited [1987] RPC 1, 11.
88 Jesper Clement “Visual Influence on In-Store Buying Decisions: An Eye-tracking experiment on the Visual 
Influence of Packaging Design” (2007) 23(9) Journal of Marketing Management 925-6.
89 Durham n. 54. 
90 Jane Leighton and Geoff Bird, The Effect of Branding of Consumer Choice (Mountainview, 2012).
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This is evidence of lookalikes affecting the processing fluency of consumers – the ease with 
which consumers can find and select the product they want to buy. 
However, at this early stage, an inhibition in a consumer’s processing fluency is unlikely to be 
considered evidence relevant to passing off or trade mark infringement claims. A court is 
likely to be sceptical about this effect as a single purchasing decision taking 10 milliseconds 
longer is not sufficient damage, unfair advantage or detriment (as the case may be) to warrant 
a remedy.91 As the research in this field develops this might change. The other finding by 
Moutainview, namely that a higher number of mistakes were made when a lookalike (in 
contrast to a distinctive own brand) was presented at the same time as a brand leader, is 
useful evidence. The next stage is for this to best tested in a real world environment with the 
products on a real supermarket shelf and consumers making their decisions without extreme 
time pressure. Further research in this field is awaited with interest.
91 Also see Rebecca Tushnet “Gone in Sixty Milliseconds: Trademark Law and Cognitive Science” (2007) 86 
Texas Law Review 507.
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Summary Points Chapter 3
SP 3.1:  Own brand (and lookalikes)
Own brands have lifecycles and lookalikes are most common as these own brands develop 
and enter their later life cycles.
The literature on innovation suggests:
• Own brand is more successful in low innovation product categories;
• Incremental innovation by manufacturer brand owners makes it more difficult 
for own brand to penetrate the market and this fact might be a driver for 
manufacturers to innovation;
• Lost sales due to own brand leads to less money being spent by manufacturers 
on research and development;
• There is little empirical evidence on whether own brand affects innovation; but 
in the food sector it has been found that own brand has had no effect in Europe 
(except in Spain).
Perceived quality  - own brand which is perceived to be of a similar quality to manufacturer 
brands will be more successful.
Business strategies – price premiums can still be maintained by manufacturers where there 
is a well-managed promotional strategy and product innovation.
SP 3.2:  Business harm
The following represents potential business harm which, theoretically, might be caused by 
lookalikes:
• Lowering innovation;
• Wasted rents on packaging changes;
• Brand followers might be pushed out of the market place; 
• Adverse effect on advertising.
Other justifications to prevent lookalikes
• To protect the investment in market research to obtain new consumer insights;
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Literature reviews identifies the following in relation to lookalikes: 
Consumer perceptions
• Reception – in the absence of the brand leader, products that look similar to that 
leader are better received by consumers than those that look distinct;
• Comparison – when a lookalike on the shelf at the same time as the brand 
leader the lookalike might be used for comparison purposes;
• Mistake – the presence of lookalikes will reduce a consumer’s reaction time in 
selecting a product and will (under time pressure and outside the normal shop 
environment) increase the chance of mistaken selection.
Product identification
• Themes being copied is more effective than copying features;
• Cues in relation to colours (and other cues) there is a limited range of things 
which consumers will accept and understand;
• Consumers identify products by reference to cues in descending order: colour; 
shape; dominant images; name.
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Chapter 4:  Existing lookalike 
studies
4.1 Introduction
The subject of lookalikes has been reported or considered as part of various reviews. The 
most recent was that undertaken by Hogan Lovell for the European Commission, but recent 
studies have also been conducted by the European Brands Association (AIM) and MARQUES 
as well as by the International League for Competition Law. At the national level, the issue of 
lookalikes was considered by the Trade and Industry Parliamentary Committee in 1998 and 
as part of the Gowers Review of Intellectual Property in 2006. 
4.2 Hogan Lovells Report
The European Commission commissioned Hogan Lovells to produce a report on the issue of 
lookalikes, which was published 13 January 2012.1 It was intended to provide an in-depth 
comparative legal assessment of the legal protection against “parasitic copying” under the 
laws of the various Member States of the European Union.2 The report contained two 
elements: first, direct enquiries of lawyers in each of the Member States; and secondly, a 
literature review.3 The enquiries involved two questionnaire-based surveys and a second 
survey on the implementation of the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive (2005/29) 
(UCPD).4 The study also included a more in-depth case study of six Member States 
(Bulgaria, Germany, Italy, Spain, Sweden and the UK).5
The study concluded that “All Member States offer some form of protection [against 
lookalikes], even though the scope of the rights granted…differ”.6 Indeed, it concluded that 
the present legal frameworks appear to lead to different results in different countries7 and 
so the general effectiveness of the laws was questioned.8 The report noted that trade mark 
law and design law have been harmonised across the EU and concluded that the continuing 
different approaches to lookalikes in Member States might relate to how the issue was best 
dealt with historically.9 It also found that in some Member States’ consumer protection laws 
could be used to prevent lookalikes10 and that the UCPD appears to have improved the 
situation in some Member States in relation to lookalikes.11
1 MARKT/2010/20/D.
2 Final Report (MARKT/2010/20/D), [2 and 3].
3 This was merely a list of relevant literature.
4 Ibid, [20 and 21].
5 The reasons for selection of these countries are explained in Ibid, [31 to 32].
6 Ibid, [11] and [42].
7 Ibid, [106].
8 Ibid, [11].
9 Ibid, [16].
10 Ibid, [15].
11 Ibid, [19].
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The study found that in most Member States the primary means of preventing lookalikes is 
unfair competition law12 (the exception being the UK13), but there was a divergence between 
Member States as to what “contrary to honest practices” means in terms of their unfair 
competition law.14 Some Member States distinguish between classic and parasitic unfair 
competition and it appears that the majority have taken lookalikes to be covered by the 
UCPD.15 Nevertheless, other Member States took the view that the UCPD was intended to 
benefit consumers and so Member States were free to enact laws to prevent lookalikes, but 
most Member States have not done so.16
The questionnaire to the lawyers included: “Does the law of your Member State provide 
specific legislative provisions to protect against parasitic copying.” However, problematically 
there was no definition agreed of what amounts to “parasitic copying” when the questions 
were asked and so respondents were essentially answering the question based on their own 
understanding of this term leading to potential variations (e.g., some might think origin 
confusion important, others might not). 
The problems identified with establishing a claim based on lookalikes (parasitic copying) 
were examined in more detail in relation to certain countries.17 The report concluded there 
can be problems with proving that products or packaging are distinctive, proving confusion 
as to commercial origin, and establishing that there has been an imitation of the original 
product.18 The respondents were asked to apply their law to certain examples (case studies 
as it were). Each country came to a different conclusion as to whether a particular example 
was a lookalike or not.19 Thus the different requirements in each country necessarily produce 
different results. This case study is probably the best indication to participants of what was 
within the scope of the term “parasitic copy” (lookalike).
4.3 The European Brands Association (AIM)
The European Brands Association (AIM) conducted its own review of the laws relating to 
lookalikes across its member countries.20 The report includes a table setting out whether 
there is a law against “parasitic copying”, whether it is useful or effective for brand owners, 
and how participants rate the country for an appreciation of the problem. There is no synthesis 
of the results. The responses vary in quality with some countries saying little or nothing 
(Estonia and Luxembourg) and others providing extensive information (the UK and Italy). 
12 Ibid, [46 et seq].
13 Ibid, [44].
14 Ibid, [49] and necessarily Article 10bis of the Paris Convention.
15 Ibid, [57].
16 Ibid, [109].
17 Ibid, Bulgaria, [88 to 88.6], Germany [89 to 89.9], Italy [90 to 90.4], Spain [91 to 91.8], Sweden [92 to 92.5] 
and the United Kingdom [93 to 93.4].
18 Ibid, [87].
19 Ibid, [95].
20 September 2010.
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4.4 MARQUES 
The MARQUES Unfair Competition team conducted their own survey on lookalikes.21 This 
involved questionnaires being sent to representatives from each of the countries represented 
in MARQUES. Those questionnaires asked things such as whether trade dress can be 
proprietary and, if so, the scope and how such rights can be obtained. It also asked some 
interesting questions such as whether “quality difference” is an issue, whether the presence 
of a different trade mark on the packaging affects the result, the admissible evidence, and 
cost of pursuing the claim. There was also a question on the size of the problem of “lookalikes” 
in the country. The answers to this last question varied in quality and clarity, but it is apparent 
that the problem is perceived to be a bigger issue in some countries than others. There was 
no synthesis of the results however.
4.5 International League for Competition Law 
(LIDC)
In 2009, LIDC and its national reporters22 answered a series of questions: “What are the 
criteria that determining the unfairness of so-called ‘look-alikes?’”; “What are the prohibitions 
and appropriate sanctions?”. The report began by acknowledging the difficulties with defining 
a lookalike23 and then continued with a report on the various countries. The report identified 
the distinction between confusion and parasitism which exists in some jurisdictions.24 The 
reporters confirmed that a basic freedom to trade is provided in France, Luxembourg, 
Sweden, Lithuania, Czech Republic, Spain, China, Austria, Germany, Belgium, the UK, 
Japan, Italy and Switzerland (Lithuania and Latvia did not).25 
The reports all said the chances of success will depend on the facts of the case. Many 
mentioned an established law of unfair competition, but only in Germany was it reported that 
there was a long history of cases relating to lookalikes.26 However, Sweden, Lithuania, the 
UK, Japan and Estonia all reported that usually lookalikes cannot be prevented by reliance 
on unfair competition laws (passing off) alone.27
There are three aspects which recur in the reports on preventing lookalikes: (i) the requirement 
to establish reputation, (ii) the requirement of distinctiveness; and (iii) the defendant’s 
activities enabling “cost saving”.28 For parasitism, where such an action is available, the 
important factors are the economic value in being able to copy, the distinctiveness of the 
21 MARQUES, Protection and Infringement of Look-alikes (Complied by Paul Steinhauser and Till E Lampel) 
(August 2011). 
22 The report was prepared by Hon Prof Dr Guido Kucsko: International Report for Question B: What are the 
criteria that determine the unfairness of so-called lookalikes; what are the prohibitions and appropriate 
sanctions (LIDC 2009).
23  Ibid, p.[Section II]
24  Ibid, [1.1.2].
25  Ibid, [1.3.1].
26  Ibid, [2.2.2].
27  Ibid, [2.2.3].
28  Ibid, [4.1.4].
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trade dress, and the degree of familiarity.29
4.6 Trade and Industry Select Committee, 
House of Commons
In 1998 the Trade and Industry Select Committee of the House of Commons reported on the 
issue of lookalikes (as well as some other branding issues).30 The Committee considered a 
lookalike to be a product that was so close to a [manufacturer] branded product that it calls 
the [manufacturer] branded product to mind.31 The committee took evidence from both 
manufacturer brand owners (in particular the British Brands Group), from retailers (such as 
Tesco and ASDA), and from third party manufacturers (such as McBride). The committee 
heard the conflicting views, with the British Brands Group stating lookalikes “ride off the 
innovation, investment, effort, risk and reputation of the brand,”32 and Tesco saying they 
“indicate to consumers that there is a competing (and cheaper) product of the same quality 
as the manufacturer’s brand”.33 The Committee noted that the alleged problem lay in the test 
for confusion, with lookalikes calling to mind the brand product and riding on its marketing 
achievement without falling foul of the law.34 
The Government submission took the view that further legislation is not appropriate.35 The 
Chartered Institute of Patent Agents (CIPA)36 believed the terms “get up” and “brands” were 
too imprecise37 and the Institute of Trade Mark Attorneys (ITMA) took a very strong line 
against giving protection against lookalikes.38 The Committee concluded:
 “we are not convinced that the law is deficient in this area; the simple fact is that, whatever 
the law, brand owners would be understandably reluctant to start legal proceedings 
against the supermarkets who are their largest customers.”39
29  Ibid, [4.4].
30  Trade and Industry Committee (Eighth Report), Trade Marks, Fakes and Consumers (1998-9 Session), HC 
Paper 380. 
31  Ibid, [30].
32  Ibid, Ev, 3.
33  Ibid, Ev, 24.
34  Ibid, [32].
35  Ibid, Ev, 146.
36  Now the Chartered Institute of Patent Attorneys (CIPA).
37  Ibid, Ev, 85.
38  Ibid, Ex 179 to 181.
39  Ibid, [36].
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4.7 HM Treasury: Gowers Review of Intellectual 
Property
In 2006, the Gowers Review of Intellectual Property40 received submissions on the issue of 
lookalikes (it called them “copycats”). The Review cited figures from some available 
research41 and took the view on the evidence submitted that passing off was insufficient, 
stating the following:42
 “…the Review believes that passing off does not go far enough to protect many brands and 
designs from misappropriation for the following reasons:
• if copycats appear on the market before the [claimant]43 has built up goodwill in a 
certain appearance, the brand owner cannot rely on the law of passing off. This may 
prevent new entrants from adequately protecting the appearance of their products; 
and
• it is difficult to demonstrate consumer confusion in court and substantial evidence may 
be required to bring a successful passing off action.
This is often especially relevant to small designers who are at risk of their designs being 
copied before they are able to establish a reputation in the marketplace.”
At the time Gowers reported, the UCPD44 had not been implemented45 and so the Review 
recommended that the government should monitor the effect of the current law and the 
Directive and take further action if the situation is found still to be ineffective.46 This response 
was criticised by some commentators for largely reflecting the same “wait-and-see” approach 
that had been taken when the Trade Marks Act 1994 had been adopted.47 Such criticism 
argued that wait-and-see had been used as a strategy for “too long”.
40 (HM Treasury 2006).
41 Fighting Private Label (Business Insights, 2005); Jean Noël Kapferer “Stealing Brand Equity: Measuring 
Perceptual Confusion Between National Brands and ‘Copycat’ Own-Label Products” (1995) Marketing and 
Research Today 96 and the Consumer Associations 1998 study (this study is described below at paragraph 
[5.3.5]). These were all provided by the British Brands Group.
42 HM Treasury n. 40, [5.84 and 5.85].
43 The Review says “Defendant” but this is clearly an error and should read Claimant.
44 Directive 2005/29/EC.
45 Now implemented by the Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations 2008 (SI 2008/1277).
46 Recommendation 37.
47 Christopher Morcom QC “Gowers: A Glimmer of Hope for UK Compliance with Article 10bis of the Paris 
Convention” [2007] European Intellectual Property Review 125, 126.
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Chapter 5:  Previous Surveys
5.1 Introduction
There have been a large number of reports published outlining different consumer perceptions 
related to lookalikes. Some of these surveys have been reported without any details of 
methodology1 or questions, but in respect of others the methodology and questions have 
been made available. Where a survey does not include its methodology then the assessment 
of its value is more difficult than when full methodology is provided. This is why the two types 
of survey have been separated. This section will consider the findings of those surveys to 
date.
5.2 Surveys with no published methodology
5.2.1 Europanel – Reported in The Independent on 
Sunday 20 February 1994 
Europanel interviewed 2,000 “housewives” asking about their perceptions of own brand. A 
snapshot of the results was published in the Independent on Sunday.2 It reported that of the 
shoppers at ASDA, 4% thought its own brand was better, 75% of shoppers thought its own 
brand was as good and 21% thought it was worse. At Gateway,3 2% thought own brand was 
better, 67% thought it was as good and 31% thought it was worse. In relation to Sainsbury, 
7% thought own brand was better, 78% thought it was the same and 15% thought it was 
worse. This study was not considering packaging at all, but rather own brand generally (and 
so the report relates to both own brand and lookalike). However, it does appear to suggest 
that as far back as 1994 upwards of two-thirds of shoppers thought that own brand goods are 
at least as good as those of manufacturers. 
5.2.2 Consumer Association 1994
In December 1993, the Consumer Association conducted a survey of 681 shoppers at the 
checkouts of Safeway,4 Sainsbury and Tesco. A summary of the results was published in 
their magazine Which?5 The survey found that of the shoppers interviewed 3% had a 
lookalike (or the branded product it represented) in their shopping baskets, rather than the 
product they intended. In total, 12.5% of those interviewed had bought a product they had not 
intended to purchase in the last six months because they thought it was something else. 
1 These tend to those carried out early on and it is assumed result from the debates occurring in relation to 
lookalikes during the passage of the Trade Marks Act 1994.
2 Patrick Husking “Inside Story: Superstores Stalk the Superbrands” Independent on Sunday, 20th February 
1994.
3 Gateway became Somerfield, which was eventually taken over by The Co-operative in 2009.
4 Now Morrisons.
5 “Public Interest Own Brands: Lookalikes” Which? Magazine March 1995, 30-31.
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Furthermore, only 13% of those people interviewed found the packaging of the lookalike and 
the manufacturer’s branded product confusing and only 11% would not have been “particularly 
bothered” by the fact they mistakenly bought a lookalike. 
In relation to consumer attitudes, it appeared that 20% disapproved of supermarkets 
producing products which look like well-known brands. As to quality, 37% thought the 
manufacturers’ brands were of a better quality than lookalikes, while only 7% thought the 
lookalike was better. As to price, 59% thought most brands were more expensive than 
lookalikes and 2% thought it was the reverse. As to value for money, 33% thought that 
lookalike products were better value for money whereas 20% thought that manufacturer 
branded products were better value.
5.2.3 British Retail Consortium 19946
On April 13 1994, a poll was conducted by MORI7 for the British Retail Consortium with 514 
shoppers polled over 21 locations. Of those surveyed 69% regularly purchased own brand 
goods and 2% purchased only own brand. The reasons given by consumers for purchasing 
own brand were that they were cheaper (42% strongly agree), they were better value for 
money (33% agree) or they were equivalent to the manufacturer’s brand (26% agree).
The survey found that 79% of shoppers denied ever being confused by retailers’ own brands 
as being equivalent to a manufacturer’s brand (and 21% have been confused). Further, 51% 
of consumers reported that they found it helpful to have similar packaging to identify own 
brand alternatives; and 59% said such packaging helped for price comparisons between own 
label and branded products.
Less than 20%8 of consumers strongly agreed that they bought own brand because of the 
similarly of packaging, whereas 21% strongly agreed that they bought own brand because 
they believed it is mostly made by well-known manufacturers. The methodology is not clear, 
but it is presumed that the questions were asked with options of “Agree” and “Strongly Agree”. 
The figures presently only set out those who “Strongly Agree” and so it is possible that others 
(or even many others) said that they “Agree” with some of these conclusions.  
5.2.4 Which? 2013
In February 2013, Which? conducted a survey of 2,244 of its Members.9 They found that 
20% of participants had purchased a lookalike believing it to be a manufacturer brand owner’s 
product at least once. Of those who had mistakenly purchased the lookalike product, 38% 
were annoyed by the fact and 30% felt misled. The survey further found that 18% of 
participants had deliberately purchased an own brand product because it resembled a 
branded product. The report found that of those 18%, 60% had made the purchase because 
6 Supermarketing “Quarrel over Brands vs Own-label Hots Up” (22nd April 1994), 5. 
7 The only document available is British Retail Consortium “Summary of Result of the MORI Research 
Commissioned by the British Retail Consortium.”
8 There is no indication of anything more precise, but it is likely the figure was close to 20%.
9 “Spot the Difference: Big Brand or Supermarket Equivalent?”  (2013) Which Magazine May 2013, 22.
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it was cheaper while 59% wanted to test to see whether it was as good as the branded 
product.  
The report then asked selected participants to source four manufacturer brand owner’s 
products alongside the lookalikes. The name of the products was removed and the participants 
were asked to identify which was the manufacturer brand. The results were as follows:
Products Compared Identified manufacturer branded product Identified lookalike
Jacob’s Cream Crackers / 
Aldi’s Savour Bake Creams 50% 43%
Head and Shoulders / Boots 
Anti-Dandruff 84% 7%
Sarson’s Malt Vinegar / 
Lidl’s Samson Malt Vinegar 50% 40%
Herbal Essence / Boots 
Fruit Essence 64% 13%
Those who did not know the answer were excluded.
These results demonstrate that in at least two of products the packaging, without the products 
name, were similar enough to mean that approximately half of consumers would not know 
the difference. In respect of the other two products the results were less conclusive. This 
demonstrates, at least, that packaging is similar between certain own brand products and 
manufacturer own brand products. It also might indicate how important product names (trade 
marks) are to purchasing decisions.
This part of the survey involved participants who were self-selecting and so, it might be said, 
they do not necessarily represent a cross-section of society. This might suggest the results 
found were higher than in the population as a whole. Conversely, it might be said that, as 
readers of Which?, the participants are the more aware of consumer issues and so are less 
likely to be confused. Accordingly, the result may be lower than the population as a whole. In 
the absence of information regarding the tested population it is not possible to determine 
which of these outcomes is the most likely.
A second part of the survey asked 20 participants (no details are provided as to their selection) 
to take a blind taste test of three pairs of products. This found that in relation to Oat Biscuits 
70% preferred the taste of McVitie’s Hobnobs over 30% preferring Alidi’s Oaties. And 85% 
preferred the taste of Monster Munch (Pickled Onion flavour) to Asda’s Beastie Bites at 15%. 
However, in relation to Pringles Original 45% preferred the original to 55% preferring Tesco’s 
Chipz Original. Thus, in some cases, a consumer mistakenly buying the wrong product might 
get what they view as inferior and in others it might be the converse. “
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5.3 Surveys with published methodology
5.3.1 Methodology testing
Where the methodology used to conduct a survey is apparent from the literature, it is 
appropriate to assess the quality of the survey. The pitfalls that can occur from poorly 
conducted surveys have been explained numerous times by the courts and, by way of 
guidance to best practice, the rules adopted by the English courts10 for admissibility and 
weight of surveys11 are set out below:
1. The number of surveys carried out (if there was more than one) must be recorded and 
disclosed;
2. The number of people questioned must be recorded and disclosed;
3. The totality of all answers must be disclosed;
4. The questions should not be leading;
5. The questions should not lead the person questioned into a field of speculation upon 
which they would not have embarked had the question not been put;
6. The exact answers must be recorded and disclosed (and not abbreviations);
7. Any coding must be accurately carried out and the methods disclosed, but this coding 
should not take place on the spot; and
8. The instructions given and the way the interviews were carried out must be disclosed.
The surveys considered below cannot be expected to meet these high standards. Indeed, in 
many respects, it would be unnecessary for them to do so considering the different purposes 
they serve and the fact there is no subsequent cross-examination. However, some of these 
factors will be applied to demonstrate where a survey has a particular strength or weakness.
10 This practice is now confirmed as applicable during proceedings at the Intellectual Property Office as well: see 
Tribunal Practice Notice (2/2012).
11 See Imperial Group plc v Philip Morris Ltd [1984] RPC 293, 302–3; also see Scott Ltd v Nice-Pak Products 
Ltd [1988] FSR 125, 133. The Court of Appeal recently endorsed this standard in Marks and Spencer v 
Interflora [2012] EWCA Civ 1501.
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5.3.2 NOP Consumer Market Research – For Reed 
Business Publishing – February 1994
Between 25 and 27 February 1994, on behalf of Reed Business Publishing, NOP Consumer 
Research interviewed 1004 people who were 15 years and older. The survey asked two 
questions. 
The first question asked how often the person buys “supermarkets’ own brand grocery 
products.” Of those who responded: 44% always or often bought own brand products; 41% 
occasionally bought own brand products; and 14% never bought such products. 
The second question was: “in your opinion is the packaging of the supermarkets’ own brands 
so similar to the branded alternatives that you find you confuse the two or not?” In the results, 
19% of the interviews answered yes. It is important to note that the question is clearly leading 
and did not present a range of options (only yes and no). The value of the survey is therefore 
greatly diminished; notwithstanding most respondents went against the lead of the question.
5.3.3 NOP Consumer Market Research – For Mars - 
April 1994
Between 15-17 April 1995, NOP Consumer Market Research interviewed 1008 people who 
were 15 years and over12 on behalf of Mars. Of those interviewed 92% had bought own 
brand products regularly or sometimes.13 The survey went on to ask whether the participant 
had ever picked up a product in the shop they did not intend to buy. The results were 42% of 
participants said that they had done so and 21% had actually purchased the wrong product. 
The reasons given for picking up the wrong product include, in relation to the products: were 
the same colour (28%); were the same or similar shaper (13%); looked the same or similar 
(30%); had a similar product design (22%); were on the same/similar shelf in the store (7%); 
or unintended product was a supermarket own brand version (4%). The methodology for 
eliciting this reply was an open question: “What was it about the brand that caused this?” The 
opening question on this issue did not put a time frame for when the mistaken purchase was 
made (e.g. was it in the last six weeks, six months, six years or ever?) and so it could be that 
the issue is now purely historic. In contrast, the free response questions regarding the 
reasons for this confusion are particularly useful.
The survey went on to ask how important the participants thought it was for products from 
various manufacturers to look distinct. In relation to the interview population as a whole, 67% 
thought it was important that the packaging should be distinct; however, amongst those who 
had picked up the wrong product this figure went up14 to 86%.15 
An open question was also asked: “Who do you think makes own brand products for the 
12 NOP/42729.
13 The options were “Regularly”, “Sometimes”, “Never” and “Don’t Know”.
14 Strangely, of those who bought the product, the figure goes down to 85%.
15 The options were “Very important”, “Fairly important”, Fairly unimportant”, “Very unimportant” and “Don’t 
Know”.
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supermarket?” No options were presented, but interviewees’ responses were coded. The 
responses suggest that 41% of interviewees thought that own brands were made by 
manufacturer brand owners; 14% thought they were made by other manufacturers; 18% 
thought they were made by retailers themselves; and 31% did not know. Where a participant 
indicated that they believed that the manufacturer brand owner made the own brand goods,16 
a follow-up question was asked enquiring why they had this belief. This was reported with 
17% indicating it was because they believed it had a similar taste or performed similarly and 
11% said it was because of the same or similar packaging with a further 8% saying simply 
that it looked the same.
5.3.4 NOP Solutions 1997
NOP Solutions conducted a survey of 996 people between 28 February and 2 March 1997 
and asked two questions relating to lookalikes. The first question asked“…if you see an own-
label product in a supermarket with a design very similar to the product you normally buy, 
would you assume that the branded company had made it for the supermarket, or not?”. This 
is clearly a leading question nevertheless the result was the same as in the previous survey17 
in that 41% of interviewees thought that own brand was made by the manufacturer of the 
similar looking brand. The second question was “have you, personally, ever been in a 
supermarket and bought a product believing it to be a branded product, only to discover later 
that it is the supermarket’s own-label brand?” Results were 17% of interviewees said that 
they had mistakenly bought a product. In addition to being a leading question, the survey did 
not determine when the similar product had been purchased (the last week, the last six 
months or ever) or why they believed they made the mistake (e.g., was it similar packaging? 
shelf-placing? similar taste? etc). In comparison to the earlier survey conducted for Mars, the 
methodology of this later NOP survey is less robust. 
5.3.5 Consumer Association 1998
In 1998 the Consumer Association commissioned RSL to survey consumers during February 
and March 1998.18 The survey looked for consumer mistakes relating to lookalikes and, in 
particular, four types of mistake: first, where the supermarket’s own brand was mistaken for 
the manufacturers’ brand; secondly, where the manufacturer’s brand was mistaken for the 
supermarket own label products; thirdly, where the wrong variant of a product is selected 
(e.g., the low-fat version of a product instead of the regular variety); and fourthly where 
completely the wrong product is selected.19
Mistaken purchases: Of those interviewed, 27% had selected the wrong item off the shelf 
once in the last six months. Of that sample, 35% had taken the own brand instead of the 
manufacturer’s brand (representing 9% of shoppers overall); 29% had taken the wrong 
variant of a product (representing just under 8% of shoppers overall); and 13% had taken 
16 A (weighted) 412 interviewees.
17 NOP Consumer Market Research – For Mars - April 1994, see paragraph [5.3.3].
18 Consumer Association Confusion in the Supermarket? (1998); presented at Consumer Reactions and 
Attitudes, 24th April 1998.
19 Ibid, 7.
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completely the wrong product (representing 3% of shoppers overall).20 The survey found 
variations with certain classes of shopper reporting a greater number of mistakes in relation 
to certain products. 
In relation to the consumers who mistakenly picked up the wrong product, 63% said the 
mistake was related to the packaging in some way. Of all consumers who mistakenly picked 
up the wrong products, the reasons given for the mistake (and more than one could be given) 
were 59% colour, 27% shape, 23% size, 11% name and 37% shelf location.21
Reactions to mistake: Where consumers noticed the mistake between taking the product 
from the shelf and arriving at the checkout, 96% returned the product and 88% replaced it 
with what they had intended to buy. Further, where the mistake was noticed at the checkout 
47% did not buy the product. The survey went on to try and identify what was perceived to be 
consumer detriment. It did this by looking at those who picked up or bought the wrong 
product. Of those people, 30% were bothered a little by picking up that product and 19% 
were bothered a lot. The reasons for this included: preferring the usual brand (17%); feeling 
irritated, cross or annoyed (17%); felt tricked or conned (13%); did not want it (12%); own 
fault (7%); and price difference (7%).22 Conversely 29% were not bothered very much about 
their mistake and 21% were not bothered at all. The reasons for this included: it not being 
important (33%); the buyer’s own fault (13%); used product anyway (13%); the product is the 
same or just as good (12%); and managed to correct the problem before purchase (5%).23
Attitudes to packaging: The survey also investigated certain consumer attitudes to 
packaging. Results were 71% of participants thought that packaging should look different 
between products and 75% said that similar packaging might be confusing. Conversely, 58% 
expected packaging to be similar with 29% suggesting it is useful as it indicates that it is the 
well-known brand with 39% thinking it helps because the supermarket brand is just as good 
as the well-known brand.24 As the Consumer Association made clear,25 this might suggest 
that there is a fine line between the useful “signals” from an own brand and being too close 
so as to be confusing.
Quality: The survey then looked at the similarity of packaging and the perceived quality. Five 
products were used for the comparison and consumers were asked to state whether the 
products were similar and then to assess whether the perceived quality of the manufacturer’s 
brand was better, the own brand was the better quality or they were of the same quality.26
20 Ibid, 8-9.
21 Ibid, 9.
22 Ibid, 11-13.
23 Ibid, 11-13.
24 Ibid, 15.
25 Ibid, 15.
26 Ibid, 17-18.
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Branded 
Product
Own brand Perceived 
Similarity
(Similar/Not 
similar)27
Quality
(Manufacturer 
brand better /
same / own 
brand better)28
Value for 
money
(Manufacturer 
brand better /
same / own 
brand better)29
Origin
(Same 
company /
Different 
company)30
Kellogg’s 
Crunchy Nut 
Cornflakes
Tesco Honey 
Nut Cornflakes
82 / 18 51 / 31 / 10 32 / 20 / 37 42 / 49
Nescafé Fine 
Blend Coffee
Sainsbury Full 
Roast Coffee
82 / 17 53 / 29 / 10 33 / 20 / 36 44 / 46
Jif Cream 
Cleaner Lemon
ASDA Farm 
Store Cream 
Cleaner
38 / 62 64 / 9 / 21 45 / 15 / 31 30 / 59
Sensodyne 
Mint 
Toothpaste
Tesco 
Toothpaste for 
Sensitive Teeth
71 / 29 39 / 37 / 12 25 / 22 / 38 50 / 38
Comfort Vitality 
Fabric 
Conditioner 
Lemon
ASDA Silk 
Fabric 
Conditioner
84 / 16 46 / 36 / 9 31 / 19 / 38 52 / 38
27282930 
All the products, except the Jif Cream/ASDA Farm store, were selected because they were 
believed to have similar packaging. Jif Cream/ASDA Farm Cream were selected as a 
“control”. This led the Consumer Association to reach certain conclusions. First, in relation to 
the cleaner and fabric conditioner there was a relationship between perceptions of similarity 
and quality; and consumers who thought the packaging similar were more likely to rate the 
two brands as the same quality.31 In relation to cereals and coffee there was no significant 
relationship between the similarity of packaging and perceived value for money; whereas for 
the other products where the packaging was similar, consumers were more likely to think the 
own brand was better value for money. For all the brands, where people thought the packaging 
of the products was similar they were more likely to think they had the same manufacturer.
Review of this survey: The survey and its methodology were reviewed by Alan Wicken on 
behalf of the British Brands Group.32 The review was largely positive, highlighting the fact 
that it was a nationally representative study and that it used a control product (the Jif Lemon). 
Nevertheless, Wicken made two significant criticisms. First, the survey did not look at brand-
to-brand lookalikes (brand leader to brand follower), rather it considered only brand-to-own-
brand lookalikes. This might lead to an underestimate of the number of mistaken consumer 
purchases. Secondly, a question could have been asked, but was not, about how respondents 
27 The scale used was “Very Similar, Similar, Not very similar, not at all similar”. 
28 The scale used was “Supermarket much better”, “Supermarket a little better”, “Same”, “Brand a little better” 
and “brand much better”.
29 The scale used was “Supermarket much better”, “Supermarket a little better”, “Same”, “Brand a little better” 
and “brand much better”.
30 The scale used was “Definitely made by same company”, “Probably made by same company”, “Probably not 
by same company”, “definitely not made by same company”.
31 Consumer Association n. 18,14.
32 Alan Wicken Review of Research into Lookalikes (commissioned by the Consumers’ Association) (May 1998).
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would feel about packaging which incorrectly suggest a connection between the brand leader 
and the own brand.33 These criticisms are certainly valid although it is clear the review was 
extracting findings from the Consumer Association’s survey to support the British Brands 
Group’s position.
5.3.6 RSGB Survey for the BBG 1998
The RSGB Study34 consisted of three separate surveys covering approximately 1,300 
participants (total sample size 3,994 individuals). Each survey was conducted on different 
occasions during January and February 1998, as part of RSGB’s General Omnibus Survey. 
Each survey was divided into two groups: the first group was shown pictures of three pairs of 
products; and the second group had those products described to them. They were then 
asked a series of questions.
First, participants were asked about the perceived similarity between the paired products: 
one product being chosen as being very similar; one as being quite similar; and one as being 
quite different. The participants were then asked whether they would mistakenly buy the 
lookalike rather than the branded product; whether they thought the lookalike was made by 
the same manufacturer as the branded product; and whether they believed the owner of the 
lookalike brand had a commercial agreement with the branded product. The results were as 
follows:
Branded product Lookalike Perceived 
Similarity 
(Average aspects 
of similarity 
mentioned)
Oral Confusion 
(“Mistake” / 
“Made By” and 
“Agreement”)
Visual Confusion 
(“Mistake” / “Made 
By” and 
“Agreement”)
Gillette Deodorant 
“Pacific Light”
Blueprint 
Deodorant 
“Tradewind”
90% (2.27) 10% / 13% / 21% 42% / 32% / 34%
Bailey’s Irish 
Whiskey Liquor
ASDA’s Irish 
Whiskey Liqueur 
County Cream
71% (1.87)5 - -
Pantene Pro-V Superdrug’s 
“Vitamin Active”
6% (0.42) 11% / 21% /30% 5% / 17% / 23%
The survey concluded that a person was eight times more likely to purchase a lookalike 
product where it had similar packaging to the branded product. Furthermore, consumers 
thought it twice as likely that the most similar pair came from the same manufacturer as the 
distinctively packaged pair. Similarly, consumers were more likely to think a commercial 
agreement exists where the packaging is similar, rather than distinct. It was also said that 
confusion was lower where photographs of distinctive products were shown to them. 
33 Ibid, 4.
34 RSGB, Study of Lookalikes: Summary Report (Prepared for British Brands Group) March 1998 (JN 
0904/0808/0809).
52
Impact of Lookalikes
Review of this part of the survey: The survey had some shortcomings. First, it could have 
dealt with not just similarity as an abstract, but going further to investigate and clarify whether 
it was the colour, the packaging shape, the imagery, the name or some other factor which 
made it similar. The second part of the survey is more problematic. The first question asked 
was leading. It went no further than determining whether the two packages are confusing 
(“mistakenly purchased”) and it clearly led interviewees into fields of speculation they might 
not otherwise enter. Similarly, the second question leads by asking: “Would you say [Vitamin 
Active] is made by the people who make [Pantene]?” Again this could have been asked in a 
non-leading way. Similar objections could be made against the third question as well.  
Other results: There were two other results set out in the survey, but no methodology was 
included. The first result was 59% consumers said they would prefer distinctive packaging as 
opposed to similar packaging; and 67% said they would be annoyed if a product’s packaging 
suggested that a product was connected with a long-established brand when this is not the 
case. 
5.3.7 Don Edwards & Associates for BBG 2009
The survey conducted by Don Edwards & Associates on behalf of the British Brands Group 
had two parts. Between 8 and 14 January 2009 a series of face-to-face interviews were 
conducted with 1,199 grocery shoppers over the age of 16. Additionally, between 8 January 
to 1 February 2009 an online survey was conducted with between 920 and 946 grocery 
shoppers aged between 16 and 64.
Face-to-face: statements: The face-to-face survey asked respondents to express their 
attitude35 to the following statements: (i) it can be confusing or misleading when the packaging 
of two grocery shopping items look similar (64% strongly agreed or agreed); (ii) I have been 
confused or misled by the packaging of two grocery shopping items which look similar (38% 
strongly agreed or agreed); (iii) I have accidently bought the wrong grocery shopping item 
because the packaging design was similar to the item I wanted (32% strongly agreed or 
agreed); and (iv) it would concern me if the packaging of a grocery item suggested that the 
item is connected to a long established make or brand when it is not (66% strongly agreed or 
agreed).
The questions present some interesting results although the statements themselves do beg 
additional questions. At the outset it is clear the results are unnecessarily leading. That aside, 
where the packaging is “confusing or misleading” or the consumer has been “confused or 
misled” nothing goes further to determine what caused the confusion or related to the 
consumer being misled (i.e., there is no information as to whether it was  origin, consistency, 
price, quality, value for money or something else). The third statement asks about a specific 
problem without investigating the general problem first, in that it is important to know how 
many mistaken purchases were made overall (and not just those where the purchase relates 
to the similarity of the packaging). The fourth statement does not distinguish adequately the 
35 Each question had the following four options “Strongly agree”, “agree”, “neither agree nor disagree”, “disagree” 
and “strongly agree”.
Impact of Lookalikes 
53
level of similarity about which consumers are being asked (between counterfeits, confusing 
similar packaging and lookalikes). 
Face to face: Product questions: The second part of the face-to-face interview involved the 
participants being shown four products: two butter substitutes, Buttery Gold and You’d Butter 
Believe It (the latter perceived as a lookalike of “I Can’t Believe it’s not Butter”); and two 
washing powders, Ultima and Sherry’s (the latter perceived as a lookalike of Bold). The 
participants were then asked when looking at the picture of the product whether another 
grocery product was brought to mind. The approach is certainly sound.
Butter: in relation to Buttery Gold (the control), 47% said it did not remind them of any 
other products; 26% of respondents mentioned Utterly Butterly; 5% mentioned I Can’t 
Believe It’s Not Butter; and 7% mentioned assorted other brands. For You’d Butter Believe 
It (the lookalike): 37% said it did not remind them of any other product; 33% said it 
reminded them of I Can’t Believe It’s Not Butter; 16% said it reminded them of Utterly 
Butterly; other brands were mentioned but none were significant. The alternative answers 
are interesting in that Buttery Gold (the control) still reminded 26% of another brand 
(Utterly Butterly). 
Washing Powder: in relation to Ultima (the control): 91% said it did not remind them of any 
other product; 3% said it reminded them of Aerial; and other brands were mentioned but 
none significant. For Sherry’s (the lookalike): 41% said it did not remind them of any other 
product; 33% said it reminded them of Bold; 10% said it reminded them of Aerial; 4% said 
Persil: and finally two other brands were mentioned. 
Perceptions about the product: The second half of the survey used ten products with a 
lookalikes and “control” and a series of questions were asked. The first question asked 
whether the branded product/lookalike/control were made by the same manufacturer. Across 
all products, lookalikes and controls, a little under 39% of interviewees thought that the 
manufacturer of the branded product was the same (a little under 31% for the control; 46.5% 
for the lookalike). The second question asked about the similarity between the branded 
product and the lookalike/control. When participants said that a product was similar a fourth 
question was asked as to what evoked the similarity (and they could select more than one 
option). The following reasons were cited: brand name (17.3%); shape (52%); size (45%); 
colour (70%); text font (24.4%); imagery (24.6%); logo (20.4%); and the overall design 
(54%).36 It was not explored in the report, but there appeared to be no meaningful correlation 
between products which were considered to be very similar and those which had the same 
manufacturer. 
The fourth question was: “how likely do you think one of these products could be bought by 
mistake believing it to be the other one?” The question is clearly leading. With that in mind, 
in relation to all the lookalike save one, more participants said they might be mistaken than 
participants who said they would not have been mistaken. In contrast, in relation to all the 
controls but one, significantly more participants said they would not be mistaken than those 
participants stating they would be mistaken.
36 These results are averaged across all the ten products.
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The fifth and sixth question looked at whether the interviewee would buy the branded product 
rather than lookalike or control; and conversely, whether they would buy the lookalike or 
control over the branded product. To negate price differentials between the lookalike and the 
control, the price of the control was stated to be the same as the price of the lookalike. The 
branded product was stated to have its real price. 
To try and assess the “lookalike” effect the results obtained from the survey have been 
converted (for the purposes of this discussion) into “swing”. This represents the difference (in 
percentage) between those who would buy the lookalike product (over the manufacturer 
brand) and those who would not, minus the difference (in percentage) between those who 
would buy the control product (over the manufactured brand) and those who would not. 37
In relation to vinegar, there was a 22% swing towards the control and in relation to Jam 
Sandwich biscuits a 9% swing to the control. In relation to all other products there was a 
swing towards the lookalike. There was a 27% swing to both the lookalike washing powder 
and butter substitute. Across all ten products, the overall swing across was 10.5% towards 
lookalikes. 
5.3.8 Don Edwards & Associates for European Brands 
Group (AIM) 2011
A survey with similar methodology was carried out by Don Edwards & Associates for AIM. 
The first stage of the survey took place between 20 and 31 October 2011 and involved 997 
German grocery shoppers over the age of 16. The second part was an online survey 
conducted between 27 and 31 October 2011 with a sample of 504-505 German grocery 
shoppers aged between 16 and 64.
Face-to-face: Statements: The face-to-face survey asked participants to express their 
attitude38 to the following statements: (i) it can be confusing or misleading when the packaging 
of two grocery shopping items look similar (70% strongly agreed or agreed); (ii) I have been 
confused or misled by the packaging of two grocery shopping items which look similar (28% 
strongly agreed or agreed); (iii) I have accidently bought the wrong grocery shopping item 
because the packaging design similar to the item I wanted (23% strongly agreed or agreed); 
and (iv) it would concern me if the packaging of a grocery item suggested that the item is 
connected to a long-established make or brand when it is not (56% strongly agreed or 
agreed).
Face-to-face: Product questions: The second half of the survey used seven products each 
with a lookalike and control. The first question asked whether the branded product/lookalike/
control were made by the same manufacturer. A little over 39.5% of participants thought the 
lookalike/control were made by the same manufacturer (29% for the control and 50% for the 
lookalike). The second question asked about the similarity between the branded product and 
the lookalike/control. These questions will not be explored here.
37 So in relation to vinegar (53% would buy the lookalike vinegar – 19% would not = 34%) – (68% would buy the 
control vinegar – 13% would not buy the control = 56% (rounded)). Thus the swing in this case would be 22% 
to the control.
38 Each question had the following four options “Strongly agree”, “agree”, “neither agree nor disagree”, “disagree” 
and “strongly agree”.
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The fourth question was the same as for the British survey: “how likely do you think one of 
these products could be bought by mistake believing it to be the other one?” The same 
criticisms as in relation to the British survey can also be made here. Nonetheless, in relation 
to all the lookalikes there were more participants saying they might be mistaken than 
participants who said they would not have been mistaken. In contrast, in relation to all the 
controls there were significantly more participants who said they would not be mistaken than 
those who were mistaken.
The fifth and sixth question looked at whether the participant would buy the branded product 
over the lookalike or the control; and conversely whether they would buy the lookalike or 
control over the branded product. The prices of the control were set to the price of the 
lookalike and the branded product had its actual price. In relation to chocolate drink there 
was a 3% swing towards the control. In relation to all other products there was a swing 
towards the lookalike, the biggest swing being 33% swing towards the lookalike for the dried 
potato product. There was an overall swing of 17.57% towards lookalikes. 
5.3.9 AIM Parasitic copies in Europe
In November 2011, AIM surveyed its members as to their perceptions of lookalikes,39 thus 
providing information on manufacturer brand owners’ own perceptions of lookalikes. The 
survey indicated that 71.4% of brand-owners40 reported that their products had attracted a 
lookalike during 2009-10.41 That perceived copying was mainly of an existing range (68%) 
or of both an existing and new range (28%) with very little copying only of a new range.42 It 
was reported that about 19% of the lookalikes were produced by manufacturer brand 
competitors; 28% by retailers (own brand); and 51% by both. It was also found that the 
incident of there being a lookalike did not represent the first time it had happened (56%43).44
Notwithstanding the high reported incidents of lookalikes, only 37% tracked the effect of the 
lookalike on their own product;45 and of those 76% tracked it through sales and 23% tracked 
it through customer surveys.46 Based on these tracked sales it was asked what percentage 
of sales the lookalike attracted from the manufacturer’s brand in the store where it was 
sold:47
39 AIM Survey, Parasitic copies in Europe (Dedicated Research) (November 2011).
40 Ibid, [1].
41 Of those that had not, 12% said their products were no susceptible to lookalikes.
42 Ibid, [1.1].
43 An addition 31% reported that it in some cases it was the first time in others not.
44 Ibid. [1.1.4].
45 Ibid, [1.2].
46 Ibid, [1.2.1].
47 Ibid, [1.2.2].
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Percentage of sales acquired by lookalike 
(Options)
Number answering to the option
Less than 2% 13%
More than 2% up to 5% 13%
More than 5% up to 10% 32%
More than 10% up to 20% 17%
More than 20% up to 40% 10%
More than 40% 1%
Did not answer 14%
Median: 5-10%
This question was followed by a question asking participants what effect the entry onto 
market of a retailer’s lookalike48 had compared to the entry of a distinctive manufacturer 
brand competitor in terms of lost sales:
Percentage of sales lost due to lookalike 
compared to a distinctive branded competitor 
(Options)
Number answering to the option
No effect 1%
Less than 2% 8%
More than 2% up to 5% 18%
More than 5% up to 10% 20%
More than 10% up to 20% 23%
More than 20% up to 40% 8%
More than 40% 8%
Did not answer 13%
Median: 10 to 20%
There was no survey on the effect of an own brand (non-lookalike) on sales, but it is apparent 
that members report that greater loss of market share is caused by a lookalike than a new 
distinctive competitor (median 10-20% loss of share); although in total the overall lost sales 
for a new lookalike are in the range of 5-10% (median) loss of market share. 
Action taken: The survey went on to ask whether action had been taken against the lookalike 
(62% had taken some action)49 and to comment on why they failed to take action. Results 
showed 49% believed there were insufficient legal remedies; and 45% believed that there 
was a lack of judicial appreciation of the problem.50
Analysis: The AIM survey presents an interesting view of the perception of brand owners. 
48 It was also reported that there was an effect on a participants product when a competitor manufacturer had a 
lookalike introduced into the market (51% reported an effect).
49 Ibid, [2].
50 Ibid, [2.8].
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However, as evidence of lost sales/market share changes it has a number of flaws. First and 
foremost, it is not clear what was being referred to when it came to what amounts to a 
lookalike (or parasitic copy as the survey called it), relying instead on self-reporting. A brand 
owner (whether manufacturer or own brand) is more likely to have a perception that their own 
product is being copied by a “lookalike” than an impartial bystander. A further problem is that 
it was not clear whether the concept of lookalike covered activities which amounted to trade 
mark infringement, passing off (unfair competition), copyright or design right infringement or 
elsewhere where there are already acknowledged to be effective legal remedies, or whether 
it was restricted to “lookalikes” in the sense of something that the participant thought should 
be protected, but was not. There was also no effective “control” used as there is no indication 
relating to the effect on sales where a distinctive own brand was put on the market (as it is 
not apparent that the “distinctive competitor” question extended to “distinctive own-brand” or 
not). 
5.4 Summary of survey findings
The surveys discussed above are of varying quality. Nevertheless, with their flaws in mind, 
the following presents a summary of the findings across the surveys in relation to four key 
areas: mistaken purchases of products (and the reasons); perceived common origin; 
perceived quality of own brand goods; and general perceptions about packaging. 
5.4.1 Mistakes
It is clear that many consumers report that they have been confused by packaging at some 
point in the past. During the 1990s, studies range from 21% in NOP for Mars to 6% in the 
second of the Consumer Association Survey (with a range of 19% in the NOP for Reed 
Survey; 17% NOP Solutions 1997; 13% Consumers Association 1995).  Indeed, more recent 
research appears to suggest a much higher result as Don Edwards found in their UK survey 
that 32% of respondents agreed or strongly agreed that they had bought the wrong product 
by mistake in the past a lower result was found in their German study with 23% reporting the 
same. The most recent survey, by Which?, suggests a slightly lower figure of 20% of 
consumers making a mistaken purchase of a lookalike. It is clear across all these studies that 
consumers report making mistakes in what they have bought and in high numbers. There 
was much less reporting of whether these mistakes actually bothered consumers with only 
the Consumer Association in 1994, 1998 and 2013 (as Which?) reporting on the matter 
(1994, 11% particularly bothered; 1998, 30% bothered a little and 19% bothered a lot; 2013 
38% annoyed and 30% misled). The reasons for the mistake were also not as thoroughly 
investigated, but some common results do emerge.
Factors for mistake: The reasons giving for the mistake include the colour of the mistakenly 
purchased product (NOP Mars 1994, 28%; Consumer Association 1998, 59%; Don Edwards 
UK, 70%) or its shape (Consumer Association 1998, 23%; NOP Mars 1994, 13%; Don 
Edwards UK, 52%) or its size (Consumer Association 1998, 23%; Don Edwards UK, 45%). A 
highly reported factor unrelated to the product get up is the product’s shelf location (NOP 
Mars 1994, 7%; Consumer Association 1998, 37%) 
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5.4.2 Consumer perception of common origin
The surveys also show a consistent finding in relation to common origin for own brand 
(although not all investigated the reasons for it). The NOP survey for Mars found 41% of 
respondents thought that own brands were manufactured by well-known manufacturer 
brands; similarly, NOP Solutions study in 1997 found it to be 41%; the British Retail Consortium 
1994 study found it to be 21%. More recent research shows that these figures have not 
changed with the Don Edwards & Associates reporting in 2009 that 39% of respondents think 
that own brand share a common origin (31% for the control and 46.5% for the lookalike) with 
very similar results for their survey of German consumers in 2011 where there was 39.5% of 
respondents believing in common origin (29% for the control and 50% for the lookalike). 
Similar results were also found in the earlier RSGB Survey for the BBG in 1998. Accordingly, 
it is clear that a large number of consumers believe that own brand have the same origin as 
the manufacturer brand products. In many cases this is not because of the packaging (as the 
controls for the recent Don Edwards survey shows), but where the packaging is similar then 
it appears that more people think the own brand has a common origin with the manufacturer.
5.4.3 Consumer perceptions of quality
In a now very dated study by Europanel in 1994, it was found that 78% of consumers of three 
major supermarkets thought that the own brand was the same or better quality than the 
manufacturer brand owner. A much lower percentage was found in the same year in research 
conducted by the British Retail Consortium where 26% of respondents perceived own brand 
to be of the same quality. 
In relation to a similar question, the NOP Study for Mars found that 17% of respondents said 
they thought they had similar origin because they had similar taste or performance. The 
Consumer Association who used five products in 1998 and found that as the similarity of 
packaging increases it becomes more likely that consumers will perceive the quality of 
products to be the same. The effect did not exist across all product categories however. The 
2013 blind taste tests carried out by Which? demonstrated that consumer perceptions of the 
manufacturer brand owner’s product tasting better was found in two out of three products.
5.4.4 Consumer views on packaging
Some of the surveys asked respondents about their perceptions of packaging. This section 
will summarise those views although it will not refer to results which related link to the 
confusion or mistake and packaging (as these are referred to under mistake above). The 
British Retail Consortium (BRC) 1994 survey found that 20% of consumers strongly agreed 
they bought products because of the packaging. The Consumer Association in 1998 found 
that 71% of participants thought that products should be in distinct packaging with 29% 
thinking it was useful to have similar packaging. A brand loyalty type question was asked by 
the RSGB Survey in 1998 and the two Don Edwards surveys which found that between 56% 
and 67% of respondents would not like the packaging of a grocery item wrongly suggested a 
connection to a well-known brand (67% RSGB; 66% Don Edwards UK; and 56% Don 
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Edwards Germany). This shows that consumers want to have distinct packaging and believe 
brands should be protected although as the Consumer Association 1998 survey shows a 
large number also want cues from the packaging showing its intended purpose.
Summary Points Chapter 5
SP. 5.1 – Surveys
The surveys are of mixed quality, but disregarding these differences, the literature review of 
survey research shows:
Mistakes
• High levels of consumers making mistaken purchases;
• Reasons for these mistake include packaging such as cues of colour, shape, size;
• Shelf position is also reported as a factor.
Consumer perception
• general perception of own brand goods as having a common origin with 
manufacturer brand owner products (irrespective of packaging);
• when packaging is similar there is an increased perception of common origin;
• consumer perceptions of own brand are generally good with at least a quarter 
(and possibly three-quarters) of consumers perceiving own brand to be as good 
as the manufacturer brand owner’s products;
• in some product categories (but not all) it appears that similarly perceived quality 
increases when the packaging becomes similar.
Consumer beliefs respecting packaging
• consumers desire distinctive packaging and believe that brands should be 
protected;
• consumers also want cues from packaging to indicate intended purpose (generic 
cues).
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Part 2:  Research
Chapter 6: Interviews
6.1 Introduction
The research team approached manufacturer brand owners and retailers so as to discuss 
the issue of lookalike products. The interviews with brand owners took place in February 
2012 with a follow-up during March and April 2012. The interviews with retailers took place in 
March and April 2012. The purpose of the interviews was to try and understand the issues 
from a commercial perspective, both that of manufacturer brands and retailers. 
6.2 Methodology and Reporting
The British Brands Group (BBG) was approached for suggestions of brand owners who 
would be willing to participate in the research. A list of contacts was provided by the BBG in 
January 20121 and these contacts were approached by the research team. In addition to 
members of the British Brands Group, the research team approached other brand owners 
who might be willing to participate. In each case, the individual approached was sent a list of 
questions as discussion points; these are included in Appendix A. 
Any person who agreed to participate was given the option of speaking on the record (with 
comments being attributed to a particular company) or speaking off the record (so that the 
comments are attributed to a type brand owner without identifying the particular company) or 
a mixture of the two. To protect the anonymity of those brand owners who did not wish to be 
identified no further details about who was approached by the research team will be included 
in this report.
Once a company had agreed to participate in an interview it was offered the chance of 
making written comments on the questions included in Appendix A before the interview. 
Thereafter, an interview (or phone conference interview) was undertaken where an open-
ended discussion took place regarding the issues of lookalikes. These interviews were 
recorded. After the interview, the research team produced a note of the interviews and this 
was then sent to the people interviewed for further comments and approval.2 Müller (which 
also agreed to be identified), in contrast to other interviewees, asked to produce the first draft 
of the note and this was edited by the research team and then agreed by Müller. If no note 
was approved then nothing is included from the interview. The approved notes are included 
in Appendix B. 
1 An earlier list was provided, but this was the list which was used.
2 Some headings have been changed or added since the notes’ approval, but the text itself has not changed 
save to correct typographical, grammatical and syntax errors which remained after approval.
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In February 2012, the research team met with members of the BRC and explained the 
purpose of the interviews. At that meeting members were presented with a list of discussion 
points; these are also included in Appendix A. Retailers were given the same opportunity as 
manufacturer brands to speak to us on or off the record and the same procedures were 
undertaken with the approval of the note. One retailer, which was willing to participate on an 
anonymous basis, thought an interview was not required due to the fact that lookalikes were 
not particularly relevant to its industry. Instead, the retailer sent a short statement by email, 
which it agreed could be printed. Eventually, only one retailer – The Cooperative – was willing 
to be interviewed (and also identified). The approved note of that interview is also in Appendix 
B. 
Accordingly, although retailers were given an opportunity to be involved in the research they 
expressed little interest in doing so. As a result we only managed to obtain a very narrow 
spectrum of their views. 
The analysis set out in this chapter is based solely on the notes included in Appendix B and 
on no other aspects of the interviews with either manufacturer brand owners or retailers. 
Different interviewees emphasised different things and some did not comment on certain 
questions. Accordingly, there are no common answers upon which to construct this section; 
rather, general themes have been brought together.
6.3 Results
Theme 1: Concept of lookalike
There was a general sense amongst all interviewees as to what makes packaging similar 
and so what makes a lookalike. 
The interviewees came up with some or all of the following indicia for lookalikes. The 
lookalikes should be in the same product category3 and share similar colour,4 wording or 
other logo,5 iconography,6 and layout,7 the shape of packaging8 and the materials used 
to make it.9 The overall look and feel of the product was thought to make it a lookalike 
according to some interviewees.10 Additionally, some interviewees indicated that the colour 
of the product itself (when externally visible) could be indicative of a lookalike11 as could the 
3 This was only expressly mentioned by the Beverage, [1] but the context suggests that this was a general 
requirement.
4 GSK, [1]; Diageo [2]; PZ Cussons [1]; Müller [1]; LFMCGM [1 and 2] (where copying the exact Pantone® 
colour was thought to be a particular problem); Beverage, [1]; Beauty [2]; Co-op [5].
5 GSK, [1]; Diageo [2]; PZ Cussons [1]; Müller, [1]; LFMCGM, [1]; Co-op [5].
6 GSK, [1]; Diageo [2]; Müller [1]; LFMCG [1]; beauty [2]; Co-op [5].
7 GSK, [1]; Beauty, [3]. 
8 GSK, [1]; Diageo, [2]; PZ Cussons, [1]; Müller [1] (they also thought the pack weight significant); LFMCGM, 
[1]; Co-op, [5].
9 Müller, [1].
10 GSK, [1]; PZ Cussons, [1]; also see Diageo, [1].
11 Diageo, [2]; PZ Cussons, [1].
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composition or nutritional information12 or other “claims”13 made about the product. This was 
despite the fact that it was accepted by some that the colour of the product itself can represent 
a generic signal14 and that the claims made or composition of the product cannot be 
restricted.15 
Characterising a lookalike: It was generally felt that one shared feature was not usually 
enough to make something a lookalike;16 rather, it required a combination of elements.17 
Some interviewees also suggested their research had indicated that there was an order of 
importance which consumers attach to the various elements, starting with colour,18 then 
shape,19 then wording or other logo,20 and then iconography.21 Further, the research 
suggested that consumers look at packaging for only 2-3 seconds before making their 
purchasing decision.22 
Many manufacturer brand owners accepted that many lookalikes did not create consumer 
confusion23 and so passing off would not be made out. Instead of confusion they felt that 
there might be a likelihood of association between the products,24 or that consumers might 
believe the products shared the same elements,25 or there was some form of “family” 
relationship,26 or simply that a lookalike appropriates the “positive image” associated with 
the well-known packaging.27 Some were quite frank, such that the assessment of whether 
something was a lookalike was described as subjective,28 and “you know it when you see 
it.”29
Signalling: It was accepted by most manufacturer brand owners that certain marketing cues 
were acceptable on own brand as signals to consumers about the nature of the goods.30 A 
particular reference was made to category colours31 and the need to use such colours was 
something emphasised by the retailer as well.32 However, it was suggested that the number 
12 Müller, [1]; in contrast LFMCGM suggested that the formulations of lookalikes were often distinctly different 
(at [4]) and consumers did not often compare them (at [4]).
13 Müller, [1]; Beauty, [2 and 3].
14 PZ Cussons, [2].
15 Beauty, [3].
16 GSK, [14]; PZ Cussons, [2].
17 GSK, [14].
18 LFMCGM, [1]; Beverage, [1].
19 LFMCGM, [1].
20 LFMCGM, [1].
21 LFMCGM, [1].
22 Diageo, [2].
23 GSK, [1] (although they suggested that a product might share the same manufacturer and still be no confusion 
as to origin); Diageo, [4]; Beverage, [1 and 2].
24 Beverage, [1].
25 GSK, [1]; LFMCGM, [3].
26 PZ Cussons, [3]; Beverage, [1 and 3].
27 Beverage [3].
28 Beauty, [3]
29 PZ Cussons, [6].
30 Diageo, [19]; LFMCGM, [27]; Beauty, [8]; but see GSK, [14].
31 LFMCGM, [28].
32 Co-op, [16].
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of signals or common cues would vary across the categories.33 One interviewee perceived 
the difficulty to be where these signals were taken from a manufacturer brand owner who had 
developed the consumer perception as a signal.34 It appears that some manufacturer brands 
developed packaging so as to distance themselves from the usual marketing cues.35 
Ranges: A concern raised by one interviewee was that of lookalikes mirroring an entire 
range.36 This is where each product in the lookalike range copies the packaging of the 
substitutable product in the manufacturer brand owner’s range.
Timing of arrival: There were differing views as to when lookalikes generally arrived on the 
market. One interviewee suggested that there was no particular pattern.37 Others suggested 
that lookalikes would usually only arrive once the manufacturer brand had created sufficient 
market share.38 Accordingly, a lookalike generally did not arrive on the market at the same 
time or soon after the manufacturer brand.39 It might be that even if the retailer wanted to 
enter the market quickly this would not be possible by reason of formulation development40 
or for other unspecified reasons.
Rationale for prevention:  The justification for restricting lookalikes was usually suggested 
to be where the seller of the lookalike was perceived to be appropriating the investment in 
research and development undertaken by manufacturer brand owner41 or, put another way, 
appropriating the goodwill (or brand equity).42 Such investment is made in the form of 
undertaking marketing surveys and advertising.43 It was suggested that it takes 2-3 years44 
to recover this investment. 
Another sort of harm suggested was where the packaging inaccurately suggested to 
consumers that the lookalike was equivalent in quality to the manufacturer brand product45 
(the products are comparable46). As it was put by one interviewee very succinctly: 
“... our competitor is clearly convinced that there is some advantage. Whether this is 
through confusion or some of the magic of our product rubs off on them. But it is clear that 
they think there is some advantage in looking like a brand.”47
33 Co-op, [7].
34 LFMCGM, [27].
35 LFMCGM, [27].
36 GSK, [17].
37 GSK, [11].
38 GSK, [11]; LFMCGM, [26]; a related comment was made by Diageo, [18]. 
39 GSK, [11].
40 LFMCGM, [25].
41 GSK, [2 and 5].
42 GSK, [5]; PZ Cussons, [3].
43 GSK [5].
44 LFMCGM, [29].
45 Diageo [5]; LFMCGM, [7] said they had conduct research supporting this finding.
46 GSK [5];
47 PZ Cussons, [5]; also see Diageo, [3].
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Theme 2: Incidents of lookalikes
The incidents of lookalike seemed to vary: some suggested they faced an incident once 
every couple of months;48 another stated they had an issue with three of the four big retailers 
over the previous two years;49 a third indicated they had ten cases over the last ten years;50 
and a fourth said potential lookalikes arrived about once a week.51 There was one report that 
incidents were cyclical52 and another suggesting the problem is getting worse.53 The 
incidents and the parties producing and selling lookalikes appears to vary between product 
categories.54 There were some examples of actual lookalike cases which were presented by 
interviewees and some specifically described why a particular product was, in their view, a 
lookalike.55 
Differing perceptions: A particular issue was that different interviewees had differing views 
of what amounts to a lookalike.56 This meant some would report something as a lookalike 
where it was essentially related to the protection of registered designs57 or trade mark 
infringement,58 whereas others thought of lookalikes only in terms of passing off or to be 
outside existing rights.
Theme 3: Innovation
One manufacturer brand owner interviewee explained how the decline in business in 
particular product categories has led to a reduction in research and development (although 
they “had not joined the dots” to see if this reduction related to lookalikes.)59 Another 
manufacturer brand owner described the need to stay ahead of lookalikes, and how this 
might actually spur the development of new product features60 through costly research.61 
They also pointed out that when new manufacturer brands come to the market they need 
innovations or they would not get listed.62 There was a feeling amongst some manufacturer 
brand owners that own brand (and lookalikes) did not innovate.63 Nevertheless, the retailer 
interviewee described how they innovated in relation to some of their own brand products 
and gave a recent example of an original product.64 Nobody reported actually leaving a 
product category or not entering it because of lookalikes as such.65
48  Diageo, [7]; LFMCGM, [17]; GSK said there were not many example at [6].
49  PZ Cussons, [9].
50  Müller, [2].
51  Beverage, [4].
52  Beverage, [4].
53  PZ Cussons, [7]; Beverage, [15].
54  LFMCGM, [14].
55  GSK, [7, 15 and 16]; Diageo, [10]; Müller, [2 and 11].
56  Beverage, [4] also spoke of large single batches with the issue disappearing after that batch was sold.
57  Müller, [2].
58  Müller, [3]; Beverage, [9].
59  GSK, [22].
60  LFMCGM, [15].
61  LFMCGM, [16].
62  LFMCGM, [32]. Listing in this context essentially means that it is the list of retailers stocked products.
63  LFMCGM, [35].
64  Co-op, [17].
65  See, for example, GSK, [22]. 
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Theme 4: Packaging and investment
It depended on the industry as to whether manufacturer brand owners change their packaging 
or not.66 None had changed their packaging specifically because of the arrival of a new 
lookalike,67 although some had considered, but rejected, doing so.68 However, one did say 
they had changed packaging to distinguish themselves from competitors generally.69 
It was explained that the existence of lookalikes would simply become part of the marketing 
mix and so it might be a contributing factor in making a change to packaging, but never a 
decisive one.70 Indeed, the desire to be distinctive might lead to introducing packaging with 
unusual colours71 or to take other steps to distance the product from lookalikes.72 The other 
side of the coin is demonstrated by the retailer who indicated that it too changed its packaging 
every two years or so to avoid its packaging looking too dated,73 such changes being related 
only to the retailer’s own product cycle.74
Copying of products: Only one interviewee mentioned packaging development and said 
they would not copy the existing packaging of a product on the market, although one accepted 
that they had done so a long time ago.75 Both the retailer and manufacturer brand owners 
believed that having distinctive packaging was important.76 One interviewee reported how 
competitors adopted packaging similar to its old packaging following a change.77 The fact 
that there is not copying does not mean that the packaging of rivals is not considered during 
a redesign however.78
Retailer perspective: It was reported by one retailer that many aspects of packaging design 
and shape are constrained by what the manufacturer can source or what they are already 
using.79 It is too expensive for a retailer to get a factory retooled to change packaging design 
or colour. An example was given where the retailer tried to have the packaging colour changed 
to match the rest of its range, but the increased manufacturing costs made it prohibitive.80 It 
is also quite common for a manufacturer to make own brand for more than one retailer and 
this means common packaging design.81
66 Beauty, [12] (changes, but none which would be noticed by consumers); Beverage, [12] (never changed); 
Müller, [7] (change every 2-3 years); GSK, [21] (every 2-5 years depending on the product).
67 See GSK, [21]; Diageo, [17].
68 GSK, [21]; LFMCGM, [39].
69 Müller, [7].
70 Diageo, [17].
71 PZ Cussons, [22]; also see LFMCGM, [27].
72 PZ Cussons, [22].
73 Co-op, [15].
74 Co-op, [15].
75 PZ Cussons, [23].
76 LFMCGM, [29 and 40]; Co-op, [11].
77 Müller, [7].
78 LFMCGM, [40]; Co-op, [15].
79 Co-op, [8].
80 Co-op, [9].
81 Co-op, [10].
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Theme 5: Sales
There were mixed responses as to how lookalikes affected the sale of manufacturer branded 
products. One interviewee said the launch of own brands affects sales, but it was not possible 
to determine whether this was greater when the own brand was a lookalike.82 Another said 
that there was no evidence that sales were significantly affected by the launch of lookalikes.83 
Two others said that lookalikes had affected sales but without being specific.84
One interviewee described how the launch of a lookalike product led to a 15% drop in sales 
across the whole market (and greater drop within the particular retailer).85 They generally 
expected a 10% long-term drop in market share,86 whereas a long-term 5% drop was usual 
when a distinctive competitor enters the market.87 Another interviewee reported a 20% drop 
in sales when a lookalike product was launched by one retailer, but a 40% drop when another 
retailer launched a dissimilar own brand.88 This was attributed to the own brand being pushed 
strongly by the latter retailer, but not by the former.89 It was suggested that only 15% of 
customers buying own brand were new to the product category, the remainder having 
previously purchased manufacturer brands.90 Therefore, usually there is no increase in 
volume sales.91
It was explained that sales can be affected in two ways: first, by loss of volume; and secondly 
by reason of brand followers being de-listed to make way for the own brand.92 It was 
suggested that lookalikes tended to lead to volume growth, rather than market growth 
(number of units sold goes up, but the turnover generated does not).93 
82  GSK, [19]; also see PZ Cussons, [15] where a similar more oblique point was made.
83  Diageo, [14].
84  Müller, [5]; PZ Cussons, [21].
85  LFMCGM, [30].
86  LFMCGM, [33].
87  LFMCGM, [32].
88  Beauty, [6].
89  Beauty, [6]; see Diageo, [14].
90  LFMCGM, [35].
91  LFMCGM, [37].
92  LFMCGM, [35].
93  LFMCGM, [37]; also see Beauty, [7].
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Theme 6: Advertising spend and promotions
It was reported that lookalikes benefit from advertising by manufacturer brand owners. In 
other words, lookalikes aim to enter the market at the right time after the bulk of advertising 
spend has occurred.94 Therefore, sellers of lookalikes do not want advertising spend cut as 
they want as much benefit as possible.95
New entry and advertising spend: Where a distinctive competitor enters the market, 
advertising spend generally increases to avoid the loss of market share,96 whereas in relation 
to lookalikes the responses vary. One interviewee described how advertising spend would be 
reduced in order to avoid promoting the lookalike, unless the market was growing in another 
retailer.97 Another, however, said a new lookalike would lead to an increase in general 
marketing spend,98 possibly even an additional 10% spend.99 Another response to the 
lookalike was to invest in training in the shop (i.e., advertising to the shop staff) in which a 
lookalike was launched.100 Others said lookalikes would have no effect on advertising spend 
either way.101 Even where spending is not affected by lookalikes, their entry might affect the 
nature of the advertising campaign.102 
The retailer explained that it did not generally pay for advertising for a particular own brand 
product, but rather for its entire own brand range.103
Promotions: There was a view that promotions, and price cuts, are generally not a good 
response to the arrival of lookalikes,104 particularly where such activity undermines the 
premium nature of the product.105 However, one interviewee said that promotions by 
manufacturer brands are often met by promotions from own brand,106 and so it is not worth 
running them. Others simply said they would not run promotions in response to lookalikes.107 
However, one interviewee indicated that they had been compelled to use promotions due to 
a lookalike, despite knowing that it might not work in the long term.108 The retailer acknowledged 
that when it launched an own brand product it might adopt promotional strategies such as 
three for the price of two.109
94 LFMCGM, [31].
95 LFMCGM, [31].
96 LFMCGM, [32].
97 LFMCGM, [33] (described as a significant effect).
98 Müller, [5].
99 Müller, [6].
100 Beauty, [11] with £90,000 being spent in total.
101 Diageo, [16].
102 Diageo, [15 and 16].
103 Co-op, [13].
104 Beverage, [12]; Diageo, [20].
105 Diageo, [20]; Beverage, [12].
106 Beauty, [10].
107 GSK, [24].
108 LFMCGM, [41 and 42].
109 Co-op, [13].
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Theme 7: Making own brand
There was a mixed response as to whether the manufacturer brand owners made own brand 
products: some did110 and others did not.111 The retailer described how own brand 
manufacturers regularly change and so who is involved changes over time.112 One interviewee 
described how the squeezing of its manufacturer branded product’s market share was so bad 
that it was pushed towards making own brand to defend its profits.113
Theme 8: Consumer complaints
Most of the manufacturer brand owners had no record of consumers making complaints 
about lookalike products,114 but they tended to think that consumers would complain to 
retailers and not to the manufacturer.115 The only retailer interviewed said they had never had 
a complaint from a consumer about a lookalike product.116 However, one interviewee 
described how they had an email address on their website to send complaints regarding 
lookalikes, which they reported was used and resulted in meaningful reports from 
consumers.117 Another described some instances of reports from consumers who were 
confused in the form of emails,118 and a third reported general evidence of consumers 
contacting them about confusion.119
Theme 9: Legal disputes
A common concern amongst manufacturer brand owners was that passing off was not made 
out by lookalikes as there was not confusion.120 Accordingly, other causes of action are relied 
upon where they are available, in particular, trade mark infringement.121
Competitors: The approach to incidents of lookalikes varies depending on the putative 
defendant. Where the lookalike is produced by a third party manufacturer then they will be 
pursued very robustly,122 although it is still usually resolved without recourse to legal 
proceedings being issued.123 One manufacturer brand owner reported that it is usual that 
other competitor issues get into the mix and so it rarely remains a simple lookalike issue.124
110  Müller, [9] (in Germany, but not the UK); LFMCGM, [12].
111  GSK, [23]; Diageo, [6].
112  Co-op, [17].
113  LFMCGM, [12].
114  GSK, [25]; LFMCGM, [44]; but its value was acknowledged, PZ Cussons, [5].
115  GSK, [25].
116  Co-op, [19].
117  Beverage, [14].
118  Beauty, [13].
119  Diageo, [23].
120  GSK, [7]; PZ Cussons, [18]; LFMCGM, [20]; Beverage, [10].
121  Beverage, [10].
122  GSK, [8]; LFMCGM, [17].
123  GSK, [8]; LFMCGM, [18].
124  LFMCGM, [17].
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Retailers: Where the lookalike is sold by a retailer then manufacturer brand owners are more 
reluctant to take action.125 Nevertheless, any action would begin with business to business 
conversation,126 although this would be based on legal advice.127 Manufacturer brand owners 
had differing views of whether they would actually bring proceedings against a retailer where 
they are major customers.128 Some were clear that it would be a difficult decision, but they 
would nevertheless bring such proceedings129 and some had even done so.130 Others said 
they would not bring a case against a retailer/customer under any circumstances.131 The 
balance to be struck was described as being between the overall value of the brand and the 
loss of a potential customer.132 It was generally the view, however, that disputes with retailers 
were ordinarily resolved without resort to legal proceedings.133 
Retaliation: One interviewee reported that they would not bring proceedings because they 
feared retailers would “punish”134 them with price inflation or de-listing. Both of these actions 
would lead to a dip in volume sales.135 However, no threat of such punishment had yet been 
made in relation to lookalikes.136 Other interviewees, although concerned about problems 
with commercial relationships, would take steps to minimise the risk to the relationship, such 
as any business to business conversation excluding the usual relationship manager.137 
Indeed, it was suggested by one manufacturer brand owner that the dispute could be 
compartmentalised138 and that “retailers would expect you to protect your brands, they would 
want you to protect your brand.”139
The retailer interviewed said that they had not had any complaints from manufacturers 
regarding lookalikes140 and the other retailer said they did not sell the right sort of products to 
attract such complaints.141
125  See, for example, GSK, [9].
126  Diageo, [9] and [11]; Beverage, [6].
127  Beverage, [5].
128  GSK, [9]; Beverage, [4].
129  GSK, [10]; PZ Cussons, [9] (including against the its biggest global customer).
130  Diageo, [10]; Beverage, [7].
131  LFMCGM, [22].
132  Beverage, [5].
133  Diageo, [8]; PZ Cussons, [7]; Beverage, [5]; GSK, [9] where more circumspect.
134  Another referred to “strong arm” tactics: Beauty, [4].
135  LFMCGM, [22 and 23].
136  LFMCGM, [23] (the example of punishment was relating to price rises not lookalikes); a similar incidence 
relating to price rises was referred to by PZ Cussons, [12].
137  Diageo, [11].
138  PZ Cussons, [11].
139  PZ Cussons, [12].
140  Co-op, [12].
141  Consumer Goods Retailer, [1].
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Theme 10: Litigating and forum selection
The regular concern of the cost of bringing proceedings was mentioned, particularly with the 
attendant risk of passing off actions.142 As one interviewee suggested, it is easy to spend 
£10,000-£20,000 before realising one does not have a very good case.143 An interviewee 
expressly stated that they avoid the UK because of the cost of litigation144 and another 
indicated they had a lookalike case in the UK where they specifically had not taken action 
because of the cost.145 Others had started proceedings or at least threatened to do so.146 One 
interviewee stated:
“... there may be instances we think it is important to stand our ground and to make an 
investment in the third party’s legal costs. Even if our lawyers say the case is not that 
strong. You do however want to establish credibility. It is more of a commercial rather than 
a legal decision.”147
Surveys: Some brand manufacturers had conducted surveys in contemplation of litigation in 
relation to perceived lookalikes to see whether consumers were confused. They received 
mixed results. Some surveys found that even with a prominent rival brand name there was 
still some confusion as to origin,148 others suggesting that their surveys gave no indication of 
confusion.149 Obviously without precise comparisons of the products or details of the survey 
this matter could not be explored in much depth.
EU regional variations: The problems caused by lookalikes varied between jurisdictions in 
terms of the incidents of lookalikes, the availability of remedies, and the business response.150 
The sorts of products which attract lookalikes seem to vary between countries and the 
dominance of particular brands.151 Some interviewees described the German unfair 
competition law as particularly useful at preventing lookalikes152 as well as giving favourable 
reports of the German court system.153 There was particular concern regarding obtaining 
relief in Eastern Europe.154 Another interviewee reports greater success against lookalikes in 
Australia than they had in the UK.155 It was explained by another that when there was an 
incidence of a lookalike in the UK, they would undertake investigations to see if it was also 
being sold in another European country to avoid litigating domestically.156
142 GSK, [7]; PZ Cussons, [18]; Beverage, [9 and 10]; also see LFMCGM, [1].
143 PZ Cussons, [19].
144 Beverage, [9].
145 Beauty, [5].
146 GSK, [7].
147 PZ Cussons, [18]. The third party in this context being the putative defendant in a lookalikes claim before the 
courts. 
148 PZ Cussons, [20].
149 LFMCGM, [19].
150 Diageo, [13] (no pre-existing relationships in Eastern Europe more likely to issue proceedings).
151 Diageo, [12].
152 GSK, [13]; LFMCGM, [10].
153 GSK, [13]; LFMCGM, [10]; Beverage, [7].
154 Beverage, [7].
155 PZ Cussons, [8]. 
156 LFMCGM, [11].
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Theme 11: Commercial strategies
The usual commercial strategies are used to try and address lookalikes,157 with no interviewees 
reporting the adoption of particular commercial strategies being used. Unsurprisingly, none 
mentioned entering agreements with retailers to restrict the stocking of lookalikes as it would 
present competition law issues.158 It was suggested by one manufacturer brand owner that 
retailers would not agree to shelving arrangements where the lookalike was kept away from 
the brand leader.159
Theme 12: Current legal framework and proposals for 
law reform
There was a general concern that passing off was not sufficient to prevent improper lookalikes 
as there was usually no confusion as to origin:160 “consumers almost never buy an own brand 
thinking it is the branded product”.161 It was also pointed out by one interviewee that despite 
packaging being protected by a variety of intellectual property rights (such as copyright, 
designs and trade marks), the rights a manufacturer brand owner had were only as strong as 
the best individual right.162 Therefore, despite the product having very similar packaging there 
was rarely a “knock-out” punch.163
The proposals of how to legislate to prevent lookalikes led many manufacturer brand owners 
to make several suggestions, including: enactment of a general unfair competition law;164 and 
creation of a right based on the “overall impression of the product.”165 Other suggestions 
included a right of action under the UCPD166 or something based on the approach of the 
Court of Justice in L’Oreal v Bellure167 being extended to packaging.168 
Most interviewees, however, could not identify a point where a product went from permissibly 
sharing marketing cues to becoming a lookalike.169 Nevertheless, one interviewee, a brand 
director, thought that a product was a lookalike where at least three key elements of the 
following were apparent: colour, shape, branding iconography or structuring of artwork were 
adopted (a view not shared by the legal director of the same company).170 Another suggested 
that it would just require the colour and the layout being copied.171 A less ambitious suggestion 
157 PZ Cussons, [24]; Müller, [8]. 
158 See Beverage, [13].
159 LFMCGM, [43].
160 Diageo [5].
161 LFMCGM, [7].
162 PZ Cussons, [6]; also see Müller, [4].
163 PZ Cussons, [4].
164 GSK, [4]; LFMCGM, [5].
165 Diageo, [4].
166 GSK, [4].
167 C-487/07 L’Oreal v Bellure [2009] ECR I-5185, [2009] ETMR 55; none of the interviewees mentioned the 
subsequent refinements by the Court of Justice and others: see Annex II, [II.4.1].
168 Diageo, [4]; LFMCGM, [5].
169 GSK, [4]; PZ Cussons, [6]; Beauty, [3] described the assessment as difficult and subjective.
170 LFMCGM, [5].
171 Beauty, [3].
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was to provide an inclusive list of get-up which makes something a lookalike.172 One of the 
retailers thought it was unnecessary for there to be further legislation173 and the other did not 
comment.
Theme 13: Unfair Commercial Practices Directive
Most of the interviewees had not considered relying on the Consumer Protection from Unfair 
Trading Regulations 2008 to prevent lookalikes.174 A reason given was that trading standards 
would not have the resources to pursue lookalikes.175 However, one interviewee saw the 
2008 Regulations as a significant tool which could be used to prevent lookalikes. They 
described how, after failing to reach a commercial settlement,176 they approached trading 
standards which in turn spoke to the other party, ultimately leading to an agreement to change 
the packaging.177 Nevertheless, they believed that a private right of action under the 2008 
Regulations would greatly assist in the prevention of lookalikes,178 although a disclosure 
requirement as to how packaging was generated would probably be needed as well.179
172 Diageo, [4].
173 Consumer Goods Retailer, [3].
174 Diageo, [24]; LFMCGM, [45].
175 GSK, [4]; LFMCGM, [45].
176 Müller, [12].
177 Müller, [14].
178 Müller, [15]; also see GSK, [4].
179 Müller, [15].
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Summary Points Chapter 6
SP 6.1:  Features of a lookalike and signalling
Features
• Product category; colour; wording and logo; Iconography; layout; packaging 
(shape and materials); overall look and feel and the product (colour, composition, 
nutritional information, other “claims”);
 Order of Importance (descending): Colour; Shape; Wording and logo and 
Iconography;
Lookalikes are associated, rather than confused, with brand leaders (a “family” relationship).
Signalling – certain common cues, and in particular colour, were accepted by retailers and 
manufacturers to be generic to a particular product or category.
SP 6.2:  Incidents of lookalikes
• The incidents of lookalikes varied over time and between product categories;
• Reporting on the number of incidents was hampered by differing view on what is 
meant be a “lookalikes” incident.
SP 6.3:  Innovation
Negative - Decline in business by reason of lookalikes would led to a decline in research and 
development;
Positive - Competition from own brand (including lookalikes) might increase in packaging 
and product innovation (but costly);
Own Brand Innovation - Retail reporting but disputed significant by manufacturers.
SP 6.4:  Packaging and investment
• Packaging – general distinctiveness from competitors (not specific);
• No specific changes made as a response to lookalikes reported;
• Lookalikes taken into account as part of general “marketing mix” (contributing 
factor to change);
• No explicit (current) practice of copying admitted by retailers or manufacturers.
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Industry limitations on packaging variation:
• Available materials and product composition;
• Manufacturing costs;
• Generic features;
SP 6.5:  Sales
• Some reports of loss of volume, but some reported no evidence of such loss and 
a mixed picture regarding whether a greater loss associated with a lookalike 
compared to a distinctive own brand (factors other than packaging often at 
play);
• The entry of an own brand might lead to de-listing;
• Suggested a redistribution of existing customers to product category when 
lookalike or own brand enters the market (no increase in volume sales).
SP 6.6:  Advertising and promotion
• New competitor on market leads to an increase in advertising spend (defensive);
• Different response when own brand or lookalike enters market varies widely 
between interviewees;
• Promotions and price cuts not usual response (undermine premium nature of 
brand leader and so ineffective against lookalike).
SP 6.7:  Legal Disputes
Passing off not usually made out in relation to real instances of lookalikes (no confusion);
Commercial considerations very important in how dispute pursued: 
• Difference between competitors versus customers (retailers);
• Retaliation concerns by retailers (price inflation; de-listing);
• Negotiation and mediation (importance of protecting brand);
Balance: overall value of brand versus loss of potential customer.
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SP 6.8:  Litigation and forum-shopping
• Considerations for which jurisdiction to litigation include cost, forensic 
considerations (surveys; customer confusion), availability of remedies and 
business response;
• Favourable jurisdictions: Germany (Unfair Competition Law); Australia;
• Problem jurisdictions: Eastern Europe; UK.
SP 6.9:  Unfair Commercial Practices Directive (UCPD) and Law Reform
Trading Standards
• Lack of resources to pursue lookalikes;
• Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations 2008 nevertheless could be 
significant tool;
• “Brokerage”/Mediation role;
Private right of action under the 2008 Regulations
• Important in prevention of lookalikes;
• Disclosure requirement (packaging development) also desirable;
Other proposals for reforms
• Enactment of a general unfair competition law;
• Creation of a right based on overall impression of the product;
• Right for trade dress (L’Oreal v Bellure);
Consensus on “lookalike” (or test) important.
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Chapter 7:  Consumer 
Surveys
7.1 Introduction
This chapter reports on the two stages of consumer research conducted by i2 media research 
limited. The research was conducted during the period October 2011 to March 2012. The 
research is concerned only with the consumer’s interaction with the product’s packaging. It 
does not cover any other aspect of the consumer’s shopping experience, such as shelf-
placement, customer support from staff, or other forms of promotional activity.
7.2 Questions the consumer research 
addressed and research methodology
The consumer research in the project was designed to address two distinct questions. Each 
question was addressed by its own dedicated survey.
Question 1: Consumer perceptions of similarity
First, if two substitutable products have similar packaging to what extent (and in what way) 
do consumers believe that those products have the same characteristics? And does the 
belief in shared characteristics vary as the packaging is perceived to get more (or less 
similar)?
The first question is qualified further by clarifying what is considered relevant. For example, 
at one end of the scale the packaging is so similar (or the same) that consumers may believe 
the products are the same – i.e., confusion as to origin (e.g., consumers believe that 
Sainsbury’s beans are actually Heinz beans). At the other end of the scale there is no 
packaging similarity at all (e.g., at the extreme end a white tin of baked beans with simply the 
name Sainsbury’s and the words baked beans on the side). References to characteristics 
means, for example, that consumers think Sainsbury’s baked beans are the same as Heinz 
because they have the same taste, quality of ingredients, same manufacturer, and they are 
canned by the same person or they have the same nutritional profile.
A survey was developed which asked respondents to rate product trios (two own brands 
relative to each other and to a manufacturer brand) in twelve different categories. Multiple 
versions of the survey were developed which varied the position of the manufacturer brand 
relative to own brands in the trios. The survey was constructed so as to include all twelve 
product trios, together with a series of mini-surveys, each of which comprised three trios. The 
surveys were made available online via surveymonkey.com for the period 2 January to 8 
March 2012. In this time period data was obtained 330 UK participants. Participants were 
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recruited through invitations to participate presented on publicly accessible forums and 
websites, and through email invitations. Respondents were self-selecting and participation 
was voluntary. Each respondent completed the survey question set in relation to an average 
of 3.5 product trios. In total, the phase 1 survey obtained 1160 product trio question set 
responses from 330 UK participants. A copy of the full survey questions is included in 
Appendix C.  Results from the first survey are presented in this chapter, with a detailed 
breakdown of results per product and per product split between users and non-users of each 
category in Appendix D.
Question 2: Consumer perceptions of advantage and 
disadvantage
The second consumer research question addressed consumer perceptions of advantage 
and disadvantage from any accidental and or deliberate purchase of lookalikes, to inform the 
project’s view on the extent to which lookalikes can be shown to cause consumer detriment. 
If the first survey reveals that closeness of packaging makes a difference to consumer 
perceptions of product features, then do consumers perceive themselves to be disadvantaged 
by purchase of a product with similar packaging? What are the participants’ actual experiences 
with lookalike type products? Do they report accidentally purchasing lookalike type products? 
How much advantage and disadvantage do they report from doing so? And do they report 
deliberately purchasing lookalike type products? And how much advantage and disadvantage 
do they report from doing so?
Contextual consumer research questions in second 
survey
Each of the consumer research questions was addressed using its own specific research 
exercise, that is, a dedicated survey.
In addition to addressing the core consumer research questions outlined above, the second 
survey also sought to contextualise responses. To do so, it required respondents to provide 
a series of self-reports about their behaviours in relation to purchasing fast moving consumer 
goods (FMCG) products and their perceptions of retailers and brand owners. These data, 
though not directly relevant to the core consumer research questions this chapter addresses, 
are reported here for completeness.
7.3 Methodology of identifying products
Product indication: The British Brands Group proved very helpful by providing examples of 
products it believed to be lookalikes, in particular about 20 examples of products which were 
on the market in 2010. In addition to approaching the manufacturer brand owners, the 
research team also contacted the British Retail Consortium and presented on the project at 
a meeting of BRC members in June 2011. We asked for members of that group to give 
feedback on the study at the early stage and to provide potential examples of lookalikes. 
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Despite indicating they would respond by the end of July 2011 (and numerous attempts by 
the research team to follow up on this interest) nothing was ever received in relation to this 
aspect of the report. 
Field Work: The research team also undertook field work in the 
main supermarkets (Tesco, ASDA, Sainsbury, Morrison, Aldi, Wilko 
and Lidl) and pharmacies (Boots and Superdrug) looking for 
potential lookalikes. In addition, those lookalikes which had been 
identified by the BBG were acquired. It became apparent that 
some of the examples presented by the BBG had changed their 
packaging since 2010. A particular example of this was the 
withdrawal of the packaging by Wilko of its “lookalike” for “Charlie” 
bodyspray.
The lack of a control: A further objective of the research 
methodology was to find an equivalent product for each 
lookalike to include as a “control”. This was to facilitate a 
comparison between a manufacturer branded product, a 
lookalike and a control. Ideally, this would be where the 
supermarket had both a lookalike and non-lookalike own 
brand product. One of the few examples where this was 
possible was in relation to “Charlie” bodyspray at Tesco.
It was more common to find that the lookalike product was the own brand equivalent to the 
manufacturer branded product, as demonstrated by Clearasil.
There were also particular problems 
identifying control products even from 
other retailers. This is because in 
relation to certain products, all brands 
(manufacturer, lookalike, and control) 
had similar packaging, as can be 
demonstrated by the Lurpak example:
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Nevertheless, eventually the products selected for the consumer study were:
Category Brand Leader “Lookalike” “Control”
Bodyspray* Charlie Pink Tesco Sweet Tesco Pink Body Spray
Bodywash* Original Source Lime Tesco’s Wake Up Sainsbury’s Lime 
Bodywash
Cheese* The Laughing Cow 
Cheese
Tenery Cheese Tesco’s Cheese 
Triangles
Razor* Gillette Mach 3 Boots Blade 3 Morrison’s Triple Blade
Washing Up Liquid* Fairy Lemon Washing 
Up Liquid
Magnum Lemon 
Washing Up Liquid 
Tesco Lemon washing 
up liquid
Shampoo* Head and Shoulders Boots anti-dandruff Sainsbury’s Anti-
dandruff
Drinks# Red Bull ASDA Blue Charge Mixxed Up
Vinegar* Sarson’s Malt Vinegar Samson’s Malt Vinegar Asda Malt Vinegar
Butter Lurpack Norpak Tesco Butterpak
Ibuprofen Nurofen Ibuprofen 
capsules
Boots Ibuprofen 
caplets
Sainsbury’s Ibuprofen 
capsules
Skin care Clearasil Ultra Boots Skin Clear Tesco Clear Skin
Shaving gel* Gillette Fusion Shaving 
Gel
Boots Blade 3 Shaving 
Gel
Morrison’s Shaving Gel
* The lookalike/brand leader were indicated as lookalikes in the British Brand Groups Sample Packaging 
Survey 2010 (the control was selected by the research team)1  
# The lookalike is an updated version of packaging indicated in that 2010 Sample (control selected by the 
research team)
7.4 Consumer research results: Study 1 
The first survey addressed the project’s first key research question, namely whether the 
perceived relative similarity in packaging of two different own brand products to a manufacturer 
brand product is related to respondents’ perceptions of various quality characteristics of the 
two own brands, including their perceived origin.
It was notable that results varied across the different product categories, suggesting that a 
range of factors aside from product appearance may be relevant.
A series of figures in Appendix D show, per product, survey respondents’ ratings of (i) 
perceived similarity in look of packaging and the (ii) perceived likelihood of common origin. 
These charts show respondents’ ratings of perceived similarity in appearance of packaging 
of two own brands to the brand per category (on the left), and perceived likelihood of each of 
the two own brands being manufactured by the same manufacturer/entity as the brand per 
category (on the right).
1 See http:www.britishbrandsgroup.org.uk/upload/File/Similar%20pkg%20examples%202010.pdf; a similar 
survey was conducted at the end of 2011 and early 2012 (after the consumer research was started).
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These figures relate to each of two own brands to manufacturer brand for all twelve of the 
product trios, across all respondents (n=330, providing 1160 product trio ratings).2 As 
indicated in these figures, there is a statistically significant lookalike effect for some, but not 
all, product categories included in the survey. For some of the product types included in the 
survey, differences between two own brands and a manufacturer brand product in ratings of 
perceived similarity of packaging appearance and/or similarity in perceived common origin 
were significantly positively correlated with differences in the perceived quality of the own 
brand products.
In section 7.4.3 below, a scatter plot illustrates the relationship between difference in 
perceived similarity of packaging of two own brands to manufacturer brand, and differences 
between the two own brands on ratings of four dimensions of perceived quality (quality, 
suitability for intended use, expensiveness, value for money). This illustrates a statistically 
significant lookalike effect across the 12 product trios. Increased perceived similarity of 
packaging to manufacturer brand product packaging of one own brand product relative to 
another is significantly correlated with higher perceptions (ratings/expectations) of price, 
quality, suitability for intended use and (marginally) value for money.  Further analyses show 
that when the groups are considered separately, the lookalike effect is significant both for 
users and non-users when analysed across all product categories (grouping all product 
categories together).
The charts in Appendix D which also show the results on (i) perceived similarity in look of 
packaging, and (ii) the perceived likelihood of common origin of each of two own brands to 
manufacturer brand for all twelve of the product trios, with respondents split into users and 
non-users of the product category, for each product. These figures illustrate that where there 
were differences between the pattern of ratings provided by users and non-users of the 
various product groups, the lookalike effects were more likely to be measured in relation to 
non-users. That is, being a consumer of the product category (e.g., shaving gel) tends to 
weaken the beneficial effect on an own brand of looking more like the manufacturer brand 
than does another own brand.
The scatter chart shown in Figure 7.4.4 illustrates the relationship between difference in 
perceived similarity of packaging of two own brands and manufacturer brand, and difference 
in perceived likelihood of common origin between each of the two own brands and 
manufacturer brand. This illustrates a statistically significant lookalike effect on perceived 
common origin across the 12 product trios.  Increased perceived similarity of packaging to 
manufacturer brand product packaging of one own brand product relative to another is 
significantly correlated with higher ratings of likelihood of common origin to the manufacturer 
brand product. Further analyses show that when the groups are considered separately the 
lookalike effect is significant both for users and non-users when analysed across all product 
categories (grouping all product categories together).
2 The data behind the figures for Survey 1 can be found in Appendix E.
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7.4.1: Relationship between differences in perceived 
similarity in look of packaging to perceived common 
origin
A significant relationship in differences between two own brands’ perceived similarity in look 
of packaging to a manufacturer brand and perceived likelihood of having a common origin to 
that brand was found in nine of the 12 product categories tested (boxed in green below, the 
upper box) and not in the other three (boxed in red below, the lower box):
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7.4.2 Relationship between differences in perceived 
similarity in look of packaging and perceived quality
A significant relationship in differences between two own brands’ perceived similarity in look 
of packaging and a manufacturer brand and perceptions of quality was found in four of the 
12 product categories tested (boxed in green below, the upper box) and not in the other 8 
(boxed in red below, the lower box).
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7.4.3 Relationship between differences in perceived 
common origin and perceived quality
A significant relationship in differences between two own brands’ perceived likelihood of 
common origin to manufacturer brand and perceptions of quality (quality, suitability for 
intended use, expensiveness, value for money) was found in five of the 12 product categories 
tested (boxed in green below, the upper box) and not in the other seven (boxed in red below, 
the lower box).
As described above, through interaction with representatives of manufacturer brand owners 
and retailers the research team identified a range of 12 FMCG manufacturer brand products 
each with two potential substitutes, one or both of which might be considered by consumers 
to be lookalikes of the manufacturer brand products.  Each of the 12 product categories of 
three products (the manufacturer brand product and two own brand equivalents) was 
presented to survey respondents. For each trio, participants were required to rate their 
perception of the similarity or dissimilarity in look of each non-target product’s packaging to 
that of the manufacturer branded product equivalent.
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It is important to note that for the 12 product categories, ratings of similarity of the look of the 
packaging of the own brands to look of the packaging of the manufacturer brand were 
relatively low responses were looked at as a whole, or when users and non-users of each 
product category were considered separately. This is illustrated by the charts for perceptions 
of each product, and by the user/non-user charts in Appendix D.
There is a statistically significant lookalike effect: With the method deployed in the 
survey, it has been possible to evaluate the relationship between the difference in perceived 
similarity to target (manufacturer brand) of two non-targets (own brands) and differences in 
perceived qualities of the two non-targets. As show in the figure overleaf, the Phase 1 survey 
identified a statistically significant lookalike effect across the 12 product trios. Increased 
perceived similarity of packaging to manufacturer brand product packaging of one own brand 
product relative to another is significantly correlated with higher perceived (ratings/
expectations of) price, quality, suitability for intended use and (marginally) value for money.
The correlations shown in the figure overleaf are pooled across users and non-users of the 
products. Further analyses demonstrated that when the groups are considered separately 
the lookalike effect is significant both for users and non-users.
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Figure 7.1 - Scatter chart illustrating the relationship between difference in similarity of packaging of two 
own brand to manufacturer brand, and differences between the two own brands on ratings of four 
dimensions of perceived quality (quality, suitability for intended use, expensiveness, value for money)
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7.4.4 Comparing responses of users and non-users of 
products
An interesting point to note from the comparisons between users and non-users of the 12 
product categories shown in Appendix D, is that where lookalike effects were found either 
directly on quality on perceived common origin to brand, or indirectly on perceived quality as 
a result of perceived common origin to brand, these tended to be observed more frequently 
in relation to non-users of a product category than in relation to users of a product category.
There is a statistically significant lookalike effect on perceived origin: It has also been 
possible to evaluate the relationship between the difference in perceived similarity to target 
(manufacturer brand) of two non-targets (own brands) and differences in perceived likelihood 
of common origin to the manufacturer brand of the two non-targets.
As show in the figure overleaf, the first survey identified a statistically significant lookalike 
effect on perceived origin. Increased perceived similarity of packaging to manufacturer brand 
product packaging of one own brand product relative to another is significantly correlated 
with higher ratings of perceived likelihood of common origin of one own brand with the 
manufacturer brand to another own brand with the manufacturer brand.
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7.4.5 Discussion
Accordingly, the first stage survey showed a relatively weak, but significant, lookalike effect, 
in relation to some categories of product. Effectively, an own brand product, whose packaging 
is perceived by respondents to look more like that of a manufacturer brand for which it could 
be a substitute, appears to gain some advantage in being of higher perceived quality (quality, 
suitability for intended use, expensiveness, value for money) over another own brand product 
whose packaging looks less like that of a manufacturer brand.
As noted above, whilst a lookalike effect is observable in relation to some categories of 
product, there is substantial variability across product categories. This suggests potentially 
important roles of a range of other considerations.
Some may focus around product characteristics. For example, any lookalike effect may be 
lower in relation to a fairly generic product (such as vinegar) relative to a category in which 
manufacturer brands have innovated (such as razors or shaving foam). Equally, lookalike 
effects may be moderated by consumer perceptions of own brand products, for example, 
because of consumer associations of reliability and quality with well-known high street 
retailers, such as Boots, Sainsbury and Tesco.
And as shown in above, whilst the lookalike effects we found were evident in responses of 
users and non-users of the relevant product categories, the effect seems to be slightly more 
evident for non-users of a product category.
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7.4.6 Increased lookalike effect?
Although the methodology used in the first survey was not designed to explore the matter, it 
is worth noting that in a retail environment shelf positioning might increase any lookalike 
effect. There is evidence that consumers concentrate on certain parts of the shelf and so 
prime positioning can affect the likelihood a consumer looks at a product and the attention it 
is given.3 It may be that certain shelf placements would increase a lookalike effect if the 
products closely mirror the range, or alternatively where they are positioned in such a way as 
to enable the comparison of equivalents.
The Superdrug “lookalike” and Head and Shoulders as presented in the shop (above left); and the Boots 
lookalike and Clearasil as presented in the shop (above right). Original Source and the Tesco lookalike 
(below left) and Gillette Shaving Gel and the Boots lookalike (below righ\t)
3 Xavier Dreze, Stephen Hoch and Mary Puck “Shelf Management and Space Elasticity” (1994) 70(4) Journal 
of Retailing 301.
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7.5 Consumer research results: Study 2
The project’s second consumer research activity was a large-scale, nationally representative 
survey in three countries (UK, the United States and Germany) designed to understand the 
extent to which consumers report purchasing lookalikes (accidentally or deliberately) and the 
extent to which, if at all, they consider having done so, or doing so, to advantage or 
disadvantage them.
To address this question, i2 media research developed with the Project Steering Board a 
short survey targeting the research questions directly.
The survey was conducted on a large scale internationally (UK, Germany and the United 
States), with each national sub-sample being nationally representative. This enabled us to 
compare results obtained in each of the three countries sampled. The survey sampled 1,000 
consumers in the UK, 500 in Germany and the United States, and was conducted for i2 
media research by GfK NOP Media ltd4 using their nationally representative online panels 
in the UK, Germany and USA. The number of responses targeted per territory was selected 
such that sufficiently robust and reliable results would be generated.
The survey was specifically designed to understand the extent to which consumers report 
purchasing lookalikes (accidentally or deliberately) and the extent to which whether they 
consider having done so, or doing so, to advantage or disadvantage them.
7.5.1 Accidental or mistaken lookalike purchase is 
reported
Substantial proportions (50-60%) of the UK, German and US populations report having 
purchased a lookalike accidentally or mistakenly at least once or twice. The results showed 
20-25% of all three national samples reported having done so a few times, or even frequently, 
and a further 28-37% ever having done so.
4 The data behind the figures for Survey 2 can be found in Appendix F.
90
Impact of Lookalikes
2.2%
10.8%
3.3%
18.0%
16.7%
18.3%
37.0%
33.1%
28.4%
42.8% 39.4%
50.0%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
UK (n=938) USA (n=480) Germany (n=426)
% reporting having purchased a lookalike accidentally/mistakenly
No, never 
Yes, once or twice 
Yes, a few times 
Yes, frequently
Figure 7.3 - Proportion of respondents reporting different frequencies of having purchased a lookalike 
product accidentally/mistakenly
This is an important finding to report as it shows that, regardless of the reasons why 
consumers may do so, many report having purchased lookalikes accidentally or mistakenly 
at some point. If these proportions are thought of in terms of numbers of households it 
generates substantial numbers. For example, 20% of UK households5 purchasing a 
lookalike frequently or even a few times would equate to over 5 million accidental product 
purchases having been made. And 60% of UK households every having done so would 
equate to over 15 million accidental product purchases have been made in total.
7.5.2 Advantage and disadvantage associated with 
accidental lookalike purchase
To quantify the extent to which respondents who reported having purchased a lookalike 
product accidentally or mistakenly perceived themselves to have been disadvantaged or 
advantaged by having done so, these questions were asked directly to the relevant 
respondents. The results are illustrated overleaf.
In summary, across the three national samples 5-15% of accidental purchasers of lookalikes 
rated the purchases as having been of the highest level of disadvantage (“very much”) to 
them, and 30-40% rated the purchases as having been of the next highest level of 
5  In 2011 there were 26.3million households in the United Kingdom according to the Office of the National 
Statistics: All household reporting is based on the United Kingdom statistics only.
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disadvantage (“somewhat”). Across the three national samples a majority (50-60%) 
considered themselves to have been disadvantaged “very little” or “not at all”.
This result is balanced by broadly similar proportions of respondents rating the episodes to 
have advantaged them, to a broadly similar degree as they rated the episodes to have 
disadvantaged them.  Across the three national samples relatively low proportions (5-15%) 
of accidental purchasers of lookalikes rated the purchases as having been of the highest 
level of advantage (“very much”) to them. The survey did not address the question of why 
respondents perceived advantage or disadvantage as a result of having made a mistaken 
purchase. We speculate that any perceived advantage could be based on a perception of 
cost saving. Across the three national samples a majority (50-60%) considered themselves 
to have been advantaged “very little” or “not at all”.
As shown in the chart overleaf, the perceived advantage and disadvantage ratings in relation 
to accidental purchase of lookalikes are fairly balanced.
It is though worth noting that scaled to national populations the reports captured by this 
survey equate to high numbers of households reporting accidental purchase of lookalikes to 
disadvantage them very much (in the UK for example, 1.68 million households) or somewhat 
(in the UK for example, around 9.92 million households).  And substantial, although fewer, 
numbers report that it advantages them very much (in the UK for 0.99 million households), or 
somewhat (in the UK for example, 8.99 million households.)
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Figure 7.4 - Proportion of respondents reporting extent of advantage and of disadvantage from having 
purchased a lookalike product accidentally/mistakenly
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7.5.3 Lookalike purchase reported deliberately
Across all three national samples a relatively high proportion of respondents reported having 
purchased a lookalike deliberately. Deliberate purchase of a lookalike could encompass two 
scenarios: (a) where a respondent sets out from home with the specific intention of buying a 
lookalike; and (b) where in the shop a respondent deliberately decides to purchase an own-
brand product that happened to look like a manufacturer branded product. The defining 
feature of the report is that the purchase of a lookalike was not accidental or by mistake. As 
demonstrated in the chart below, German consumers were much more likely to report having 
purchased a lookalike product deliberately than were US consumers, followed by UK 
consumers.
Across the three national samples, a minority of respondents, ranging from 40% (in the UK) 
to 23.5% (in Germany) reported never having deliberately purchased a lookalike.
8.4%
17.5% 20.5%
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28.5%
37.0%
27.1%
25.6%
19.0%
40.7%
28.3% 23.5%
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% of samples reporting ever having purchased a lookalike deliberately
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Yes, a few times 
Yes, frequently
Figure 7.5 - Proportion of respondents reporting different frequencies of having purchased a lookalike 
product deliberately
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7.5.4 Advantage and disadvantage associated with 
deliberate lookalike purchase 
Respondents who reported ever making a deliberate lookalike purchase were asked to rate 
the extent, if any, to which they considered the purchase to have advantaged and to have 
disadvantaged them. The consumers were answering this question based on their own 
perceptions about the nature of the product and not based on full information about its actual 
qualities.
Across the three national samples between 10-25% of deliberate purchasers of lookalikes 
rated the purchases as having been of the highest level of advantage (“very much”) to them 
whilst between 2-10% rated the purchases as having been of the highest level of disadvantage 
to them.
Across the three national samples a majority (60-75%) considered themselves to have been 
advantaged “very much” or “somewhat” by their deliberate lookalike purchases, compared to 
a minority (15-25%) who reported considering themselves to have been disadvantaged “very 
much” or “somewhat”.
These data are illustrated in the graph below.
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Figure 7.6 - Proportion of respondents reporting extent of advantage and of disadvantage from having 
purchased a lookalike product deliberately 
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7.5.5 Additional data from survey 2
In addition to the core research questions our second survey addressed, several additional 
questions were posed to respondents to provide additional context in which to enable 
interpretation of the results from the core research questions.  
Purchasing tendencies: Respondents were asked which if a series of statements best 
describes their typical behaviour when shopping for groceries and household items.  The 
chart shows the proportion of each of the British, American and German samples selecting 
each option.  The pattern of results is broadly similar across the three national samples. The 
least likely response was “I tend not to buy brand/own-brands” (meaning respondents did not 
characterise their purchase behaviours in terms of brand/own-brand).  Frequency of response 
was highest for “I tend to buy a specific brand/own-brand, but sometimes experiment with a 
different one”, followed by “often switching”, then “never changing”.
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Typical purchase behaviour 
... I tend not to buy brands/ 
own-brands
... I tend to stick to a specific 
brand/own-brand, and never 
change
... I tend to buy brands/ own-
brands, and often switch brands 
... I tend to buy a specific 
brand/own-brand, but 
sometimes experiment with a 
different one
(n=1975)
Figure 7.7 - Proportion of respondents selecting each of 4 possible typical purchase behaviours
Those reporting that they buy brands or own-brands were then asked whether they tended 
to buy brands or own-brands.  Their responses are shown in the table and chart below. The 
main result to note is that German respondents were least likely to report buying brands only 
– with a much higher proportion of German than UK or USA respondents reporting buying 
own-brands only.
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Figure 7.8 - Proportion of respondents reporting tendency to buy manufacturer brands, own-brands or a 
mixture
Importance attributed to considerations for day to day purchases: Respondents were 
next asked to rank in order of importance a series of five considerations for day-to-day 
purchasing decisions. The chart below shows the proportion of each of the British, American 
and German samples ranking each option as first, second, third, fourth and fifth in relative 
importance. The pattern of results is broadly similar across the three national samples, with 
best value for money being ranked above highest quality for UK and US respondents. The 
notable exception is that German respondent reported “Highest quality” to be a more 
important consideration than “Best value for money” in contrast to UK and US respondents 
who thought that was the second most important feature.
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Figure 7.9 - Proportion of respondents ranking (from 1 to 5) considerations in order of importance for day to 
day purchase in UK, USA and Germany
Importance of various characteristics in purchasing decisions: Respondents were next 
asked to rank order a series of six characteristics of products in terms of their perception of 
how much each influences their likelihood of purchasing a day to day product.
The table below and chart overleaf show the proportion of each of the British, American and 
German samples ranking each option as first, second, third, fourth, fifth and sixth in relative 
importance.  The pattern of results is broadly similar across the three national samples, with 
previous positive experience with the product itself consistently rated as most important and 
product packaging shape and colour as less so.
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Figure 7.10 - Proportion of respondents ranking (from 1 to 6) different elements influencing their purchasing 
decisions (UK, USA, DE samples)
Relative strengths of own-brand and manufacturer brands: Respondents were finally 
asked to indicate whether they though own-brand products or manufacturer brand products 
delivered:
• Lower prices;
• Higher quality;
• Better value for money;
• Best fit for purposes.
As the charts below show, when asked to associate various strengths of products with own-
brand products, manufacturer brand products or both, respondents from all three national 
samples tended towards rating own-brand products as being associated with “lower prices” 
and “better value for money”, and manufacturer brands as being associated with being of 
“best fit for purpose” and “higher quality”.
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Figure 7.11 - Charts showing proportion of respondents rating own-brand (blue) or manufacturer brand (red) 
products to be better at providing lower prices, value for money, best fit for purpose and higher quality.  
Green bars represent proportion of sample indicating that both retailers and brand owners are equally good 
at delivering the features.
An interesting result shown in the fourth chart above (‘higher quality’) is that German 
respondents were more likely than were UK or US respondents to report that branded and 
retailer own-brand products are roughly the same at delivering ‘higher quality’.  This result 
provides a coherent rationale for the two findings reported above – that German respondents 
reported ‘Highest quality’ to be a more important purchase consideration than ‘Best value for 
money’, in contrast to US and UK respondents, and that German respondents were much 
more likely to report deliberately purchasing lookalike products. The rationale would then be 
that deliberate purchase of lookalike products would be based on a consumer perception that 
lookalike and manufacturer brand products are of similar high quality.
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Summary Points Chapter 7
SP 7.1:  Consumer survey Lookalike effect
Based on the sample of products the following results were obtained:
• One own-brand product can benefit over another own brand product in 
consumer perceptions of its features (quality, suitability for intended use, 
expensiveness, value for money) by its packaging looking more like that of a 
manufacturer brand product in its category;
• One own-brand product can benefit over another own brand product in 
consumer perceptions of common origin with the manufacturer brand (quality, 
suitability for intended use, expensiveness, value for money) by its packaging 
looking more like that of a manufacturer brand product in its category. Such 
shared origin also increase perception of shared features.
This suggests a lookalike effect subject to the following:
• Any lookalike effect varies across different types of product category. Lookalike 
effects were observed in relation to some products, and not in relation to others;
• Any lookalike effects are more likely to be observed in relation to non-users of a 
product category.
SP 7.2: Survey 2 – Mistake and Advantage/Disadvantage
Mistake
A substantial proportion of consumers report having purchased a lookalike product mistakenly 
(by accident):
• 20-25% reported do so at least a few times; 
• around 60% reported doing so at least one (across the three national samples).
Disadvantage
Across the three national samples:
• 5-15% of all respondents who reported making an accidental purchase of a 
lookalike product rated the purchase as having the highest level of disadvantage 
(“very much”); 
• 30-40% rated the purchases as having been of the next highest level of 
disadvantage (“somewhat”);
• across the three national samples a majority (50-60%) considered themselves to 
have been disadvantaged “very little” or “not at all”;
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High numbers of households reporting accidental purchase of lookalikes to disadvantage 
them “very much” (in the UK for example, 1.68 million households) or “somewhat” (in the UK 
for example, 9.92 million households).
Advantage
Balancing this, across the three national samples:
• 4-15% of accidental purchasers of lookalikes rated the purchases as having been 
of the highest level of advantage (“very much”) to them;
• 30-40% rated the purchase as having the next level of advantage (“somewhat”); 
• the remainder considered themselves to have been advantaged “very little” or “not 
at all”.
Scaling these proportions to numbers of households generates an estimate of substantial 
numbers being advantaged “very much” by accidental purchase of lookalikes (in the UK for 
example 0.99 million households), or “somewhat” (in the UK for example, a little under 8.99 
million households).
Deliberate Purchase
• A higher proportion (60-75%) of consumers reported having purchased a lookalike 
product deliberately;
• Of these, much higher proportions report associating the purchase with 
advantage (10-20% “very much” and around 50% “somewhat”) than disadvantage 
(2-10% “very much” and around 10-15% “somewhat”).
As context to the above, the second survey found that respondents across the three national 
samples:
• ranked previous positive experience with a product as more important 
than aspects of its appearance (such as packaging shape and colour) as 
considerations in purchasing decisions;
• ranked “value for money” as a more important consideration in their purchase 
decisions than “highest quality” (except for German respondents, who rated them 
as equally important);
• tended towards rating own-brand products as being more associated with 
“lower prices” and “better value for money”, and manufacturer brands as 
being associated with being of “best fit for purpose” and “higher quality;
• reported buying manufacturer brands and own-brands, but with more of a 
tendency to buy manufacturer brands.
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Chapter 8: Sales Data
8.1 Introduction
There were reports, both in the literature and from brand owners during interviews,1 that the 
sales of manufacturer branded products were affected by lookalikes. The purpose of the 
analysis in this chapter is to investigate in available sales data what, if any, effect there is on 
those sales and to see if the effect is different when a distinctive own brand is launched. The 
raw sales data in this chapter were provided by Kantar Worldpanel2 but the analysis of that 
data was conducted by the research team. 
8.2 Methodology
8.2.2 Collection of data
In summary, the data sought from Kantar was the sales volume and sales value relating to 
three products in twelve different product categories. These three products represent the 
brand leader (a manufacturer branded product), the lookalike and the control. The analysis 
attempts to measure the effect of the “launch event” of a lookalike and so the data sought 
was intended to represent the sales of the brand leader for 12 months before the launch of 
the lookalike and the sales of both the lookalike (or control) and the brand leader for the next 
24 months. These figures were sought in relation to the overall market and the particular 
supermarket where the lookalike (or control) was sold. This represented the ideal, but as will 
be explained below this was not always available. First, the products studied will be identified 
once more.
8.2.3 Products
The sales data were sought for the same products as those selected for the purposes of the 
consumer research discussed in Chapter 7. The reason these were chosen was so that the 
consumer research data could be used in conjunction with the sales data. The sales data 
was sought and obtained after the products were tested in the consumer research. Accordingly, 
the products selected were as follows:
1  See Chapter 6, Theme 5: Sales.
2  www.kantarworldpanel.com.
102
Impact of Lookalikes
Category Brand Leader6 “Lookalike” “Control”
Bodyspray Charlie Pink Tesco Sweet Tesco Pink Body Spray
Bodywash Original Source Lime Tesco’s Wake Up Sainsbury’s Lime 
Bodywash
Cheese The Laughing Cow 
Cheese
Tenery Cheese Tesco’s Cheese 
Triangles
Razor Gillette Mach 3 Boots Blade 3 Morrison’s Triple Blade
Washing Up Liquid Fairy Lemon Washing 
Up Liquid
Magnum Lemon 
Washing Up Liquid 
Tesco Lemon washing 
up liquid
Shampoo Head and Shoulders Boots anti-dandruff Sainsbury’s Anti-
dandruff
Drinks Red Bull ASDA Blue Charge Mixxed Up
Vinegar Sarson’s Malt Vinegar Samson’s Malt Vinegar Asda Malt Vinegar
Butter Lurpack Norpak Tesco Butterpak
Ibuprofen Nurofen Ibuprofen 
capsules
Boots Ibuprofen 
caplets
Sainsbury’s Ibuprofen 
capsules
Skin care Clearasil Ultra Boots Skin Clear Tesco Clear Skin
Shaving gel Gillette Fusion Shaving 
Gel
Boots Blade 3 Shaving 
Gel
Morrison’s Shaving Gel
8.2.4 Volume / Value vs Market Share
The data used for this analysis were absolute volume (and value) sales of particular products. 
There is no consideration of the effect of lookalikes on market share. The interviews with 
brand owners3 considered lost sales in relation to market share rather than volume. 
However, the research team considered that there would be problems with using market 
share for the following significant reasons. First, the market definition would be very difficult, 
if not contrived, and any definition of the market chosen for this study would be perhaps 
justifiably open to criticism. Secondly, some of the products studied created the market or 
were very dominant4 within the market for the product in question. Accordingly, any entry of 
a new product onto that market might have a significant effect on market share even if the 
volume sold did not change.5 Thirdly, some of the own brand products (control / lookalike) 
have very low volumes and so measuring their market share would be measuring very small 
changes.
3 See Chapter 6, Theme 5: Sales.
4 This does not mean in the competition law sense.
5 Imagine Red Bull was selling 90 units in a retailer and so had a 100% market share within that retailer. The 
retailer launched an own brand (lookalike) and managed to sell 10 units of its own brand and Red Bull 
continued to sell 90 units. Now 100 units are sold in that retailer, but without any change in volume, Red Bull 
has lost 10% market share. 
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The use of volume data provides a loose indication of whether the own brand is expanding 
the market or “taking” sales from others. However, to assess this accurately would require 
data on the total number of units sold within the market (which once more requires market 
definition). Conversely, there are problems with using volume as the measure. Volume data 
do not take account of other players in the market (i.e., other competitors – the manufacturer 
brands and retailers) and it does not indicate how particular products are doing compared to 
the market as a whole (e.g., whether the market is growing or shrinking). However, it is 
reasonable to assume that the movement of a product, which is the brand leader, will 
generally follow the movement of the market overall. 
8.2.5 Launch event
The data provided by Kantar do not include the date of a product’s “launch event” as such. 
However, it is assumed that the first time sales of the product reported in their data represent 
a good proxy for the actual launch event (although, in fact, it can take some weeks or even 
months for data to feed through to the Panels and so be recorded by Kantar).6 Where there 
was no “launch event” for a lookalike, because it was launched before the branded product, 
the data provided constituted an indicative 36-month period. A lookalike which was launched 
before a branded product would of course have to change its packaging to become a 
lookalike.
8.2.6 Weaknesses in data sets and noise
Although data were sought for the period of 12 months before launch for each of the products, 
this was not possible for a number of reasons. A brief summary of issues connected to each 
data set appears in Appendix J. The nature of sales data makes the data very noisy (as the 
sales figures for each four week period regularly change radically) and this may mask 
otherwise statistically significant results.
8.2.7 Barcodes/product codes
The data collected by Kantar is based on bar codes and Kantar’s own internal “Product 
codes”. Kantar (obviously) does not record the look of packaging in which each product was 
sold. Kantar’s product codes for a product do not (usually) change when the packaging 
changes. Similarly, it is not always the case that the product code will change where an own 
brand product is rebranded. This means that it is not possible to measure directly the sales 
effect of the particular packaging used for the consumer surveys in Chapter 7. However, it is 
reasonable to assume that the packaging of the lookalike will be closest to the brand leader 
at the time of the lookalike’s launch event7 and become more distinct as time goes on. This 
is because the perceived lookalike advantage is strongest when a new product enters the 
market. However, this assumption also means that the control’s packaging may have been 
closer to the brand leader at the launch event, but subsequently distanced itself before the 
consumer survey. There are no data on this and so it must be assumed that the control never 
resembled the brand leader.
6 Interestingly the research group purchased the Boots Blade 5 Shaving Gel for the purposes of the consumer 
research on 7th September 2011. The product does not appear on Kantar data until the 4 week period ending 
27th November 2011. It was also included in the British Brands Group in their 2010 Study.
7 See paragraph [8.2.5].
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8.2.8 Brands
In determining the sales of a particular product it was necessary to identify what constitutes 
that product. For this reason, the idea of “brands” was adopted. This was determining what, 
in the research team’s view, would be substitutable.8 This means products of different sizes 
and volumes and prices were combined into a brand. It was therefore a subjective assessment 
of what a consumer would consider substitutable, without any consumer research to support 
these decisions. There is therefore scope for error. In any event, the selections made for 
each particular brand (with their barcodes and product codes) are set out in Appendix G. It 
should be noted that the combination of products into brands means that it is not possible to 
divide the value by volume statistics to obtain a unit price.
8.2.9 Substitution data
Kantar Worldpanel is able to provide data as to substitution. This indicates whether one 
panellist changes his or her habits and extrapolates this to an entire market. For example, 
where a panellist bought one bottle of Original Source Lime Bodywash each week for six 
months and then stopped buying that and instead started buying an own brand lime bodywash, 
this would be considered a substitution. It may be that further research could use this sort of 
data in assessing the lookalike effect. However, for the purposes of this research, it was 
considered that to understand the various factors that might underlie substitution would 
require interviews with consumers (and the relevant panellists) before understanding whether 
the packaging made the difference. As the purpose of the data analysis here is not to measure 
substitution as such but lost sales, these problems are not as significant.
8.2.10 Assumptions
For the reasons outlined in the previous paragraph the following assumptions are made:
1. A lookalike is likely to have the most similar packaging to the branded 
product when it is launched; and
2. The packaging of the control has not changed significantly during any study 
period.
8  For example, it was decided that a single can ASDA Blue Charge was not substitutable for a 12 can multipack 
of Red Bull.
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8.3 Hypotheses
The purpose of the research was to see whether the number of sales a brand leader 
decreases as the packaging of an own brand gets closer to that of the brand leader. Line 
graphs setting out the sales data are available at Appendix H. These line graphs provide a 
good indication of the rapid and drastic changes in sales patterns over the year but they do 
not provide any great insight into lookalikes. The basic research question can be expressed 
in three hypotheses:
H1 A brand leader’s volume (value) sales will decline when any own brand enters  
 the market;
H2 The decline will be greater in the supermarket selling the own brand than   
 across the whole market; and
H3 This decline will be greater when the product is a lookalike than when it is a  
 dissimilar own brand.
Summary of theory behind hypothesis: It is axiomatic that in a competitive market the 
entry of a new competitor will affect negatively the sales of existing players on that market; 
unless the sales of the new product is absorbed entirely by market growth.9 Accordingly, it 
would be expected that an own brand entering the market, as a new competitor, would divert 
sales from existing players including the brand leader. This is the basis of H1. Own brand 
products are on sale only in particular supermarkets, and so any negative effect they have on 
sales is likely to be greatest in that supermarket. Accordingly, where the “launch event” of 
own brand is a significant factor in a drop in sales, it would be expected that the decline 
would be greater in the particular supermarket (where customers can choose between the 
two products) than it would be on the overall market (as only a proportion of the customers 
on that market are likely to visit a particular supermarket10). This is the basis of H2. Finally, if 
there is an advantage in selling a lookalike over a distinctive own brand it would be expected 
that the decline in volume will be greater in relation to the lookalike than against the control. 
This is the basis of H3.
9 Except where the product fails.
10 The nature of these goods is such it will be assumed that few, if any, customers are likely to change 
supermarkets because of the arrival of a particular own brand product.
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8.4 Mean sales
8.4.1 Year by year comparison of mean sales 
The following table sets out the mean sales of the manufacturer brands across the three 
periods. The first period is a period before the launch of the lookalike (usually one year, but 
this is not always the case).11 The second period is the 12 months after the launch of the 
lookalike and the third period is the next 12 months (where data permits). Accordingly, the 
following charts show the decline in sales of the brand leader which may relate to the launch 
of the lookalike. Where there are no “launch” data (i.e., data for the last 3 years is all that is 
provided or the lookalike or control came first), no figures are provided below. Where the 
sales of the lookalike have grown following launch the increase is marked in red.
Manufacturer 
Vs Lookalike
Period 1 Period 2 Period 3
Whole S/M Whole S/M Whole S/M
Bodyspray 105.9 25.27 112.5 
(+6.2%)
25.9 
(+2.5%)
129.7 
(+15.3%)
17.0 
(-34.4%)
Bodywash 177.3 84 128.3 
(-27.6%)
38.6 
(-54.4%)
214 
(+66.8%)
59.15 
(+153%)
Cheese 104.9 - 106.3 
(-1.3%)
- 87.1 
(-18.1%)
-
Razor 30.5 8.1 28.2 
(-9.2%)
3.8 
(-53.1%)
21 
(-25.5%)
2.3 
(-39.0%)
Washing up 
lqd
218.1 - 166 
(-23.9%)
- 144.5 
(-13.0%)
-
Shampoo - - - - - -
Drinks 684 109.4 908.38 
(+132.8%)
102.4 
(-6.4%)
629.31 
(-30.7%)
56.23 
(-45.1%)
Vinegar 622.0 - 568.0 
(-8.9%)
- 568.0 
(=)
-
Butter 1386.0 3 1259.0 
(-9.2%)
0.4 
(-86.7%)
1106.7 
(-12.0%)
0.5 
(+25%)
Ibroprofen 206.0 11.8 199 
(-3.4%)
12.6 
(+6.8%)
- -
Skin care - - - - - -
Shaving gel 194.7 29.4 152.2 
(-21.8%)
13.5 
(-54.1%)
- -
 
Manufacturer brand vs lookalike: Mean sales of Brand Leader (‘000)
11 The time periods are set out in Appendix J.
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Manufacturer 
Vs Control
Period 1 Period 2 Period 3
Whole S/M Whole S/M Whole S/M
Bodyspray 57.6 15.9 138.8 
(+141%)
39.8 
(+150%)
109.3 
(-21.3%)
30.5 
(-23.4%)
Bodywash 166.2 36.8 195.3 
(+17.5%)
39.07 
(+6.1%)
- -
Cheese - - - - - -
Razor 16 1 10.8 
(-32.5%)
2.8 
(+180%)
- -
Washing up lqd 163.5 40.5 292.2 
(+78.7%)
129.8 
(+320.5%)
152.3 
(-47.9%)
68.3 
(-47.4%)
Shampoo 884.9 191.7 564.3 
(-36.2%)
109.8 
(-42.7%)
584.6 
(+3.6%)
126.0 
(+14.8%)
Drinks 353.6 21 355.9 
(+0.7%)
25.1 
(+19.5%)
358.9 
(+0.8%)
35.8 
(+42.6%)
Vinegar - - - - - -
Butter 1396.2 276.9 1656.7 
(+18.7%)
307.5 
(+11.1%)
1366.7 
(-17.5%)
357.5 
(+16.2%)
Ibroprofen 226.1 35.3 192.8 
(-14.7%)
27.9 
(-21.0%)
204.9 
(+6.3%)
26.3 
(+5.7%)
Skin care - - - - - -
Shaving gel - - - - - -
Manufacturer brand vs control: Mean sales of Brand Leader (‘000)
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8.4.2 Analysis of findings
As these charts show, there were some very significant movements in the sales of the brand 
leader products (both across the whole market and within the supermarket) following the 
lookalike/control product being launched. The comparison of mean sales shows that the 
mean sales of the brand leader across the whole market went down, sometimes dramatically, 
in 8 out of 10 of the product categories during the first period following the launch of the 
lookalike. In relation to the drop in sales with the particular supermarket the sales went down 
in 5 out of 7 categories.
In relation to the launch of the control product the mean sales of the brand leader went up, 
sometimes substantially, across the whole market in relation to 5 out of the 8 product 
categories. In relation to the sales within a particular supermarket, the sales of the brand 
leader went up following the launch of a control in relation to 6 of the 8 product categories.
The data in relation to the lookalike products initially suggests a very dramatic and negative 
effect on sales following the launch of a lookalike, but a very positive effect following the 
launch of a non-similar packaged product. This does not fit H1. The sales of the brand leader 
whether going up or going down can be related to a number of factors, including possibly the 
packaging. The following section looks to see whether there is a closer correlation between 
the sales of the brand leader and the own brand (whether lookalike or control).
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8.5 Correlations
8.5.1 Methodology
If H1 H2 and H3 are correct it would be expected that there would be a correlation between the 
volume sales of the brand leader and the volume sales of the own brand (both control and 
lookalike). This will be tested using the following null hypothesis:
H0 There is an inverse correlation between the number of sales of the brand leader 
and those of the own brand
The correlations are based on scatter 
charts with the sale of lookalikes on the Y 
axis and the sale of branded products on 
the X axis.  The chart to the right 
demonstrates an ideal cluster which 
would prove the null hypothesis. When 
the sales of the lookalike are zero the 
sales of the branded product are at their 
highest and as the sales of the lookalike 
increase those of the branded product 
decrease. 
The time does not need to be considered 
because the comparison between sales 
figures is taking place at the same time. The 
further away the cluster is from following the 
pattern in the “Ideal” cluster the less correlated 
the results will be and so the less likely that 
there is a relationship between the sales of the 
two products. The scatter chart on the left, 
based on some of the data analysed, shows a 
very low correlation. 
The correlation between the two sales figures is demonstrated by the Pearson product 
coefficient (r). The closer the coefficient is to -1 the closer the correlation is to that which 
would be expected under the null hypothesis. If the coefficient is close to 0 then there is no 
correlation at all. Finally, the closer the coefficient is to 1 the correlation represents the 
opposite of what is expected under the null hypothesis. The nature of results and the noise 
in the data has meant that statistical significance is measured at four different levels rather 
than at a single level: 10%, 5%, 2% and 1%. 
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Definition of “negative association” and “positive association”
“negative association” means, unless the context otherwise suggests, that there is 
significant negative correlation which suggests an association between an increase in 
sales of the own brand (lookalike or control as the case may be) and a decrease in the 
sales of the brand leader. 
“positive association” means, unless context otherwise suggests, that there is a 
significant positive correlation which suggests an association between an increase in 
sales of the own brand (lookalike or control) and an increase in the sales of the brand 
leader. 
The data correlated: The basic approach adopted was to measure the correlation of the 
sales over three periods. The first period was 24 weeks after launch of the lookalike/control. 
As the sales data represent four-weekly cycles, 24 weeks was used as an approximation to 
the first six months of sales (26 weeks). A second correlation was obtained for the sales 
during the first 12 months after launch. A third was obtained for all sales data from launch. In 
certain instances some of these correlations were not possible. For example, where the own 
brand product was launched before the brand leader the correlations over a 36-month period 
were assessed. In addition to the volume of sales, the value of those sales and the correlation 
between that of the brand leader and the lookalike/control are included in Appendix J. Those 
value correlations will not be discussed here.
The coefficients for volume sales are displayed in the charts below to three decimal places; 
in Appendix J they are displayed to five decimal places. The scatter charts behind the 
coefficients are in Appendix I. The trend lines for those charts demonstrate increases both 
gentle and drastic as well as decreases both gentle and drastic. The charts themselves are 
not enough to interpret adequately the data across product categories.
Importance of associations: A negative association in relation to a particular product 
category indicates that there might be substitution between the brand leader and the lookalike 
or control. Such substitution could be caused by the similarity of the packaging, but it might 
also be caused by numerous other factors such as price, advertising, promotions, shortages 
in supply, previously poor/good experience and so forth. The lack of a negative association 
(or even a positive association) might also be the result of different interplays of these and 
other factors, in particular an increase in the size of the market. 
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8.5.2 Correlations - 24 weeks
Product Category Brand leader/Lookalike Brand leader/control
Whole Market Supermarket Whole Market Supermarket
Bodyspray 0.503 -0.212 0.707 0.658
Bodywash -0.813# -0.119 -0.121 -0.621
Cheese -0.884* - - -
Razor 0.118 0.913* -0.863* -0.263
Washing up lqd -0.203 - -0.367 -0.001
Shampoo - - -0.894* -0.642
Drinks -0.434 -0.416 0.640 0.511
Vinegar -0.070 - - -
Butter -0.278 -0.300 0.254 -0.434
Ibuprofen* 0.697 0.519 -0.490 0.578
Skin care - - - -
Shaving gel -0.703 -0.910* -0.233 -0.587
* The Ibuprofen sales represent only 16 weeks of sales and not 24 in relation to the lookalike (but the 
control is 24 weeks)
₮→ p < 0.1 ; # → p < 0.05 ; * → p < 0.02 ;  $ → p < 0.01
Summary of data - 24 weeks: These figures represent the correlation between only 6 pairs 
of data and so are likely to give very limited insight. Nevertheless, of 35 measured correlations 
6 show a statistically significant correlation (17.1% of comparisons show a significant 
correlation). Looking at these correlations more closely it is apparent that there are 3 negative 
associations out of seventeen measured correlations for lookalikes (17.6%) and 1 positive 
association (5.9%). Two of those 3 negative associations relate to the whole market and only 
1 relates to the supermarket (the positive association is also related to the supermarket). In 
contrast, there are 2 negative associations out of 18 measured correlations for control 
products (11.1%) and no positive associations. These 2 negative associations are both 
related to sales across the whole market.
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8.5.3 Correlations – 12 months
Product 
Category
Brand leader/Lookalike Brand leader/control
Whole Market Supermarket Whole Market Supermarket
Bodyspray 0.399 -0.125 -0.186 0.053
Bodywash -0.421 -0.278 -0.331 -0.268
Cheese -0.546₮ -0.161 - -
Razor* -0.069 0.203 -0.311 -0.018
Washing up lqd -0.201 - -0.130 0.084
Shampoo - - -0.675 -0.542₮
Drinks 0.323 0.316 -0.014 0.032
Vinegar -0.125 - - -
Butter -0.164 -0.244 -0.083 -0.363
Ibuprofen* - - -0.067 0.058
Skin care - - - -
Shaving gel - - -0.284 -0.174
* The data on the sales of the Morrison’s Control Razor are only available for 11 months from launch (df=9, 
rather than df=11)
₮→ p < 0.1 ; # → p < 0.05 ; * → p < 0.02 ;  $ → p < 0.01
Summary of data – 12 months:  This represents the correlations of the first 12 months of 
sale, and of 32 measured correlations only 3 show a statistically significant correlation (9.3% 
of comparisons show a significant correlation). Looking at these correlations more closely it 
is apparent that there are 1 negative association out of 14 measured correlations for lookalikes 
(7.1%) and no positive associations. The negative association related to sales across the 
whole market. In contrast, there are 2 negative associations out of 18 measured correlations 
for control products (11.1%) and no positive associations.
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8.5.4 Correlations – All data
The final correlation considered is the change in sales volume from (a) the first 4 week period 
when the lookalike or control entered the market to (b) the last period for which data have 
been received. This means some of the results reported here may already have been reported 
in one of the earlier tables. Where there was no launch event, it includes the correlation of all 
the data received.
Product Category 
(df)
Brand leader/Lookalike Brand leader/control
Whole Market Supermarket Whole Market Supermarket
Bodyspray (26) 0.308 -0.001 -0.0386 0.049
Bodywash (25) -0.092 -0.012 -0.331 -0.268
Cheese (21/37) -0.444# -0.208 0.270 0.450$
Razor (24) 0.124 0.225 -0.311 -0.018
Washing up lqd 
(27/18)
-0.104 - -0.077 0.078
Shampoo (37/18) -0.172 -0.241 -0.333 -0.296
Drinks (24) 0.455* 0.394# -0.212 -0.270
Vinegar (24/37) 0.199 - 0.297₮ -0.349#
Butter (24) -0.393# 0.023 -0.144 -0.017
Ibuprofen* (2/25) 0.697 0.518 0.187 0.305
Skin care (37) -0.188 -0.028 -0.255 -0.151
Shaving gel (4/14) -0.703 -0.910* -0.179 -0.190
₮→ p < 0.1 ; # → p < 0.05 ; * → p < 0.02 ;  $ → p < 0.01
Summary of results – All data: This represents the correlations of all the data from launch 
(or over the 36-month period) of sale, and of 46 measured correlations only 8 show a 
statistical significance. This represents 17.4% of comparisons showing a significant 
correlation. However, of those 8 correlations, 4 are actually positive. Looking at these 
correlations more closely it is apparent that there are 3 negative associations out of 22 
measured correlations for lookalikes (13.6%) and 2 positive associations (9%).12 Two of 
those 3 negative correlations relates to the whole market and only 1 the supermarket (the 
positive correlation relates to the same product in both the supermarket and whole market). 
In contrast, there is 1 negative association out of 24 measured correlations for control 
products (4.2%) and 2 positive correlations (8.3%). One negative correlation is related to 
sales across the whole market and 1 of the positive associations is across the whole market 
and one for the supermarket.
12 Three of these correlations – that for Shaving Gel (lookalikes); Bodywash (control); and Razor (control) are 
all the second reporting of the same data. The former was reported at 24 weeks the other two at 12 months.
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8.5.5 Ranked correlations
As was explained above, the data is very noisy and includes numerous outliers and this may 
affect the number of negative and positive associations identified. Accordingly, to reduce the 
effect of the noise in the data and remove the effect of outliers the sales figures were ranked. 
The ranking begins at the launch of the product (or the beginning of the 36 month period 
where relevant). The 4 week period with the highest sales is ranked 1 and that with the 
second highest 2 and so forth (and when the sales in two weeks were the same they were 
given the same ranking). This enables the data to be assessed to see whether the ranking of 
the sales of the brand leader decrease is associated with the ranking of the sales of the own 
brand increasing. 
The table below sets out the correlations using both Kendall’s tau b and Spearman’s rank 
correlation (Rho). 
Product Category 
(sample size)
Brand leader/Lookalike Brand leader/control
Whole Market Supermarket Whole Market Supermarket
Kendall Spear Kendall Spear Kendall Spear Kendall Spear
Bodyspray (28/27) 0.445$ 0.634$ -0.014 -0.017 0.189 0.215 0.135 0.154
Bodywash (26/13) -0.124 -0.153 0.068 0.105 -0.116 -0.190 -0.271 -0.363
Cheese (23/39) -0.367* -0.505* - - 0.150# 0.274# 0.231 0.337₮
Razor (26/11) 0.007 0.027 0.209 0.266 -0.357 -0.399 -0.189 -0.264
Washing up lqd 
(29/20)
-0.057 -0.132 - - -0.011 -0.060 0.058 0.063
Shampoo (39/20) -0.039 -0.081 -0.166 -0.209 -0.260 -0.364 -0.112 -0.147
Drinks (26) 0.217 0.390# 0.245₮ 0.370₮ -0.201 -0.272 -0.190 -0.266
Vinegar (26/39) 0.072 0.092 - - 0.237 0.322 -0.234# -0.343#
Butter (26) -0.424$ -0.581$ 0.155 0.188# -0.162 -0.210 -0.012 -0.017
Ibuprofen* (4/27) 0.333 0.400 0.333 0.600 0.216 0.297 0.219 0.329₮
Skin care (39) -0.158 -0.230 -0.035 -0.036 -0.154 -0.233 -0.041 -0.072
Shaving gel (6/16) -0.548 -0.621 -0.730 -0.830 0.017 0.066 -0.043 -0.069
₮→ p < 0.1 ; # → p < 0.05 ; * → p < 0.02 ;  $ → p < 0.01
Summary of results: This represents the correlations of all the data from launch (or over the 
36-month period) of sale, and of 46 measured correlations only 3 demonstrate a negative 
association using both Kendall’s tau b and Spearmans (Rho) (6.5%) and 3 demonstrate a 
positive association (6.5%). Looking at these more closely it is 2 negative associations and 
2 positive associations of 21 measured correlations for lookalikes. Those negative 
associations relate only to the whole market and not the supermarket and one positive 
association one is in the supermarket and one the whole market. For controls, there is 1 
positive and 1 negative association out of 24 measured correlations. 
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A further, three correlations demonstrate a positive association using Spearman’s (Rho) but 
not Kendall’s tau b and one a negative association using only that test. Two of the positive 
associations related to controls and the negative association and 1 positive association 
related to lookalikes.
8.5.6 Analysis of both sets of correlations
There were 10513 measured correlations for Pearson’s. Of these measurements, 49 related 
to lookalike products and 56 related to control products. These will be looked like individually 
then in combination. 
Lookalikes: Of the 49 measured correlations relating to lookalikes there were 6 negative 
associations (12.2%) and 3 positive associations (6.1%) and the remaining 40 correlations 
were not significant either way (81.6%). Of the 6 negative associations 5 related to sales 
across the whole market and only 1 related to sales within a supermarket. None showed a 
negative association both across the whole market and in the relevant supermarket. The 
position for ranked correlations showed 2 negative associations and 2 positive associations 
of 21 measured correlations. Those negative associations relate only to the whole market 
and not the supermarket and of the positive correlations one is in the supermarket and one 
the whole market.
Control: Of the 56 measured correlations relating to lookalikes there were 5 negative 
associations (8.9%) and 2 positive associations (3.6%) and the remaining 49 correlations 
were not significant either way (87.5%). Of the 5 negative associations 3 related to sales 
across the whole market and 2 related to sales within a supermarket. In only one product 
category, Shampoo at 12 months, was there a negative association both across the whole 
market and in the relevant supermarket. For ranked correlations there is 1 positive and 1 
negative association out of 24 measured correlations.  
13 This section does not double count (see footnote 12 above).
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Hypothesis testing: In this section it has been shown that there is no consistent pattern 
demonstrating H0 In relation to lookalikes, the results of 87.7% were inconsistent with that 
hypothesis (including both no association and positive associations). Further, in relation to 
controls, 91.1% of results were inconsistent with that hypothesis. Accordingly, although it is 
apparent means the entry onto the market of a lookalike has a negative association in a few 
product categories (Bodywash, Cheese, Shaving Gel and Butter) it is not consistent enough 
across all product categories to support H0. Further, although this will be explored later, only 
in one instance (Shampoo, a control product) was a negative association found in relation to 
the whole market and the supermarket. Accordingly, only this product category supports H2.
8.6 The relative effect of packaging
8.6.1 Relative similarity of packaging and significant 
correlations
The analysis of the data so far has drawn a distinction between the “lookalike” and the 
“control”. However, some of the lookalikes are closer in appearance to the brand leader than 
others and, similarly, some controls are more dissimilar from the brand leader than others. 
The first consumer survey, reported in chapter 7, asked respondents to rate the similarity of 
the packaging of a lookalike (and control) to the brand leader on a scale from 1 (they don’t 
look at all like each other) to 7 (they look exactly the same).14  Accordingly, a score of 4 
represents the mid-point and a score of over 4 represents the consumer rating the packaging 
of product as more alike than different. Whereas a score of less than 4 means the packaging 
looks more different than alike. However, a rating below 4 does not, automatically, mean that 
the packaging is distinctive. 
In the table below the Pearson correlations calculated above are set out, where a correlation 
was found to be statistically significant it is coloured red for positive and black for negative. 
To make the ranges of similarly easier to distinguish the upper range is marked orange (a 
rating of 5 or over), the upper-mid range (a rating between 4 and 5) is marked yellow; the 
lower-mid range is marked lime green (a rating between 3 and 4); and the lower range is 
marked dark green (a rating of below 3). 
In contrast to the earlier statistical analysis the controls and lookalikes can be considered at 
the same time as the similarity is between the own brand (lookalike and control) and the 
brand leader. It can be seen that all the products in the upper-mid and upper range are 
lookalikes; whereas all the products in the lower range were controls. However, products in 
the lower-mid range fall into both categories.
14  The raw results for column one are reported in Appendix E.
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24wks 12m All
Product
(LL) Lookalike
(CT) Control
Similarity of 
packaging W/M S/M W/M S/M W/M S/M
Body spray (LL) 5.3252 0.503 -0.212 0.399 -0.125 0.308 0.001
Skin care (LL) 5.0381 - - - - -0.188 -0.028
Butter (LL) 4.7475 -0.278 -0.3 -0.164 -0.244 -0.393# 0.023
Cheese (LL) 4.5747 -0.884* - -0.546₮ -0.161 -0.444# 0.208
Shampoo (LL) 4.4456 - - - - -0.172 0.241
Vinegar (LL) 4.058 -0.070 - -0.125 - 0.199 -
Wash Up liqd (LL) 3.7831 -0.203 - -0.201 - -0.104 -
Drink (LL) 3.7706 -0.434 -0.416 0.323 0.316 0.455* 0.394#
Ibuprofen (LL) 3.75 0.697 0.519 - - 0.697 0.518
Razor (LL) 3.5882 0.118 0.913* -0.069 0.203 0.124 0.225
Body wash (LL) 3.5395 -0.813# -0.119 -0.421 -0.278 -0.092 -0.012
Wash Up liqd (CT) 3.4824 -0.367 -0.001 -0.13 0.084 -0.077 0.078
Shave gel (LL) 3.4783 -0.703 -0.91* - - -0.703 -0.91*
Razor (CT) 3.1527 -0.863# -0.263 -0.311 0.018 -0.311 -0.018
Vinegar (CT) 2.9706 - - - - 0.297₮ 0.349#
Body wash (CT) 2.9079 -0.121 -0.621 0.331 0.268 -0.331 -0.268
Shampoo (CT) 2.8819 -0.894* -0.642 -0.675* -0.542₮ -0.333 -0.296
Butter (CT) 2.83 0.254 -0.434 -0.083 -0.363 -0.144 -0.017
Cheese (CT) 2.7841 - - - - 0.27 0.45$
Body spray (CT) 2.3445 0.707 0.658 -0.186 0.053 -0.039 0.049
Shave gel (CT) 2.0429 -0.233 -0.587 -0.284 -0.174 -0.179 -0.190
Drink (CT) 2 0.640 0.511 -0.014 0.032 -0.212 -0.270
Skin care (CT) 2 - - - - -0.255 -0.151
Ibuprofen (CT) 1.9875 -0.49 0.578 -0.067 0.058 0.187 0.305
₮→ p < 0.1 ; # → p < 0.05 ; * → p < 0.02 ;  $ → p < 0.01
Summary of results: If H3 were correct there would be the most negative associations in the 
orange (upper) region (in fact there are none), followed by the yellow (where there are 3), 
followed by the light green (where there are 5) and finally the dark-green (where there are 5). 
There is no clear pattern demonstrating this result however. The total number of negative 
correlations is greater in the lower-mid and lower than in the upper-mid and upper. The 
number of negative associations “above” the bar (a mark of 4) is less half of those below the 
bar. 
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This does not reflect the number of products in each of the categories (as there are more 
products in the green regions). In the upper region, 0% of correlations represented a negative 
association; in the upper-mid region, 17.6% of correlations represent a negative association; 
the figure is 12.2% in the lower-mid; and 10.4% in the lower region. Conversely, in the upper-
mid region, 5.88% of correlations represent a positive association; the figure is 7.3% in the 
lower-mid; and 14.5% in the lower region. This does show a slightly greater proportion of 
negative associations in the upper-mid region than in the lower regions and similar there is 
slightly smaller proportion of positive associations in that region than below. 
8.6.2 Perceived common origin and significant 
correlations
If H3 is correct it would also be expected that as the perceived common origin of the own 
brand with the brand leader increased there would more statistically significant correlations 
(as calculated above). 
The respondents to the consumer survey were also asked to rate the likelihood of the product 
as having a common origin on a scale of 1 to 7 (once more 1 extremely unlikely to be made 
by the same company and 7 extremely likely to be made by the same company). As before 
this is set out on the table below. As there were no products which the aggregate score 
suggests that consumers considered the product to have a common origin all products were 
marked with a score of below 4. Similarly, no products achieved a rating of under 2.5. The 
range of aggregate scores is therefore very narrow. Nevertheless, the same colour scheme 
is used as above (save there are no orange or yellow sections).
Impact of Lookalikes 
119
24wks 12m All
Product
(LL) Lookalike
(CT) Control
Similarity of 
packaging W/M S/M W/M S/M W/M S/M
Butter (LL) 3.9600 -0.278 -0.3 -0.164 -0.244 -0.393# 0.023
Body spray (LL) 3.8468 0.503 -0.212 0.399 -0.125 0.308 0.001
Shampoo (LL) 3.8378 - - - - -0.172 0.241
Skin care (LL) 3.7778 - - - - -0.188 -0.028
Razor (LL) 3.7029 0.118 0.913* -0.069 0.203 0.124 0.225
Vinegar (LL) 3.6765 -0.070 - -0.125 - 0.199 -
Ibuprofen (LL) 3.6707 0.697 0.519 - - 0.697 0.518
Cheese (LL) 3.5632 -0.884* - -0.546₮ -0.161 -0.444# 0.208
Drink (LL) 3.4727 -0.434 -0.416 0.323 0.316 0.455* 0.394#
Vinegar (CT) 3.4493 - - - - 0.297₮ 0.349#
Razor (CT) 3.4104 -0.863# -0.263 -0.311 0.018 -0.311 -0.018
Cheese (CT) 3.2273 - - - - 0.27 0.45$
Wash Up liqd (LL) 3.2235 -0.203 - -0.201 - -0.104 -
Shampoo (CT) 3.1862 -0.894* -0.642 -0.675* -0.542₮ -0.333 -0.296
Wash Up liqd (CT) 3.1765 -0.367 -0.001 -0.13 0.084 -0.077 0.078
Ibuprofen (CT) 3.0886 -0.49 0.578 -0.067 0.058 0.187 0.305
Shave gel (LL) 3.0857 -0.703 -0.91* - - -0.703 -0.91*
Body wash (CT) 3.0789 -0.121 -0.621 0.331 0.268 -0.331 -0.268
Body spray (CT) 3.0331 0.707 0.658 -0.186 0.053 -0.039 0.049
Body wash (LL) 2.9737 -0.813# -0.119 -0.421 -0.278 -0.092 -0.012
Skin care (CT) 2.9720 - - - - -0.255 -0.151
Butter (CT) 2.8788 0.254 -0.434 -0.083 -0.363 -0.144 -0.017
Drink (CT) 2.8570 0.640 0.511 -0.014 0.032 -0.212 -0.270
Shave gel (CT) 2.6377 -0.233 -0.587 -0.284 -0.174 -0.179 -0.190
₮→ p < 0.1 ; # → p < 0.05 ; * → p < 0.02 ;  $ → p < 0.01
Summary of results: If H5 is proven it would be expected that there would be the most 
negative associations towards the top of the table. Considering the eight products with the 
highest perceived origin (those with a score of 3.5 or over) then of 32 measured Pearson 
correlations there were 3 negative associations (9.3%) and 2 positive associations (6.25%). 
If this is contrasted with the five product with the lowest perceived origin (those with a score 
of under 3) then of 26 measured correlations there were 3 negative associations (11.5%) and 
1 positive association (3.8%). For completeness, in the middle region (a score greater than 
3.0 but less than 3.5) there were eleven products. In relation to those products there were 53 
measured correlations of which 7 were negative associations (13.2%) and 7 were positive 
associations (13.2%).  These figures show that there were proportionally more negative 
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associations amongst the five products with the least perceived common origin (<3.0) than 
there were in the eight products with the highest perceived common origin (>3.5). However, 
proportionally there were more still in the middle region between the two.
8.6.3 Analysis of the similarity of packaging and 
common origin
When the correlations are re-arranged so as to represent consumer’s perception of package 
similarity and common origin the data suggests away from packaging similarity being 
associated with negative correlations. Where the packaging was most similar there were no 
negative associations and although there were proportionally more negative associations in 
the “upper-mid” region than the “lower-mid” or “lower region” this appears to be masking how 
the data is actually spread. In the lower-mid region there are no further negative associations 
in the four most similar packaged products (those four products immediately below the upper-
mid region), but there are three positive associations. The negative associations found in the 
lower-mid region are actually all in the four products closest to the lower region. Further, 
there were proportionally more negative associations in the lower region than the lower-mid 
region. The results in relation to the perceived common origin similarly demonstrate an 
unclear picture. This means that no clear pattern emerges whereby as packaging (or 
perceived origin) becomes closer to the brand leader the number of negative associations 
increases. The lack of such a relationship may be the result of numerous other factors 
masking the association caused by packaging or it may be that no such relationship exists. 
8.7 Conclusions on Hypotheses H1 to H3
If a lookalike effect was to be evidenced from the sales data then H1, H2 and H3 would have 
been demonstrated by the data. When the comparisons were made between the lookalikes 
and controls there were more negative associations for lookalikes than controls. There was 
however less than a 5% difference across all data and so it might be reasonable to put this 
distinction down to chance rather than the slightly more similar packaging.  Further, when the 
relative similarity of the packaging was considered, the pattern of negative associations did 
not tend to be at the highest level of similarity (and this was more pronounced with perceived 
origin). 
If the launch of an own brand, whether lookalike or control, was causing substitution of sales 
it would be expected that there would be more negative associations within supermarkets 
than across the whole market (as the sales of the new own brand would take place in that 
supermarket). However, this pattern was not demonstrated as most negative associations 
were across the whole market. Further, there were positive associations in some product 
categories and this is contrary to all the hypotheses and so makes the picture more unclear.
Nevertheless, in some product categories there is an association between an increase in 
sales of an own brand (both control and lookalike) and a decrease in sales of a brand leader. 
It is possible that association is caused by a number of factors, one of which is the similarity 
of packaging. Conversely, the wide number of factors affecting sales means that an 
association between the similarity of packaging and the sales might be masked by these 
other factors.
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Summary Points Chapter 8
SP 8.1: Are sales affected by launch of own brand / lookalike.
• Following the launch of lookalike there was generally a drop in annual sales of 
brand leader;
• Following the launch of control there was generally an increase in annual sales of 
brand leader.
SP 8.2: Correlations – Lookalikes and Control.
• In some product categories there is negative association between the sales of the 
control and lookalike and the brand leader; 
• However, in other product categories there is positive association between the 
sales of the control and lookalike and the brand leader;
• In a substantial majority of product categories there are no significant correlations 
found at all;
However, masking of data limits conclusions which be drawn on associations. A number of 
factors may underlie this, one of which is the packaging.
SP 8.3: Correlation – Relative similarity in packaging.
Similarity in packaging – conclusions unclear:
• There are more negative associations where own brand is slightly similar to brand 
leader than where most similar, slightly dissimilar, or very dissimilar;
• More negative associations where own brand is very dissimilar than where it is 
slightly dissimilar;
Accordingly, no clear pattern emerges demonstrating that negative associations increase as 
the packaging becomes more similar. 
SP 8.4: Packaging and Common Origin.
• There are fewer negative associations where the perceived origin of the own 
brand is closer to the brand leader than when the perceived origin is further away; 
• No clear pattern emerges demonstrating that negative associations increase as 
consumers increasing perceive an own brand shares a common origin with the 
brand leader.
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SP 8.5 Conclusions on H1 to H3.
On the current data the following can be stated:
• H1 A brand leader’s volume (value) sales will decline when any own brand 
enters the market (NOT PROVEN);
• H2 The decline will be greater in the supermarket selling the own brand than 
across the whole market (NOT PROVEN); and
• H3 This decline will be greater when the product is a lookalike than when it is a 
dissimilar own brand (NOT PROVEN).
The quality of the data is such that it is not possible to say that H1 to H3 are not true, merely 
that the current data does not prove them.
“negative association” means, unless the context otherwise suggests, that there is 
significant negative correlation which suggests an association between an increase in sales 
of the own brand (lookalike or control as the case may be) and a decrease in the sales of the 
brand leader. 
“positive association” means, unless context otherwise suggests, that there is a significant 
positive correlation which suggests an association between an increase in sales of the own 
brand (lookalike or control) and an increase in the sales of the brand leader.
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Part 3:  Going Forward – Legal 
and Business Landscape
Chapter 9:  The Impact of 
Lookalikes
9.1 Introduction
This chapter brings together the literature from Part 1 and the research described in Part 2 
and addresses the central questions of the research. 
9.2 Is there a lookalike effect?
There have been a number of published surveys, and a vast number of unpublished ones, 
which make it clear that consumers make mistaken purchases. The literature also indicates 
that the cause of these mistakes is often packaging, but other factors, such as shelf position, 
are also reported. The literature generally does not examine or clarify whether the common 
perceived origin relates to the packaging itself or relates to beliefs about the origin of own 
brand products more generally.1 
Some of the recent studies have indicated that consumers are more likely to buy own brand 
products where they look more like the branded product.2 The existing literature also reports 
that consumers generally believe manufacturer brands to be “better” than own brand.3 
Accordingly, this might suggest that lookalikes are also perceived to be “better” the more 
closely they resemble the brand. To date, of the surveys considered in the present research 
only, the Consumer Association has tried to equate similarity with quality.4 That said, even 
that study does not examine what the term “quality” meant to the consumers. 
1 This might be called the Marmite problem – where consumers believed all yeast extracts were made by the 
same company and the packaging makes no difference: see Beecham Group v J Sainsbury plc (unreported) 
6th April 1987, Whitford J (also see discussion in Annex IV).
2 Paragraphs [5.3.7] and [5.3.8].
3 Paragraph [5.2.1].
4 Paragraph [5.3.5]; using behavioural experiment Jean-Noel Kapfere, in “Stealing Brand Equity: Measuring 
Perceptual Confusion between National Brands and ‘Copycat’ Own-label Products” (May 1995) Marketing 
and Research Today 96, was able to conclude that “when the copy and the original are presented side by 
side…the consumers judge the copy similar or equivalent to the original…The exterior resemblance of the 
products side by side is a source of inferences on the internal equivalence of the products and their 
performance” (at 102). As he acknowledged this experiment was on a side by side comparison basis which is 
not usually how consumers make the comparison. 
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The present research addressed a subtle question, namely, whether the relative similarity in 
packaging of one own brand to a manufacturer brand to another own brand was related to 
respondents’ perceptions of various quality characteristics, including perceived origin. 
At the outset, it should be made clear that the consumers did not view any of the twelve 
manufacturer branded products selected for the study as having a particularly strong own 
brand lookalike.5 This might suggest the research team made a poor choice of samples; 
however most, although not all, of the samples were products which were put forward as 
good examples of “lookalike” by the manufacturers themselves (through the British Brands 
Group (BBG) in its 2010 Study). It is therefore fair to assume that the results are representative 
of consumer perceptions of the product packaging perceived by manufacturers as problematic.
Despite the absence of any samples being standout lookalikes, the research found from the 
individual comparison graphs that there was a statistically significant lookalike effect for 
some, but not all, product categories.6 When this was plotted on a scatter chart it appears 
across all product categories that there is a small but statistically significant lookalike effect. 
This means that, as product packaging becomes closer to the manufacturer branded product, 
there are higher consumer expectations of product features, namely, price, quality, fitness for 
intended purpose, and (marginally) value for money. 
It was also found that there is a statistically significant lookalike effect on common origin. 
Consequently, the closer the two sets of packaging are to each other, the more likely it is that 
consumers believe the products have the same origin.7 
It was also found that the lookalike effects were more likely to be measured in relation to non-
users. This is consistent with the research team’s finding that previous experience is most 
important factor in making purchasing decisions.8 This could mean that the lookalike effect 
is most significant when a lookalike enters a mark. Further, that being a consumer of the 
product category (e.g., shaving gel) tends to weaken the beneficial effect on an own brand of 
looking more like the manufacturer brand than does another own brand and so the lookalike 
effect is lower in relation to the person most likely to buy the product.
Finding 1: Is there a lookalike effect?
There is a small, but statistically significant, lookalike effect leading consumers to 
believe that similar-looking products have similar product characteristics, and similar 
origin. The effect is greater, however, in those consumers who do not use products 
within a particular product category (and so the effect is lower in relation to the persons 
most likely to buy the product). This is consistent with the existing literature which 
suggests consumers are confused when packaging is similar.
5 Paragraph [7.4.3].
6 See paragraph [7.4].
7 It appears that some, but not many, manufacturer brand owners do make own brand: see Chapter 6, Theme 
7: Making own brand.
8 See paragraph [7.5.5].
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9.3 Consumer detriment
The next issue that needs to be considered is whether consumers suffer detriment as a result 
of this lookalike effect. The measure of any such detriment is difficult, primarily as there are 
arguments over how that detriment should be gauged. Does it relate only to an individual 
purchase? Or can it also be extended to the loss of product choice or lack of product 
innovation? 
The literature, and the research undertaken here, has generally considered the responses of 
individual consumers making purchasing decisions, rather than the broader questions as to 
product availability. Those broader questions will be considered, to the extent possible, within 
the confines of business harm. 
There were some reports from manufacturer brand owners of consumer complaints they had 
received directly regarding lookalikes.9 A difficult question is whether a mistaken purchase 
of a product automatically creates consumer detriment. The Consumer Association10 took 
the view that a mistaken purchase causes detriment only if consumers were “bothered” about 
it. This seems to be a sensible benchmark to adopt; however, it does require the assumption 
that consumers have full information about the differences between the desired product and 
the one mistakenly purchased, which is not always the case. 
9.3.1 Mistaken purchase
Much of the literature does not investigate the question of whether consumers were concerned 
about their mistaken purchase or not.11 
In the Consumer Association survey mentioned above, it appears that one in five consumers 
were bothered a lot by their mistake and three in ten were bothered a little.12 The research 
conducted as part of this study found that across the UK, German and the US, 5-15% of 
accidental purchasers rated their level of disadvantage as being “very much” and 30-50% 
reported the next highest level of disadvantage. This presents broadly similar results to those 
obtained by the Consumer Association. In terms of UK consumer reports, this represents a 
high number of households reporting that the accidental purchase of lookalikes disadvantages 
them very much (1.68 million households) or somewhat (9.92 million households).13
Conversely, a substantial number of consumers across the three jurisdictions reported an 
advantage resulting from an accidental purchase. In that group, 11-22% of accidental 
purchasers of lookalikes considered themselves to have had the highest level of advantage 
from their mistake and a further 49-56% reported having the next level of advantage. In terms 
of the UK data, this represents a substantial number of households reporting that the 
accidental purchase of lookalikes advantages them very much (0.99million households) or 
somewhat (8.99million households).14
9 See paragraph Chapter 6, Theme 8: Consumer complaints.
10 See paragraph [5.3.5].
11 See the discussion in Chapter 5; as from a business perspective, and a legal perspective, this is not relevant.
12 See paragraph [5.3.5]; also see the earlier survey at paragraph [5.2.2].
13 See paragraph [7.5.2].
14  See paragraph [7.5.2].
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This suggests that some consumers suffer detriment from the mistaken purchase whilst 
others find it to be a positive experience.
Finding 2: What is the consumer advantage / disadvantage from mistaken 
purchases?
A high number of households report that the accidental purchase of lookalikes 
disadvantages them very much (1.68 million) or somewhat (9.92million). Conversely, a 
substantial number of households reported such a purchase to advantage them very 
much (0.99 million) or somewhat (8.99 million). This suggests that some consumers 
suffer detriment from the mistaken purchase whilst others find it to be a positive 
experience. The research did not find out why some consumers perceived the purchase 
to be a good or bad experience.
9.3.2 Intentional purchases
There was nothing found in the literature reporting whether consumers who intentionally 
purchase a lookalike perceive themselves as suffering a detriment (e.g., a person knowingly 
buys an own brand product on the basis that it looks like a well-known manufacturer brand 
product). Again, a consumer’s (possibly mistaken) beliefs about a product may have a 
significant influence on whether they perceive the intentional purchase as advantageous. If 
a consumer perceives the lookalike to be of equal (or better) quality than the manufacturer 
brand owner’s product then they are likely to report an advantage – even if the products are 
not actually equivalent. Nevertheless, as with mistaken purchasers it will be assumed that 
the consumers have full information. Further, the research found that consumers tended to 
rank value for money as more important than quality15 and if a lookalike is perceived a small 
drop in quality for a bigger drop in price this might lead them to assume it to be advantageous. 
The research found a very high number of consumers had purchased a lookalike deliberately 
(60-70% across the three jurisdictions) and unsurprisingly a much higher proportion of those 
consumers reported the experience to be advantageous (10-20% at the highest level of 
advantage and approximately 50% at the second highest level) than disadvantageous (2-
10% at the highest level of disadvantage and 10-15% at the second highest level).16 
Finding 3: Do consumers deliberately purchase lookalikes and do they gain 
advantage from it?
A substantial majority of consumers had deliberately purchased a lookalike and of 
those consumers most of them found the experience to be advantageous. The research 
did not find out why some consumers perceived the purchase to be advantageous. 
The literature includes a number of other matters which have been investigated relating to 
consumer’s attitudes to packaging. They generally report that packaging should look 
15  See paragraph [7.5.5]. 
16  See paragraph [7.5.4].
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different,17 although some similarity is found to be useful for signalling purposes.18 Both 
manufacturer brand owners and retailers accepted that some customer cues are necessary 
signals.19 This is because if there is a lookalike effect then it is likely to lead to some mistaken 
purchases and so to some detriment, but it also signals to consumers and so leads them to 
buy lookalikes and receive the reported advantage. The conclusion reached by the Consumer 
Association that there might be a fine line between useful signals and confusing packaging 
therefore appears apt.20
Finding 4: What role does packaging play in signalling in relation to lookalike 
packaging?
There is a fine line between confusing packaging and using generic cues to provide 
useful signals to consumers.
9.4 Business harm
The potential types of business harm associated with lookalikes and discussed in the 
literature21 include: lowering innovation; wasted costs on changing packaging; sales 
diversion, and an adverse effect on advertising.22 
9.4.1 Innovation
The research team had no empirical evidence regarding the relationship between innovation 
and lookalikes. However, the literature discusses it in the wider context of own brand goods 
and it is reasonable to assume that similar issues are at play with lookalikes. Of course, 
lookalikes are not confined to own brand and they may be produced by a third party 
manufacturer and sold in a variety of retailers. 
In the literature it is clear that manufacturer brand owners believe that own brands (rather 
than just lookalikes) do not undertake product innovation.23 Similar views were expressed in 
the interviews undertaken by the research team.24 However, this is clearly not the view of the 
own brand retailers themselves. The only retailer who discussed the issue with the research 
team supported their innovation assertion by describing a recent product where there had 
been own brand innovation.25 It is outside the scope of this study to assess whether retailer 
own brands lead to innovation or not. 
17 See paragraph [5.3.3], [5.3.5], [5.3.7] and [5.3.8].
18 See paragraph [5.2.3] and [5.3.5].
19 See Chapter 6, Theme 1: Concept of lookalike.
20 See paragraph [5.3.5].
21 See paragraph [3.3.2].
22 An additional issue was whether lookalikes have a greater impact on brand followers (see paragraph [3.4.4]), 
this was not something that could be investigated by the research team as no relevant data or literature was 
available.
23 See paragraph [3.3.2].
24 See Chapter 6, Theme 3: Innovation.
25 See Chapter 6, Theme 3: Innovation.
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The literature includes some very limited empirical evidence suggesting that, in the food 
sector in Europe at least, the presence of own brand on the market does not inhibit 
innovation.26 The evidence was too general to divide the data between distinctive own brand 
and lookalikes and the relative effect of each. The literature goes further, however, to suggest 
that own brand actually spurs innovation within the manufacturer brand owners.27 There was 
some support from the present research that own brands, and lookalikes, necessitate 
innovation28 as it was the only way for a manufacturer brand owner to maintain an edge. 
Furthermore, it is through innovation that the manufacturer brand owners can stay ahead and 
maintain the price differential with lookalikes. However, there may be a tipping point where 
the lost sale caused by lookalikes (or other competitors) is such that research can no longer 
be funded or commensurate.29 
Accordingly, the literature and the interviews provide some limited evidence to support the 
suggestion that lookalikes spur manufacturer brand owners to innovate (usually incremental)30 
as it is the best way to maintain the price differential. Such an effect, however, might disappear 
in markets where market share (more precisely, sales) have declined so much that the costs 
of research cannot be recovered. Thus, there is circumstantial evidence that if, and when, a 
lookalike causes a drastic fall in sales this might in turn reduce the expenditure on innovation.
Finding 5: What effect do lookalikes have on innovation?
There is some limited evidence to support the suggestion that lookalikes spur 
manufacturer brand owners to innovate as it is the best way to maintain the price 
differential. Such an effect, however, might disappear in markets where market share 
(more precisely, sales) have declined so much that the cost of research cannot be 
recovered.
9.4.2 Wasted packaging costs
The literature postulates that the existence of lookalikes might cause manufacturer brand 
owners to change their packaging regularly in order to distance themselves from the 
lookalike.31 This otherwise unnecessary redesign would amount to wasted costs. The 
literature includes two instances (Flash and Head and Shoulders) where a change in style or 
look of packaging of a brand leader has been followed by competitors so that the packaging 
in the product category remains very similar even though the brand leader has made radical 
changes. These changes might be indicative of two things. The first would be that lookalikes 
have actually caused additional redesigns to be undertaken (wasted costs). The second is 
that the brand leader was refreshing the design in any event and this refreshed design was 
then followed / copied by competitors (no wasted costs). 
26 See paragraph [3.3.2].
27 See paragraph [3.3.2].
28 See Chapter 6, Theme 3: Innovation.
29 See Chapter 6, Theme 3: Innovation.
30 See paragraph [3.3.2].
31 See paragraph [3.4.2].
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This issue was explored during the interviews with the brand owners. It is clear that some 
brands never change their packaging at all whilst others change it at regular and sometimes 
quite frequent intervals.32 Indeed, the packaging of more than one of the products used for 
the consumer survey changed between the time of its purchase for the survey and the 
drafting of this report.33 
However, even in those industries where there is a regular change of packaging, nobody 
reported that a change of packaging was caused (or brought forward) by the arrival or 
existence of a lookalike.34 In fact, some had considered making such a change but decided 
against doing so.35 This may be because consumers prefer packaging not to undergo regular 
radical changes. Nevertheless, it is clear that when a regular packaging renewal is being 
undertaken then the packaging of rivals, including lookalikes, would be considered. 
Accordingly, it does not appear that costs were wasted36 by repeated packaging redesigns 
caused by lookalikes; rather, any redesigns undertaken would happen in any event as part of 
the normal lifecycle of the product.
Finding 6: Do lookalikes lead the brand manufacturer to change its own packaging?
It does not appear that lookalike products directly cause brand manufacturers to make 
additional (and wasteful) changes to their packaging.
9.4.3 Sales diversion
The entry onto the market of a new lower-priced competitor of similar quality would generally 
be thought to divert sales away from the existing products. However, the literature on 
lookalikes causing lost sales is very limited indeed. This might be explained by the fact that 
even within the relevant industries, and where a lookalike is perceived by a manufacturer 
brand owner, only about a third track it at all, and of those only three-quarters track it through 
sales.37 Nonetheless, a survey by the manufacturer brand owners’ group AIM reported that 
a lookalike attracts an average (median) of 5-10% of market share from the manufacturer 
brand.38 Further, on average (median) there is a 10-20% greater decline caused by the 
launch of a lookalike than that expected when a competitor in distinctive branding is launched 
(this appears to refer to both distinctive own brand and non-own brand competitors).
32 See Chapter 6, Theme 4: Packaging and investment.
33 The research team did not set out to investigate this, but coincidentally noticed that Boots Ibuprofen changed 
as did Clearasil Ultra.
34 See Chapter 6, Theme 4: Packaging and investment.
35 See Chapter 6, Theme 4: Packaging and investment.
36 It might be that there would be slightly more costs associated in distinguishing a product from a lookalike 
when a redesign occurred, but this would be too difficult to measure. 
37 See paragraph [5.3.9].
38 See paragraph [5.3.9].
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A further problem is that a product’s sales may be affected by a wide range of factors. These 
include most obviously a change in the size of the market and the product’s price, but similarly 
the running of promotions, the extent of advertising campaigns, shortages in supply reducing 
sales, shelf-positioning, previously good or bad experiences with a particular product and so 
forth, are all relevant factors. Thus, any effect on sales on a brand leader caused by the entry 
on the market of a lookalike might not be immediately apparent as changes in sales figures 
might be caused by so many different factors.
The research team addressed the issue of sales diversion in two ways. First, the team 
discussed the issue during the interviews and, secondly, examined certain sales figures for 
product trios over twelve product categories. During the interviews, there were very different 
responses regarding the effect lookalikes had on sales. Only one interviewee specifically 
reported sales being affected by the launch of a lookalike and this being worse than the 
launch of a distinctive own brand.39 Another reported the converse, namely that sales had 
fallen more when a distinctive own brand had been launched than following the launch of a 
lookalike.40 Others said there had been some effect on sales and one even said that there 
was no discernible effect on sales.41 This result is not surprising given the numerous factors 
at play and, at best, it provides somewhat inconclusive evidence as to sales diversion.
Finding 7: Do manufacturer brand owners report that lookalikes cause additional 
loss of sales over distinctive competitors?
The literature suggests that lookalike packaging causes a greater loss of sales (or 
market share) than distinctive competitors. However, the qualitative data from the 
interviews produced inconclusive results.
The second aspect of this research examined the volume sales data of trios of products 
(brand leader, lookalike and control) over twelve product categories. The mean sales of the 
brand leader did appear to take a dip, and sometimes a drastic dive, following the launch of 
a lookalike product in most (although not all) product categories.42 However, in relation to the 
control it appears that following the launch of the product the brand leader gained sales, 
sometimes substantially. This pattern suggests strongly that other factors, other than 
packaging, may well have been at work. This becomes more evident when a more precise 
measure of the association between the own brand (control and lookalike) was correlated 
with the brand leader. 
It was expected that there would be a correlation between the own brand / lookalike volume 
sales going up and the brand leader’s going down. In some product categories, such a 
correlation was found and it is possible that this is caused by the similarity of the packaging 
(the lookalike effect at work).43 However, in over 80% of cases there was no correlation 
between the sales of the brand leader and the lookalike. Further, in a little over 6% of cases 
the pattern was the converse and the sales of the lookalike and brand leader both went up.44 
39 See Chapter 6, Theme 5: Sales.
40 See Chapter 6, Theme 5: Sales.
41 See Chapter 6, Theme 5: Sales.
42 See paragraph [8.4]
43 See paragraph [8.3].
44 See paragraph [8.5.6].
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When the relative similarity of the packaging (based on the consumer survey) was taken into 
account it was expected that there would be substantially more significant correlations where 
the packaging was considered similar by consumers. But this result was not found. Indeed, 
there were actually fewer significant correlations where consumers perceived the own brand 
and brand leading product to have a common origin than when they did not.45 
The variety of factors mentioned above could well be masking the effect of the lookalike 
packaging on brand leader sales or it may be that its effect is negligible.  
Finding 8: Do sales figures show that lookalikes causes additional loss of sales over 
distinctive competitors?
In a very limited number of product categories, an association was found between a 
reduction in the sales of the brand leader and an increase in the sales of the lookalike. 
This could have been caused by numerous different factors, one of which is the 
similarity of the packaging (the lookalike effect at work). Such associations did not 
appear to relate to consumers’ relative perception of packaging similarity or common 
production origin and also did not generally appear to exist within the particular 
supermarket selling the own brand. The evidence is inadequate to determine whether 
lookalike packaging generally diverts sales or if the effect of that packaging is 
negligible.
9.4.4 Advertising
The literature on advertising and lookalikes is limited, but it does tend to suggest that 
advertising is effective at drawing away trade from non-retailer rivals, but is less effective 
against own brand.46 Nevertheless, it was postulated by the research team that, in order to 
retain market share against lookalikes, manufacturer brand owners would have to spend 
more money on advertising than would be the case from own brand alone. If this was proved 
it would represent a cost on, and so harm to, manufacturer brand owners. 
It was only possible to examine this issue within the scope of the interviews conducted with 
manufacturer brand owners. In those discussions, it was explained that generally it was 
advantageous for retailers to delay the launch of own brands until the bulk of the advertising 
spend had been completed, as manufacturer brand owners’ advertising caused growth in the 
own brand market as well.47 The responses of manufacturer brand owners to own brands 
once launched seem to vary between spending more, making no change in spending at all, 
and cutting all spending.48 Future research could be undertaken to measure advertising 
spend using media monitoring services to see whether advertising by manufacturer brand 
owners increases or decreases following the launch of a lookalike.  However, based on the 
interviews no meaningful conclusions can be drawn as to the effect on advertising spend 
when a lookalike enters the market.
45 See paragraph [8.6.3].
46 See paragraph [3.4.5].
47 See Chapter 6, Theme 6: Advertising spend and promotions.
48 See Chapter 6, Theme 6: Advertising spend and promotions.
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Findings 9: Do lookalikes affect advertising spend?
There are differing responses by manufacturer brand owners when a lookalike enters 
the market. Accordingly, no meaningful conclusions can be drawn as to the effect on 
advertising spend when a lookalike enters the market.
Impact of Lookalikes 
133
Chapter 9 Findings
Finding 1 – Is there a lookalike effect?
There is a small, but statistically significant, lookalike effect leading consumers to believe 
that similar-looking products have similar product characteristics, and similar origin. The 
effect is greater, however, in those consumers who do not use products within a particular 
product category (and so the effect is lower in relation to the persons most likely to buy the 
product). This is consistent with the existing literature which suggests consumers are 
confused when packaging is similar.
Finding 2 - What is the consumer advantage / disadvantage from 
mistaken purchases?
A high number of households report that the accidental purchase of lookalikes disadvantages 
them very much (1.68 million) or somewhat (9.92million). Conversely, a substantial number 
of households reported such a purchase to advantage them very much (0.99 million) or 
somewhat (8.99 million). This suggests that some consumers suffer detriment from the 
mistaken purchase whilst others find it to be a positive experience. The research did not find 
out why some consumers perceived the purchase to be a good or bad experience.
Finding 3 - Do consumers deliberately purchase lookalikes and do they 
gain advantage from it?
A substantial majority of consumers had deliberately purchased a lookalike and of those 
consumers most of them found the experience to advantageous. The research did not find 
out why some consumers perceived the purchase to be advantageous.
Finding 4 - What role does packaging play in signalling in relation to 
lookalike packaging?
There is a fine line between confusing packaging and using generic cues to provide useful 
signals to consumers.
Finding 5 - What effect do lookalikes have on innovation?
There is some limited evidence to support the suggestion that lookalikes spur manufacturer 
brand owners to innovate as it is the best way to maintain the price differential. Such an 
effect, however, might disappear in markets where market share (more precisely, sales) have 
declined so much that the cost of research cannot be recovered.
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Finding 6 - Do lookalikes lead the brand manufacturer to change its own 
packaging?
It does not appear that lookalike products directly cause brand manufacturers to make 
additional (and wasteful) changes to their packaging.
Finding 7 - Do manufacturer brand owners report that lookalikes causes 
additional loss of sales over distinctive competitors?
The literature suggests that lookalike packaging causes a greater loss of sales (or market 
share) than distinctive competitors. However, in interviews with the research team only one 
of the manufacturer brand owners reported this finding; the others gave a mixed picture.
Finding 8 - Do lookalikes causes additional loss of sales over distinctive 
competitors?
In a very limited number of product categories, an association was found between a reduction 
in the sales of the brand leader and an increase in the sales of the lookalike. This could have 
been caused by numerous different factors, one of which is the similarity of the packaging 
(the lookalike effect at work). Such associations did not appear to relate to consumers’ 
relative perception of packaging similarity or common production origin and also did not 
generally appear to exist within the particular supermarket selling the own brand. The 
evidence is inadequate to determine whether lookalike packaging generally diverts sales or 
if the effect of that packaging is negligible.
Finding 9 - Do lookalikes affect advertising spend?
There are differing responses by manufacturer brand owners when a lookalike enters the 
market. Accordingly, no meaningful conclusions can be drawn as to the effect on advertising 
spend when a lookalike enters the market.
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Chapter 10:  Legislative Policy 
10.1 Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to draw conclusions as to the legal aspects of the research 
which was set out in Part 1 and the Annexes. It addresses the following whether any of the 
three target jurisdictions provide a satisfactory lookalike law, provides a possible statutory 
description of a lookalike and analyses the UK’s freedom to legislate in the realm and the 
potential for other possible solutions.
10.2 Lookalikes under the law as it stands in 
UK, Germany and the United States
It appears that under the law of passing off in the UK, most claimants in “lookalike” cases do 
not fare very well. Of the ten lookalike cases considered,1 the claimant was successful in 
only three instances and partially successful in one.2 That said, the lack of success in itself 
does not prove anything, as the claimant might simply have brought a weak case. Further, it 
is apparent that the cases failed for a number of different reasons but the pivotal reason was 
usually because confusion could not be proved.3 
The situation in Germany is commonly reported to be much more favourable than that in the 
UK.4 In particular, there appears to be greater success at obtaining interim injunctions in 
Germany, notwithstanding this depended on the particular judicial chamber where the case 
was brought.5  When it comes to the substantive cases between retailers and lookalikes, 
despite the long history of German cases based on parasitic copying, the cases do not 
appear to be consistent. The two decisions of the German Supreme Court (BGH) considered 
come to opposite conclusions – one finding the “lookalike” to be a parasitic copy and the 
other not.6 Furthermore, a procedural change made in 20117 means that unfair competition 
cases have become more difficult to bring successfully.
1 See Annex IV.
2 F Hoffmann-La Roche v DDSA Pharma [1972] RPC 1; Reckitt & Colman Products v Borden Inc [1990] RPC 
341; United Biscuits v Burtons Biscuits [1992] FSR 14 (partial success) and United Biscuits v ASDA [1997] 
RPC 513. 
3 Cf. See Chapter 6, Theme 10: Litigating and forum selection.
4 See Chapter 6, Theme 10: Litigating and forum selection.
5 See paragraph [2.3].
6 See Annex IV.
7 See the BGH decision of TUV (2011) GRUR-Prax 228; also see paragraph [2.3] and Annex II.
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Similarly, in the United States there is not a consistent approach to trade dress infringement 
where the infringing product is a lookalike being sold by a retailer.8 The issue usually 
remains whether or not the trade dress is such that consumers are confused.
In each of these three jurisdictions it is clear that a retailer (or another) selling a lookalike 
might be prevented from doing so (whether as passing off, unfair competition or trade dress 
infringement) but in each jurisdiction successfully bringing an action is challenging. 
Point 1: Does the law of any of the three target jurisdictions clearly prevent 
lookalikes? 
In none of the three jurisdictions examined - the UK, Germany and the United States 
– is the legal position of lookalikes sufficiently clear. Nevertheless, at the interim 
stage, there is a perception that a claimant is more likely to be successful in the 
favourable German forum than in either of the other two countries.
10.3 Legal definition
The sorts of packaging features which make a product a lookalike were generally agreed and 
supported by the research – colour, wording, logos, iconography, layout, shape and 
composition of packaging.9 This largely fits with the previous attempts to legislate in this 
field.10 In the interviews it was emphasised that certain cues are generic. Such cues would 
be things which are “descriptive”, “functional,” or “commonplace”.11 In trade mark law, where 
something has become generic it is for the person asserting that fact to prove the matter in a 
revocation action.12 Accordingly, whether the definition of a lookalike excludes the generic 
elements (leaving it to the claimant to prove that it is not generic) or it forms a defence to a 
claim (leaving it to the defendant to prove it has become generic) is a matter of policy. 
Furthermore, a strong view came across in the interviews that a lookalike is something that 
you will know when you see it,13 sometimes called an “elephant test.” However, such tests 
are generally not appropriate in assessing intellectual property infringement.14 Nevertheless, 
if a statutory definition were required the following definition reflects the evidence collected 
(adopting the approach of requiring the claimant to prove the packaging has not become 
generic). 
8 See Annex II, paragraph [II.5.3].
9 See Chapter 6, Theme 1: Concept of lookalike.
10 See Annex I, paragraph [I.2.1].
11 See Chapter 6, Theme 1: Concept of lookalike and generally Annex I.
12 Trade Marks Act 1994, s. 46.
13 See Chapter 6, Theme 1: Concept of lookalike.
14 See Lucasfilm v Ainsworthy [2009] EWCA Civ 1328, [77] and the criticisms of such an approach by the 
Supreme Court, Lucasfilm v Ainsworthy [2011] UKSC 39, [47] (assessing copyright infringement by knowing 
it when you see it).
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Point 2: If a statutory definition of a lookalike were required what might it be?
Lookalikes can be appropriately described as “goods which by virtue of their name, 
shape, colour, packaging or labelling or any combination thereof, are similar in overall 
appearance to the goods; but excluding any of those things where they are descriptive, 
functional or commonplace.”
10.4 Unfair advantage
Irrespective of business harm, it might be the case that lookalikes give own brand an “unfair 
advantage”; something which should be prevented on policy, rather than economic, grounds 
(i.e. it cannot be prove by empirical evidence as such). This terminology largely comes from 
trade mark law. 
It was this advantage, or alternatively the “appropriation” of consumer insights (research), 
which some of the manufacturer brand owners thought justified the creation of a right to 
prevent lookalikes.15 It was emphasised that the investment in research could take as long 
as two to three years to recover. Intellectual property rights, in particular patents, are based 
on the premise that it takes time to recover research and development costs.16 
If there is value in packaging and it is worth encouraging packaging innovation then a law 
preventing lookalikes would fit within the intellectual property paradigm. The assessment of 
whether the advantage of being a lookalike is “unfair” is a policy decision. 
Point 3: Other than specific business harm, what other reasons do manufacturer 
brand owners put forward for lookalikes to be prevented?
Manufacturer brand owners reported that lookalikes enabled competitors and retailers 
to take unfair advantage of the manufacturer brand owner’s research into consumer 
insights and packaging design. 
10.5 Freedom to legislate
It is probable that the prevention of lookalike is within the scope of the Unfair Commercial 
Practices Directive (2005/29) (UCPD) as discussed in Annex III.17 As the Directive is a 
maximal measure it sets the maximum and minimum level of protection which Member States 
can provide. This means that Member States would be precluded18 from enacting any 
measure to prevent lookalikes where it went further than the UCPD (i.e. prevented the sale 
of a lookalike which is not contrary to the UCPD). 
15 See Chapter 6, Theme 1: Concept of lookalike.
16 See Ashley Roughton, Phillip Johnson and Trevor Cook, The Modern Law of Patents (2nd Ed, Lexisnexis 
2010), Appendix B for a summary of these theories.
17 Save business-to-business selling of lookalike products such as between (non-brand) manufacturers and 
whole-sellers.
18 The European Union would of course be free to enact legislation which goes beyond the UCPD.
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Furthermore and significantly, it would mean that some lookalikes are already unlawful in the 
United Kingdom as they are contrary to the Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading 
Regulations 2008. Therefore, under European Union law, the only lookalikes which can be 
prohibited are already prohibited in the UK. However, certain lookalikes already being 
unlawful under the 2008 Regulations is of little significance if trading standards (or others) do 
not have the resources to take action against those breaching the Regulations.
Point 4: What freedom does the United Kingdom have to legislate in this field?
It is probable that the prevention of certain lookalike is within the scope of the Unfair 
Commercial Practices Directive (2005/29/EC). If this is the case then the United 
Kingdom may not be free to legislate to further prevent lookalikes save in business-to-
business transactions. However, it would mean that certain lookalikes are unlawful 
under the Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations 2008.
10.6 Private enforcement
The UCPD leaves it up to Member States to determine how they would like to enforce the 
Directive. It merely suggests the certain sorts of organisations which might have the right to 
bring an action, and this includes consumer groups and competitors.19 In relation to 
lookalikes, the British Brands Group, amongst others, has advocated very strongly for there 
to be private enforcement of the Consumer Protection from Trading Regulations 2008.20 
However, the UK did not include a private right of action when the UCPD was originally 
implemented, as it might have “unintended and adverse consequences, by potentially 
providing consumers with undesirable latitude to sue traders and by impacting on the law of 
misrepresentations.”21 
The Law Commission gave preliminary advice in 2008 agreeing that private redress would 
present great uncertainty22 and it followed this with a consultation in 2011.23 In its report, 
published in 2012, it concluded that there should be a limited private right of action for 
consumers for some, but not all breaches of the UCPD (importantly it used “bait and switch” 
- an extreme form of lookalikes – as a example of a problem area).24
In total 22 Member States have provided for some form of private right of action, they are: 
Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, 
Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, 
Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain and Sweden.25 The implementation in Ireland, with its very 
similar legal system, is particular relevant to the UK. In Ireland, the Directive was implemented 
19 Directive 2005/29/EC, article 11.
20 See for example, John Noble “Time to Stop the Copycats” (2007) Managing Intellectual Property 31, 33.
21 Response to the Consultation Paper on implementing the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive (December 
2006).
22 Law Commission, A Private Right of Redress for Unfair Commercial Practices? (London 2008).
23 Law Commission, Consumer Redress For Misleading And Aggressive Practices (Consultation Paper No 199 
(Scots No. 149)).
24 Law Commission, Consumer Redress for Misleading and Aggressive Practices (2012) (Cmd 8323), [4.40 to 
4.61], Recommendation 4.
25 This list is based on the results reported in Appendix 5 of the Hogan Lovell Report.
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by the Consumer Protection Act 200726 which provides that any person may apply to the 
court to have an order to prohibit another person from continuing or engaging in acts which 
would be contrary to the Act (the Directive).27 Put simply, there is no right of damages, but 
there is a right to an injunction. This greatly limits the number of private actions which are 
likely to be brought, but is likely to meet the concerns of manufacturer brand owners.
The concerns expressed during the implementation in the UK and recently by the Law 
Commission do not appear to have occurred in Ireland where there have only been two 
reported cases relying on the Consumer Protection Act 2007 and only one of those relating 
to lookalikes28 albeit the injunction was granted only on the grounds of passing off.29 Further, 
following enquires with the Irish National Consumer Agency30 it appears that only one further 
case31 (still pending and not related to lookalikes) has been started using this private right of 
action.32 Therefore, a total of three cases have been started before the courts since 1st May 
2007.33 This does not mean, however, that the private right of action is not a useful tool that 
has been used during the commercial resolution disputes without the need to start legal 
proceedings; further research into this issue would be useful.
Point 5: What legislative proposals might the United Kingdom consider?
A properly constituted private right of action under the 2008 Regulations would neither 
make conduct unlawful which was not already so nor, based on the Irish example, 
would it open the floodgates. 
26 No 19 of 2007. 
27 Section 71; there are certain notice requirements on the Agency so that they must have an opportunity of 
being involved in the proceedings.
28 McCambridge Limited v. Joseph Brennan Bakeries [2011] IEHC 433; the other case is Tesco Ireland Ltd -v- 
Dunnes Stores [2009] IEHC 569 (a misleading advertising case).
29 McCambridge Limited v. Joseph Brennan Bakeries [2011] IEHC 433 upheld on appeal (in relation to passing 
off) [2012] IESC 46.
30 There is a statutory obligation to give notice to the National Consumer Agency when any application is made: 
Consumer Protection Act 2007, s. 71(3). Accordingly, unless that obligation has not being met by parties, the 
Agency will have knowledge of all such cases commenced (whether or not they subsequently settle or are 
otherwise resolved).
31 Flogas v Morgan Fuels Ltd (still pending).
32 Research Team’s Correspondence with Freedom of Information Officer at National Consumer Agency (12th 
December 2012).
33 When the 2007 Act came into force: Consumer Protection Act 2007 (Commencement) Order 2007 (S.I. No. 
178/2007).
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Postscript 
P.1 Introduction
The nature of research is that it usually raises more questions than it answers. It was therefore 
considered useful to set out some ideas for future research if, and when, the relevant 
resources become available. 
P.2 Interviews
P.2.1 Retailer and third party manufacturer engagement
The interviews reported in Chapter 6 enabled a number of themes to be explored. These 
largely reflected the view of the major manufacturer brand owners. The retailers, with some 
limited exceptions, did not take advantage of the opportunity to explain the other side of the 
relationship. Some manufacturer brand owners presented what they perceived to be the 
retailers’ views, but this is obviously not as valuable as the real thing. Further, as was made 
clear by the retailer who was interviewed, many of the packaging decisions are effectively 
made by third-party manufacturers.1 A discussion with some of these third-party 
manufacturers would enable the circle to be completed. 
P.2.2 Interviews in Ireland
A number of the manufacturer brand owners reported that a private right of action under the 
Unfair Commercial Practises Directive (2005/29) (UCPD) might make a significant difference 
in addressing their concerns with lookalikes.2 By way of comparison, in Ireland there is a 
private right of action under the Consumer Protection Act 2007, the Irish implementation of 
the UCPD, but over five years since commencement there have been only three cases issued 
(and two judgments given).3 The manufacturer brands in the Irish market are largely the 
same as the United Kingdom. Furthermore, many, but not all, of the United Kingdom retailers 
operate in the Irish market (in particular, Tesco, Aldi, Lidl and Iceland). Therefore, it would be 
useful to interview Irish manufacturer brand owners, retailers and others to see what effect 
the 2007 Act, and the private right of action, has had in the lookalikes field. 
1 See Theme 4: Packaging and investment.
2 See Theme 12: Current legal framework and proposals for law reform.
3 See paragraph [10.6].
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P.3 Consumer research
The consumer research reported in Chapter 7 presented some findings as to consumer 
advantage and disadvantage from the mistaken and deliberate purchase of lookalikes. 
Further consumer research could explore why consumers perceive themselves to be 
disadvantaged or advantaged (as the case may be) by the lookalike purchases they made 
and whether these perceptions affect subsequent purchasing behaviour.
P.4 Business harm
The sales data examined in Chapter 8 did not present a clear picture. It is plausible that this 
was because volume sales are affected by too many variables and so it was not possible to 
isolate the effect, if any, of similar packaging. It may be that addressing this aspect on a micro 
rather than macro level would resolve some of the issues presented. An ideal experiment 
might involve examining the sales of a brand leader in a small number of individual branches 
of retailers (in different socio-economic and regional areas) before the launch of the lookalike 
packaging (and a control distinctive own brand product) and then examining the sales of the 
brand leader and the lookalike after launch. 
Simple visits to different branches of the major retailers demonstrate the different stock held: 
sometimes only a brand leader is held; sometimes brand leader and own brand; and 
sometimes a range of brands, including own brand. This variation is most evident between 
the superstores and the local convenience store branches. It would be important to ensure 
that the stores selected were comparable in terms of the type of consumer they attract (single 
basket versus trolley for instance) and that they hold the same sort of stock. 
Such a study would be difficult with Kantar style data, which presents a good picture of the 
overall marketplace, but for such a study would have too small a sample size. Therefore, it 
would require EPOS scanner data from a series of individual retailers so as to examine the 
movement in sales. It was not possible, despite requests from the IPO and the research 
team, to obtain global scanner data from the retailers or the manufacturer brand owners for 
the present research. This was largely related to the commercially-sensitive nature of the 
scanner information. Accordingly, it should be anticipated that it may be equally difficult (if not 
more so) for this data to be provided in relation to an individual store.
In addition to this scanner data, it would also be necessary to know exactly when the 
packaging changed in a particular store. As discussed in Chapter 8,4 barcodes do not 
usually change with a change in packaging. This means that information about the change of 
packaging would need to be sought from the brand leader and the retailer respectively (as it 
cannot be obtained from the raw sales figures themselves). Further, the packaging is 
sometimes trialled or rolled out nationwide over a period of weeks. Therefore, it would be 
necessary to know when the packaging changed for the sample stores. This is information 
that is probably available to the brand owners or retailers, but might not be information which 
is routinely monitored.
4  See paragraph [8.2.7].
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The narrow scope of the research means that price fluctuations and planograms could be 
considered to minimise the number of variations other than packaging.
P.5 Conclusion
The research has addressed the question of lookalikes and in so doing presented new 
findings. The future research proposed in this Postscript would further enhance our 
understanding of the issues. Yet, as before, the insights from such research may present 
further and more interesting questions. This is because as the consumer market evolves so 
does the consumer. Therefore, the issues raised by lookalikes are likely to be as dynamic as 
the market itself.
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Annex I: “Lookalike” – An 
Etymology
I.1 Ambiguity and Accepted Terminology
This report has devised its own working definition of a lookalike. However, one of the most 
pronounced problems in the lookalike debate is the determination of when a product is a 
lookalike and when it is acceptably similar. Many of the studies into lookalikes as well as 
discussions of the topic are problematic in that there is no agreed definition of when a product 
is a lookalike and when it is not. 
Lookalikes and Intellectual Property Rights: In relation to intellectual property rights, the 
term lookalike is sometimes used to cover things which are trade mark, design or copyright 
infringements. Therefore, in this context, the issue of lookalikes is substantially one of 
enforcement of intellectual property rights (whether this is a problem with evidence, cost or 
commercial difficulty). 
Lookalikes and Perceived Business Harm: Distinct from intellectual property rights, the 
term lookalike could also be used to cover activities which do not amount to infringement of 
intellectual property rights or come within the scope of unfair competition laws. Nevertheless, 
such practices may be perceived as problematic by brand owners.1 In the latter instance the 
issue is one of substantive law that can be remedied only by creating a new legal right. 
Lookalikes – A Narrow Perspective: This ambiguity in the meaning of lookalike is aptly 
demonstrated by a description in The Times:2
“The subtle goal of ‘lookalike’ packaging is to hijack the reputation and symbolism of the 
famous brand. To give two products a virtually identical visual appearance is to imply a 
similarity of quality, taste or efficiency.”
If something is virtually identical (at least in legal terms) then it represents something which 
is likely to be a counterfeit product (or some other form of intellectual property infringement) 
and so represents a very narrow view of lookalikes. 
Lookalikes – A Broader Approach: At the other extreme is the definition of a lookalike (or 
parasitic copying) used by AIM:
“Parasitic copying takes many – but not necessarily all – of the marketing properties of a 
brand and becomes a variation on a theme. Thus the colour and shape of the packaging, 
the layout and the design of the label, the concept and style of the advertising and 
promotion and the design of the product itself are closely imitated.”3
1 Including both manufacturing brands and own brand.
2 ‘Brand of Logic’, The Times, 20 April 1994.
3 AIM Position Paper: (AIM Trade Mark Committee, January 2010), 3.
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This definition is very wide indeed, and presents as many questions as it answers. How many 
marketing properties need to be copied? What is meant by concept and style? And how close 
does something need to be to be an imitation? Despite the problematic nature of this 
definition, the mischief is clear in that it suggests that a lookalike is something which is 
misleading the consumer into believing that the product has the same quality, source of 
innovation and the same set of values as the brand.4
I.2 Lookalikes – Approaches to a Legal 
Definition
In the context of the present report, it is useful to consider some of the attempts to create a 
legal definition for lookalikes.
I.2.1 Trade Marks Bill (1994)
The first attempt at a statutory definition was during the passage of Bill that was to become 
the Trade Marks Act 1994. Whilst the Bill was being considered by the Public Bills Committee 
of the House of Lords, an amendment was tabled to what became section 10 of the Trade 
Marks Act 1994 so as to include the following additional act of infringement:5
 () A person infringes a registered trade mark if in the course of trade he sells or offers for 
sale goods which by virtue of their name, shape, colour, packaging or labelling or any 
combination thereof, are similar in overall appearance to the goods covered by the trade 
mark and in respect of which the trade mark is used by or with the permission of the trade 
mark proprietor thereof and such sale or offer for sale without due cause takes unfair 
advantage of, or is detrimental to, the distinctive character or reputation of the trade mark.
This amendment was rejected by the Government on two grounds. The first was that it went 
beyond the scope of what was permitted by the Directive6 (as the acts of infringement are 
set out in Article 5) and, secondly, the Government found it hard to accept that a person could 
be sued for trade mark infringement without actually using the registered mark at all.7 
Accordingly, the amendment was withdrawn.8 When the Bill returned from the Committee 
for Report a new clause was proposed to address lookalikes in a different way:9 
Unfair competition: Article 10 bis.
—(1) Where any goods of the proprietor of a trade mark bearing the trade mark are 
associated in the course of trade with any label, packaging or container having an overall 
appearance of a distinctive character it shall be an act of unfair competition actionable as 
4 Ibid.
5 See Public Bill Committee, Trade Marks Bill, Second Sitting, 18th January 1994, col 26 (Amendment 25 
moved by Lord Reay).
6 Directive 89/104/EEC now Directive 2008/95/EC.
7 Lord Strathclyde, Public Bill Committee, Trade Marks Bill, Second Sitting, 18th January 1994, col 31-33.
8 Ibid, col 33.
9 HL Deb, 24th February 1994, Vol 552, col 749 (Amendment 34 moved by Lord Reay).
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such for any person in the course of trade to supply or offer to supply any such goods with 
or in any label packaging or container which is similar in overall appearance, whether by 
reason of name, shape, colour, design or any combination thereof or otherwise, to the 
overall appearance of that of the proprietor’s goods if the use of the label, packaging or 
container either: 
(a) is likely to cause confusion, which includes a likelihood of association with the proprietor 
or the proprietor’s goods; or
(b) without due cause takes unfair advantage of, or detrimental to, the distinctive character 
or repute of the appearance of the proprietor’s goods or trade mark.
(2) In an action for unfair competition under this section all such relief by way of damages, 
injunctions, accounts or otherwise is available to the plaintiff (in Scotland, pursuer) as is 
available in respect of infringement of a registered trade mark or other property right.
This amendment was also rejected on the basis that the government did not think it fell within 
the scope10 of the Trade Marks Bill. Concerns were raised regarding the quality of the drafting 
of the proposed clause. However, the biggest issue appears to have been over the desirability 
or otherwise of having a general unfair competition law, something the government would not 
introduce without discussing it first with industry generally.11 Again, the amendment was 
withdrawn.12 The issue of lookalikes was raised once more in the House of Commons during 
the passing of that Bill, but no further drafting was proposed.13
I.2.2 Copyright and Trade Marks Bill (2000)
In 2000, the Copyright and Trade Marks Bill (a Private Members Bill) was proposed which 
would, amongst other things, have prevented lookalikes. Clause 3 read:
Duty not to imitate features of goods or services
3. (1) A person (“A”) shall not, in relation to any goods or services, use any features of 
packaging, marking, labelling or decoration in such a way that the public is likely to 
attribute to A’s goods or services the reputation of another person (“B”) or the qualities or 
reputation of B’s goods or services.
(2) For the purposes of subsection (1) it is immaterial whether there is any similarity 
between the goods or services of A and those of B.
(3) Subsection (1) shall not apply to features of packaging, marking, labelling or decoration 
that are commonplace.
10 As to scope see, Erskine May, Parliamentary Practice (28th Ed, 2011) (Ed Malcolm Tuck), 564-5.
11 Lord Strathclyde, HL Deb, 24th February 1994, Vol 552, cols 757-759.
12 HL Deb, 24th February 1994, Vol 552, col 759.
13 It was discussed at second reading: HC Deb, 18th April 1994, vol 241, col 676-688 (an interesting debate 
reiterating the issue was also heard on HC Deb 24 July 2000 vol 354 cc873-80).
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The Bill did not get past the second reading debate.14 Once more there were issues about 
the drafting. It was difficult to ascertain what would amount to a “lookalike” service and how 
a service could be packaged, marked, labelled or decorated. Usually references to services 
in this context would refer to the advertising of the services or paperwork connected to 
providing them.15 This draft, however, continues to be the closest representation of what 
manufacturer brand owners believe they would need to prevent lookalike products. 
I.2.3 Institute of Grocery Distribution (1995)
The Institute of Grocery Distribution instituted a Dispute Resolution Procedure in relation to 
Packaging and Trade Dress. As part of the procedure it included the following:16
“For the purpose of avoiding or resolving disputes, it is accepted that a product sold in the 
United Kingdom should avoid using any combination of the same or similar name, colour 
scheme, shape, typeface, design layout or portrayed images so as to convey significant 
visual features which are essentially similar to those of another producer. Exceptionally, a 
single feature may be sufficiently significant.
However, it is recognised that similarities may justifiably occur where special features are:
1. descriptive;
2. necessarily dictated by functional considerations;
3. already in common use in the UK amongst similar products at the time the matter is  
 being considered; or
4. required to indicate the proper or safe usage/application of the products.”
This Procedure was signed by the major retailers (except ASDA17) and has been used at 
least by Tesco.18 There are of course definitional issues about this phrasing including the 
meaning of “significant visual feature” and what amounts to “essentially similar”; however, 
this definition once more highlights the sort of thing that is understood by the concept of a 
lookalike. The Trade and Industry Committee of the House of Commons was told variously 
that this dispute resolution procedure was “inadequate”19 (as reported by the British Brands 
Group) and that it worked (as suggested by Tesco).20 It is clear now however that it has not 
dealt with the concerns raised by manufacturer brand owners.
14 HL Deb, 17th March 2000, Vol 610, col 1885-1906.
15 See Trade Marks Act 1994, s. 10(5).
16 Dispute Resolution Procedure in relation to Packaging and Trade Dress (IGD 1995).
17 See Trade and Industry Committee (Eighth Report), Trade Marks, Fakes and Consumers (1998-9 Session), 
HC Paper 380, Ev 4 (British Brands Group).
18 Trade and Industry Committee (Eighth Report), Trade Marks, Fakes and Consumers (1998-9 Session), HC 
Paper 380, Ev 24 (Tesco).
19 Ibid.
20 Ibid, Ev, 24; Tesco also suggested it had ceased to sell lookalikes.
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I.2.4 DG Internal Policy
As part of a wider study on misleading packaging, the European Commission (DG Internal 
Policy) considered the issue of lookalikes (it called them “copycats”). The report stated that 
lookalike packaging “may mislead consumers into thinking that they are buying a premium 
brand. The design and colour of the package and images on the package are confusing. 
Thereby avoids investing in brand development and rides free at its rival’s expense”.21  The 
report also acknowledged that lookalike packaging might fall foul of the Unfair Commercial 
Practices Directive.22 Ultimately, the following definition of misleading packaging (which 
would include lookalikes) was presented by DG Internal Policy:23 
 “A packaging practice shall be regarded as misleading if it deceives or is likely to deceive 
the average consume as a result of the size of the packaging, its form or design or other 
important elements directly related to the packaging, including a comparison of differences 
between the current packaging and
(i) previous packaging, or 
(ii) the packaging of competitor’s products, 
and causes, or is likely to cause him to make a transactional decision which he would not 
otherwise have taken.”
I.3 Conclusions on definitions
This panoply of definitions makes it clear that there is no generally agreed definition, but 
rather an assortment of related concepts. Additionally, it is often not clear which definition is 
being used at a particular time. Nevertheless, it is apparent that the working definition 
proposed in Chapter 1 is not in common accord with the attempts to define lookalikes in 
statutes and other regulatory instruments in the past.
 
21 DG Internal Policy (Margaretha Lawrynowicz), Misleading packaging practices (Briefing Paper) IP/A/IMCO/
NT/2011-19.
22 Ibid, The Regulation of Unfair Commercial Practices under EC Directive 2005/29 – New Rules and New 
Techniques (Oxford 2007), 191-4.
23 Ibid, 59.
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Annex II - Current Legal 
Landscape
United Kingdom
II.1 Passing off
In the United Kingdom, lookalikes are most likely to be prevented under the law of passing 
off. The three basic elements to be established in order to make out a claim of passing off are 
(i) goodwill in the get-up of goods; (ii) a misrepresentation leading the public to believe the 
goods supplied by one trader are those of another; and (iii) damage caused by reason of the 
erroneous belief.1 State of mind is irrelevant if these elements are established2 although 
the courts are rarely impressed with defendants who ‘sail close to the wind’.
II.1.1 Goodwill
Traders have to show3 that they have sufficient goodwill4 (reputation, in the strict sense, is 
not enough5) in a mark or get-up for the public to believe that they are buying a particular 
trader’s goods, rather than those of the person allegedly passing off. This requires there to 
be business conducted in the United Kingdom, that is, the sale of a significant number of 
goods.6 In short, it is necessary to show that the second trader has taken the first trader’s 
goodwill. 
This goodwill can be reflected in the get-up of the packaging of the goods in the same way 
that it can exist in a word or figurative mark. The leading case on get-up remains Reckitt & 
Colman v Borden,7 where the House of Lords accepted that a plastic lemon, as used by Jif, 
could attract goodwill and so be protected under the law of passing off: 
1 Reckitt & Colman Products Ltd v Borden Inc (No 3) [1990] RPC 341, 499; also see the five elements identified 
by Lord Diplock in Erven Warnink BV vJ Townend & Sons (Hull) Ltd (No 1) [1979] AC 731, 742.
2 Gillette (UK) Ltd v Edenwest [1994] RPC 279, 289–94.
3 The point at which the goodwill must be established is when the second trader commences the conduct 
complained of: Cadbury Schweppes v Pub Squash [1981] RPC 429.
4 The traditional definition of goodwill is found in Inland Revenue Commissioners v Muller & Co’s Margarine Ltd 
[1901] AC 217, 223.
5 Athletes’ Foot Marketing Associates Inc v Cobra Sports Ltd [1980] RPC 343.
6 Anheuser-Busch Inc v Budéjovicky Budvar NP (t/a Budweiser Budvar Brewery) [1984] FSR 413, 462 et seq; 
there are slightly different rules for services: Hotel Cipriani v Cipriani [2010] EWCA 110 [2010] RPC 16, [118] 
adopting Pete Waterman Ltd v CBS UK Ltd [1993] EMLR 27.
7 [1990] 1 WLR 491, (HL).
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“The deception alleged lies not in the sale of the plastic lemons or the dimpled bottles, but 
in the sale of lemon juice or whisky, as the case may be, in the containers so fashioned 
as to suggest that the juice or whisky emanates from the source with which the container 
of the particular configuration have become associated in the public mind.”8
Accordingly, where the packaging distinguishes the goods of one trader from another passing 
off is not precluded simply because the packaging itself is the indication of origin. But, where 
that packaging is no longer a source identifier, for example where it is common to the trade, 
it cannot be distinctive of any trader,9 and so no action for passing off can lie. Furthermore, 
where a consumer wants goods with a particular construction or feature on the grounds the 
goods are practical, functional or aesthetically pleasing then these features may not usually 
be relied upon as a source identifier.10 Thus, the test is not whether something is original or 
eye-catching,11 but whether it is distinctive.12 Of course, where packaging is very new or 
novel then it is possible that it will become distinctive more quickly, but that is the only relevant 
aspect.13
II.1.2 Defendant’s misrepresentation
It is actionable to misrepresent that one’s business or trade is that of another person or is 
connected with that person in any way likely to cause damage.14 This same test applies to 
get-up as it does in relation to other marks or signs. The activity of one trader misrepresenting 
a connection to another person is not actionable unless it also appears to consumers that the 
other person is actually responsible for that trader’s goods or services. The basic test applied 
to get-up passing off cases was stated in Payton & Co15 by the Master of the Rolls:
“What is it that the [claimants] must make out in order to entitle them to succeed in the 
action? They must make out that the defendant’s goods are calculated to be mistaken for 
the [claimant’s] and the goods of the defendants unquestionably resemble each other, but 
where the feature in which they resemble each other are common to the trade, what has 
the [claimant] to make out? He must make out not that the defendant’s are like his by 
reason of those features which are common to them and other people, but he must make 
out that the defendant’s are like his by reason of something peculiar to him, and by reason 
of the defendant having adopted some mark, or device or label, or something of that kind, 
which distinguishes the [claimant’s] from other goods which have, like his, the features 
common to the trade”
8 [1990] 1 WLR 491, 504 (Lord Oliver).
9 [1990] 1 WLR 491, 505.
10 Christopher Wadlow, The Law of Passing-Off (4th Ed, Sweet and Maxwell 2011), [8-142]; also see Crescent 
Tool v Kilborn & Bishop (1917) 247 F. 299 cited with approval in Hodgkinson & Corby v Wards Mobility 
Services [1994] 1 WLR 1564.
11 Payton & Co (1899) 17 RPC 48 (per Romer LJ) affirmed [1901] AC 308.
12 See New Way Packaged Products v Lucking [1960] RPC 147.
13 White Hudsom & Co v Asian Organisation [1964] 1 WLR 1466.
14 Ewing v Buttercup Margarine Co Ltd [1917] 2 Ch 1, 11–13; Clock Ltd v Clock House Hotel Ltd (1936) 53 RPC 
269, 275; British Telecommunications plc v Nextcall Telecom plc (Trade Marks) [2000] FSR 679.
15 (1899) 17 RPC 48 affirmed [1901] AC 308.
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The misrepresentation must be made either to customers or end consumers (i.e., the 
packaging) of the other’s goods16 and it should be judged against how the relevant goodwill 
was acquired in trade. This means that customer confusion is central to the action for passing 
off.17 In assessing whether a customer would be confused it is necessary to consider the 
attention they would pay to the purchase,18 what the goods are,19 and how they are sold or 
provided.20 The characteristics of the customers of those goods or services are also relevant, 
but such customers will have an imperfect recollection.21 In making the actual assessment, 
the entirety of the get-up of both the claimant’s and the defendant’s product must be 
considered and not simply the aspects that are in common.22 An association becomes 
unacceptable where it crosses the line between ‘I wonder if there is a connection’ (permissible) 
to ‘I assume there is a connection’ (unacceptable).23
There is no need to show that anyone was actually deceived by the get-up, but proving such 
deception will greatly assist the claim.24 Similarly, if it can be shown that a trader was actually 
acting fraudulently this will be very good (but not conclusive) proof that customers were 
confused.25 In any event, there must be a substantial number of customers confused (or 
more than trivial or a de minimis number).26
II.1.3 Likelihood of damage
The final element of passing off is that damage is caused or, at least, there is some likelihood 
of injury to the trader’s goodwill. In straightforward passing off, where the goods are competing 
on the same or similar markets, the likelihood of damage comes from the customer confusion 
itself, in particular, by reason of trade being diverted. Other sorts of damage can result in 
particular in the form of blurring or loss of distinctiveness.27 It may be, accordingly to 
academic argument, that brand owners get-up being “debased” by others using the same 
get-up, which could be actionable without there being any actual confusion as to origin.28
16 Erven Warnink [1979] AC 731.
17 But confusion per se is not sufficient to found such an action: see My Kinda Town Ltd (t/a Chicago Pizza Pie 
Factory) v Soll and Grunts Investments [1983] RPC 407, 418.
18 eg Morning Star Cooperative Society Ltd v Express Newspapers Ltd [1979] FSR 113, 117.
19 Teleworks Ltd v Telework Group Plc [2002] RPC 27, [12].
20 William Edge & Sons Ltd [1911] AC 693, 704; HFC Bank plc v HSBC Bank plc (formerly Midland Bank plc) 
[2000] FSR 176, 185.
21 William Edge & Sons Ltd [1911] AC 693, 704–5 (sale to washer women); Johnstone v Orr-Ewing (1882) 7 App 
Cas 219, 225 (for Indian natives who did not speak English).
22 Aristoc Ltd v Rysta Ltd [1945] AC 68, 86.
23 See for example, Schweppes v Gibbens (1905) 22 RPC 601.
24 Reed Executive plc v Reed Business Information Ltd [2004] EWCA Civ 159; [2004] ETMR 56, [111].
25 eg Champagne Heidsieck et cie Monopole Société Anonyme v Buxton [1930] 1 Ch 330.
26 Neutrogena Corp v Golden Ltd (t/a Garnier) [1996] RPC 473, 493–4 (but note concerns about using words 
trivial and de minimis).
27 Bulmer v Bollinger [1978] RPC 79 and Tattinger v Allbev [1993] FSR 641.
28 Jennifer Davis “Why the United Kingdom should have a Law against Misappropriation” (2010) 69 Cambridge 
Law Journal 561; also see Susie Middlemiss and Steven Warner “Is there Still a Hole in this Bucket? Confusion 
and Misrepresentation in Passing Off” (2006) 1 Journal of Intellectual Property Law and Practice 131.
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II.2 Tort of unfair competition
II.2.1 Paris Convention Article 10bis
The Paris Convention includes a requirement, at Article 10bis, for contracting parties to 
prevent unfair competition.29 It has been suggested that the United Kingdom is not compliant 
with this obligation as it lacks a general unfair competition law.30 However, as the diplomatic 
negotiations leading up to the conference make clear this obligation can be implemented 
under the criminal law, administrative or the civil law.31 There is no requirement on a country 
to create a specific unfair competition law if the protection is provided by the general law.32 
Thus, the protection required by Article 10bis was met by the Trade Descriptions Act 1968 
(and its predecessors)33 and, following its repeal in relevant respects, is now met by the UK 
implementing law for the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive 2005/29/EC.
Nevertheless, over the years, there has been a number of attempts to transform passing off 
into a more general unfair competition law or a tort of misappropriation. This has largely 
failed because of the view that the common law avoids monopolies34 as was explained in 
Cadbury-Schweppes v The Pub Squash Company:35
“…competition must remain free; and competition is safeguarded by the necessity for the 
[claimant] to prove that he has built up “an intangible property right” in the advertised 
descriptions of his product or, in other words, that he has succeed by such methods in 
giving his product a distinctive character accepted by the market. A defendant, however, 
does not wrong by entering a market created by another and there competing with its 
creator. The line may be difficult to draw; but, unless it is drawn, competition will be stifled.”
There is no doubt that much of the ground covered by unfair competition laws in other 
European countries is provided for by a range of causes of action such as breach of 
confidence,36 malicious falsehood37 and passing off. However, the English law does not 
appear to cover straightforward misappropriation – the wrong commonly associated with 
lookalike cases. 
29 It is therefore also an obligation under the TRIPS Agreement, art 2(1) and an EU obligation, EEA Agreement, 
Protocol 28, art 5.
30 See for example, Christopher Morcom “Gowers: a glimmer of hope for UK compliance with Article 10 bis of 
the Paris Convention” [2007] European Intellectual Property Review 125.
31 Actes de la Haye (1926), 478-480; Acts de Londres (1934), 421-422; also see Christopher Wadlow, The Law 
of Passing Off (4th Ed, Sweet and Maxwell 2011), [2-022].
32 Actes de Washington (1911), 255, 305; Actes de la Haye (1926), 472, 578.
33 See Stephan Ladas, Patents, Trademarks, and Related Rights: National and International Protection (Harvard 
1975), 1699. Ladas is widely accepted to be the leading English language commentator on the Paris 
Convention.
34 See Hodgkinson v Ward Mobility [1994] 1 WLR 1564, 1568, Jacob J.
35 [1981] RPC 429, 491.
36 See Tanya Aplin, Lionel Bently, Phillip Johnson and Simon Malynicz, Gurry: On Breach of Confidence (2nd Ed, 
OUP 2012).
37 See Christopher Wadlow, The Law of Passing Off (4th Ed, Sweet and Maxwell 2011), Ch 6.
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II.2.2 Passing Off and Unfair Competition Law
The question as to whether passing off has evolved into an unfair competition law was raised 
by a Delphic statement of Aldous LJ in Arsenal v Reed.38 This was followed by a number of 
commentators asking whether the time had come for an unfair competition law to be 
recognised in the common law. The views were mixed: some described a new wider tort as 
a “sledgehammer to crack a nut,”39 while others proposed extending passing off to cover 
“pre-sale” misrepresentations.40 These are misrepresentations as to origin which might 
attract a customer, but are corrected before the purchase takes place.41 If this was clearly 
introduced it might have some effect on passing off as many lookalikes are picked up off the 
shelf but the consumer realises the mistake before reaching the checkout.
Whether passing off has actually developed into unfair competition law was considered by 
the Court of Appeal in L’Oréal v Bellure.42 After considering the cases and the arguments of 
the parties, Jacob LJ reiterated that passing off always requires some form of 
misrepresentation43  and he took the view that misappropriation was not a helpful term.44 He 
made it clear that the misrepresentation does not need to be about the origin of the goods. 
Other deceptions, such as a misrepresentation of equivalent quality, would also be sufficient.45
38 [2003] EWCA Civ 696, [2003] ETMR 73, [70].
39 Tom Alkin “Should there be a Tort of ‘Unfair Competition’ in English Law?” (2007) 3 Journal of Intellectual 
Property Law and Practice 48, 52.
40 Ben Allgrove and Peter O’Byrne “Pre-sale Misrepresentation in Passing Off: An idea whose Time has come 
or Unfair Competition by the Back Door?” (2006) 1 Journal of Intellectual Property Law and Practice 413.
41 They have recently be recognised in trade mark law: Och-Ziff Management v Och Capital [2010] EWHC 2599 
(Ch), [2011] ETMR 1; but this does not necessarily extend to passing off as noted by Christopher Wadlow, The 
Law of Passing Off (4th Ed, Sweet and Maxwell 2011), [5-183-5-186].
42 [2007] EWCA Civ 968; [2008] ETMR 1.
43 He expressed a similar view in Reed v Reed Employment [2004] EWCA Civ 159, [2004] RPC 40, [149].
44 [2007] EWCA Civ 968; [2008] ETMR 1, [135 to 161].
45 Based on the approval of his decision at first instance in Hodgkinson & Corby Ltd v Wards Mobility Services 
Ltd [1994] 1 WLR 1564 (see [137]).
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Germany 
II.3 UWG (Unfair Competition)
The German law46 of unfair competition, Gesetz gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb (UWG), 
has long been seen as an effective tool to prevent all sorts of unfair commercial practices. 
The law is structured so that there is a general prohibition47 in relation to business-to-
business practices48 and in relation to business-to-consumer practices.49 This is followed 
with a non-exhaustive50 list of examples of things which fall under the prohibition, including 
one which is particularly relevant to lookalikes.51 The relevant provisions read as follows:52
Section 9
Prohibition of unfair commercial practices
 (1) Unfair commercial practices shall be illegal if they are suited to tangible impairment of 
the interests of competitors, consumers or other market participants.
(2) Commercial practices towards consumers shall be illegal in any case where they do 
not conform to the professional diligence required of the entrepreneur concerned and are 
suited to tangible impairment of the consumers ability to make an information-based 
decision, thus inducing him to make a transactional decision which he would not otherwise 
have made. Here reference shall be made to the average consumer or, when the 
commercial practice is directed towards a particular group of consumers, to the average 
member of that group. Reference shall be made to the perspective of the average member 
of a group of consumers who are particularly vulnerable and clearly identifiable because 
of their mental or physical infirmity, age or credulity, if it is foreseeable for the entrepreneur 
that his commercial practice will affect the latter group only.
(3) The commercial practices towards consumers, listed in the Annex to this Act, shall 
always be illegal.
46 In this section, cases will be cited in the English, rather than German style.
47 This is based on existing case law: Statement of Grounds of the Governmental Draft of the Unfair Competition 
Act 2004 (Bundestag, No 15/1487), 18.
48 §3 (I) UWG.
49 §3 (II) UWG.
50 Begr RegE UWG 2004, BT-Drucks 15/1487, p 13 and 18.
51 §4 No. 9 UWG before codification it was acknowledges as an act of unfair competition in Puppenjunge (1941) 
GRUR 116 (RG) and Torpedofreilauf (1940) GRUR 489 (RG).
52 Translation from www.gesetze-im-internet.de (by Brian Duffett).
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(4) Unfairness shall have occurred in particular where a person offers goods or services 
that are replicas of goods or services of a competitor if he
a) causes avoidable deception of the purchaser regarding their commercial origin;
b) unreasonably exploits or impairs the assessment of the replicated goods or services; 
or
c) dishonestly obtained the knowledge or documents needed for the replicas
II.3.1 Principle of the freedom to copy
An overarching principle of German unfair competition law is that a person should be free to 
copy the get-up or design of a competitor product.53 Accordingly, unfair competition rules 
cannot generally preclude copying as this would undermine the limited and restricted nature 
of intellectual property protection54 and restrict the freedom to participate in the market.55 
However, there is protection against replica (or imitation) products being sold, but this is not 
about the copying of the product56 as such, but rather about the circumstances regarding 
how the product is offered to the public. This rule also means that where a particular act or 
action would be an infringement of an intellectual property right (if registered) it cannot be 
prohibited under unfair competition law as well.57
II.3.2 Interests protected
The prohibition on imitations and replicas is intended to protect the interests of the person 
whose product has been copied,58 although it is likely to give consumer protection to the 
relevant public as well.59 The law is there to serve a public interest by encouraging innovative 
and undistorted competition,60 but ensuring that innovation is not hindered by reason of 
copying being too easy.61
53 Handtaschen (2007) GRUR 795, [51] (BGH).
54 cf  Klemmbausteine III (2005) GRUR 349, 352 (BGH).
55 Eike Ullmann, juris PraxisKommentar UWG: Gesetz gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb (Juris Gmbh 2009), § 
4 Nr 9, [31]; Ansgar Ohly “Designschutz im Spannungsfeld von Geschmacksmuster-, Kennzeichen- und 
Lauterkeitsrecht” (2007) GRUR 731, 735.
56 No absolute rights are granted: Rudolf Nirk  “Zur Rechtsfigur des wettbewerbsrechtlichen Leistungsschutzes“ 
(1993) GRUR 247, 249; Hefermehl/Köhler/Bornkamm UWG § 4 Rdn 9.4.
57 Elektronische Pressearchive (1999) GRUR 325, 326 (BGH); Paperboy (2003) GRUR 958, 962 (BGH); 
Handtuchklemmen (2005) GRUR 600, 602 (BGH); Baugruppe (2008) GRUR 790, [35] (BGH); Apfel-Madonna 
(1966) GRUR 503, 506  (BGH).
58 Vespa-Roller (1988) GRUR 620, 621 (BGH); Finnischer Schmuck (1991) GRUR 223, 225 (BGH); Cartier-
Armreif (1994) GRUR 630, 634 (BGH); cf  Imitationswerbung (2008) GRUR 628, [12] (BGH).
59 Vitamin-Zell-Komplex (2005) GRUR 519, 520 (BGH); as discussed below at Annex III, III.2), for the purposes 
of the UCDP it is immaterial what the intention of the legislation is where it is a commercial practice within the 
meaning of that Directive.
60 Vitamin-Zell-Komplex (2005) GRUR 519, 520 (BGH); Gartenliege (2007) GRUR 984, [23] (BGH).
61 cf Vakuumpumpen (2000) GRUR 521, 526  (BGH); Axil Beater: “Unlauterer Wettbewerb“ (2011 Mohr Siebeck), 
[1906 ff].
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II.3.3 Elements of parasitic copying
To bring a claim it is necessary to establish the following: 
(1) the competitor has made and offered an imitation or replica product on the market;
(2) the product has “competitive individuality” meaning that the get-up is such that it 
indicates to consumers its origin or characteristics; and
(3) there are circumstances making the actions unfair, in particular one of those things set 
out in UWG §9(4). 
Prerequisites: A prerequisite for any action to be brought under the UWG is that the 
defendant must be engaged in business activity (be a market participant); but it is immaterial 
whether or not the parties are at the same level of competition (so a manufacturer can bring 
a case against a retailer). As the law is there to prohibit the imitation of products, it does not 
matter if the particular product is still on the market.
Certain market awareness: The get-up of the product must be such that that its specific 
form or specific characteristics suggest to the public the product’s commercial origin.62 The 
law does not protect concepts or ideas, only the aspects of the product which represent the 
distinctive packaging.63 Similarly, the law does not protect themes.64 Nevertheless, there 
may be certain features of a product’s get-up which are presumed by consumers to be 
something which should be kept free for others to use (such as generic colours or symbols). 
In such cases, copying cannot be prevented.65
The closer the copy is to the original the less that is required to establish the competitive 
nature of the product.66 Thus, where it is a perfect copy or different only in minor details, very 
little evidence is needed to establish the competitive nature.67
“Competitive individuality” (or “nature” or “purpose”) (wettbewerbliche Eigenart): The 
competitive individuality of the product is that distinctiveness of get-up which informs the 
public of its origin or characteristics.68 Any feature or characteristic of the get-up,69 including 
62 Les-Paul-Gitarren (1998) GRUR 830 (BGH); Modulgerüst (2000), GRUR 521, 523 (BGH); Laubhefter  (2002) 
GRUR 86 (BGH).
63 cf Rosaroter Elefant (1995) GRUR 47, 48 (BGH).
64 Knoblauchwürste (2009) WRP 1374, [21] (BGH).
65 cf. Pulverbehälter (1968) GRUR 59 (BGH);  Rollhocker (1981) GRUR 517, 519; Vakuumpumpen (2000) 
GRUR 210, 213; Modulgerüst (2000) GRUR 521, 523.
66 Betonsteinelemente (1992) GRUR 523, 524 (BGH); Tele-Info-CD (1999) GRUR 923, 927 (BGH).
67 Beschlagprogramm (1986) GRUR 673, 675 (BGH); Vakuumpumpen (1996) GRUR 210, 211 (BGH).
68 Helmet Köhler and Joachim Bornkamm, UWG (30th Ed. Beck 2012), [9.24]; Henning Piper, Ansgar Ohly and 
Olaf Sosnitza, Gesetz gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb, (5th Ed. 2010), [9.32].
69 Coffeinfrei (1963) GRUR 423, 428 (BGH); Gebäudefassade (1977) GRUR 614, 615 (BGH); Grau/Magenta 
(1997) GRUR 754, 756; Messerkennzeichnung (2001) GRUR 251, 253.
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its shape,70 or labelling,71 or numbering systems,72 can be used to support a finding of its 
competitive individuality, provided the feature has not become generic.73 There is also no 
requirement of any originality, novelty or individual character as protection relates to indication 
of origin or characteristics.74 Further, the greater the product’s reputation the more likely it is 
that consumers will make false assumptions as to origin.75 This requirement can be met 
even where a consumer would determine that the two products are distinct if they undertake 
a closer inspection.76 Finally, the competitive individuality may still remain even where the 
manufacturer has changed its own packaging and the competitor copies the old packaging.
Public renown of get-up: In Noppenbahn (Dimpled Foil)77 the BGH (Supreme Court) held 
that the product’s get-up needs to be sufficiently well-known amongst the relevant public 
before it can be parasitically copied.78 Essentially, this requires the product79 to be sufficiently 
familiar to the relevant public (“market awareness”80) such that they might be deceived about 
its origin. Accordingly, this might suggest that the product and its get-up must have been on 
the market for some time before protection is available under UWG §9(4). However, there are 
some cases and commentators which suggest there is no requirement that the product has 
been on the market for any particular time.81
Assessment of competitive individuality: The determination of a product’s competitive 
individuality can be made by the judge alone82 even where the judge is not the relevant 
consumer. The inclusion of the retailer’s trade mark (or another trade mark) on the product 
does not in itself preclude a finding that there is a competitive individuality.83 In making this 
assessment the judge will take into account all the circumstances of the case even where a 
particular factor, standing alone, would not affect the competitive individuality of the get-up.
Imitation: The next requirement is that the second comer is selling an imitation or replica of 
the original product. It does not need to be an imitation of the entire product, it is sufficient 
that the competitive individuality is established by those aspects which have been copied.84 
70 Hemdblusenkleid (1984) GRUR 453 (BGH); Tchibo/Rolex I (1985) GRUR 876, 877 (BGH).
71 cf Coswig (1956) GRUR 553, 557 (BGH); Gebäudefassade (1977) GRUR 614, 615 (BGH); 
Messerkennzeichnung (2001) GRUR 251, 253 (BGH); Tupperwareparty (2003) GRUR 973, 974 (BGH).
72 cf Michel-Nummern (2006) WRP 765, [28] (BGH).
73 Gartenliege (2007) GRUR 984, [24] (BGH).
74 Ovalpuderdose (1976) WRP 370, 372 (BGH); Vitra programm (1984) GRUR 597(BGH).
75 Viennetta (2001) GRUR 443, 444 (BGH); LIKEaBIKE (2010) GRUR 80, [37] (BGH); Femur-Teil (2010) GRUR 
1125, [24].
76 Les-Paul-Gitarren (1998) GRUR 830, 833 (BGH); Handtaschen (2007) GRUR 795, [28] (BGH).
77 (2002) GRUR 275 (BGH).
78 (2002) GRUR 275, 277 (BGH).
79 This has been described as a stumbling block for niche products,  although it is not clear why this is the case 
as the relevant public for those products will be those aware of the niche (even if the public in general is not 
aware): Hogan Lovell’s Report (MARKT/2010/20D), Appendix 8, pg 7.
80 Handtuchklemmen (2005) GRUR 600, 602 (BGH); Stufenleitern (2007) GRUR 339, [39] (BGH); Gartenliege 
(2007) GRUR 984, [34] (BGH); Gebäckpresse (2009) GRUR 79, [35] (BGH).
81 Ovalpuderdose (1976) WRP 370, 371 (BGH); Betonsteinelement (1992) GRUR 523, 524 (BGH); Helmet 
Köhler and Joachim Bornkamm, UWG (30th Ed. Beck 2012), [9.25].
82 Hemdblusenkleid (1984) GRUR 453, 454 (BGH).
83 Modulgerüst (2000) GRUR 521, 524 (BGH).
84 Tele-Info-CD (1999), GRUR 923, 926 (BGH); Handtaschen (2007) GRUR, 795, [32] (BGH). 
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Therefore where the second comer is an independently created “replica” it is not actionable,85 
but such a claim must be proved by the defendant.86
There are three levels of imitation:87 (a) a perfect copy of the original;88 (b) a copy which is 
different only in minor or insignificant details; and (c) a copy which exploits elements of 
another’s work. The more closely the imitation resembles the original, the lesser the degree 
to which the remaining relevant factors will be necessary to find the defendant’s doing 
actionable.89 The third level of imitation is the most relevant to lookalikes. It might occur 
where the original is not copied as such, but it is used as a model from which the new product 
or packaging is built,90 and it would remain an imitation as long as recognisable elements of 
the original remain.91 It is not enough that the similarities are such that consumers will make 
an association between the lookalike and the manufacturer’s product.92 Further, confusion 
as to trade origin, brought on by similar packaging, can be dispelled by appropriate steps 
being taken, such as having clear and prominent labels attached to the product.93 This is 
particularly relevant to lookalikes.
Ranges of products: The similarity of the products can be judged across the whole range,94 
and so products which are not otherwise sufficiently similar can become so.95 Further, the 
longer the copying of a range has occurred and the more products copied, the more likely it 
is that it amounts to taking unfair advantage.
Unfairness: The mere fact that a product is a replica or lookalike is not enough on its own, 
there must also be an element of unfairness. In addition to avoidable deception regarding 
origin, two other forms of unfairness are described in § 4 Nr. 9 UWG: unreasonable exploitation 
of the product; or impairing the distinctiveness of the product. The copied product must be 
something which has a reputation (“appreciation”) in the public perception which relates to 
the quality,96 exclusivity, and luxury or prestige97 value of the product.98 The rationale is that 
the higher the reputation of the copied product the more that can be transferred to the replica 
or lookalike99 and, accordingly, it is necessary to show that there has been some transfer of 
85 Blendsegel (2002) GRUR 629, 633; ICON (2008) GRUR 1115, [24] (BGH).
86 Blendsegel (2002) GRUR 629, 633 (BGH).
87 This is based on the case law: Helmet Köhler and Joachim Bornkamm, UWG (30th Ed, Beck 2012), [9.34].
88 Something like scanning or photograph: Helmet Köhler and Joachim Bornkamm, UWG, (30th Ed , Beck 2012), 
[9.35].
89 Gartenliege (2007) GRUR 984, [14] (BGH).
90 Modulgerüst I (2000) GRUR 521, 524 (BGH); Femur-Teil (2010) GRUR 112, [25] (BGH).
91 Rotaprint (1963) GRUR 152, 155 (BGH); Hit Bilanzen (2003) GRUR-RR 329, 330 (OLG München).
92 Tupperwareparty (2003) GRUR 973, 975 (BGH).
93 Güllepumpen (1999) GRUR 751, 753 (BGH); Viennetta (2001) GRUR 443, 445; cf Stufenleitern (2007) GRUR 
339, [26] (BGH); Handtaschen (2007) GRUR 795, [25] (BGH); ICON (2008) GRUR 1115, [20] (BGH); 
Ausbeinmesser (2009) GRUR 1073, [10] (BGH); LIKEaBIKE (2010) GRUR 80, [23] (BGH); Femur-Teil (2010) 
GRUR 1125, [21] (BGH).
94 Ha-Ra/HARIVA (1999) GRUR 183, 186 (BGH); Rillenkoffer (2008) GRUR 793, [29] (BGH).
95 Büromöbelprogramm (1982) GRUR 305, 307 (BGH); Beschlagprogramm (1986) GRUR 673, 675 (BGH); cf 
Möbelprogramm zur Geschmacksmusterfähigkeit (1975) GRUR 383, 385 (BGH).
96 Les-Paul-Gitarren (1998) GRUR, 830, 833 (BGH).
97 Tchibo/Rolex I  (1985) GRUR 876, 878 (BGH).
98 Similarily: Pen 68(2011) GRUR-RR 182, 183 (OLG Frankfurt).
99 Femur-Teil (2010) GRUR 1125, [42] (BGH); Hartplatzhelden.de (2010) GRUR 436, [18] (BGH).
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this reputation for the action to succeed.100 This means the reputation is not exploited merely 
because things are brought to mind, rather there must be very specific reasons why the 
consumer buys the other product even though the consumer knows that it is not from the 
same source (such as perceptions of quality).
Factors for inappropriate use: The courts take into account a number of factors in deciding 
whether there has been inappropriate use. These include: (i) the extent of the competitive 
individuality of each of the products; (ii) the closeness of the imitation;101 (iii) the cost and 
return on the manufacturing cost of the original;102 (iv) the cost saving for the lookalike103 (the 
greater the cost saving for the imitator the more likely it is that the copying is unfair104) (v) the 
commercial success of the lookalike;105 and (vi) any customary practice relating to licence 
fees.106
Obstruction: Another form of unfair competition is obstruction, which arises where the 
replica product obstructs the market entry of the genuine product. Something will be an 
obstruction only where it not only disturbs the market, but also is actually directed at a 
particular competitor.107 The Ovalpuderdose108 case is a good example of this. The product 
was not sold in Germany, but was sold in other European countries. The BGH held that the 
lookalike being sold on the European market would obstruct the market entry of the genuine 
product and so the lookalike had to be removed from the market.
United States
II.4 Trade Dress
In the United States, trade marks are protected under the States’ common law, but this 
protection can be shored up by registration under the federal Lanham Act or at the State 
level.109 In each case, the basic requirement for a trade mark is that it must be used in 
commerce,110 meaning a bona fide use of a mark in the course of trade.111
In the United States, trade dress is simply a type of “trade mark”. The definition of a trade 
mark is a mark which “includes any word, name, symbol, or device, or any combination”.112 
The word “includes” means that it is not restricted to those things listed. Nothing shall be 
100 Also see Bestellnummernübernahme (2005) GRUR  348, 349 (BGH).
101 Arbeitselement für Resektoskopie (2006) GRUR-RR  278, 279 (OLG Köln).
102 Tele-Info CD (1999) GRUR 923, 927 (BGH).
103 Tele-Info CD (1999) GRUR 923, 927 (BGH).
104 Helmet Köhler and Joachim Bornkamm, UWG, (30th Ed. Beck 2012), [9.66, No. (3)].
105 See McLaren (1994) WRP 599, 601 (BGH).
106 see Rolls-Royce (1983) GRUR 247, [248] (BGH).
107 Sebastian Heim “Protection of Competitors, Consumers and the General Public – The New German Act 
against Unfair Competition” (2006) 1 Journal of Intellectual Property Law and Practice 524, 531.
108 Ovalpuderdose (1976) WRP 370, 372 (BGH).
109 State registration will not be considered here.
110 US Constitution, art I, s.8, cl. 3; see Trade-Mark Cases, 100 US 82 (1879); also see Hanover Star Milling v 
Metcalf, 240 US 403, 425 (1916).
111 Lanham Act §45 (15 USC §1127).
112 Lanham Act §45 (15 USC §1127).
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refused registration on account of its nature113 alone and, more pertinently, the definition 
includes “product configuration,” or what might be more commonly called trade dress.114
II.4.1 Nature of protection
Protection for a trade mark (or trade dress) is the same whether it is registered or unregistered 
in terms of subject-matter and exclusive rights. The purpose of registration is to provide 
additional rights to a trade mark owner, such as constructive notice of the claim of ownership 
of the mark,115 nationwide constructive use of the mark as at the date of application,116 and 
prima facie evidence of registrability.117 After five years of continuous use, the trade mark 
becomes incontestable and can thereafter be challenged only on very limited grounds.118 
II.4.2 Distinctiveness
Trade dress must be distinctive to be considered a trade mark (registered or unregistered). 
This distinctiveness can be either inherent or acquired.119 The relevant law is now set out in 
a trinity of Supreme Court cases: Two Pesos v Taco Cabana;120 Qualitex v Jacobson 
Products;121 and Wal-Mart Stores v Samara Brothers.122 In summary, Two Pesos suggested 
that trade dress can, in some circumstances, be inherently distinctive. However, the lower 
courts had difficulty working out the appropriate test for assessing whether trade dress had 
become inherently distinctive.123 In the subsequent Wal-Mart decision the Supreme Court 
appears to have modified its view and made it clear that product-packaging trade dress can 
be inherently distinctive, but product-design trade dress cannot.124 Accordingly, in terms of 
lookalikes many, although not all,125 aspects of the packaging would be considered to be 
product-packaging, rather than product-design.126 It could in theory be inherently distinctive; 
however, in most cases it would be necessary for there to be evidence of secondary meaning. 
113 Lanham Act §2 (15 USC §1052 ).
114 See Kohler Co v Moss Inc, 12 F 3d 632 (7th Cir 1993); see earlier decisions, Application of Kotzin, 276 F 2d 
411, 414-5 (CCPA 1960); Application of Honeywell, 497 F.2d 1344 (CCPA), cert denied 419 US 1090 (1974). 
The court put emphasis on the word “includes” and so it was not restricted to things listed; also see S. Rep 
100-515, 100th Cong 2d Session 44.
115 Lanham Act §21 (15 USC §1072).
116 Lanham Act §7 (15 USC §1057(c)).
117 Lanham Act §7 (15 USC §1057(b).
118 Lanham Act §15 (15 USC §1065); those grounds set out Lanham Act §33 (15 USC §1115(b)).
119 Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition, s, 13 (1995); also see Wal-Mart Stores v Sanara Brothers, 529 US 
205, 210-211(2000).
120 505 US 763 (1992), rehearing denied 505 US 1244 (1992).
121 514 US 159 (1995).
122 529 US 205 (2000).
123 See Graeme Dinwoodie and Mark Janis, Trade Dress and Design Law (Aspen 2010), 76-77; also see Graeme 
Dinwoodie “Reconceptualizing the Inherent Distinctiveness of Product Design Trade Dress” (1997) 75 North 
Carolina Law Review 471.
124 Wal-Mart Stores v Sanara Brothers, 529 US 205, 212-213(2000).
125 An example given in Wal-Mart (at 215) is that of a Coca-Cola bottle. The bottle is product-packaging for the 
person who drinks the Coke, but product-design for the person who collects glass bottles.
126 An example of a case trying to distinguish between product-design and packaging is In re Slokevage, 441 F 
3d 957 (Fed Cir 2006); also see McKernan v Burek, 118 F. Supp 2d 119 (D. Mass 2000).
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This can be provided by evidence from consumers, surveys (if properly conducted) and long 
and continuous use of the market,127 to name a few.
II.4.3 Functionality
Trade dress cannot be protected under the Lanham Act to the extent that it is functional. 
There are two forms of functionality – utilitarian and aesthetic. The Supreme Court has 
indicated that “in general terms, a product feature is functional if it is essential to the use or 
purpose of the article or if it affects the cost or quality of the article”.128 Thus, where the 
packaging has to be a particular shape for functional reasons, such as where the colour of 
the packaging is dictated by the colour of the contents, then this will not be protectable as 
part of the trade dress.
II.4.4 Confusion
The basic right of action for trade mark or trade dress infringement is set out in §43(a) of the 
Lanham Act:129
§43 False designations of origin, false descriptions, and dilution forbidden
 (1) Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or any container for 
goods, uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any combination 
thereof, or any false designation of origin, false or misleading description of fact, or false 
or misleading representation of fact, which—
(A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the affiliation, 
connection, or association of such person with another person, or as to the origin, 
sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, or commercial activities by another 
person, or
(B) in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the nature, characteristics, 
qualities, or geographic origin of his or her or another person’s goods, services, or 
commercial activities,shall be liable in a civil action by any person who believes that he or 
she is or is likely to be damaged by such act.
127 Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition, §13, comment (e).
128 Innwood v Ives Laboratory, 456 US 844, 850, n 10 (1982); Qualitex v Jacobson Prod, 514 US 159 (1995); 
TrafFix Devices v Marketing Displays, 532 US 23 (2001).
129 15 USC §1125.
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In the determination of whether a lookalike and a brand leader are confusing there is a 
number of factors which the courts use. These vary between the twelve circuits.130 By way of 
example, the Federal Circuit has adopted the following factors:131
(1) The similarity or dissimilarity of the trade dress as to appearance, connotation and 
commercial impression.
(2) The similarity or dissimilarity and nature of the goods or services as described in an 
application or registration or in connection with which a prior mark is in use.
(3) The similarity or dissimilarity of established, likely-to-continue trade channels.
(4) The conditions under which and buyers to whom sales are made, i. e. “impulse” vs. 
careful, sophisticated purchasing.
(5) The fame of the prior mark (sales, advertising, length of use).
(6) The number and nature of similar trade dress in use on similar goods.
(7) The nature and extent of any actual confusion.
(8) The length of time during and conditions under which there has been concurrent use 
without evidence of actual confusion.
(9) The variety of goods on which a trade dress is or is not used (house mark, “family” 
mark, product mark).
(10) The market interface between the owner of the trade dress and the owner of a prior 
mark:
(a) a mere “consent” to register or use.
(b) agreement provisions designed to preclude confusion, i. e. limitations on continued 
use of the marks by each party.
(c) assignment of mark, application, registration and good will of the related business.
(d) laches and estoppel attributable to owner of prior mark and indicative of lack of 
confusion.
(11) The extent to which applicant has a right to exclude others from use of its trade dress 
on its goods.
130 See n. 163 for a description of the circuits and the issues that arise.
131 In re E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co, 476 F. 2d 1357, 1361 (CCPA 1973); followed and endorsed Champagne 
Louis Roederer v Delicato Vineyards, 148 F. 3d 1373 (Fed Cir 1998); the other famous set of factors comes 
from Polaroid Corp v Polarad Eletronics Corp, 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir 1961).
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(12) The extent of potential confusion, i. e., whether de minimis or substantial.
(13) Any other established fact probative of the effect of use.
These factors are aids in determining the issue of the likelihood of confusion, but they are not 
determinative as the ultimate question remains as to whether the consumer is confused132 
and not all factors are given equal weight.133 A detailed discussion of these factors is outside 
the scope of this report, but certain factors have particular significance for lookalikes and 
these will now be addressed.
Appearance, sound and connotation of the trade dress: The first factor is the similarity in 
appearance of the two different sets of trade dress. In making this assessment the general 
recollection of the customer, rather than a side-by-side comparison, is undertaken.134 
Nevertheless, a side-by-side comparison is permitted in circumstances where this happens 
in real life,135 and this is particularly likely in terms of own brand lookalikes where the goods 
are likely to share shelf space with the brand leader. 
Similarity of the goods or services: The similarity of the goods and services is important in 
assessing confusion.136 The courts have acknowledged that certain products are expected to 
expand into new related markets and that this might lead to potential confusion.137 Again, this 
factor is relevant for own brand where retailers expand into a new market. Indeed, the 
incidents of lookalikes almost always arise where the goods are in the same product category. 
This does not mean the goods are always similar, but it is usually going to be more likely than 
not.
Strength and famous marks: Where the trade dress is particularly famous it will be given 
greater protection.138 However, this may have a counter-effect in defeating lookalikes, where 
in some cases it has been suggested that the better known the trade dress, the more likely 
that any difference in the other trade dress will be noticed by customers.139
Trade channels and marketing environment: The channel of trade or the marketing 
environment in which the goods are sold will be significant as to whether or not there will be 
confusion. This means, for example, that where the trade dress is used by one trader in 
relation to retail goods and by another in relation to wholesale goods confusion is unlikely.140 
132 Playtex Prods v Georgia-Pacific, 390 F.3d 158, 162 (2d Cir 2004).
133 See In re Majestic Distilling Co., 315 F.3d 1311, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
134 Malletier v  Burlington Coat Factory, 426 F.3d 532, 538-9 (2d Cir 2005); Louis Vuitton Malletier v Dooney & 
Bourke, 454 F.3d 108, 117 (2d Cir 2006).
135 Compare McNeil Nutitionals v Hearlands Sweetners, 511 F.3d 350, 359 (3d Cir 2007); Top Tabacco v North 
Atl. Operating, 509 F.3d 380, 381 (7th Cir 2007).
136 Scarves by Vera v Todo Imports, 544 F.2d 1167, 1173 (2d Cir 1976).
137 Tiffany & Co v Parfums Lamborghini, 214 USPQ 77, 78-9 (SDNY 1981).
138 CPC International v Skippy, 231 USPQ 811, 814 (ED Va 1986); Virgin Enterprise v Nawab, 335 F.3d 141, 147 
(2d Cir 2003); Kenner-Parker Toys v Rose Art Industries, 963 F.2d 350, 352-3 (Fed Cir 1992); but see Kellogg 
v Toucan Golf, 337 F.3d 616, 626 (6th Cir 2003).
139 BVD Licensing Corp v Body Action Design, 846 F.2d 727, 728-9 (Fed Cir 1988); Louis Vuitton Malletier v 
Haute Diggity Dog, 507 F.3d 252, 262 (4th Cir 2007).
140 Cadbury Beverages v Cott Corp, 73 F.3d 474, 481 (2d Cir 1996).
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Similarly, where one trader sells to the mass market and another sells to upmarket customers, 
confusion is less likely.141 Again, in general, lookalikes are sold in the same trade channels 
although they may be marketed differently.
Actual confusion: It is not necessary to prove actual confusion, but where it can be proved 
it will add great weight to the case for confusion.142 An individual instance of actual confusion 
can be so significant that it can be given weight by the court.143 Conversely, where the trade 
dress has been used in the same geographical market for some time and there is no evidence 
of actual confusion, this is good evidence that there will be no customer confusion.144 This 
sort of evidence can be supplemented by evidence from surveys and similar sources.145 
Initial interest confusion and post-sale confusion: The United States courts have 
recognised so-called “initial interest confusion”, that is, where initially a customer is confused 
and so becomes interested in a competitor’s product, but such confusion is dispelled before 
the purchase takes place.146 The courts have also recognised that confusion otherwise than 
at the point of sale can be actionable.147 This is often called secondary confusion148 or post-
sale confusion. This is to protect the owner of the rights in the trade dress from consumers 
who merely see the goods after they were sold without the identifying labels.149 Both types of 
confusion might be relevant to lookalikes as many consumers may pick the wrong product off 
the shelves only to replace it before the counter (initial interest confusion), whereas others 
may buy a lookalike thinking it is the same only to find out later on use it is different (post-sale 
confusion).
II.4.5 Dilution
There is federal protection against dilution under the Lanham Act150 as well as several State 
statutes151 which prevent trade mark dilution.152 There was originally some doubt about the 
application of the dilution provisions to trade dress, but an amendment made in 2006 makes 
it clear that Congress intended to include it.153
141 Duluth News-Tribune v Mesabi Publishing Co, 84 F. 3d 1093, 1099 (8th Cir 1996).
142 World Carpets v Dick Littrell’s New World Carpets, 438 F. 2d 482, 489 (5th Cir 1971); also see Berkshire 
Fashions v Sara Lee Corp, 725 F. Supp 790, 796-7 (SDNY 1989), affr’d 904 F.2d 33 (2d Cir 1990).
143 Daddy’s Junky Music Stores v Big Daddy’s Family Music, 109 F.3d 275, 284 (6th Cir 1997).
144 Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition §23; also see Pignons SA de Mecanique v Polaroid Corp, 657 F. 
2d 482, 490 (1st Cir 1981).
145 See Jerry B. Swann “Likelihood of Confusion Studies and Straitened Scope of Squirt” (2008) 98 Trademark 
Reporter 739.
146 See Playboy Entertainments v Netscape Comm, 354 F. 3d 1020, 1024-5 (9th Cir 2004); it has been suggested 
to be on a statutory basis: Checkpoint Sys v Check Point Software, 269 F. 3d 270, 295 (3d Cir 2001).
147 See Ferrari SPA Esercizio v Roberts, 944 F. 2d 1235, 1245 (6th Cir), cert denied, 505 US 1219 (1992).
148 It originated with Mastercrafts Clock & Radio v Cacheron & Contantin-Le Colutre Watches, 221 F. 2d 464, 466 
(2nd Cir 1955), cert denied 350 US 832 (1955).
149 Lois Sportswear USA v Levi Strauss & Co, 799 F. 2d 867, 872-3 (2d Cir 1986); also see Hermes Int v Lederer 
De Paris Fifth Ave, 219 F. 3d 104, 107 (2d Cir 2000).
150 E.g. Advantage Rent A Car v Enterprise Rent A Car, 238 F. 3d 378, 381 (5th Cir 2001).
151 These are not considered here.
152 About half the states: see Mosley v Secret, 537 US 418, 430 (2003). However, before statutory intervention 
there was no protection under the common law: Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition (1995), §25.
153 The inclusion of Lanham Act s. 43(c)(4).
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Famous trade dress is protected from two sorts of dilution under the Lanham Act: dilution by 
blurring (the watering down of the potency of a mark and the whittling away of its selling 
power154); and dilution by tarnishment (unwholesome associations being made with a trade 
mark155). The latter is not relevant to lookalikes and so will not be considered and the former 
is probably only of marginal relevance and so warrants only a short introduction.
Famous marks: The federal law protects only famous trade dress from dilution.156 This 
requires the trade dress to be widely recognised by the general public of the United States 
and, in making that determination, the court will consider the following factors: (i) the duration, 
extent and geographical reach of advertising and publicity of the trade dress, whether 
advertised or publicised by the owner or a third parties; (ii) the amount, volume and 
geographical extent of sales of goods offered under the trade dress; (iii) the extent of actual 
recognition of the trade dress; and (iv) whether it has been registered for many years.157
Dilution by blurring: The protection against blurring is engaged where the famous mark is 
blurred by an association caused by reason of the similarity between the get-up of a product 
and the famous trade dress so that it impairs the distinctiveness of that famous trade dress. 
Put another way, blurring occurs when the trade dress no longer brings to mind only the 
famous trade dress, but both sets of trade dress.158 The following factors, which are not 
exhaustive, will be taken into account in assessing whether the mark (for mark read trade 
dress in the following) has been blurred: (i) the degree of similarity between the mark or trade 
name and the famous mark; (ii) the degree of inherent or acquired distinctiveness of the 
famous mark (this might raise the question of whether a mark that is iconic, rather than just 
famous, will be more difficult to blur159); (iii) the extent to which the owner of the famous mark 
is engaging in substantially exclusive use of the mark; (iv) the degree of recognition of the 
famous mark; (v) whether the user of the mark or trade name intended to create an association 
with the famous mark; and (vi) any actual association between the mark or trade name and 
the famous mark. 
This list is not exhaustive and so in addition to these statutory factors, the following additional 
factors (as examples) may assist in determining whether there has been blurring: first, the 
similarity of the marks and the products; secondly, the sophistication of the consumer; thirdly, 
the defendant’s predatory intent; fourthly, the renown of the senior mark; and, fifthly and 
finally, the renown of the junior mark.160 The factors which relate to the confusion analysis are 
not usually relevant.161 However, similarity of marks and goods can be relevant to whether an 
association may be made by the consumer and accordingly whether blurring occurs.
154 See Toys R Us v Canarsie Kiddie Shop, 559 F. Supp 1189, 1208 (EDNY 1983).
155 New York Stock Exchange v New York, New York Hotel, 293 F. 3d 550, 558 (2d Cir 2002); Coca-Cola Co v 
Alma Leo USA, 719 F, Supp 725, 728-9 (ND Ill 1989).
156 Lanham Act §43(c) (15 USC §1125(c)); this was amended in 2006 under the Trademark Dilution Revision Act 
following the Mosley v Secret, 537 US 418 (2003).
157 Lanham Act §43(2)(A) (15 USC §1125(2)(A)).
158 Mattel Inc v MCA Records, 296 F 3d 894, 904 (9th Cir 2002).
159 Louis Vuitton v Haute Diggity Dog, 507 F.3d 252 (4th Cir 2007).
160 Mead Data Central v Toyota Motor Sales, 875 F. 2d 1026, 1035 (2d Cir 1989).
161 See Times Mirror Magazine v Las Vagas Sporting News, 212 F.3d 157, 168-9 (3d Cir 2000) (criticism of Mead 
Data criteria as based on confusion).
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The law of trade dress and blurring has not been well explored, but trade dress may become 
famous (for example the Coca Cola bottle) and that shape being used for other products, 
such as beer, could potentially amount to dilution. 
Significance of own brand labelling: In the United States162 there is a divergence between 
the Circuits163 as to an effect of having a retailer’s label on products which have a trade dress 
similar to that of a manufacturer. Some courts have gone as far as to acknowledge that own 
brands “owe their existence to the advertising and promotion efforts” of manufacturer 
brands.164 The majority view is that using a retailer’s mark does turn what would otherwise be 
infringing trade dress into permitted trade dress.165 Therefore, in general, the courts have 
found that a defendant which has placed a different label on confusing trade dress did not 
avoid liability as it had not done enough to dissipate confusion.166
Nevertheless, where there is clear and prominent labelling some US courts have taken the 
opposite view and held that proper labelling can be sufficient to negate confusion. For 
example, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit stated in Versa Prods. Co. v. Bifold Co:167
“[E]xcept where consumers ordinarily exercise virtually no care in selecting a particular 
type of product (as may be the case with inexpensive disposable or consumable items, 
[such as] cookies), clarity of labeling in packaging and advertising will suffice to preclude 
almost all possibility of consumer confusion as to source stemming from the product’s 
configuration.”
162 In general see Andrew Corydon Finch “When Imitation is the Sincerest Form of Flattery: Private Label 
Products and the Role of Intention in Determining Trade Dress Infringement” (1996) 63 University of Chicago 
Law Review 1243.
163 In the United States, there are twelve circuits and they can, and often do, have diverging rules on federal 
matters. Each circuit must follow the precedent of its Court of Appeals (so a District Judge in the Sixth Circuit 
is not strictly bound to follow the decision of the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals), but all must follow decisions 
of the US Supreme Court.
164 Smithkline Beckman Corp v Pennex Products, 605 F Supp 746, 748 (ED Pa 1985).
165 McCarthy, Trademarks and Unfair Competition (4th Ed, 2012 Revision), § 23:53.
166 Source Perrier, S.A. v. Waters of Saratoga Springs, Inc., 217 USPQ 617 (SDNY 1982); Accord Aris-Isotoner 
Gloves, Inc. v. Fownes Bros. & Co., 594 F. Supp. 15 (SDNY 1983); PAF S.r.l. v. Lisa Lighting Co., 712 F. Supp. 
394 (SDNY 1989); Life Indus. Corp. v. Star Brite Distrib., Inc., 803 F. Supp. 646 (EDNY 1992); Nabisco 
Brands, Inc. v. Conusa Corp., 722 F. Supp. 1287 (MDNC 1989), aff’d without op., 892 F.2d 74 (4th Cir. 1989)
167 50 F.3d 189 (3d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 808 (1995).
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European Union
II.4 Trade mark registration 
Under European Union trade mark law, and so UK law and German law, it is possible to 
register any sign168 which can be graphically represented as a trade mark,169 provided that 
the representation is clear, precise, self-contained, easily accessible, intelligible, durable, 
unequivocal, and objective.170 Therefore where get-up functions as an indication of origin and 
is not functional it can be registered.
However, a trade mark cannot be registered if the relevant public171 would think that it is 
devoid of distinctive character.172 This exclusion is to prevent the registration of a mark which 
is incapable of fulfilling its essential function, namely distinguishing173 the goods or services 
of one undertaking from others which have a different origin.174 A trade mark, or get-up, can 
either be inherently distinctive or acquire that distinctiveness. The test for the distinctiveness 
of shape or get-up marks is the same as for any other mark. However, consumers are not in 
the habit of making assumptions about the origin of products based on the shape of their 
packaging alone in absence of any other element.175 In short, it is difficult to establish that 
get-up is inherently distinctive. Thus, usually, the get-up will need to have been on the market 
for some time to acquire the necessary distinctiveness.176 The problem is that in the time 
others might enter the market with a lookalike. Essentially, the difficulty in relation to packaging 
is trying to register the combination of elements necessary to provide robust protection 
against lookalikes. Another issue with get-up marks is the restrictions on marks where the 
shape of the mark results from the nature of the goods themselves, the shape is necessary 
to obtain a technical result or it gives substantial value to the goods.177
168 But not everything is a sign: see C-321/03 Dyson Ltd v Registrar of Trade Marks [2007] ECR I-687; [2007] 
ETMR 34.
169 Directive 2008/95/EC, Art 2.
170 C-273/00 Sieckmann v Deutsches Patent- und Markenamt [2002] ECR I-11737; [2003] ETMR 34.
171 C-136/02 Mag Instrument Inc v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) 
(OHIM) [2004] ECR I-9165; [2005] ETMR 46, [19] and [49]; C-218/01 Henkel KGaA v Deutsches Patent- und 
Markenamt [2004] ECR I-1725; [2005] ETMR 45, [50]. The relevant public is made up of those who might buy 
the goods or services.
172 Directive 2008/95/EC, Art 3(1)(b).
173 The distinctiveness bar may actually be very low: see C-64/02 Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market 
(Trade Marks and Designs) (OHIM) v Erpo Mobelwerk [2004] ECR I-10031; [2005] ETMR 58.
174 C-329/02 SAT.1 Satellitenfernsehen GmbH v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and 
Designs) (OHIM) [2004] ECR I-8317; [2005] ETMR 20, [23]; C-37/03 BioID [2005] ECR I-7975, [27].
175 C-136/02 Mag Instrument Inc v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) 
(OHIM) [2004] ECR I-9165; [2005] ETMR 46, [30].
176 The things which might be used to prove distinctiveness are explained in: C-108 and 109/97 Windsurfing 
Chiemsee Produktions - und Vertriebs GmbH v Boots- und Segelzubehor Walter Huber [1999] ECR I-2779; 
[1999] ETMR 585, [51]; also see C-25/05 August Storck (Storck II) [2006] ECR I-5719.
177 Directive 2008/95/EC, Art 3(1)(e); as to the test applied to shapes see C-299/99 Philips v Remington [2002] 
ECR I-5475, [2002] ETMR 81; and C-48/09 Lego Juris v OHIM, Mega Brands [2010] ETMR 63.
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II.4.1 “Free riding”
The rights granted under a trade mark by Article 5(2) of the Trade Marks Directive (and Article 
9(3) of the Community Trade Mark Regulation) means that where a third person uses a sign 
which is identical or similar to a registered trade mark which has a reputation178 in the United 
Kingdom179 (or in the case of a Community trade mark, the EU) and the use of the sign, being 
without due cause, takes unfair advantage of, or is detrimental to, the distinctive character or 
repute of the trade mark it can be prevented.180
Essentially, there are three forms of dilution in the European Union. In C-252/07 Intel181 the 
Court of Justice identified these as follows: first, detriment to the distinctive character of the 
earlier mark; secondly, detriment to the repute of that mark and, thirdly, unfair advantage 
taken of the distinctive character or the repute of that mark. The Advocate-General in 
C-323/09 Interflora v Marks and Spencer182 went further and tried to place these three types 
into conventional categories in the context of trade mark law. The first he called blurring (or 
dilution in the strict sense) which is where the uses that entail a danger that the trade mark 
loses its distinctive character and thereby its value. The second he called tarnishment which 
protects against uses that endanger the reputation of the trade mark. The third he called 
protection against free-riding or the taking of unfair advantage of the reputation or 
distinctiveness of another’s trade mark. 
It is plausible that all of these could apply to lookalikes, but it is the last (free-riding) which 
has been referred to most frequently in this context and so it will be given greater consideration. 
Indeed, so called free-riding is the most pervasive and in many respects appears to dwarf the 
importance of the other two because a finding of tarnishment or blurring (the other forms of 
dilution) can help support a finding of free-riding or unfair advantage.183
The leading case on free-riding, and the one most regularly cited in relation to lookalikes, is 
the Court of Justice decision in C-487/07 L’Oréal v Bellure.184 In that case, the term free-
riding was described as to take unfair advantage is that a person, through the use of a sign 
similar to a mark with a reputation, rides on the coat-tails of that mark in order to benefit from 
its power of attraction, its reputation, and its prestige, and exploits, without paying any 
financial compensation and without being required to make efforts of her own in that regard, 
the marketing effort expended by the proprietor of that mark in order to create and maintain 
the image of that mark. The advantage resulting from such use must be considered to be an 
advantage that has been unfairly taken of the distinctive character or the repute of that 
mark.185 
178 As to reputation see: C-301/07 Pago International v Tirolmilch [2009] ECR I-9429; [2010] ETMR 5, [21].
179 In another member state.
180 Directive 2008/95/EC, Art 4(3) and 5(2) still suggest that it only applies to dissimilar goods or services. But the 
Court of Justice has indicated that it applies to both similar and dissimilar goods: C-292/00 Davidoff & Cie SA 
v Gofkid Ltd [2003] ECR I-389; [2003] ETMR 42; C-408/01 Adidas-Salomon AG v Fitnessworld Trading Ltd 
[2003] ECR I-12537; [2004] ETMR 10.
181 C-252/07 Intel v CPM [2008] ECR I-8823, [2009] ETMR 13, [27].
182 C-323/09 Interflora v Marks and Spencer [2012] ETMR 1, [AG52] and [AG53]
183 C-487/07 L’Oreal v Bellure [2009] ECR I-5185, [2009] ETMR 55, [45].
184 [2009] ECR I-5185, [2009] ETMR 55.
185 C-487/07 L’Oreal v Bellure [2009] ECR I-5185, [2009] ETMR 55, [49].
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When making these assessments it is important to acknowledge that the relevant public is 
different from that for blurring (and probably tarnishment) – it is the consumers of the goods 
and services of the later user of the mark which must be considered (rather than the goods for 
which the mark is registered).186 Whichever public is used as the barometer, this test is 
incredibly generous to trade mark proprietors and it has even been suggested by Jacob LJ that 
it effectively removes the word ‘unfair’ from unfair advantage.187 He went on to say: 
“So far as I can see this is saying if there is ‘clear exploitation on the coat-tails’ that is ipso 
facto not only an advantage but an unfair one at that.”188
After these comments were made in the Court of Appeal, the concept was explored in more 
detail by the Court of Justice in C-323/09 Interflora v Marks and Spencer:189
 “the concept of ‘taking unfair advantage of the distinctive character or the repute of the 
trade mark’, also referred to as, inter alia, ‘free-riding’, relates not to the detriment caused 
to the mark but to the advantage taken by the third party as a result of the use of the 
identical or similar sign. It covers, in particular, cases where, by reason of a transfer of the 
image of the mark or of the characteristics which it projects to the goods identified by the 
identical or similar sign, there is clear exploitation on the coat-tails of the mark with a 
reputation.”
In the context of keywords referencing on the internet the court held that where someone goes 
to a website by reason of the use of a keyword and this causes them to make a purchase this 
can in principle amount to taking unfair advantage.190 This might suggest that the use of get-up 
which has been registered as a trade mark on other products could be infringing where it is 
used by a retailer or another manufacturer. However, the Interflora court went on to say that 
where an alternative product is put forward, which is not a mere imitation of the goods, and 
which offers an alternative to the goods provided by the trade mark proprietor, then this falls 
within the ambit of fair competition.191 A similar view had already been reached by Daniel 
Alexander QC sitting as the Appointed Person in Beko192
“…it is possible to envisage situations in which a user of a mark intentionally uses a sign 
and the use of it, objectively viewed, provides an advantage but the user does not intend to 
take advantage of a proprietor’s registered mark. He may intend other results (such as for 
example signalling that there goods or services are similar or have similar characteristics). 
In such a situation, a role may remain for the concept of unfairness in excluding from 
liability free riding which in fact takes place but which is an unintended consequence of 
some other purpose.”
186 C-252/07 Intel v CPM [2008] ECR I-8823, [2009] ETMR 13, [36]; Antartica SRL v OHIM [2009] ECR I-28; [2009] 
ETMR 47 [48].
187 This originates from Darren Meale and Joel Smith, ‘Enforcing a Trade Mark when Nobody’s Confused: Where 
the Law Stands after L’Oréal and Intel’ (2010) 5 Journal of Intellectual Property Law and Practice 96, 103; which 
with approval in L’Oreal v Bellure [2010] EWCA Civ 535; [2010] ETMR 47, [18]. It has been described by the 
Advocate-General as moving away from the welfare optimal position (as users are prejudiced without benefit to 
proprietor): see C-323/09 Interflora v Marks & Spencer [2012] ETMR 1, [AG 94].
188 L’Oreal v Bellure [2010] EWCA Civ 535; [2010] ETMR 47, [49].
189 C-323/09 Interflora v Marks & Spencer [2012] ETMR 1, [74].
190 C-323/09 Interflora v Marks & Spencer [2012] ETMR 1, [87 and 88].
191 C-323/09 Interflora v Marks & Spencer [2012] ETMR 1, [91].
192 O-307-10 (20th August 2010).
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It is unclear precisely what the Court of Justice meant in Interflora by a “mere imitation”. Does 
it mean “slavish imitation” or replica as it was used in L’Oréal and the Comparative Advertising 
Directive193? Or does it mean something less? Is there are requirement of intention?194 Where 
it is not an imitation (whatever that means) and the similarity of packaging is merely signalling 
to the consumer that it is substitutable then this, according to the court, is a due cause for 
using the mark195 and so it is not an infringement. It would amount to “fair competition”. 
Whether a particular lookalike falls on the side of fair or unfair competition is likely to depend 
on the circumstances of the case. 
 
193 Directive 2006/114/EC, article 4(g).
194 This issue is discussed in Whirlpool v Kenwood [2009] EWCA Civ 753; [2010] ETMR 7.
195 The due cause element of the Court of Justice’s reasoning is explained in Specsavers International v ASDA 
[2012] EWCA Civ 24; [2012] ETMR 17, [141].
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Annex III:  Unfair Commercial 
Practices Directive
III.1 Introduction
The Unfair Commercial Practices Directive (2005/29), or UCPD, represented a fundamental 
shift in consumer protection law both at the European level and within the individual Member 
States.1 In relation to the United Kingdom, it was described as the biggest shake-up in 
consumer law for over 40 years.2 Most importantly of all, it has occupied the field in relation 
to unfair commercial practices between businesses and consumers and so its scope is of 
vital importance.
III.2 Scope
The scope of the UCPD is very important as it is a maximal Directive,3 which means that 
Members States cannot restrict free movement of goods or services for any reason falling 
within the field approximated by the Directive. In other words, they cannot adopt stricter (or, 
by implication, more lax) laws which fall within the scope of the UCPD even if it would provide 
greater consumer protection (or more lax, to provide a more competitive environment).4 The 
scope, therefore, is very important and it applies to:5
“…unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices, as laid down in Article 5, before, 
during and after a commercial transaction in relation to a product…”
The definition of “commercial practices” means any act, omission, course of conduct or 
representation, commercial communication including advertising and marketing, by a trader, 
directly connected with the promotion, sale or supply of a product to consumers.6 Essentially 
this means the UCPD does not extend to unfair commercial practices which do not affect 
consumers or where the effect on consumers is minimal;7 although it might still affect such 
1 As to previous attempts to harmonise unfair competition law across Europe see Christopher Wadlow “Unfair 
Competition in Community Law: Part 1: The Age of the “Classical Model” [2006] European Intellectual Property 
Review 433 and Christopher Wadlow “Unfair Competition in Community Law: Part 2: Harmonisation Becomes 
Gridlock” [2006] European Intellectual Property Review 469; also see Friedrich-Karl Beier “The Law of Unfair 
Competition in the European Community: Its Development and Present Status” [1985] European Intellectual 
Property Review 284 (also see an extended version at (1985) 16 International Review of Intellectual Property 
Law 139).
2 Joel Smith and Rachel Montagnon “The New Consumer and Business Protection Regulations: Another String 
to the Brand Owner’s Bow?” (2009) 4 Journal of Intellectual Property Law and Practice 33, 33.
3 Directive 2005/29/EC, article 4.
4 C 261/07 and C 299/07 VTX [2009] ECR I-2949; [2009] 3 CMLR 17, [52].
5 Directive 2005/29/EC, article 3. There are a number of paragraphs of Article 3 preserving other legal regimes, 
but none relates to lookalikes.
6 Directive 2005/29/EC, article 2(d).
7 Directive 2005/29/EC, recital (6).
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laws where they are directly addressed to consumers.8 The UCPD does not therefore 
extend to national laws relating to unfair commercial practices which prevent harm only to 
competitors’ economic interests or which relate to a transaction between traders.9 The 
touchstone is whether the practice is related to influencing consumers’ transactional decisions 
in relation to products.10
The difficult question is what amounts to the situation where both consumer and competitor 
interests are engaged.11 The Court of Justice has indicated that where a law falls within the 
definition of commercial practices it is within the scope of the UCPD, whether the law is 
aimed at protecting consumers or preventing competitors behaving in a certain fashion.12 If 
something is connected to the promotion, sale or supply of products to consumers then it 
falls within the scope of the UCPD.13 Only where is it not connected to these things and 
relates only to competitor harm does it fall outside the Directive.14
III.2.1 Lookalikes
A product which looks similar to another product is, in the usual course of things, connected 
to the promotion, sale or supply of products to consumers. However, the Explanatory 
Memorandum to the Proposed Directive15 expressly mentions “slavish imitations” as 
something outside the scope of the UCPD:
 “It also means that acts which constitute unfair competition in some Member States but 
which do not harm the economic interests of consumers, such as slavish imitation (ie 
copying independently of any likelihood of consumer confusion) and denigration of a 
competitor, are outside the scope of the Directive. Acts which are classed in some Member 
States as unfair competition which do harm consumers economic interests, such as 
confusion marketing (which generates a danger of confusion among consumers with the 
distinctive signs and/or products of a competitor) are within scope.”
At first blush, this suggests two things: first, that lookalikes (absent confusion) fall outside the 
scope of the UCPD;16 and secondly, passing off may fall within its scope. Each of these 
issues will be examined in reverse order.
8 Jochen Glöcker “The Scope of Application of the UCP Directive – “ I Know What You Did Last Summer”” 
(2010) International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law 570, 582.
9 Directive 2005/29/EC, recital (6).
10 Directive 2005/29/EC, recital (7).
11 See Christopher Wadlow “The Emergent European Law of Unfair Competition and its Consumer Law Origins” 
[2012] Intellectual Property Quarterly 1, 20; similar points are raised by Asterios Pliakos and Georgious 
Anagnostaras “Harmonising National Laws on Commercial Practices: Sales Promotions and the Impact on 
Business to Business Relations” (2010) European Law Review 425.
12 C-304/08 Zentrale zur Bekämpfung unlauteren Wettbewerb [2010] 2 CMLR 24,   [38].
13 C-540/08 Mediaprint Zeitungs [2011] 1 CMLR 48, [19]; C-304/08 Zentrale zur Bekämpfung unlauteren 
Wettbewerbs [2010] 2 CMLR 24, [38].
14 C-540/08 Mediaprint Zeitungs [2011] 1 CMLR 48, [21].
15 COM (2003) 356final.
16 There is some further support for this on the basis that the Enforcement Directive (2004/48/EC), recital (13) 
refers to “parasitic copies” in terms of unfair competition law for competitors.
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III.2.2 Passing off 
A leading commentator on passing off suggested that passing off is unaffected by the 
UCPD.17 This might be true, although it is important to consider the arguments that it does 
fall within scope. If passing off (or indeed, protection under the UWG in Germany) is affected 
by the UCPD then some of the discussion in Annex II and IV on the effectiveness of those 
laws might be superseded.
In looking at the effect of the UCPD, the first thing to note is that the intention or purpose of 
a particular law does not matter as to whether it falls within scope.18 What is important is 
whether the law is connected with the promotion, sale or supply of products to consumers. 
Once goodwill is established, the law of passing off exists to prevent a misrepresentation 
being made to the customer of the product or, importantly, a misrepresentation to the ultimate 
consumer of the product.19 As has been discussed, this misrepresentation might result from 
the get-up of the goods being confusingly similar. Such misrepresentation is likely to be 
connected to the promotion, sale or supply of the product and it is difficult to see how a court 
could conclude that the get-up or signs on a product were not related to those things. It is 
immaterial that passing off is intended to prevent business harm. Assuming this is correct, 
only where the misrepresentation is purely between the manufacturer and wholesaler would 
the action for passing off fall outside the scope of the UCPD.20 If this were right passing off 
as a tort would still exist but its scope would have varied (narrowed) and additional things 
might be needed to be proved to make out the action. The potential changes to the law of 
passing off are outside the scope of this report save to the extent that the maximum scope of 
passing off is probably now limited by the UCPD. 
III.3 The original view of the Commission
The extract of the Explanatory Memorandum as set out above21 appears to suggest that 
lookalikes, as they do not necessarily require confusion and do not cause harm to consumer 
interests, fall outside the scope of the UCPD. This view was reiterated by Giuseppe B. 
Abbamonte, the Head of the Health and Consumer Department of the European Commission 
responsible for the Directive:
“If a commercial practice harms only the competitor but does not hurt the consumer, it will 
fall outside the scope of application of the Directive. As a result, an act may violate the 
standard of unfair competition in certain Member States but still not be subject to the 
Directive. This is, for example, the case of denigration and slavish imitation (i.e., slavish 
copying independently of the risk of confusion for the consumer). The latter is forbidden 
in certain countries as an act of unfair competition because they consider that the company 
copying the product is taking undue advantage of the reputation or expenditure of a 
competitor…Consumers may derive an advantage from the placing on the market of such 
products, which may be substitutes having the same quality as the branded products but 
17 Christopher Wadlow, The Law of Passing Off (4th Ed, Sweet and Maxwell 2011), [2-075 – 2-078].
18 See paragraph [III.2].
19 Erven Warnick [1979] AC 731, 742; see also Hoffman-La-Roche v DDSA [1969] FSR 410.
20 As in Scandecor Development v Scandecor Marketing [1999] FSR 26.
21 See paragraph [III.2.1].
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are sold at lower prices. Therefore, such an action does not run afoul of the Directive.” 22
This statement reflects a misconception about lookalikes (at least some lookalikes), namely 
that the product within the packaging is of the same quality.23 The nature of lookalikes is that 
they are usually substitutable, but that does not mean they are the same quality, efficacy and 
fitness for purpose. Indeed, a lookalike may often try to do the same thing as a branded 
product, but in a different way or have different chemical or nutritional content. In any event, 
the Commission’s original view applies only to the extent that the contents of the similar 
looking packages are actually the same. 
If the consumer believes them to the same, but they are not, and a consumer would not buy 
them if they realised they were not in fact the same (or as good), then it is possible this 
indicates consumer harm and a lookalike would fall within the UCPD. Indeed, there is an 
extract of a recital which appears to support this view:24
“It is not the intention of this Directive to reduce consumer choice by prohibiting the 
promotion of products which look similar to other products unless this similarity confuses 
consumers as to the commercial origin of the product and is therefore misleading.”
However, it is not entirely clear how this recital will fit with the Article of the Directive itself. As 
has been mentioned above, something comes within the scope of the UCPD where it is a 
commercial practice. The packaging of a product, making it a lookalike or otherwise, must be 
concerned with promotion, sale or supply of products to consumers.25 The reason the 
packaging looks like it does is to signal certain things to the consumer about its purpose, 
price and quality. Indeed, if packaging has no impact on consumers, then making a 
transactional decision regarding branding would be almost entirely unnecessary. 
22 Giuseppe B. Abbamonte “The Unfair Commercial Practices Directive: An Example Of The New European 
Consumer Protection Approach” (2005) 12 Columbia Journal of European Law 695, 700-1.
23 Glöcker n 8, 583.
24 Directive 2005/29/EC, recital (13).
25 Glöcker n 8, 583.
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III.4 Other member states
The Hogan Lovells report26 states that the majority of Member States27 have taken the view 
that “parasitic copies” are an example of an unfair commercial practice under the UCPD.28 
The view taken by the majority of member states that lookalikes are within scope is either 
incorrect or, alternatively, lookalikes can (in principle) be prevented under the UCPD. 
III.5 Modified view of the Commission
In 2009 the Commission modified its view on lookalikes in its Guidance on the Implementation 
of the Directive.29 The issue of lookalikes is mentioned in relation to Article 6 of the UCPD 
where the Guidance (using the term “copycat”) suggests that consumer deception takes 
three forms:
• outright confusion – the consumer buys the copycat product mistaking it for the brand;
• deception over origin – the consumer recognises the copycat product is different, but 
believes, due to similar packaging, that it is made by the same manufacturer; and
• deception over equivalence or quality – again the consumer recognises the copycat 
is different but believes, due to the similar packaging, that the quality is the same or 
closer to what they would have assumed if the packaging were different.
The third category gives the impression to consumers that the price alone is the only term of 
comparison between the products (rather than the combination of price and quality). The 
Commission then presents an example: “a trader names or brands his new sunglasses so as 
to very closely resemble the name or brand of a competitor’s sunglasses. If the similarity is 
such as to confuse the average consumer making him or her more likely to opt for the new 
sunglasses when, without such confusion, he or she otherwise wold not have done so, this 
practice would breach the directive.”30
This suggests that where a consumer buys a lookalike believing that it is of the same quality 
as the branded product the lookalike might breach the UCPD. However, if it is the same 
quality (to the average consumer) then there could be no breach of the UCPD (as then 
competition is simply on price). Further, where the consumer would have bought the lookalike 
even if it had been packaged in distinctive packaging there is no breach of the Directive. 
26 See Main Report, paragraph [4.2].
27 The High Court of Ireland came to the view that packaging was not related to “marketing and or advertising” 
and so lookalikes are outwith the scope of the Directive: McCambridge v Brennan Bakeries [2011] IEHC 433. 
This may be in part because only the Article 6 implementation was considered (Consumer Protection Act 
2007, s. 43) and not the Directive as a whole (in particular, s. 41). The point was not taken on appeal - 
McCambridge Ltd v Joseph Brennan Bakeries [2012] IESC 46 – where the Supreme Court simply upheld the 
passing off claim.
28 Final Report (MARKT/2010/20/D), [57]; this does not mean it has had a practical difference (this was only 
found in 14 Member States, see [61]).
29 Commission Staff WP, Guidance on the Implementation/Application of Directive 2005/29/EC on Unfair 
Commercial Practices (3rd December 2009), SEC (2009) 1666, 36-37.
30 Ibid, 37.
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Although, in a different context in C-323/09 Interflora v Marks & Spencer,31 the Court of 
Justice felt that in the interests of preserving fair competition right owners might, in some 
circumstances, be obliged to adapt its efforts to acquire or preserve its customer base.
III.6 UCPD and Intellectual Property
The UCPD does not affect the laws relating to intellectual property32 and so it has no effect 
on other laws of trade marks, copyright, design law and other remedies which might be used 
to prevent similar packaging. It is not entirely clear what the term “intellectual property” is 
meant to mean in this context and whether it might include passing off. The only guidance 
would be the list of things considered to be intellectual property by the Commission in relation 
to the Enforcement Directive33 in its Statement it suggested that intellectual property extends 
to “trade names, in so far as these are protected as exclusive property rights in the national 
law concerned”.34 Whilst goodwill is a property right, the marks representing that goodwill 
are not usually seen as property rights in gross (ie. separate from the goodwill) and this is 
why a mark cannot be assigned (or, possibly, licensed) separately from the goodwill.35 It is 
more likely that passing off is characterised as unfair competition.36 Accordingly, it is likely 
that passing off, and the protection it provides, is not excluded from the scope of the UCPD 
on the grounds it is an intellectual property right.
 
31 [2012] ETMR 1, [64].
32 Recital (9).
33 Directive 2004/48/EC.
34 Commission Statement on Directive 2004/48/EC [2005] OJ L 94/37.
35 Warwick Tyre v New Motor and General Rubber [1910] 1 Ch 248; Tavener Rutledge v Trexalpalm [1975] FSR 
479, 486; cf Shelly Lane, The Status of Licensing of Common Law Marks (Dareheath 1991).
36 See Directive 2004/48/EC, Recital (13) and, in another context, Christopher Wadlow has stated that passing 
off is part of unfair competition for the purposes of the Rome II Regulation on the applicable law to non-
contractual obligations: see Christopher Wadlow “The New Private International Law of Unfair Competition 
and the ‘Rome II’ Regulation” (2009) 4 Journal of Intellectual Property Law and Practice 789.
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Annex IV:  Lookalikes in the 
courts
United Kingdom 
There has been a small number of cases1 before the English courts2 where passing off 
has been alleged in relation to lookalikes.3 The following are representative of those 
cases.4
F Hoffman-La Roche v DDSA Phamaceuticals
The case of F Hoffmann-La Roche v DDSA Pharmaceuticals5 related to the sale of a drug 
which was sold under the trade mark Librium in distinctive black and green capsules with the 
name Roche on each one. The defendant started marketing similar capsules in black and 
green with DDSA written upon them. They argued that the drug inside the capsules was the 
same and the colours were merely signalling this to consumers. However, the Court of Appeal 
took the view that the public associated the green and black capsules with Roche. Rather 
than, as the defendant suggested, being a signal to consumers. Therefore passing off was 
made out.
Lever Brothers v Robert McBride
In Lever Brothers v Robert McBride6 the claimant, the owner of the Domestos brand, tried 
to stop the defendant selling its thick bleach. The claimant argued that any blue coloured 
plastic bottle with a red cap, ribbing and waisting and a paper label had become distinctive 
of Domestos. The judge took the view that “anyone who actually reads or even looked at the 
label…with any attention at all could not possibly be confused into thinking [the Defendant’s 
product] was Domestos or was in any way connected with Domestos”. The judge accepted 
that in principle confusion was possible where the label was different, but concluded that this 
was not such a case. The bottles were a different size, the shape was only vaguely similar, 
the wasting and ribbing were different styles and the shades of blue were different.
1 There are some older cases such as William Edge & Sons v William Niccolls & Sons [1911] AC 693; Lever v 
Goodwin [1886-90] All ER Rep 427; Payton & Co v Snelling, Lampard & Co [1901] AC 308.
2 An example before the Scots courts is Haig & Co v Forth Blending 1954 SC 35 CS (OH). However, the facts 
were somewhat peculiar to the way Scotch Whisky was sold in pubs. For examples relating to Ireland, see 
Gerard Kelly “Protecting the Goods: Dealing with the Lookalike Phenomenon through the Enforcement of IP 
rights in the United Kingdom and Ireland” [2011] European Intellectual Property Review 425, 431-432.
3 There are other cases relating to trade dress of course, in particular where the trade dress claimed is for the 
product design.
4 Other cases involving lookalikes of some type include, for example, Diageo North America Inc v Intercontinental 
Brands [2010] EWCA Civ 920; [2010] ETMR 57.
5 [1972] RPC 1.
6 (unreported) 23rd May 1980, Slade J.
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Imperial Group plc v Philip Morris Ltd
Imperial Group plc v Philip Morris Ltd7 related to the John Players Special (JPS) brand sold 
by Imperial Tobacco and the launch of the Raffles brand by Philip Morris. JPS had been on 
sale for a little over a decade with a black pack, gold writing and the JPS monogram. The 
Raffles pack was also black with gold writing and something which looked like a Royal Crest. 
The case turned on whether a black pack with gold writing was distinctive and so had sufficient 
goodwill and whether a similar pack would confuse the consumer. The judge held that there 
was no goodwill in the get-up as pleaded8 and that there was no misrepresentation as 
nobody would be confused between the two packets. Accordingly, the claim failed.9
Rizla v Bryant and May
In Rizla v Bryant and May10 it was argued that the colours red, green and blue, which had 
been used by Rizla for cigarette paper for many years, were protected as get-up. Bryant and 
May was about to introduce its own cigarette papers under the mark “Swan” and was intending 
to use the same colour range as Rizla. Nothing else was similar. Rizla’s case was that 
consumers would simply ask for “Reds”11 – wanting Rizla Reds – but find they are getting the 
Swan product. The court accepted this might happen, but the judge viewed this as nothing to 
do with Bryant and May, rather, it was down to individual shopkeepers. At the interim stage 
the court concluded there was nothing suggesting that, when viewed side by side or based 
on based an imperfect recollection, the packaging would cause confusion.12  Ultimately, the 
court took the view that passing off would only ever be committed by the shopkeepers and 
not by the manufacturers.13
Beecham Group v J Sainsbury
The case of Beecham Group v J Sainsbury plc14 involved an application for an interim 
injunction in relation to Marmite and Bovril. Sainsbury introduced a new own brand yeast and 
beef extracts in pots of a shape similar to those used by Beecham. The dispute related only 
to the shape of the pots and did not concern the colour of the lids or the labels. The court 
accepted, for the purpose of the application, that the shape and colour of the Marmite and 
Bovril pots had, after twenty years use, attracted sufficient goodwill. Sainsbury’s case was 
that a practice had generally developed in supermarkets that substitutable products were put 
in the same sized pots as the brand leader. Surveys were conducted by both parties. The 
claimant’s survey found that consumers assumed that the product in the Sainsbury’s pot was 
made by the same company which made Marmite. The defendant’s survey reached the same 
results, but it also discovered that the result would be the same whatever the size or look of 
the pot. The judge took the view that the public would assume any “almost solid, black sticky 
7 [1984] RPC 293.
8 [1984] RPC 293, 298.
9 [1984] RPC 293.
10 [1986] RPC 389.
11 [1986] RPC 389, 391.
12 [1986] RPC 389, 391.
13 [1986] RPC 389, 392.
14 (unreported) 6th April 1987, Whitford J.
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substance” was made by the people who make Marmite, whomever sold it. Therefore, the 
court declined to grant the injunction as it was unclear whether the case would be made out 
at trial and, further, whether damages would be an adequate remedy.
Reckitt & Colman v Borden
One of the leading cases on passing off, the so called “Jiff Lemon” case, Reckitt & Colman v 
Borden15 relates to a lookalike although it was not a lookalike sold by a retailer, but by a 
competitor. The case related to the sale of Jiff Lemon in a lemon shaped container and the 
launch by the defendant of a similar lemon shape:
The court was presented with impressive evidence. There was an independently produced 
brochure using Jiff Lemon as an example of a product which can be recognised from the 
packaging alone.16 In addition, there were a number of street surveys conducted as well as 
longer interviews away from the street. These again supported shoppers directly associating 
the lemon shape with Jiff. The defendant ran its own surveys, but got very similar results.17 
The quality of the evidence in the case was very good and almost entirely supported the 
claimant. The judge at first instance was able to conclude that shoppers were aware of Jiff 
and identified the lemon shape with Jiff without reference to the label. Accordingly, passing 
off was established, and his decision was upheld by the Court of Appeal and then the House 
of Lords.
15 Reckitt & Colman Products v Borden Inc [1990] RPC 341.
16 [1990] RPC 341, 349.
17 [1990] RPC 341, 349.
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United Biscuits v Burtons Biscuits
The first of the biscuit cases related to Jaffa cakes. In United Biscuits v Burtons Biscuits Ltd18 
the claimant sold McVitie’s Jaffa Cakes and the defendant sold Burtons Jaffa Cakes. The 
case was an application for an interim injunction following a change of packaging by the 
defendant. In 1989, McVitie’s redesigned their packaging, which the judge described as 
follows:19
“The new pack is also blue but it is dark blue at the top and bottom and shades to a lighter 
blue in the centre. The words “Jaffa Cakes” are more prominent, running across two-
thirds of the pack from left to right. They are printed in what has been described as 
“bouncy” Italic script. To the right is a single sectioned Jaffa Cake with above a whole 
orange with a single leaf attached. Immediately to the left of the orange, above the “es” of 
“Cakes,” is a stylised insignia which looks at first sight like an official stamp and which 
reads: “Made with real orange juice.” Then to the left, above the word “Jaffa,” is the 
McVities logo, this time printed on a dark blue background with a gold surround and, to 
the left of the label, a stylised wheat ear. Under the words “Jaffa Cakes,” in small orange 
lettering are the words “12 light sponge cakes, with plain chocolate and a smashing 
orangey bit.”
 “The words “Jaffa Cakes” and “McVities” are printed in white, but the words “Jaffa Cakes” 
are thrown into greater relief by the use of two-tone colour shadow, the inner dark blue 
and the outer dark orange or red.”
Burtons packaging was also described by the judge:
 “The new pack…is dark orange at the top shading to light orange or yellow at the bottom. 
The words “Jaffa Cakes” are written prominently across the pack in a similar but not 
identical “bouncy” Italic script. The words “Jaffa Cakes” are more centralised than on the 
McVities pack. The gap on each side between the beginning and end of the words and the 
ends of the pack is the same whereas on the McVities’ pack the words “Jaffa Cakes” 
appear to the left, leaving the right-hand one-third of the pack for the illustration of a Jaffa 
Cake and an orange. On the Burtons’ pack the words “Jaffa Cake” are embossed and 
thrown into greater relief by a green shadow. The Burton logo, this time written in green 
with a white background, appears in much the same position as before. The words “Made 
with real orange juice” run in smaller letters in yellow above the words “Jaffa Cakes.” To 
the right, slightly overlapping the “es” of “Jaffa Cakes,” is depicted a sectioned cake. The 
bottom one-third of the pack is taken up with a row of whole or cut oranges, six in all, with 
orange leaves sprinkled among them. Along the bottom, printed in black, are the words 
“12 cakes • delicious chocolate • tangy orange • soft sponge.”
 “…Burtons introduced a new flavour of Jaffa Cake, a lemon and lime. The pack is like the 
orange pack, except that it is coloured dark green at the top, shading to green-yellow at 
the bottom. The other differences are, first, that the words “Made with real orange juice” 
are, not surprisingly, replaced with “lemon and lime” and, secondly, along the bottom of 
one side of the pack are written in black the words “Zartes eigebäck mit zitrone und 
18 [1992] FSR 14.
19 [1992] FSR 14, 16-17.
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limone fruchtfüllung und schokol” and underneath “Genoises nappées de marmalade de 
citron—citron vert et de chocolat.”
The court heard evidence of a straw poll survey, but it was thought not to be sufficiently well 
constructed to be of any value.20 The court also heard of a tachistoscope test, but likewise 
the results were not found to be probative.21 A more substantial street survey was conducted 
and with this evidence and the judge’s own views it was found that there was potential for 
confusion in relation to the lemon and lime flavour Jaffa Cake, but not in relation to the 
orange flavour. An interim injunction was granted on this limited basis.
United Biscuits v ASDA
The most famous English case relating to lookalikes is United Biscuits v Asda Stores,22 the 
so called “Puffin/Penguin” case. United Biscuit’s Penguin had long been established as the 
market leader in the category and in 1996 ASDA launched Puffin biscuits. The packaging of 
the two products were as follows:23
The judge considered the evidence and background to the development of ASDA’s Puffin 
and reached the following conclusions:24
 “I am of the clear view that with the very important exception of the name and the bird 
picture, there is nothing in the Puffin get-up that is deceptively similar to Penguin. With the 
name and the bird picture I have no such clear conviction. The cartoon puffin (whose 
multicoloured beak is reproduced, but not very clearly) could, I am inclined to think, be 
mistaken for a cartoon penguin. The word PUFFIN is not very different from PENGUIN. 
Forty per cent of Penguins are eaten by children, and children often help with the shopping 
even though they do not pay for it.
Had the Asda product been called for example BISON (to take another name from the 
original list of possibilities) with a cartoon picture of a brown woolly bison on the packaging, 
these proceedings could not possibly succeed. Almost certainly they would never have 
been brought. But the name PUFFIN and the prominent picture of an upright dark-coloured 
bird with a white front gives me the expectation, as a matter of first impression, that a 
substantial part of the public who shop in supermarkets would see an association between 
the Asda product and McVities Penguin.”
20 [1992] FSR 14, 19-21.
21 [1992] FSR 14, 22-23.
22 [1997] RPC 513.
23 Images from the INTA Trade Dress Library.
24 [1997] RPC 513, 526-7.
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The judge heard an array of evidence, including some evidence of lost sales, which the 
claimant had attempted, unsuccessfully, to develop into an econometric model,25 as well as 
evidence of a survey conducted, although it was not relied upon, which suggested 21% of 
consumers found some similarity between Puffin and Penguin.26 Having heard all the 
evidence, the judge made three findings of fact:
“First, although occasional mistakes may be made for unaccountable reasons, it is unlikely 
that a significant proportion of supermarket shoppers would fail to distinguish between 
Puffins and Penguins if both are on sale next to each other, as they usually are… Secondly, 
that a substantial number of shoppers would suppose, or assume, or guess at an 
association (in the form of a common manufacturer) between the Puffin and the Penguin. 
Thirdly, that the great majority of shoppers would not know who manufactures Penguins 
(the McVities logo having appeared on them only quite recently) and that what they are 
concerned with is taste and quality (which depends primarily on the manufacturer) and 
cost (which depends on the supermarket retailer and on the supermarket’s influence or 
“clout” with even the largest manufacturers).”
Importantly, the judge also concluded that the design brief for Puffin had been to design 
packaging that was close, but not too close, to that of Penguin while ensuring it was a parody 
and a competitor to Penguin. They were not trying to deceive, but were consciously living 
dangerously.27 The case also reiterated an important proposition of law: where consumers 
believe something was manufactured by the same person, even if they were aware the 
product in question was an own brand, this was sufficient to amount to passing off (as it is a 
“connection”).28 Accordingly, the claim for passing off (although not trade mark infringement) 
was successful.
Red Bull v Mean Fiddler
There have been two subsequent reported decisions on lookalike type cases. The first is Red 
Bull v Mean Fiddler.29 The claimant was selling the well known energy drink Red Bull. The 
defendant ran a number of entertainment venues and decided to introduce its own energy 
drink, Sinergy, to be sold in its venues (and nowhere else). It was accepted that from a 
distance the cans looked quite similar, although with a side-by-side comparison this was not 
the case.30 By the time the application for an interim injunction was made, an undertaking 
had been given by the defendant so that any customer who asked for Red Bull is told Red 
Bull was not sold at the venue, but a different product Sinergy is sold.31 The court took the 
view that aside from a few purchasers who might point at the drink in a fridge or might say 
they will have the same to a friend, no customers would be confused as this would be avoided 
by the implementation of the undertaking. Accordingly, at the interim stage, the court felt that 
an injunction was inappropriate.
25 [1997] RPC 513, 527-8.
26 [1997] RPC 513, 529.
27 [1997] RPC 513, 531.
28 [1997] RPC 513, 531-2, 538; it is worth noting that United Biscuits does produce own brand products (see 
536).
29 [2004] EWHC 991.
30 [2004] EWHC 991, [24].
31 When Sinergy was first introduced there were some instances where test purchasers had asked for Red Bull 
and received Sinergy without being told it was a different product. This was before the undertaking was given.
Impact of Lookalikes 
185
Mars v Burgess
The final case is Mars v Burgess,32 which related to an application for an interim injunction 
to prohibit the defendant from selling something believed by the claimant to be too close to 
Whiskas cat food. The case related mainly to the colour purple (approximately Pantone® No. 
248), which the court accepted had long been associated with Whiskas.33 The Burgess cat 
food was going to use a different hue of purple (Pantone® 235).34 There was evidence that 
Burgess had looked at Whiskas packaging during the design process and that the hue of 
purple had changed from earlier Burgess designs. The court did not think looking at a rival’s 
packs during the design process was in any way sinister.35 No consumer evidence was led 
before the court and so the decision as to confusion was based on the judge’s view alone: 
 “There are some superficial similarities between the packaging of [the Defendant’s 
product] and that of Whiskas dry food, but, in my judgment, the differences, especially in 
the purple itself, and in the amount and layout of the purple, are more significant. 
Accordingly, I will not grant an interim injunction based on passing off.” 
It has been questioned why this case reached a different result from the Puffin/Penguin case, 
but suggestions have included the passage of time has increased consumer sensitivities to 
lookalikes.36
32 [2004] EWHC 1912 (Ch). There was also a trade mark claim, but this will not be summarised.
33 [2004] EWHC 1912 (Ch), [26].
34 [2004] EWHC 1912 (Ch), [29].
35 [2004] EWHC 1912 (Ch), [30].
36 Gill Grassie “EU Directive on Unfair Commercial Practices – a UK Perspective” (2005) 1 Journal of Intellectual 
Property Law and Practice 107, 109.
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Germany
Viennetta
The Viennetta case,37 before the Supreme Court, involved a Viennetta Ice Cream Cake. 
Viennetta’s packaging included a picture of the product, the manufacturer’s trade mark 
(“Langnese”) and the word “Viennetta”:38
A competitor Schöller adopted a different product name and called it a Café au Lait. The 
Court concluded that consumers typically identify packaged supermarket products by their 
brand name and further, that packaging design which simply displays the product in a 
straightforward manner, absent direct copying, would not be used to distinguish the product 
by the consumer. It therefore did not offend UWG §9(4).
37 (2001) GRUR  443 (BGH).
38 The images are reproduced from the case report.
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Garlic Sausage
In the Garlic Sausage (Knoblauch Würste)39 case the court came to a slightly different 
conclusion. It reiterated the rule from Viennetta that brand names are very important for 
consumers. However, a distinction was drawn where the product bears a supermarket’s 
brand name, rather than a competitor’s,40 as consumers have different perceptions of own 
brand products and may not necessarily consider the presence of such a mark conclusive. 
The packaging was as follows (the product on the right being the lookalike):41
39 (2009) GRUR 1069 (BGH).
40 (2009) GRUR 1069 [18] (BGH).
41 The images are reproduced from the case report.
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Atemgold
In 2005, Storck launched the brand “Atemgold“ (Breath Gold) with blue and white packaging 
showing a polar Bear. Wick, the producer of “Wick Blau,” had been using a polar bear-based 
brand since 1984. Initially, Wick was successful before the Lower Court of Cologne.42 Wick 
successfully filed a case against this packaging before the Lower Regional Court of Cologne 
and the packaging was changed. Wick continued the case when it came to the view that the 
modified packaging still infringed their packaging:43
The higher Regional Court of Cologne found in favour of Wick.44 The court held that Wick’s 
product had competitive distinctiveness and that Atemgold unreasonably exploited the 
reputation of Wick’s product as the perceptions of quality would be transferred to Atemgold. 
The court relied strongly on a consumer survey that consumers perceived Wick’s Blau as 
“the mint in a blue bag with the polar bear”45 and that there was no justifiable reason for the 
competitor to use a polar bear.
United States
Oral-B Laboratories v Mi-Lor Corp
In Oral-B Laboratories v Mi-Lor Corp,46 where Mi-Lor adopted new packaging which had an 
overall appearance similar to Oral-B’s toothbrush box used consistently by Oral-B for ten 
years. Mi-Lor’s packaging, like Oral-B’s, included a prominent blue and white oval logo and 
displayed the statement “COMPARES WITH ORAL-B.47 Particularly problematic for the 
retailer was its president of the defendant company who, in his evidence, admitted that the 
packaging was designed specifically to “catch the eye of the potential Oral-B customer.”48 
42 31 O 401/07 (LG Köln).
43 Image taken from case database.
44 6 U 131/09 (OLG Köln).
45 6 U 131/09 (OLG Köln), [21].
46 810 F 2d 20 (2d Cir 1987).
47 810 F 2d 20, 22 (2d Cir 1987).
48 810 F 2d 20, 23 (2d Cir 1987).
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After a preliminary injunction was granted the retailer submitted revised packaging to the 
court and this was still not accepted. Eventually, the defendant retailer went ahead and sold 
under further revised packaging and contempt proceedings were brought for breach of the 
preliminary injunction. On appeal the court took the view that the president’s evidence of 
conscious imitation was relevant as the law presumed that intended similarity is likely to 
cause confusion.49
Conopco v May Department Stores
The leading case on own brand and trade dress is Conopco v May Department Stores.50 In 
summary, the plaintiff launched its product, Vaseline Intensive Care, in the autumn of 1989. 
In January 1989, prior to launch, the defendant started developing an own brand competitor 
and, during the design process, it changed its packaging. The packaging of the two products 
once they got to market looked as follows:51
 
On appeal, it was held there was not trade dress infringement, because of the placement of 
the retailer’s mark:52
“This is a case in which a retailer markets a national brand product and at the same time 
markets its own private label product in direct competition. The retailer packages its 
product in a manner to make it clear to the consumer that the product is similar to the 
national brand, and is intended for the same purposes. At the same time, the retailer 
clearly marks its product with its private logo, and expressly invites the consumer to 
compare its product with that of the national brand, by name.”
“With the rise of regional and national discount retailers with established names and 
logos, retailers who market both national brands and their own private label brands in 
direct competition, this form of competition has become commonplace and well-known in 
the marketplace. When such packaging is clearly labelled and differentiated—as was the 
case here, see the discussion in the next section—we are unwilling to attribute to the 
Eighth Circuit, absent clear precedent so requiring, a rule that would make such competition 
presumptively unlawful.”
49 810 F 2d 20, 23 (2d Cir 1987); relying on Harlequin Enterprises v Gulf & Western, 644 F2d 946, 949 (2d Cir 
1981).
50 46 F3d 1556 (Fed Cir 1994).
51 Images taken from INTA Trade Dress Image Library.
52 46 F3d 1556, 1565 (Fed Cir 1994).
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This means, as McCarthy puts it, the case can be read to permit the use of own brand 
lookalike containers so long as a recognized retailer’s mark was attached.53 However, there 
have been decisions going the other way.
McNeil Nutritionals v Heartland Sweetners
In McNeil Nutritionals v Heartland Sweetners,54 the plaintiff began selling Splenda in 2000 
and by 2006 a number of Supermarket own brands began to appear. These were being sold 
in Giant, Stop & Shop, Tops, Food Lion, Safeway, Albertson’s, and Wal-Mart.55 At the material 
time Splenda was being sold for $5 for a 100-count box whereas the own brands were being 
sold for between $4.00 and $4.60. The relevant packages were as follows:56
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit ultimately held that there was sufficient evidence 
on the facts for a preliminary injunction to be granted as there was a likelihood of confusion 
between some of the own brand products and Splenda, although there was not sufficient 
evidence in relation to the others.57 In its judgment the court reiterated that the single most 
important factor in trade dress cases is similarity.58 It also thought that a side-by-side 
comparison would be appropriate in the case of own brand goods as they would be sold on 
the same shelf at the same time. The court went on to address the vexed question of what 
difference the inclusion of a retailer’s brand name makes to similar trade dress:
“To be sure, we do not suggest that the prominent presence of another well-known mark 
is an affirmative defense to every trade dress infringement action. … But this fact 
unquestionably plays a role in a district court’s analysis of the first …factor, such that it 
may cause the overall impressions created by two trade dresses to be different enough 
for the …factor to be weighed in a defendant’s favor. When it is relevant, district courts 
should consider this fact as part of its analysis of the degree of similarity …as opposed to 
some sort of independent defense.”59
53 Thomas McCarthy, Trademarks and Unfair Competition (4th Ed, 2012 Revision), § 23:53.
54 511 F. 3d 350, 358 (3d Cir 2007).
55 511 F. 3d 350, 355 (3d Cir 2007).
56 Image taken from the INTA Trade Dress Image Library.
57 511 F. 3d 350, 369 (3d Cir 2007).
58 511 F. 3d 350, 359 (3d Cir 2007).
59 McNeil Nutritionals v Heartland, 511 F.3d 350, 361 (3d Cir 2007).
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It ultimately held that “the absence of the ‘Splenda’ label from the Food Lion and Safeway 
packages is not sufficient to cure an otherwise infringing trade dress, nor is the mere presence 
of another label.”60
McNeil v Guardian Drug
In the case of McNeil v Guardian Drug,61 the manufacturer of LACTAID ULTRA (a lactose 
enzyme digestive aid) brought a claim against the manufacturer of a generic equivalent, 
which was sold as the own brand version in various supermarkets. The packaging was 
described by the court in the following fashion:62
“A comparison of the packaging of Arbor’s and McNeil’s products shows that the packages 
are virtually identical in color, design and labeling. Both McNeil’s LACTAID ULTRA and 
Defendant’s ARBOR ULTRA LACTASE are packaged in boxes which have: a dark blue 
background with gradually lighter-blue horizontal pinstriping;  the product brand identified 
in white block-print; the word “Ultra” in cursive script; a photo of dairy products in the 
center of the front panel; a yellow informational “banner” with red script to the left of the 
dairy product photo; a picture of a caplet in a “spotlight” cut-out in the lower right corner; 
and the number count of the package caplet contents in the lower left corner
The back panel of both Plaintiff’s and Defendant’s packages similarly are identical. The 
content of the text on the back of the packages is nearly verbatim the same and, on both 
packages, the text is presented in the same red and blue color combination.
Defendant does not dispute the above similarities in product packaging but does point out 
that, on its product, the name “ARBOR” appears prominently in white letters on the 
package above the product name “ULTRA LACTASE”, and in small print under the product 
name appears the invitation “Compare to the Active Ingredient in Lactaid® Ultra”, and in 
small print under the product name appears the invitation “Compare to the Active Ingredient 
in Lactaid® Ultra”. Defendant further notes that on the back of the package in small print 
appears a disclaimer that “This product is not manufactured by McNeil Consumer Products 
Company, distributor of Lactaid®)) Ultra.”
The court eventually decided that the own brand products infringed the LACTAID trade dress, 
but in so doing it made some interesting observations on shelf placement:
“Because Defendant is mimicking Plaintiff’s packaging and placing the products side-by-
side on the shelf, the price comparison signs and advertising do not dispel customer 
confusion as to the source or origin of the Arbor product. The signs and advertising can 
be read as actually telling customers “Our Arbor product is the same product as the 
national brand, only cheaper.” Furthermore, if Arbor’s goal were truly only to encourage 
customers to “compare” its product to the national brand, it would have made its package 
as distinct as possible from that of Plaintiff’s product.”63
60 McNeil Nutritionals v Heartland, 511 F.3d 350, 360 (3d Cir 2007); cf Bristol-Myers Squibb v McNeil PCC, 973 
F. 2d 1033 (2d Cir 1992).
61 984 F. Supp 1066 (E.D. Mich 1997).
62 984 F. Supp 1066, 1068 (E.D. Mich 1997).
63 984 F. Supp 1066 , 1073 (E.D. Mich 1997).
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The court also confirmed that confusion does not have to occur at the point of sale, it is 
enough that the product is selected off the shelf erroneously (initial interest confusion).64 The 
court viewed the “hook” of having similar trade dress to be enough to amount to infringement.
64 984 F. Supp 1066, 1073 (E.D. Mich 1997); also see  Esercizio v. Roberts, 944 F.2d 1235, 1239 (6th Cir1991); 
and Blockbuster Entertainment Group v. Laylco, Inc 869 F.Supp. 505 (E.D.Mich1994).
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Appendix A: Interviews – 
Discussion Points
[See Chapter 6]
Discussion points relating to lookalikes for 
brand owners
We hope to have a wide ranging discussion with brand owners about lookalikes and the 
issues that their products have faced in relation to lookalike packing. The following are 
indicative of the sorts of questions and topics we would like to cover.
1. What characteristics do you think make one product a “lookalike” of another?
2. Are there any products of yours which you believe have attracted “lookalikes”? Who 
sold the lookalike (supermarket own brand/other own brand/competitor branded 
product)? If your product packaging has been copied, have these been established 
products of yours or new variants / brand extensions recently introduced to the 
market? In the case of a retailer copy of a new product’s packaging, do you believe 
the advance knowledge the retailer has of your plans had an impact?
3. What complaints have you made to the owner of a “lookalike” product? And what was 
the outcome of your complaint (e.g. was the product packaging changed)? Did you 
involve lawyers (in-house or external) and/or send (i) a letter before claim; (ii) started 
proceedings? How much did you spend in trying to resolve the complaint and why did 
it come to an end?
4. Has the arrival of a lookalike on the market ever affected your advertising spend 
(figures would be very useful to support this)? Has the arrival of a lookalike affected 
your sales (figures would be very useful)? What about where the “lookalike” is of a 
competitor within the same product category?
5. Has the arrival of a new generic (non-lookalike) affected your advertising spend 
(figures would be very useful)? Has the arrival of a new generic (non-lookalike) 
affected your sales (figures would be very useful)?
6. How often do you change the packaging of your products? Why is it changed? Do 
you change more often when there is a “lookalike” than otherwise? Have you ever 
changed your packaging specifically because of “lookalike” packaging?
7. When you are launching a new product in what ways, if any, do you believe the 
packaging of existing products in the sector has on the packaging of your own 
product? 
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8. Are there certain products in your category where you think colours are used by your 
customers to identify the type of products (e.g. yellow for butter/silver for unsalted 
butter)?
9. Have you ever adapted the packaging of one of your products to more (or less) 
resemble a competitor (in particular, a market leader)?
10. Have you ever used commercial strategies (e.g. price cuts/2-3 offers or launching 
cheaper ranges) to challenge a lookalike? Conversely, if a retailer has launched a 
lookalike product against one of your products, has it used other marketing tools 
to gain competitive advantage (eg. price, shelf position and facings, shelf / in-store 
display, promotions)?
11. Do you have any commercial agreements with major supermarkets to discourage / 
allow own brands? (e.g. exclusivity of a product in exchange for not challenging a 
lookalike)
12. Do you manufacture own brand products for supermarkets which compete with your 
own branded products? (examples would be useful) If yes, are the own brand products 
made to a different formula to the brand and are they packaged distinctively or to look 
like yours or others’ brands?
13. If consumers wish to complain about products being packaged similarly to your 
brands, would you expect them to complain to you or to the retailer? Have you 
received any such complaints? If not, why do you think that is?
Discussion points relating to lookalikes for 
retailers
We hope to have a wide ranging discussion with the major retailers about lookalikes. The 
following are indicative of the sorts of questions and topics we would like to cover.
1. What characteristics do you think make one product a “lookalike” of another?
2. What complaints have been made to you by brand-owners relating to “lookalike” 
products? (e.g. trade mark infringement/passing off allegations). How were these 
complaints put to you? (e.g. through commercial channels or legal channels). And 
what was the outcome of the complaint? (e.g. was your product packaging changed or 
other amicable solution reacted)? Did you involve lawyers (in-house or external)? How 
far did the matter get (were proceedings issued)? Would you ever delist a branded 
product (or your own brand) if there has been an allegation of intellectual property 
infringement? How much did you spend in trying to resolve the complaint and why did 
it come to an end?
3. When you launch a new “own brand” do you ever directly spend money advertising 
that product in particular? If so, how much is spent (figures would be very useful to 
support this)? 
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4. When you launch an own brand product how does this affect the sales of the 
brand leader (figures would be very useful)? Is the effect on sales different when 
the packaging used by your own brand uses the same colour, shape, themes or 
iconography as the brand leader? 
5. How often do you change the packaging of your products? Why is it changed? Do you 
change it when brand leaders adapt their packaging? 
6. When you are launching a new own brand product in what ways, if any, do you believe 
the packaging of existing products in the sector has on the packaging of your own 
product? Are there certain products in your category where you think colours are 
used by your customers to identify the type of products (e.g. yellow for butter/silver for 
unsalted butter)?
7. In the last five pack changes (introductions) how many have resulted in shelf 
presentation which looked more like a branded product, how many which were more 
distinctive and how many which are no different?
8. How often do you use commercial strategies (e.g. price cuts/2-3 offers or launching 
cheaper ranges) when launching an own brand? Are different strategies used when 
the packaging used by your own brand uses the same colour, shape, themes or 
iconography as the brand leader?
9. Do you see leading brands as more important to create and establish new categories 
and store brands to expand them later on? Or the other way around? Or is it category 
specific?
10. How many of your own brand products are manufactured by brand leaders? In those 
cases, how often is the product the same in your own brand as the brand leader? 
11. If consumers wish to complain about products being packaged similarly to your 
brands, would you expect them to complain to you or to the brand-owner? Have you 
received any such complaints? 
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Appendix B: Interview - Notes 
of Interviews
[See Chapter 6]
GlaxoSmithKline (GSK)
Interview: 13th February 2012
Interviewees: Alicia Chantrey (Assistant General Counsel, IP) and Holly Turner 
(Group Brand Director)
Lookalike
1. We think that a product is a lookalike when it combines a number of the following 
features from the original pack: similar colour, language iconography, layout of 
graphics and copy and packaging shape. It is the overall look and feel of the product 
that makes it a lookalike. For us, the problem is usually not where the consumer thinks 
they are actually getting the same product, but rather they think “that looks to me like it 
has all the elements of Lucozade in it and I think it is made by the Lucozade people or 
it has something special in it like Lucozade”.
2. It is important that brand owners are able to protect their brand as this is the only 
way to protect the investment in research and development leading to many branding 
decisions. When the product is on the shelf it is intended to be a beacon for quality, 
safety and efficacy. These beacons, which we as brand owners have developed, 
should not be misappropriated by those who have not invested in their development. 
3. In the healthcare sector it is often the actives that are the same rather than anything 
else, or the product claims, but increasingly this is changing. There are a lot of other 
manufacturers using the same ingredients (using the same active). They are entitled 
to take the active, once it is off patent, but it is not appropriate to use packaging cues 
from the market leading brand to suggest they possess the same quality, safety and 
efficacy.
Legislative provision
4. We think there should be a specific provision on lookalikes, rather than an entire unfair 
competition law. It is difficult to identify what sort of cases should be covered by such 
a law and what should not. It is hard to work out what the tipping point is between an 
acceptable rival and a lookalike. A good starting point would be to give brand owners 
the right to take direct action against parasitic copies under the Unfair Commercial 
Practices Directive rather than having to rely on the overstretched resources of 
Trading Standards to enforce this. Trading Standards are unlikely to be seen as a 
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priority when they are tasked with handling so many other issues and consider this a 
business to business issue. We have not attempted to persuade Trading Standards 
to bring an action under the Directive to date but are not aware of any enforcement 
action by them on this issue.
Justification
5. The reason the consumer is buying the lookalike is because they have learnt all 
the marketing cues which brand owners have invested in and created and believe 
that the product is comparable. Essentially, the lookalike is misappropriating the 
goodwill (it dilutes the equity in the brand). Therefore, the justification for the right is 
the investment in the brand made by the brand owner. This investment may come 
from conducting market surveys or advertising or promotion or other similar sorts of 
investment. 
Complaints
6. We don’t have that many examples of lookalikes, but when we have had a close 
one where we have not been able to resolve it quickly through direct dialogue with 
the other party we will seek external advice from a QC. The advice is normally that 
because the third party has its brand name on the product (however small) it will be 
incredibly difficult (and expensive) to win in relation to a passing off claim.
7. For instance, we were very unhappy about the product “Night Time” 
(right) which was brought out and which competed with Nytol. The 
product Night Time had been brought about 
by a former supplier of ours after the supply 
agreement was terminated. The product 
was identical and they were using up the 
excess product, which they were entitled to do as there was no 
patent and no confidential information involved. We were 
advised by an intellectual property QC that it was a weak case 
for passing off because “Potters” was on the packaging. We 
ended up settling and Potters changed the pack. It cost us a 
lot of money, but we did not get any damages or costs as we 
could not get the matter to court. The modified packaging of 
night-time (left) no longer remains a lookalike in our view. This 
is because the category is green for herbals and it is a 
sleeping product so stars are acceptable.
Competitors
8. We would approach third parties (non-retailers) very aggressively although we have 
yet to take anything to courts against a third-party. This is because the cases have 
been resolved. Usually, where we have a reasonable case, the chances of the matter 
being resolved without recourse to the courts are “pretty good”. 
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Retailers
9. The commercial pressure in relation to whether to bring an action against a retailer 
is such that we are much more reluctant to bring claims. Essentially, it is a claim 
against one of our main customers. In general, retailers are not willing to change 
their packaging when they are approached unless there is a cast iron case (70%+ of 
success). However, in relation to passing off we can never get to that level of certainty. 
10. If it was necessary to bring a claim to protect a GSK brand then the Head of UK 
Business would support the decision. Nevertheless, it would be a difficult political 
decision as it could result in difficult conversations for our sales team with our retail 
partners. Our view is that it is unlikely we would be delisted if a claim was issued but It 
would depend on the nature of the relationship before the issue arose. In contrast, we 
have stopped supply because of a dispute with a major commercial retailer due to a 
(non-IP) dispute and so it is possible it could happen in an IP dispute.
Timing
11. The incidents of lookalike are not particularly cyclical; sometimes one or two arrive 
in quick succession, at other times none will arrive for a long time. There is no real 
timetable of when a lookalike arrives, although it will only arrive once market share 
has been created. You don’t tend to see lookalikes arriving immediately after the 
brand (and its packaging) is launched. They tend to wait until the brand is established. 
There is not much point in a lookalike being launched before a market is created. 
However, once a lookalike arrives on the market it stays. This means it will still be on 
the shelves two or three years later if there is nothing we can do about it.
12. We have never had the situation where the lookalike arrives at more or less the same 
time as us, but it is our view that there is not much value in such behaviour from the 
point of view of retailers. I am not aware of them copying the pack when they have 
seen it in advance of launch.
Regional variations
13. In my experience, Germany is somewhere where we would be able to take action 
under unfair competition law. The law of passing off in comparison does not seem 
to give sufficient protection against this sort of activity at all. In Germany, we had a 
case involving one of our vitamin ranges and a retailer introduced a lookalike. The 
court system was such that German unfair competition law was sufficient to prevent 
too many features of our pack being copied. We have also been able to tackle cases 
where there has been systematic copying of a range. It was also a lot cheaper to 
litigate. 
Signalling
14. Certain elements suggest speed, such as movement or lightning. We believe that the 
copying of these elements is a factor going towards a lookalike. However, it is the 
combination of the elements which make something a lookalike; one element taken is 
not something where we would be aggrieved.
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15. For example, we ught that this Tesco’s juicy water was something which got closer 
than we were happy with, we were concerned with the colour being the 
same and that Tesco’s had adopted the flying berries. This is an 
example of Tesco getting closer than necessary. We cannot 
say, however, whether light blue generally stands for “Really 
Light” in the marketplace. Nevertheless, we think that there 
are sufficient elements for this to be a lookalike. The 
composition of the pack is the same: the sky to the grass, the 
clouds and blackcurrants in the middle,and the playful font 
could be seen as similar; and the colour is almost identical. 
The Tesco product is no longer on the market in that 
packaging, but we did not take action, so it was not because 
of us.
16. The question is why Tesco took those cues unless it is to be the same as Ribena or 
very similar to it. It is not just the cues, but the way they appear. 
Ranges
17. A particular problem is the copying of the look of an entire range. Individual instances 
might not be problematic, but in some instances it is clear 
that entire ranges are being mirrored. This suggests a 
pattern of behaviour of following our packaging. We did 
write a letter to Boots regarding the mirroring of Panadol, 
but the commercial decision was that we would not take 
further action as we did not want to jeopardise the overall 
relationship.
18. If they are coming to the category as an own brand then 
there is no need to use the same packaging cues. You 
could buy Paracetamol and Codeine in a White Box and so 
there is no need to copy packaging.
Sales
19. The launches of own brand products do affect our sales generally and we assume 
this is worse when it is closer to the brand lead. We assume so, but cannot prove it 
however. A branded competitor’s launch would lead to a blip in sales. Consumers then 
usually revert to their brand choices (or not). Own brand however leads to an on-going 
erosion of the market share unless a new product is launched. This means we have to 
introduce new features and benefits for existing products to compete with lookalikes. 
20. In general terms, in categories where own brands have been established for longer, 
for example pain relief, they have about a 60% market share. In relation to children’s 
medicines they have only about 20% (although issues of trust are stronger in relation 
to children’s medicines). Over time, the business modelling is that own brand could 
become about 60% of market share in this market as well.
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Packaging
21. There is always a desire to have a new feature on the product and we do on occasion 
change packaging without changing a feature. In healthcare and oral care packaging 
changes every 3-5 years, but with drinks it is more like every 2-3 years. Within GSK 
we have never taken the decision to change packaging as a result of a lookalike 
although we have decided not to take action in relation to particular products because 
we were about to change our packaging and so it was not worth it. 
Product innovation
22. We have never been excluded from a market, or not entered a market, because of 
lookalike packaging. Obviously, it might be the case that a competitor or own brand 
is so strong that it was not in our interests to enter the market for other commercial 
reasons. However in general we are making cuts in our investment because the 
business is declining rather than because of own brand/lookalikes. We have not joined 
the dots.
Making for other people
23. We do not make products for other people (at least not within living memory). 
Promotions
24. We would not make decisions to start promotions based on a lookalike entering or 
being in the marketplace. Such decisions would be part of the general commercial 
category decisions.
Complaints
25. We have no record of any complaints from consumers about lookalikes. If it ever 
happened it is likely to have to come to the marketing team or legal department and 
that has not happened. We don’t have a protocol to notify the legal department if such 
a complaint is made. We consider it is unlikely that a consumer will bother to make 
a complaint if they realise they have not bought what they were expecting as our 
products tend to be relatively low value or impulse purchases and it is therefore not 
worth the hassle or the consumer feels embarrassed to admit their error.
Images
Juicy water image: mysupermarket.co.uk
Ribena Extra light: mysupermarket.co.uk
Other images supplied by GSK.
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Diageo
Interview: 15th February 2012
Interviewees: Chris Lock (Category marketing director); RomainDourlen (IP Counsel, 
Western Europe); Katherine Tsang (Senior IP Counsel, Europe IP Team)
What is a lookalike?
1. A lookalike is a product whose overall get-up resembles, calls to mind or creates a 
link, with a brand owner’s product. It may or may not be trade mark infringement or 
amount to passing off (although we don’t think passing off goes far enough to prevent 
lookalikes). 
2. Our research suggests that a consumer looks at packaging for 2-3 seconds before 
making the purchasing decision and so any product which is put into a bottle which 
has a similar shape or colour and has similar imagery or close brand name should 
be considered a lookalike. It might also be that the colour of the liquid is relevant to 
whether a product is a lookalike. This is because it could quite easily be mistaken for 
the product we have invested in to create our brand. Clearly, if there is a difference 
between iconography, bottle shape or colour it ceases to be a lookalike.
3. Some of our wholesaler producers are in a position to develop their own product and 
it will be a cheaper version of a market leader. Their primary motivation is to sell in the 
same product category and do it cheaper and so get a greater market share. We have 
no problem with own label products as such, but the problem is where retailers are 
trading on the consumer’s awareness of the branded product. 
Framing a law
4. We cannot provide a formula of when something becomes a lookalike, rather it would 
need to be something like the “overall impression of the product” brings to mind 
the brand leader. The best that could be done would be to have an inclusive list of 
things which determine the “overall impression of the product” such as the name 
of the product, the colour, packaging and extra features. It might be something like 
the Court of Justice’s approach in L’Oreal v Bellure1 as to “riding on the coat tails” 
would be appropriate2, rather than the passing off which requires there to be a 
misrepresentation. This is because it is clear that something can be a lookalike without 
there being a likelihood of confusion. 
1 C-487/07 L’Oreal v Bellure[2009] ECR I-5185.
2 Ibid, [49] – “In that regard, where a third party attempts, through the use of a sign similar to a mark with a 
reputation, to ride on the coat-tails of that mark in order to benefit from its power of attraction, its reputation 
and its prestige, and to exploit, without paying any financial compensation and without being required to make 
efforts of his own in that regard, the marketing effort expended by the proprietor of that mark in order to create 
and maintain the image of that mark, the advantage resulting from such use must be considered to be an 
advantage that has been unfairly taken of the distinctive character or the repute of that mark.”
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Harm – lack of equivalence
5. The lookalike is often cheaper as it goes through a cheaper manufacturing process 
and uses less expensive materials. Thus, the packaging suggests equivalence when 
this is not in fact the case.
Manufacturing
6. We do not make products for anyone else. 
Complaints and examples
7. On average, in relation to the United Kingdom, we would estimate that a lookalike type 
incident arises about once every two months (about six times a year). About 30-50% 
of these cases come from retailers. In about 50% of cases overall we take the view 
that the lookalike might be actionable (so about three times a year). Once we had 
formed this view we would get an opinion from an external lawyer. At this stage, the 
majority of these opinions suggest that there is a good chance of success. 
8. The way we approach a claim once we believe we have a good chance of success 
depends on the nature of the other party. Factors affecting the approach will include 
things such as: Is there an existing relationship (e.g. are they customers)? Do they 
have a history of this sort of behaviour? Are there others in the same category? 
9. If the potential claim was against a customer, we may well start with a business-to-
business conversation. Generally speaking they are resolved without issuing legal 
proceedings. 
10. Smirnoff Vodka, Bailey’s Irish Cream, Pimm’s and Gordon’s Gin have all attracted 
lookalikes. We have brought proceedings against some retailers and also against 
some manufacturers. It is our opinion that the Glenn’s Vodka brand was based entirely 
on Smirnoff and we believe that its entire business strategy was to copy Smirnoff. 
11. We may arrange it so that where there is a problem the person who has the business-
to-business conversation is not the person at Diageo who has the existing relationship 
with the retailer. The discussion with a retailer is always going to begin with being 
commercial to commercial.
Regional variation
12. The incidents of lookalikes vary between markets. In the United Kingdom, Smirnoff is 
a premium Vodka at a mid-range price and therefore we are the one that lookalikes 
chase. In the United States, there are lookalikes that compete with Absolut, but that 
is not really the case here. We presume that this is because Absolut has a lot smaller 
market share in the United Kingdom.
13. If there is no relationship, such as in Eastern Europe, you have less commercial 
leverage and so you are more likely to have to issue proceedings.
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Sales
14. We have no strong evidence to suggest that there has been a loss in sales when a 
lookalike enters the market. There are often other factors why a lookalike does well. 
In relation to Smirnoff for example, active steps were taken by the wholesaler to try 
to sell their lookalike. Accordingly, there are more factors at work than merely the 
similarity of the packaging. 
Advertising
15. There have not been cases where the arrival of a lookalike on the market has changed 
(or been the tipping point) for changing advertising plans. However, the presence of 
Glen’s Vodka on the market has led us to have several years of advertising extolling 
the virtues of our production process. The key issue for us was whether the consumer 
would pay more for what Smirnoff offered in terms of quality.  
16. This means that lookalikes might change the themes of advertising adopted, but it 
would not change the “spend” on advertising. This is because the spending is more or 
less fixed internally. We get an advertising budget for a brand and we spend it in the 
best way to promote the product within the relevant market. We would not have extra 
money (or less money) because a lookalike came on the market. 
Packaging
17. If a design is protectable then it might be a factor in designing the packaging, but such 
key spending is not affected by lookalikes as such. The existence of lookalikes goes 
into the marketing mix, as it were, but it would not be the primary factor of changing or 
accelerating the change in the packaging of our product.
18. Lookalikes tend to be attracted to more established products. It is not very useful to try 
to copy elements of a new brand as consumers are not familiar with that brand.
Signals
19. There is a risk over time that a colour adopted by a brand leader becomes an 
indication of the product. However, we would, for example, dispute that red is 
indicative of Vodka. 
Promotions
20. We have used promotions, price cuts and so forth as part of the usual commercial 
deal. It would be counter-intuitive for us to drop our prices in order to combat a 
lookalike. We would want to make more of the premium nature of the brand and why 
we are worth the money. 
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21. There is a lot of negotiation about range and layout; some of it is paid for and some is 
based on research. The category leader is normally put at eye level on the shelf. The 
competitor brands would either be above or below the brand leader. A product which 
is own label or lookalike where it is adding incremental sales will be included in the 
Category Captain’s recommendation. Only if they are purely cannibalising sales (i.e. 
substituting sales) would they be recommended for it to be removed. 
Consumer complaints
22. Consumers do complain to us about products when they are not getting the product 
they thought they were. We have strong consumer engagement. There is almost an 
attachment with some of our consumers. However, consumers complaining about 
confusing products is not is something that happens frequently. 
Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations 2008
23. We have not considered using the Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading 
Regulations 2008.
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PZ Cussons
Interview: 14th February 2012 
Interviewee: Sam Plant (IP Lawyer)
Lookalikes
1. A lookalike product is shape of bottle (packaging), colour of packaging, similar signs 
(whether having trade mark function or not), the overall look and feel of the packaging. 
Finally, the colour of formulation is also important. Accordingly, we have a range 
of products where colour is particularly important. A product like Original Source 
(Washing Gel), the first thing is the palette of colours. The colour is a key element of 
the product.
2. If you do a lemon shower gel then you would have the colour of the lemon (unless 
you are going wacky with it). This is why one element on its own is rarely enough. But 
if you have a similar shaped bottle and a similar colour liquid in it then it is likely to 
suggest to consumers it might be the same product. 
3.  When we talk about lookalikes we are talking about a third party, with no relationship 
with us, seeking to trade on the reputation and goodwill we have generated in a 
particular product. I have no doubt that some manufacturers have tried to design a 
product specifically to look like ours. This is either because of genuine consumer 
confusion or, more commonly, where a consumer thinks that is very similar to what I 
am used to buying and there must be some “family” relationship with the product to 
buy. 
Particular focus 
4. We have tended to focus on similar packaging when we have real disputes. We have 
found the similar packaging, trade marks and so forth and say they’re all individual 
rights. When I look at my Original Source bottle against someone else’s I do not have 
a knock-out punch. But in a side-by-side comparison, it is clear that my competitor 
cannot accidently look like mine. 
5. It cannot be a coincidence that the product has been produced. It is very difficult 
to prove confusion and the ideal is a consumer has called and complained about 
something they mistakenly believe to be our product. This sort of evidence is difficult 
to get: Our competitor is clearly convinced that there is some advantage. Whether this 
is through confusion or some of the magic of our product rubs off on them. But it is 
clear that they think there is some advantage in looking like a brand. We have done 
surveys in the marketplace.
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Legislation
6. We would struggle to articulate where the tipping point between a lookalike and not 
should be. It is an art and not a science. You know it when you see it as it were. When 
we have looked at this in the industry you would put together the person responsible 
for marketing, the legal adviser and so on and together they would decide what 
they think is acceptable and what is not. The tipping point is at different points along 
the line. The accumulation of the rights in packaging adds up to no more than the 
strongest individual right that you have.
Incidents of lookalikes
7. We have an increasing number of lookalike products, but I don’t think we are any 
more prone to it than anybody else. The people putting together the products, they 
know how far they can go and where the line is drawn based on the current law. When 
we have had someone overstep that mark they are very quick to recognise they have 
gone too far.
8. Most of our principal products in the UK have attracted lookalikes: Certainly in the 
United Kingdom and Australia we have seen an increase in lookalike activity. We have 
fewer in the developing world. We don’t have personal experience on the application 
of the Australian Consumer Law, although we have had more success in Australia 
than the United Kingdom. But there are no products which have appeared both in 
the United Kingdom or Australia where a real comparison of the regimes can be 
undertaken.
9. In the past two years, we have had lookalike products from three of the four big 
retailers. In this context, PZ Cussons have been obliged to take action against the 
supermarket concerned. The furthest we have got is issuing draft pleadings. We have 
not got as far as filing a claim (at least in the last three and half years). 
10. We have been very selective in the terms of action we have taken. Whenever we 
have made a threat of legal action we have always been happy to follow it through. 
Our biggest single global customers, we shared draft proceedings and we would have 
issued those had we not reached a satisfactory conclusion. 
Handling of complaints
11. We had a lot of dialogue between us and the retailers, both legal teams and 
relationship managers. It appeared to us, certainly the big four would expect brand 
owners would take action to protect their brands and they would compartmentalise the 
dispute. It would not significantly impact on the relationship. 
12. We will regularly be threatened with, and occasionally follow through, with delisting 
products. That is where there is a dispute usually over pricing (cost prices). Our view 
has always been that the retailer would be relatively unlikely to retaliate by delisting 
a product. Retailers would expect you to protect you brands. They would want you to 
protect your brand. 
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13. We are extremely cautious. But we are a brands business and without those brands 
we are nothing. If we had not reached a sensible conclusion we would have issued 
proceedings. 
14. Of the six complaints per year only one is possible to solve with the “right” letter being 
sent. Of those, three complaints are such that we would not start action unless we 
wanted to establish the principle or wanted to take action for another reason. 
Sales and advertising
15. We had a series of lookalike products and also explosion around the time of swine flu 
(Carex market-share). It is the leading hand sanitizer; as those concerns increased a 
number of people entered the market either to legitimately or otherwise eat into that 
market share.
16. I am not sure that if we say a campaign on Original Source has not led to any 
particular behaviour in relation to lookalikes or otherwise.
Legal claims
17. In respect of a case regarding one of our hair care lines, the look and feel of the own 
brand was not particularly similar. In that instance we concluded we were not in a 
strong enough position to take legal action, but we could take commercial steps. 
18. The advice of external lawyers is one factor in the decision; it is not the only one. 
In my experience our external lawyers do not give us as robust advice in relation to 
passing off as other areas of law. We don’t like fighting battles we might lose, but it is 
only one factor. However, there may be instances we think it is important to stand our 
ground and to make an investment in the third party’s legal costs. Even if our lawyers 
say the case is not that strong. You do however want to establish credibility. It is more 
of a commercial rather than a legal decision.
19. We have not had too many instances where we have spent significantly and then not 
proceeded with things too much. But you can spend £10,000 - £20,000 fairly easily 
before you realise you don’t have a very good case.
20. In the surveys we have conducted, there have been questions as to confusion. We 
have found some evidence of consumers being confused even where there the 
retailer’s name was prominently displayed. For example, we had a dispute with 
a retailer over a soap bar product where the get-up of the product was extremely 
similar. However, the brand name itself was different and prominent. But the surveys 
we carried out show some confusion or some association with the particular product. 
Consumers thought it might have been something we had manufactured for them or 
it was a range we were doing for the retailer. Or we were someway connected with 
the grocer. On that basis we did go forward. That was a reasonably significant sample 
size. 
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Arrival of a lookalike
21. I do not have any indication of advertising being directly affected by lookalikes. We 
have some instances where we believe there has been a correlation between a drop-
off in sales and the introduction of a lookalike product. This is a greater drop-off of 
sales than for non-lookalike own brand.
22. We have introduced packaging with particular colours or looks not because of existing 
lookalike products, but simply to make it more difficult for a lookalike. We certainly 
spend more money in packaging design than we did a few years ago. 
Copying of the product
23. No I don’t believe we have actually copied any existing packaging in the range as we 
seek to distinguish ourselves from our rivals. We try to go the other way to assert our 
identity. I have heard stories about in the past we have tried to steer close to the wind 
and piggy-back on brand leaders. But this is not something we have ever done in 
recent times.
Commercial strategies
24. We have not adopted commercial strategies to try and increase market share against 
a lookalike; not as a direct result of lookalikes only as part of a wider commercial 
strategy.
Manufacturing own brand
25. We do not manufacture products under the own brand label.
Consumer complaints
26. I would hope that the dream consumer would complain to us. Complaints do come to 
us although some may go to the retailers.
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Müller UK
Interview: 8th February 2012 
Interviewee: Sukh Gill (Chief Regulatory Advisor) and Gemma Wisniewski (Legal 
Executive)
(subsequent note received 18th April 2012)
Meaning of “lookalike”
1. We think the assessment of whether a product is a “lookalike” should be based on 
several features including, but not limited to: the packaging design; the similarity 
of recipes and nutritional profiles; the packaging material and colour; the shape of 
packaging; the similarity of key ingredients; having the same standard pack weights; 
the copying of discrete elements of the design; and the use of other descriptors 
which have a long association with branded products. Similarly, the way a product is 
marketed (e.g. “100% natural ingredients” branding) is also relevant. 
Incidents of lookalikes
2. Over the last five years, we have had at least ten cases where we have faced 
lookalikes for our distinctive yogurt. For commercial reasons, we are not content to 
discuss the details of many of 
these cases. For example, during 
that five year period, we have had 
a number of cases involving third 
parties adopting a similar pot 
design to ours. For example, the 
two pots to the left were the 
subject of a dispute where we instructed external lawyers and spent a significant 
amount of time internally resolving the matter. The dispute was 
essentially resolved on the basis of our registered design in the 
pot design. The competitor eventually agreed to change the pot 
design to pot on the right. This case is only one of a few similar 
cases (albeit with different resolutions) over the last few years.
3. In addition, we have had cases where third parties who have used our mark 
“CORNER” or the peel back design. In some instances we took no action for 
commercial reasons and in other cases we took no action because the product 
was already being delisted. In every case, even when no action was taken, internal 
resources and costs were incurred.
4. Our experience has led us to reach the following conclusions in relation to lookalikes. 
First, bringing intellectual property claims generally is easier in relation to registered 
intellectual property rights (where the case is often “black and white”). Secondly, 
most competitors will take some elements of a packaging design, but bringing legal 
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proceedings against them is protracted and, in our view, often provides ineffective 
remedies. Thirdly, there are many barriers to bringing such proceedings, in particular 
maintaining commercial relationships. Fourthly, in relation to registered trade marks 
the risks of making unjustified threats makes intellectual property rights more difficult 
to enforce. Finally, the threat of infringement cases can push brand owners to 
undertake very expensive redesigns.  
Effect on sales
5. We have found that the launches of lookalike products have affected sales and we 
have some sales data to support the consumer switch from Müller to other products. 
When a lookalike product is launched, Müller may increase marketing spend on a 
particular sub-brand to react to the competition. We apply normal commercial practice 
when there is any new entrant to the marketplace (such as a distinctive own brand) 
and this will have some impact on market share and sales, but this is not specifically 
measured.
Advertising spend
6. Müller would not change its advertising strategies due to lookalikes, but it might ‘beef-
up’ an existing campaign expenditure by up to 10%.
Changing packaging
7. We usually re-design our packaging every 2-3 years. Müller’s product re-designs are 
usually a reaction to competitors using similar designs. Therefore, the 2011 re-launch 
was necessary to differentiate ourselves from others in the market place. Müller has 
noticed a common theme of competitors using Müller’s old packaging designs once 
Müller has re-launched its products in a different design. Prior to any product re-
launch, Müller always carries out the necessary due diligence checks to ensure that 
its designs are not similar to competitors. Müller always aims to be distinctive. 
Commercial strategies
8. Müller does not undertake any commercial strategies in response to a lookalike, other 
than normal competitive practices aimed at all competitors. 
Manufacturing own brand
9. We do not make own brand in the United Kingdom, but we do in Germany.
Consumer complaints
10. We would expect our consumers to approach the retailer and then perhaps Müller. 
However, we do not have any examples of any such complaints. 
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Case study relying on the Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations 2008
11. In December 2009, Müller had an issue with a competitor’s lookalike packaging (the 
two pots are on the right). It was our view that, in context, this competitor’s activities 
caused or were likely to cause the average consumer to take transactional decisions 
he would not have taken otherwise. The following factual context was important in 
the case of our dispute. Müller marketed a significant part of their range, at that time, 
under the slogan “100% natural ingredients”. Both enterprises that were in dispute 
were dairies in Shropshire. The following features of the products were similar (being 
our original and longstanding features): twin-pot; nutritional profiles of the foodstuffs; 
white plastic moulding; foil lidding; fruit content; full size products; positioning of 
characterising ingredients in the corner; depiction of a yogurt swirl; and the use of 
the words “thick and creamy” to describe the yogurt. We also could show that we had 
used the peel back design for a long period and had used the slogan “Our Shropshire 
Dairy to you” and “100% natural ingredients” for some time.
12. Our own attempts at reaching a commercial agreement with the competitor, relying 
on our registered trade mark, failed and so the matter would only be resolved by 
expensive and time-consuming litigation (in an area of the law that is developing). 
Our competitor did not respond to other suggestions that their conduct was not in 
accordance with the 2008 Regulations and in particular under regulation 3, Schedule 
1, paragraph 13 of the “black-listed” activities. 
13. We made a number of arguments under the Regulations; as with trade marks, 
similarity was important, but not simply the elements which were registered trade 
marks. We believed that it is not necessary to provide actual evidence of consumer 
confusion under the Regulations and further, any attempt to invalidate the registered 
trade mark is also irrelevant. The test, we argued, was whether the aggregate effect 
of all elements misled the consumer into believing that the product is made by Müller. 
It was argued, we believed, wrongly that other brands using the peel-back design on 
yogurts was relevant and that the use of the various elements represented “custom 
and practice” in the industry.
14. We reported the dispute to Shropshire Trading Standards and they spoke to the other 
party and, relying on the 2008 Regulations, our competitor agreed to change their 
packaging. It appears to us that the key fact is that the 2008 Regulations, over and 
above conventional IP protection, enable a holistic view to be taken of the cumulative 
effect of several practices that might be treated discretely, otherwise.
Enforcement
15. Whether lookalike practices are curtailed depends on the effectiveness of 
enforcement. We believe that under the 2008 Regulations such action is necessary 
to ensure “a fair, responsible and competitive trading environment” – a stated aim of 
Trading Standards enforcement. Such attention is badly needed and long overdue. A 
major problem for us is that there is no additional civil right of action for breaches of 
the 2008 Regulations, which even if available, would need to be accompanied with 
measures requiring the infringing party to disclose how packaging was generated.
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Large fast moving consumer goods 
manufacturer with extensive portfolio of 
brands (LFMCGM)
Interview: 8th February 2012
Interviewees: Legal Director, Brand Manager, Trade Marks Attorney
Lookalike
1. We find that consumers identify products firstly by colour, secondly, by shape or 3D 
packaging, thirdly by brand logo and finally by iconography. A lookalike is therefore 
taking the “distinctive elements” of products. The problem is that the requirement of 
misrepresentation in passing off just “kills” any potential claim against “lookalikes”.
2. In relation to colour it is not simply taking the colour, but the exact pantone number 
on occasion. One of our brands has a very clear shape and colour, and if there were 
a lookalike version of the product it would be in the same pantone colour and be the 
same shape. Furthermore, it is particularly difficult to register colours as trade marks 
as you need acquired distinctiveness and competitors usually come into the market 
before this can occur. 
3. Our research suggests that where a product is in a similar shape package, brand 
consumers generally think that the product inside the container is the same. An own 
brand product having the same packaging characteristics as a branded product will 
lead consumers to recognise the product as the own brand version equivalent of the 
branded product.
4. In relation to health care products, consumers do not tend to go as far as comparing 
formulation. They will assume they are the same even when they are clearly not if they 
looked at the side of the packet. 
5. The Brand manager thought that the law needed to have at least three key elements 
being identical: colour; three-dimensional shape;and branding iconography or 
structuring of the artwork (the more subtle aspects of branding). The Legal Director 
thought it would be wrong to define lookalikes as this would lead to retailers working 
around these rules. We would ideally like a law of unfair competition. We think that 
something along the lines of “taking unfair advantage” as set out in the TM Directive3 
or CTM Regulation4 is about right.
3 Directive 2008/95/EC, art 5(2).
4 Regulation (EC) No. 207/2009, art 9(1)(c).
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Lookalike behaviour
6. In terms of pricing, the lookalike tends to be closer to the leading brand pricing than 
their other own brand versions. There are some product categories where retailers do 
not follow anyone at all and the packaging is very different and, usually, the price is 
lower. In our view, There is not much point in a retailer having an own brand which is 
not a lookalike.
Consumer beliefs
7. Consumers know the own brand is from the retailer in question. They almost never 
buy an own brand product thinking it is the branded product. A study we conducted 
in relation to a potential passing off claim confirms this view. It was an online survey 
where we created a planogram of a retailer’s shelf in store. A consumer was then 
given 93 seconds to select a product within the whole product category. After this 
selection they were asked some questions about their choice. We had hoped that 
the consumer would pick up the own brand thinking it was ours. That rarely or never 
actually happens. When they picked up the own label product they believed it to have 
the same attributes as our branded product. 
8. It is our view that the closer the packaging between the own brand and the branded 
product the more the consumer thinks the product within that packaging is the same. 
This is supported by results we have had from focus groups. 
Relationship with retailer
9. We are never going to litigate against a retailer however. Instead, there is usually 
a negotiation – a top-to-top conversation between our MD/CEO and the retailer at 
similar level. However, to start the negotiation we would need a firm legal position. 
This requires evidence of a really strong case otherwise we would not get to that 
conversation in the first place as in our experience the law is only route into such a 
conversation. 
National variations in lookalikes
10. In Germany we tend to have good results. The threat of a preliminary injunction in 
Germany is useful, but I don’t think we have ever done it in relation to a retailer’s 
lookalike. There is simply a perception that such injunctions are granted more 
readily. In Spain, we have been successful at taking reports and surveys to retailers 
(suggesting that consumers think the retailer’s product is of the same composition as 
ours) and this has led to an agreement to phase out the lookalike (or elements of it) 
within six months or so.
11. As we think there is a gap in the UK system, we would forum shop to try and bring 
claims elsewhere. For example, recently a lookalike was introduced by a British 
retailer which we did not think we could prevent in the UK. So we went to all our other 
markets to see if that retailer had introduced the products to those markets and we 
managed to have a high level discussion based on activities in one of those other 
countries.
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Manufacturing own brand
12. There are some manufacturers who say “we don’t make own label products”. We do 
some own label products although it is less than 2% of our UK business. In some 
cases we have been compelled to make own brand products. In one particular case, 
Retailer A5 was one of our biggest retailers and from a relationship point of view 
we felt we had no choice but to make the product. In other areas, where own label 
is squeezing the market significantly (as it does in some categories), the only way to 
improve profitability is to make own label. 
13. Further, in an inherited business we had a legacy where we have to make lookalikes 
of our own products for retailers. 
Incidents of lookalikes
14. The incidents of lookalikes vary between the categories. In relation to health care, 
the biggest problem for us is retailers, whereas in relation to home care it is our 
competitors. 
Innovation
15. The incidents of lookalikes increase your brand range. As we need to stay ahead of 
lookalikes we need to add features to our products. This means we will have put in the 
research into what the consumer desire is within the category. To prove that it is worth 
the listing we have to share the data with the retailer and this means six months later 
the own brand range expands (by reason of our investment in consumer behaviour, 
insight and knowledge). The retailers always follow, they “never branch out on their 
own ever”.
16. We would invest a great deal of time, money and so forth to conduct trials to add new 
claims for the product – for example, the speed the product becomes effective. This 
involves a new amount of money.
Complaints
Third party manufacturers and competitors
17. Where the lookalike is made by a smaller manufacturer selling into convenience 
shops or by a competitor we will tackle it very robustly. We send a letter before claim 
immediately in relation to competitors or rival manufacturers. These tend to have 
mixed success. It is usually that other competitor issues are brought in. There will be 
a lot of internal discussion about whether to send the letter. In number, globally there 
would be a little less than one a month. It is so infrequent that a competitor tries to 
introduce a lookalike. They are usually trying to have their own distinctive brand. 
5 The retailer was named by the interviewees, but as the brand-owner did not want to be identified it is unfair to 
identify the retailer.
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18. Smaller manufacturing, six to ten letters sent off a year. This is mainly in relation to the 
wholesaler own labels. We are usually pretty successful against these manufacturers. 
We would issue proceedings against them, and we have sent them draft pleadings, 
but we have not gone on and issued. I can’t remember the last time we filed a 
complaint against a third party manufacturer. We have not gone for any interim 
injunctions either. This is usually because when we lean on them enough to get the 
result we want.
19. The problem is we can’t prove misrepresentation based on our surveys. We usually 
don’t bother with a survey with the third party manufacturers. We would be very 
aggressive about the matter and so they know we will fight it and so they decide, as 
we are a big company, we would spend the necessary money, and so they decide 
it is not worth the financial risk. We would accordingly allege passing off without the 
consumer survey. 
20. Sometimes we will get external counsel’s view to add credibility to “the discussion”. In 
passing off, even with a very strong case the advice is generally not positive, which 
contrasts to trade mark infringement cases. 
Retailers
21. Our problem is that our biggest customer is our biggest rival. This means that retailers 
who carry less of our stock have less bargaining power with us and we are more likely 
to be robust.
22. We have been punished in the past where we have spoken out or done something the 
retailer didn’t like. They have inflated the price of lines so volumes dip or they reject 
new listings or threaten to de-list brands. It is a very real threat. The threat would be 
product specific and they can find a way to damage us. This is why we would never 
bring an action against a retailer. Having a cause of action would give us more weight 
to the discussion between directors of these large companies. We need it more than 
we don’t like it, we need this is what my lawyer’s advise. We would not threaten to 
issue in those dialogues.
23. We have suffered retribution for price increases for example. Either they de-list or they 
sold products vastly over recommended retail price (and so nobody buys the product) 
so our volume dips massively, but they make the same as they sell fewer products but 
for a much higher price. So we have to pay, but they don’t. It is punishment. Products 
will be de-listed because of price rises.
24. We have settled other types of dispute with retailers by giving them co-brand 
advertising (a normal advert then, “Product X can be found at retailer”).
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Timing
25. A lookalike can never arrive on the shelf as quickly as we can mainly because, in most 
of our categories, the retailers still have to do some formulation development. Indeed, 
if an own brand appeared 2-3 months after our product it would be difficult to prove 
whether it was based on shared information or not as some manufacturers can get 
things to shelf that quickly. So it is a feeling that they have used our research rather 
than something we can prove as such. 
26. In general, it is not advantageous to launch a lookalike before or at the same time as 
a branded product. Retailers will wait because they know brand owners will spend 
money on advertising. This advertising spend usually starts about 3 months after 
launch (after we reach peak distribution to market) and so this is the ideal time to 
introduce the own brand product.  
Signals
27. There are certain things which are signals to consumers such as yellow for lemon, 
green for pine and so forth. However, flavour and colour cues are expected, we are 
not always led by colour cues and sometimes we try to distance us from them. In 
any event, there tends not to be copying between large competitors. The disputes 
are usually around advertising such as product efficacy. The question is not that they 
cannot have imagery suggesting speed, but the source of that imagery. We accept 
that some images are so well identified, for example, speed could be shown to be a 
target.
28. We are developing signals and we would expect own brands to copy signal category 
colours. It is where the other elements are copied.
Packaging innovation
29. If you launch a product you have 2-3 years in which to recover the research and 
development in consumer demand. When we launch a new product we would want it 
look very distinctive.
Sales
30. In relation to Product B,6 when a lookalike was launched in 2010 the sales went down 
about 15% overall (it had more of an impact in that shop). The data is often difficult to 
work out however as a lot of retailers mask the launch of their own label in shopping 
basket data.
6 The product was named by the interviewees, but as they did not want to be identified it has been called 
Product B.
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Advertising spend
31. As the retailers benefit from our advertising, it is very advantageous for them to come 
at the right time. They don’t want our advertising spend to be cut as it affects them as 
well as us. Lookalikes usually arrive after the bulk advertising spend has been used. 
There are examples where the arrival of a lookalike has affected the marketing budget 
significantly. If you say a product type is a good idea then you are advertising a need 
for a product that did not exist before. If you advertise the need for a product then it 
increases demand in the market for us, competitors and own brand. If you develop a 
faster product you have iconography to identify them with speed. 
Competitors
32. New non-lookalike competitors will come to the market with advertising spend and 
new insights based on their own research. This will bring new customers into the 
category and so grow the market overall. If they can’t do that then retailers might 
not even put them on the shelf as without offering anything else they are just taking 
existing market share. The competitor brand will normally make us lose 5% market 
share (maybe more) in the long term. To lose more than 5% market share to a 
competitor is disastrous for us. To avoid losing market share, we invest in promotional 
activity and advertising. This means that although we are set to lose market share, we 
are not set to lose as much. 
Own label
33. With own label it is not uncommon to lose 10% market share over the whole market 
(and not just their own store). In contrast to competitors, we would spend less 
on advertising when an own brand comes on the market. We would reduce our 
advertising spend because we would not want to promote the own label. In relation to 
a non-lookalike own brand, we would not change our advertising spend. Also, if the 
loss from one retailer is being offset by gains in other retailers then we would continue 
to advertise to support those gains elsewhere (although it will promote the lookalike as 
well).
34. We are very fast at addressing marketing issues and so with the launch of an own 
label we would be making decisions in days on how to respond. We would never 
give up advertising spend, but we have on occasion substituted advertising for one 
of our products for another to avoid advertising the lookalike category. However, the 
two month lead time for TV advertising is not very long to see how consumers are 
responding to an own label product. 
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Sales
Price competition 
35. Consumers tend not to reject an entire product category on price (although they might 
make a decision within that category on price). This means that a lookalike is unlikely 
to attract new customers to a category and so they are likely to only eat into market 
share. A low priced lookalike might introduce people to premium range products from 
basic ranges however. We undertook some consumer research into a lookalike in 
relation to one of our health care products. It appeared that of those buying lookalike 
products only 15% were new to the sub-category (premium) (and 85% were not). 
When we lose consumers to own brand they usually do not come back because they 
find that the own brand is worth the trade down in price.
36. A particular problem is that when they bring in own label products they often say we 
don’t need the branded product any more so we will only stock it if there is a cost 
reduction. This gives us a double hit.
Volume growth
37. The data we have tends to show that own brand growth tends to be volume growth 
rather than value of the market growth (e.g. 10 units sold at £0.90, rather than 9 units 
sold at £1.00).
Masking of sales figures
38. There is a lot of masking in shopping basket data. It might be possible for a retailer 
to see how a rival’s own brand is doing, but it much easier to follow how a branded 
product is doing in their own shops. They tend to look to us for category data on 
particular products as the cost of category data from Kantar/Neilson is too high for 
them. 
Changing packaging
39. We will rarely change the packaging of the product as it represents the brand. When 
we have had a product which is in trouble with own label, we have researched 
changing that packaging and consumers have said you should not change it because 
to do so would no longer represent our brand. It is consumers who keep us from 
changing packaging to address lookalikes. 
40. When we launch a new product we look at other products in the category, we try and 
be distinct from them. We want to distinguish ourselves from those brands. We have 
considered to launch a sub-premium range, but decided against launching such a 
product as you need to advertise.
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Promotions
41. We have used promotions against a competitor coming to market. Recently, we have 
been compelled to use promotions against a lookalike own brand entering the market. 
This is because we had no other response. This strategy doesn’t pay back. If you 
compete on price then you might gain customers, but they go again when we go back 
to full price. 
42. We have invested in (paid for) off-shelf promotions. We cannot sustain off-shelf 
placing for very long and it means the retailers win both ways. They launch an own 
label and get some of the market share and then they have brand-owners paying 
for off-shelf placing. We have had instances of the own brand coming “off-shelf” 
immediately after our product. Or worse still, the lookalike comes off shelf at the same 
time as we do and so the lookalike is off shelf at the same time at the brand. 
Tenders and exclusivity
43. It is our view that they would not accept an agreement where they could not have 
own brand near-by. A retailer will sometimes ask us to tender to be the only branded 
product on the shelf for a short time. This would mean that our product would be 
against the retailer’s own brand but not also against a competitor.
Consumer complaints
44. Consumers do not complain to us directly about lookalikes and we have never had 
evidence of consumer complaints about lookalikes and, in particular, we almost never 
have consumers ringing up saying I thought I was buying the wrong things. 
Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations 2008
45. The CPR 2008 has never been considered by us as a tactic. This is because in our 
experience Trading Standards will not take action as they do not have the resources to 
take proceedings on your behalf.
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A major beverage brands owner (Beverage)
Interview: 6th February 2012
Interviewee: Legal Director
What characteristics make a product a “lookalike”?
1. A lookalike product is one which is in the same or similar product category and shares 
at least one important element of the get-up or packaging of another (usually the 
brand leader). It is often the colour or colour combination (or arrangement) which is 
most significant as they play a vital role in consumers relating to a product: “it brings 
the original to the consumer’s mind”, “it is linked” and “it acts as one of the main 
identifiers”. A lookalike presents more a likelihood of association (in terms of indirect 
confusion like an extension of line or that the consumer thinks that the companies are 
economically linked), rather than a likelihood of direct confusion as it is normally the 
case that consumers are not confused as such with regard to the product itself.
Similar origin
2. We are not sure that consumers think so much as to consider whether lookalikes are 
the same product as the product they are imitating. Consumers might buy a product 
simply by reason of the brand (even if the product is the same – using cars as an 
example). In any event, we do not make products for anyone else (e.g. competitors).
3. We also think that where the competitor’s brand is placed on the packaging it is 
likely to make a significant difference to the consumer perception as to product. A 
competitor brand even on similar packaging is going to be noticeable to consumers. 
Even so we believe that a positive image of the well-known brand leads them to 
buy the lookalike or they think that it is a brand extension in collaboration with the 
competitor/the companies are economically linked.
How often are lookalikes raised as a problem with the company?
4. It varies, but within Europe almost every day a product comes in to the legal 
department and, about once a week, one of the products is problematic. The number 
of problematic products is cyclical as demand for the product changes over the year. 
A big problem is usually with a batch of infringing products which they try to sell rather 
than on-going products (i.e., 250,000 units made and sold and that’s it).
Complaints to competitors/customers
5. Where the person selling a lookalike is a customer (e.g., a supermarket) we have 
rarely started proceedings. Usually, our customer agrees to change the packaging 
once the matter has been raised (although this may take some time to feed through). 
How quickly and in which way a particular customer responds varies greatly however 
depending on the customer. The resolution is usually on a commercial level but 
based on a legal background (i.e. the customer signs an undertaking, settlement or 
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something similar. We do get the feeling however that they will agree for only as little 
as possible of change and take steps to try to sell the lookalike product for as long as 
they can.
6. When there is a complaint against a customer’s own brand lookalike, we would 
complain and discuss it with the customer. The question is really at the end what is 
more important to us: the good relationship with the customer now and on a short/
middle term basis (e.g., over the next 1-3 years); or the long term value of the trade 
mark and brand of our products. The latter is of greater importance as if you allow one 
customer to sell a lookalike other customers will think they can sell such products as 
well and in the long run your brand will be diluted losing value and consequently your 
company will lose value too. 
7. In relation to lookalikes other than those produced by customers, cease and desist 
letters are of mixed success. A lot work, but others do not, so legal proceedings are 
to be commenced. It really depends on the jurisdiction. In Germany, for example, 
we would get a preliminary injunction within a few days and then the other side is 
very willing to stop selling and we would reach an agreement in due course. In some 
countries of Eastern Europe, it is more difficult to tackle lookalike sellers as some of 
these jurisdictions are (still) often not as developed as other European jurisdictions.
8. We would normally consider allowing the lookalike seller a reasonable sell-off period 
for already produced units/items in stock, but this will always depend on the other 
party and its behaviour/cooperation. We would also always seek a contractual penalty 
for continuing to sell the lookalike goods (although we know this is not possible in the 
United Kingdom) in order to avoid the risk of repetition.
United Kingdom as forum
9. We try to avoid the UK, the UK is too expensive to litigate (although this might 
change by reason of the Patents County Court, we would avoid the High Court). In 
any event, it is often possible to take steps in other countries (such as seeking an 
injunction under CTM Regulation, including a Pan-European injunction) and so cut 
off the supply to and the sale in the UK. We also avoid the United Kingdom because 
the civil procedure requirements are too complicated and, in particular, the disclosure 
requirements and the unwillingness to accept survey evidence. It is also our view 
that the English judges are less willing to consider a mark to be well known within the 
meaning of 9(1)(c) of the Regulation. 
10. In relation to passing off we have considered bringing a claim in relation to lookalikes. 
We seek advice from English lawyers regularly, but in general the advice is such 
that we do not pursue the claim as they predict a low chance of success. The legal 
advice we receive is usually that it would be difficult to show damage to goodwill for 
the purposes of passing off. In general, there is a better, higher chance of winning in 
other countries, rather than the United Kingdom. In any event we generally try to bring 
claims based on trade mark law, rather than passing off. Such decisions are better 
for us as they can be used in other countries (especially when based on a CTM) and 
help to establish reputation and thus a broader scope of protection of our trademarks/
brands.
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Sales and marketing data
11. [The person interviewed was not able to comment regarding advertising spend or 
sales by reason of lookalikes coming on the market as the interviewee was from the 
legal department and had not been able to obtain any figures.]
Adapting packaging
12. We have never changed the packaging of our products. We have never taken 
decisions to price cut as we are a premium product, we would not enter price battles. 
Our competitors do however enter price battles.
Agreements
13. An agreement with a supermarket about lookalikes would be on the one hand anti-
competitive and on the other hand also detrimental for our brand at the end. Thus we 
would not do that.
Consumer complaints
14. Consumers can report lookalikes, and there is an email address on our website for 
this purpose. We get from time to time meaningful reports (although much more spam 
and groundless issues are raised). The complaints are usually something along the 
lines of “I bought a product in xy country, (often a foreign country), being similar to 
your product. I tried it and it tasted bad.” The consumer going on to suggest to us 
that we do something to stop it. We are usually already aware of the issues raised by 
consumers in relation to the particular product in advance, however, and are normally 
already in process of tackling it. 
Concluding thoughts
15. The problem of lookalikes is getting worse and it is systematic. It is the systematic 
copying of brands across all sectors. We are far away from a harmonised law of trade 
marks in practice there are really big differences between the countries in the EU.
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Distributor of branded beauty/health care 
product (Beauty)
Interview: 16th February 2012
Interviewee: General Manager of the Brand
Background
1. We are the distributors of a branded beauty/health care product and in the UK we are 
responsible for its position in the UK market. Our product has about 70% market share 
in its specific product category. We have had two record years for selling Product B. 
Our product category is growing with on-line customers starting to trust the line of 
products.
Lookalike
2. A lookalike product is where it takes the main concepts of a brand’s identity, the 
colours and the “claims” are the same (or more precisely the way those claims are 
laid out) being prime examples. The particular concern is the fact the claims are in the 
same order, not that the claims are made (as if a product does something then it does 
it). Other factors might be that the ingredients for the products are totally substitutable 
(although different) and the bottle shape is very similar. Finally, the delivery method 
being similar is important as well. Lookalikes is lazy marketing, a product gets to a 
certain level of sales and then an own brand is launched.
3. A list of claims on a product in our category cannot of course be restricted. Similarly, 
the colour of the packaging alone is not enough. The tipping point is usually the 
colours and the layout. You have the colour, graphic, claims and the shape of the 
box. Retailers would argue that the brand leader has a colour scheme and in terms 
of consumer behaviour we need to go to the colour to get consumers to know the 
function of the product. In one major retailer (Shop X) I think there is a lookalike of our 
product (Product X), and in another retailer (Shop Y) their equivalent product is not a 
lookalike (Product Y) Drawing the line between similar packaging and a lookalike is 
very difficult, and very subjective. 
Retailers
4. Shops X and Y represent a substantial part of our business and so we need to protect 
our relationship with them. We have only recently (last 3 years) started to push hard 
with the grocery market. Our category is a growing category. There is so far only one 
grocer own label but it is likely to change in time as the category grows. Retailers 
want to provide own brands as an alternative. The grocery retailers use strong-arm 
negotiation tactics because they are aware of their significance in the market. 
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Competitor
5. When there was a lookalike (from another manufacturer), Brand B’s management took 
the view that it was not worth bringing legal proceedings as the cost was too high and 
the brand was growing. It was felt we should harness that growth rather than waste 
money on legal fees. At the time, our product was some 50 times bigger than the 
lookalike and as the lookalike was only in one major retailer it was not worth taking 
action.
Sales
6. We lost 20% sales in Shop X when the lookalike was launched and 40% down in Shop 
Y when their own brand was launched. The hit we got from the non-lookalike was 
therefore worse than for the lookalike. The reasons for this were mainly the way the 
own brand was strongly promoted in Shop Y, whereas this is not the case in Shop X. 
In addition, we lost a lot of our shelf space in Shop Y and it trained its staff to push the 
own brand, rather than the branded product. Conversely, we have one or two shelves 
in Shop X and the own brand was launched with only one facing; also Shop X staff 
will usually recommend our product. It was clear when the own brand was launched, 
our customers switched to the own brand but that switching has declined. Indeed, on 
the whole customers come back to our product from the own brand. Further, when a 
competitor (a major manufacturer) launched a competitor product it led to what will 
be a 20-30% decline in sales; a competitor which is a major manufacturer is a much 
bigger threat to a business of our size than the retailers. 
7. In general, the own brand does not expand the market very much, but competitor 
products generally do.
Signals
8. We accept that there would be category signals, although we more or less created the 
category.
Promotions
9. If we go on promotion then it is usual for the own brand to go on promotion as well (in 
Shop Y) and so we lose the advantage. 
10. We were spending more money within some customers on promotions when our sales 
went down and similarly we bought more shelf space to compete with the own brand.
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Advertising
11. We invested in training in Shop X (i.e. we paid to train Shop X staff) as this helped 
us develop our product range. This was a direct response to their lookalike. This is 
effectively upping advertising as it is getting Shop X staff to promote our product to 
its customers. We have paid for this training three times, each time costing £30,000. 
Essentially, it involves a feature in their official training material (so it was about 1 of 6 
pages in the monthly training manual). 
Packaging
12. We have only made very minor changes to our product’s packaging and I doubt it 
would be spotted by consumers. 
Consumers
13. We have some instances of consumers being confused so that they believe a 
lookalike is our branded product. We have had a few emails saying they have been 
confused by the lookalike. It is not something that is happening in vast numbers, but it 
is still a problem. We have done no consumer research into the issue of lookalikes or 
focus groups however.
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The Co-operative (Co-op)
Interview: 19th March 2012
Interviewees: Duncan Bowdler (Trade and Legislation Manager) and Marjorie Murphy 
(Senior Commercial Manager - Food Product Strategy)
About the Co-operative
1. The Co-operative has about 7-8% market share in the food retail market about a £7.5 
billion turnover. It provides branded and own brand goods to its own shops and to 
regional Co-operatives through the buying group, the Co-operative Trading Group. 
Regional Co-operatives themselves have a turnover of about £2.5 billion.
2. It used to have own factories providing Co-operative brand products. This began 
in 1872 when it launched its first biscuit factory. The biscuits were branded with 
“Crumpsall Biscuits” and the “Co-operative Wholesale Society”.  This was the original 
Co-operative brand. There used to be hundreds of Co-operative factories over the 
country, which made all sorts of things, not just food. Eventually, because of the broad 
range of production it became apparent that in each product area the Co-operative 
was a very small player. The factories gradually closed with a range of food factories 
lasting until about 1992-3.
The Co-operative’s own brand range
3. The Co-operative’s own brand range has been around 140 years and it says 
something about us. One of the reasons we have an own brand range is that there 
was a desire for us to be in control of the ingredients and raw materials for our 
products. We wanted to use it to inform consumers that the product has been made in 
a way that they would approve of and which is in line with our vision.
4. The first time we used a consistent Co-operative logo was the 1960s (two 
manifestations since then and the most recent is “the Co-operative”) and we have 
had an own brand image since that time. However, we do not usually lead the entry 
of new products in own brand (there are some isolated examples such as washing 
gels). An own brand would only be introduced if the margins were better for us and 
that is usually the case (although on occasion the own brand might cease to be so 
successful).
Lookalikes
5. It is our view that whether something is a lookalike depends on the how much of the 
design font, colour, imagery and pack shape has been replicated. 
6. The Co-operative has a clear brand template and we try to have a consistency across 
our brand which reinforces our brand value. The development of a new product would 
involve us looking across the product category, including the brand leader, to see if 
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there are any customer cues which are common across the category. These category 
specific cues are applied to our central brand template and not the other way around. 
We try to develop our brand to enable customers to shop easily and not to confuse 
them or mislead them in any way.
7. The number of product cues will depend on the category. For example, in relation to 
laundry products, there are lots of cues common across the category such as colours 
for biological, non-biological, colour products; signs for the number of washes and so 
forth. In another product categories there may be very few general cues.
Limits of manufacturers
8. When it comes to packaging (and even colour) we are often constrained by what the 
manufacturer has or can source (e.g., a product can only be made in a particular 
bottle size or range of sizes). Usually, if you are a late entry into the own brand 
market, it is likely that the manufacturer who will make the product is already making 
it for someone else as well. This means you are restricted to the sort of packaging the 
manufacturer is already using. 
9. It is usually too expensive to arrange a factory to be retooled to change the packaging 
significantly from that which is offered, particularly if volumes are not sufficient. For 
example, in relation to a chocolate bar we suggested to a manufacturer that the colour 
of the foil should be changed to represent the rest of our fair trade range. This would 
have brought in a lot of extra cost to the manufacturing process as we did not need 
the volume needed to make the savings in relation to that foil.
10. We do not contractually try to prevent manufacturers making own brand for other 
retailers. Our procurement process involves a tender being put out to manufacturers 
to make a product to our particular specification. We then give the tender to the best 
manufacturer in terms of quality and price and according to our responsible retailing 
agenda. This last criterion means there are sometimes a very limited number of 
manufacturers with the capacity to make the products for us.
11. We would not want to copy other people’s branding as we want our products to speak 
about our values - and principles.
Complaints from brand owners
12. We have undertaken detailed checks internally and we cannot find any example where 
we have had a manufacturer making a complaint about any of our packaging.
Advertising
13. We do not normally spend large sums of money promoting or advertising an individual 
own brand product, rather the spending is on the Co-operative brand generally. 
However, there may be promotions or other ways of pushing an own brand in an 
advertisement. When we launch a new product, whether own brand or not, we would 
usually launch it with a promotion (such as 3 for 2, or price reductions).
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14. We tend to find that customers are more likely to shop around now than in the past, 
we tend to find less loyalty in customers. They are, due to the present climate, looking 
for value.
Change of packaging
15. We tend to change the packaging every two years or so. We think that period is 
sufficient to get the value out of the product redesign, but leaving it too much longer 
might make the product start to look dated. We do not change our packaging based on 
any changes in the market leader, our changes are based entirely on our own product 
life cycle. However, when a redesign is underway we will look at the sort of packaging 
of the product in the category to judge things like customer cues and other sorts of 
development.
Signalling / customer cues
16. There are clearly certain customer cues that are used in certain product categories. 
An interesting example we have noticed is that now retailers are using the colour 
black for the packaging of premium ranges. We are not sure where this started, but it 
has become a clear signal across most retailers. Similarly, in milk there are general 
cues which have been adopted such as red, green and blue to denote the fat content 
of milk.
Innovation
17. The level of innovation in an own brand product will depend on the category. In 
relation to plain flour it is difficult to imagine any innovation, but in other brands it is 
very common. For example, recently in relation to Easter Eggs we launched our own 
brand egg made of our fair trade chocolate and so it follows our own fair trade values. 
It is quite different from everything else on the market and is innovative.
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Who makes the Co-operative own brand products
18. We are not sure how many of our own brand products are made by the brand leader. 
Further, this will change over time as we can switch supplier (or have multiple 
suppliers) so it might be that at one time a manufacturer made the own brand and at 
another time they did not.
Consumer focus groups
19. We have conducted focus groups and found that consumers’ behaviour in relation 
to own brand will vary greatly between individuals and between categories. Some 
people will buy own brand in some categories and not others. Some will know the 
manufacturer is the same for an own brand product and yet still buy the branded 
product.
Complaints
20. We have never had a complaint to our customer retailer’s department where someone 
has bought one of our own brand products believing it to be a manufacturer’s brand.
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Consumer Goods Retailer
Email 29th March 2012 from Legal Team
1. Having looked at the initial questions you posed, we feel that perhaps these are more 
applicable to the food and grocery market where customers may have expectations as 
to certain appearances denoting certain products (whether red ketchup bottles, silver 
butter packages or yellow mustard jars). 
2. For the majority of our business, we seek to make sales based on the appearance of a 
product itself (rather than its packaging) given that the vast majority of our stock is not 
placed on display and instead is featured in promotional materials or online.
3. Our overall opinion on this issue is that we do not believe further legislation for rights 
holders is necessary, as we believe existing legal rights of Trade Mark and passing off 
law are sufficient and appropriate to protect against lookalike products.
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Appendix C: Consumer 
Survey – Questions and Brief
[See Chapter 7]
Stage 1 survey
Notes: Branded and own brand products to be varied in position, though relative   
 comparisons to remain constant
 Photoshop to be used to enable presentation of any products for judgement in trios
 Demographic data to be captured for each respondent (though Stage 1 survey is  
 not designed to be nationally representative)
Please look at the packaging of the three products below
Please rank the three products in terms of your preference?
Product A [___]
Product B [___]
Product C [___]
Do you think the packaging of product B or product C looks most like that of product 
A?
Product B Product C Neither
How likely or unlikely do you think it is that product B is made by the same company 
as is product A?
1 (extremely unlikely) - 7 (extremely likely)
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Thinking of product B, how similar or dissimilar would you say its packaging looks to 
that of product A?
1 (they don’t look at all like each other) - 7 (they look exactly the same)
How likely or unlikely do you think it is that product C is made by the same company 
as is product A?
1 (extremely unlikely) - 7 (extremely likely)
Thinking of product C, how similar or dissimilar would you say its packaging looks to 
that of product A?
1 (they don’t look at all like each other) - 7 (they look exactly the same)
How likely or unlikely do you think it is that product C is made by the same company 
as the product B?
1 (extremely unlikely) - 7 (extremely likely)
Thinking of product C, how similar or dissimilar would you say its packaging looks to 
that of product B?
1 (they don’t look at all like each other) - 7 (they look exactly the same)
Comparing products B and C, to what extent do you agree or disagree that product B 
is likely to be...
1 (Strongly Disagree)-Disagree- Slightly Disagree - Neither-Slightly Agree - Agree- (Strongly 
Agree) 7
a. ...of a better quality (e.g., more desirable,tastes better, safer)?
b. ... better for its intended use (e.g., more effective, better at doing what it’s supposed 
to)?
c. ... more expensive (e.g., cost more money)?
d. ... better value for money – in your opinion?
Thinking of <product type: razors>, which of the following statements best describes 
your behaviour:
I stick to one brand, and never change
I always buy a branded one, but sometimes/ often switch brands
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I usually buy a branded one, but sometimes experiment with a different version
I always buy whatever is cheapest
I never buy them
We’d like to ask you one question we asked you earlier again. Now that you’ve thought 
more about the 3 products, please rank the three products again in terms of your 
preference?
Product A [___]
Product B [___]
Product C [___]
Which, if any, of the following are relevant to your preferences?
I prefer a product from a company I know
I prefer brands
I like trying new products
Other: (please specify) ______________________________
Which, if any, of the following products have you ever tried?
Product A [___]
Product B [___]
Product C [___]
None of them [___]
Of these, which if anywould you say you enjoyed?
Product A [___]
Product B [___]
Product C [___]
None of them [___]
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Appendix 2: Stage 2 survey
Key:
Black text: to be presented to respondents
Blue text: response options
Red text: explanatory comments for reviewers & scripter
READ OUT: Here, we are interested in your shopping habits, and specifically in your 
experiences of ‘lookalike’ products. By ‘lookalikes’, we mean products whose appearance 
may to some extent resemble the look of a well known brand in the same category.  For 
example, some people may say the “Boots Blade 3” below is a ‘lookalike’ to the “Gillette 
Mach 3”, or that “Boots Ibuprofen caplets” is a ‘lookalike’ to the “Nurofen caplets” – because 
aspects of the their packaging are similar.
To make clear the terms we are using:
• By ‘brand product’ we mean a product with a particular name. Examples might include 
Kellogg’s Corn Flakes, or Gillette Mach 3 razors.
• By ‘own-brand product’ we mean a product in the same category as a brand that 
is manufactured by a well known retailer.  So for example, there is a Tesco (and 
Sainsbury) own-brand version of Corn Flakes.
To be clear, by lookalikes we do not mean products that are counterfeit copies of branded 
products.
Neither do we mean any own-brand product.  A lookalike is where another product in the 
same category looks somewhat like a brand leader in the category.  So, in some instances a 
lookalike may be of an own-brand product.
Thinking of when you go shopping for groceries and household items....
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Question 1: to identify generic respondent purchasing tendencies
1. ... across all products you buy, which of the following statements best describes  
 your typical behaviour? For any one product.... [SINGLE CODE]
 ... I tend to stick to a specific brand/ own-brand, and never change  [1]
 ... I tend to buy a specific brand/ own-brand, but sometimes experiment with a   
 different one         [2]
 ...I tend to buy brands/ own-brands, and often switch brands    [3]
 ... I tend not to buy brands/ own-brands      [4]
 ... I don’t know         [5]
If [1], [2], or [3] to Q1
a. Do you mainly buy brand products, or own-brand products? [SINGLE CODE]
 Brands          [1]
 Own brands         [2]
 Around half and half        [3]
 I don’t know         [4]
Question 2: to identify priorities in considerations for day to day purchasing decisions
2. ... across all products you buy, please rank order the following from 1-5 in terms of  
 their importance to you?
 ... preferred brand/ own-brand       [1]
 ... lowest price         [2]
 ... highest quality        [3]
 ... best value for money        [4]
 …best fitness for purpose        [5]
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Question 3: to identify perceived influence of product presentation characteristics
3. ... across all products you buy, thinking of the appearance of the products, please  
 rank order the following from 1-6 in terms of how much they influence the likelihood  
 of your purchasing?
 Packaging shape        [1]
 Packaging colour        [2]
 Product (Brand/own-brand) name      [3]
 Product branding/iconography (other than text)     [4]
 Product descriptions on the packaging (for example, “Extra Power” or “Fresh   
 Ingredients”)         [5]
 Previous positive experience with the product itself    [6]
Question 4: accidental purchase of lookalikes
4. a.... across all products you buy, have you ever mistakenly or accidentally   
 purchased a ‘lookalike’, thinking you were buying the branded/own-branded   
 version of the product?
 Yes, frequently         [1]
 Yes, a few times        [2]
 Yes, once or twice        [3]
 No, never         [4]
 Don’t know         [5]
If [1], [2], or [3] to Q4
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 b... and to what extent would you say the experience(s) disadvantage(d ) you?
 [SINGLE CODE]
 very much         [1]
 somewhat         [2]
 very little         [3]
 not at all         [4]
 don’t know         [5]
 c... and to what extent would you say the experience(s) was (were) advantageous  
 to you?
 [SINGLE CODE]
 very much         [1]
 somewhat         [2]
 very little         [3]
 not at all         [4]
 don’t know         [5]
Question 5: deliberate purchase of lookalikes
5. a.... across all products you buy, do/have you ever deliberately purchase/d a   
 ‘lookalike’?
 Yes, regularly         [1]
 Yes, a few times        [2]
 Yes, once or twice        [3]
 No          [4]
 Don’t know         [5]
If [1], [2], or [3] to Q5
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 b... and to what extent would you say that doing so disadvantages you?
 [SINGLE CODE]
 very much         [1]
 somewhat         [2]
 very little         [3]
 not at all         [4]
 don’t know         [5]
 c... and to what extent would you say that doing so isadvantageous to you?
 [SINGLE CODE]
 very much         [1]
 somewhat         [2]
 very little         [3]
 not at all         [4]
 don’t know         [5]
Question 6: trust in retailers and brand owners
6. From your experiences of purchasing both branded and retailer own-brand   
 products, do you think the branded (such as Gillette, Kelloggs’, Original   
 Source) or the retailer own-branded (such as Tesco, Sainsburys’, Boots) products  
 are on average better at giving you the...
 a... lowerprices? [SINGLE CODE]
 Retailers         [1]
 Brand owners         [2]
 Roughly the same        [3]
 Don’t know         [4]
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 b... higher quality? [SINGLE CODE]
 Retailers         [1]
 Brand owners         [2]
 Roughly the same        [3]
 Don’t know         [4]
 c... best value for money? [SINGLE CODE]
 Retailers         [1]
 Brand owners         [2]
 Roughly the same        [3]
 Don’t know         [4]
 d... best for their purpose? [SINGLE CODE]
 Retailers         [1]
 Brand owners         [2]
 Roughly the same        [3]
 Don’t know         [4]
END
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Appendix D: Consumer 
Survey - Graphs and Charts
[See Chapter 7]
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Impact of Lookalikes
Part 1: Similarity and Origin
Bodyspray & Bodywash
1.0
2.0
3.0
4.0
5.0
6.0
7.0
Similarity Origin
R
at
in
gs
 o
f s
im
ila
rit
y 
of
 p
ac
ka
gi
ng
/li
ke
lih
oo
d 
of
 c
om
m
on
 o
rig
in
 w
ith
 th
e 
br
an
de
d
Product A
Product C
*Quality (r² =0.275, p<0.01)
*Intended use (r²=235, p<0.01)
*Quality (r ² =0.219, p<0.05)
*Intended use (r ²=0.212, p<0.05)
r²=0.313, p<0.01
n=119
Figure D.1(i) – Similarity and origin –Tesco Sweet, Charlie Pink and Tesco Pink
1.0
2.0
3.0
4.0
5.0
6.0
7.0
Similarity Origin
R
a
tin
gs
 o
f s
im
ila
rit
y 
of
 p
ac
ka
gi
ng
/li
ke
lih
oo
d 
of
 c
om
m
on
 o
rig
in
 w
ith
 th
e 
br
an
de
d 
pr
od
uc
t
Product A
Product C
*Value for money (r²=0.267, p<0.05)
n=76
Figure D.1(ii) – Similarity and origin –Tesco Wake Up, Original Source  and 
Sainsbury’s Lime Bodywash
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Cheese & Razor
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*r ²=0.380, p<0.01
n=87
Figure D.1(iii)– Similarity and origin – (Lidl) Tenery, Tesco Triangles and The 
Laughing Cow,
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*r ²=0.456, p<0.01
*Quality (r ²=0.176, p<0.05)
*Intended use (r²=0.235, p<0.01)
n=131
Figure D.1(iv) - – Similarity and origin – Gillette Mach3, Boots Blade 3 and Morrison’s 
Triple Blade
246
Impact of Lookalikes
Washing Up Liquid & Shampoo
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*r ² =0.276, p<0.05
n=83
Figure D.1(v) - – Similarity and origin – Fairy Liquid, (Aldi) Magnum and Tesco’s 
washing up liquid
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*Expensive (r ² =0.209, p<0.05)
*r ²=0.237, p<0.01
n=144
Figure D.1(vi)– Similarity and origin – Head & Shoulders, Boots Anti-dandruff and 
Sainbury’s anti-dandruff
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Drinks & Vinegar
1.0
2.0
3.0
4.0
5.0
6.0
7.0
Similarity Origin
R
at
in
gs
 o
f s
im
ila
rit
y 
of
 p
ac
ka
gi
ng
/li
ke
lih
oo
d 
of
 c
om
m
on
 o
rig
in
 w
ith
 th
e 
br
an
de
d 
pr
od
uc
t
Product A
Product C
*r ²=0.479, p<0.01
n=109
Figure D.1(vii)– Similarity and origin –ASDA Blue Charge, Red Bull and (Lidl) Mixxed 
Up
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n=68
Figure D.1(viii)– Similarity and origin –(Lidl) Samson’s Malt Vinegar, ASDA Malt 
Vinegar and Sarson’s Malt Vinegar
248
Impact of Lookalikes
Butter & Ibuprofen
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(r²=0.318, p<0.01)
*Expensive (r²=0.225, p<0.05)
*Expensive (r ²=0.252, p<0.05)
n=99
Figure D.1(x)– Similarity and origin – Lurpak, (Aldi) Norpak and Tesco Butterpak
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*Expensive (r²= -0.241, p<0.05)
n=79
Figure D.1(xi) – Similarity and origin –Boots Ibuprofen Caplets, Nurofen Ibuprofen 
Caplets and Sainsbury’s Ibuprofen Capsules
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Skin Care & Shaving Gel
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r²=0.237, p<0.05
n=105
Figure D.1(xi) – Similarity and origin –Boots SkinClear, Tesco Skin Clear and 
Clearasil Ultra,
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*Quality (r ²=0.289, p<0.05)
*Expensive (r²=0.280, p<0.05)
*r ²=0.350, p<0.01
n=69
Figure D.1(xii) – Similarity and origin –Blades 3 Shaving Gel and Morrison’s Shaving 
Gel, Gillette Fusion Shaving Gel,
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Part 2: User vs Non-Use
Bodyspray
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*r ²=0.494, p<0.01
n=36
Figure D.2(i) – Similarity and Origin - Users
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*r ²=0.227, p<0.05
*Quality (r ²=0.260, p<0.05)
*Intended use (r²=0.282, p<0.01)
*Value for money(r² =0.371,p<0.01)
*Quality (r ²=0.313, p<0.01)
*Intended use (r ²=0.285, p<0.01)
*Expensive ( r²=0.325,p<0.01)
*Value for money(r²=0.243,p<0.05)
n=82
Figure D.2(ii) – Similarity and Origin – Non-Users
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Bodywash
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r²=-0.289, p<0.05
*Value for money(r ²=0.304, p<0.05)
n=49
Figure D.2(iii) – Similarity and Origin - Users
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n=27
Figure D.2(iv) – Similarity and Origin – Non-Users
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Cheese
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*r ²=0.329, p<0.01
n=65
Figure D.2(v) – Similarity and Origin - Users
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*r ²=0.570, p<0.01
n=20
Figure D.2(vi) – Similarity and Origin – Non-Users
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Razors
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*r ²=0.516, p<0.01
n=75
Figure D.2(vii) – Similarity and Origin – Users
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*r ²=0.412, p<0.01
n=49
Figure D.2(viii) – Similarity and Origin – Non-Users
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Washing Up Liquid
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Figure D.2(ix) – Similarity and Origin –Users
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*r ²=0.812, p<0.05
n=6
Figure D.2(x) – Similarity and Origin –Non-Users
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Shampoo
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*r ²=0.271, p<0.01
n=106
Figure D.2(xi) – Similarity and Origin – Users
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*Intended use(r²=0.360, p<0.05)
*Expensive r(²=0.406, p<0.05)
n=34
Figure D.2(xii) – Similarity and Origin – Non-Users
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Drinks
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*r ²=0.454, p<0.01
n=73
Figure D.2(xiii) – Similarity and Origin – Users
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*r ²=0.534, p<0.01
*Value for money (r²=-0.405, p<0.05)
*Value for money (r² =- 0.487, p<0.01)
n=32
Figure D.2(xiv) – Similarity and Origin – Non-Users
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Vinegar
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n=54
Figure D.2(xv) – Similarity and Origin – Users
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*r ²=0.664, p<0.05
*Value for money(r ² =0.556, p<0.05)
n=13
Figure D.2(xvi) – Similarity and Origin – Non-Users
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Butter
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*r ²=0.294, p<0.05
n=72
Figure D.2(xvii) – Similarity and Origin – Users
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n=26
Figure D.2(xviii) – Similarity and Origin – Non-Users
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Ibuprofen
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Figure D.2(xix) – Similarity and Origin – Users
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Figure D.2(xx) – Similarity and Origin – Non-Users
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Skin Care
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Figure D.2(xxi) – Similarity and Origin – Users
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Figure D.2(xxii) – Similarity and Origin – Non-Users
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Shaving Gel
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*r ²=0.400, p<0.05
n=28
Figure D.2(xxiii) – Similarity and Origin –Users
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*r²=0.334, p<0.05
*Quality (r² =0.406, p<0.01)
*Intended use (r²=0.426, p<0.01)
*Expensive (r²=0.512, p<0.01)
*Value for money (r²=0.351, p<0.05)
n=41
Figure D.2(xxiv) – Similarity and Origin – Users
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Appendix E: Consumer 
Survey – Data for Charts on 
Similarity and Perceived 
Origin
[See Chapter 7]
Product Own 
brand 1
Own brand 
2
Diff in own 
brands’ 
similarities to 
manufacturer
Own 
brand 1
Own 
brand 2
Diff in own 
brands’ 
similarities to 
manufacturer
Agreement 
that own 
brand 1 is 
better than 
own brand 2
1. Body spray 
Manufacturer brand: Revlon Tesco Tesco
Similarity of own brand to 
manufacturer 5.3252 2.3445 3.00000
Quality 3.6860
Suitability for intended use 3.7273
Expensive 4.1983
Value for money 3.6777
Likelihood of own brand 
having same origin as 
manufacturer brand
3.8468 3.0331 0.7686
2. Body wash 
Manufacturer brand: Original 
source
Tesco Sainsbury’s
Similarity of own brand to 
manufacturer 3.5395 2.9079 0.6316
Quality 3.4211
Suitability for intended use 3.6711
Expensive 3.3816
Value for money 3.7500
Likelihood of own brand 
having same origin as 
manufacturer brand
2.9737 3.0789 0.1053
3. Cheese 
Manufacturer brand: 
Laughing cow
Lidl Tesco
Similarity of own brand to 
manufacturer 4.5747 2.7841 1.7701
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Product Own 
brand 1
Own brand 
2
Diff in own 
brands’ 
similarities to 
manufacturer
Own 
brand 1
Own 
brand 2
Diff in own 
brands’ 
similarities to 
manufacturer
Agreement 
that own 
brand 1 is 
better than 
own brand 2
Quality 3.4432
Suitability for intended use 3.4545
Expensive 3.3977
Value for money 3.5682
Likelihood of own brand 
having same origin as 
manufacturer brand
3.5632 3.2273 0.3333
4. Razors 
Manufacturer brand: Gillette Boots Morrisons
Similarity of own brand to 
manufacturer 3.5882 3.1527 0.4198
Quality 4.1984
Suitability for intended use 4.2063
Expensive 4.4841
Value for money 4.2143
Likelihood of own brand 
having same origin as 
manufacturer brand
3.7029 3.4104 0.2857
5. Washing up liquid 
Manufacturer brand: Fairy Aldi Tesco
Similarity of own brand to 
manufacturer 3.7831 3.4824 0.2892
Quality 3.5542
Suitability for intended use 3.5422
Expensive 3.5422
Value for money 3.7229
Likelihood of own brand 
having same origin as 
manufacturer brand
3.2235 3.1765 0.0471
6. Shampoo  
Manufacturer brand: Head& 
Shoulders
Boots Sainsbury’s
Similarity of own brand to 
manufacturer 4.3356 2.8819 1.4444
Quality 4.3475
Suitability for intended use 4.2553
Expensive 4.8786
Value for money 4.1571
Likelihood of own brand 
having same origin as 
manufacturer brand
3.8378 3.1862 0.6828
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Product Own 
brand 1
Own brand 
2
Diff in own 
brands’ 
similarities to 
manufacturer
Own 
brand 1
Own 
brand 2
Diff in own 
brands’ 
similarities to 
manufacturer
Agreement 
that own 
brand 1 is 
better than 
own brand 2
7. Drinks 
Manufacturer brand: Red Bull Asda Lidl
Similarity of own brand to 
manufacturer 3.7706 2.0000 1.7593
Quality 4.2407
Suitability for intended use 4.1759
Expensive 4.0370
Value for money 4.2963
Likelihood of own brand 
having same origin as 
manufacturer brand
3.4727 2.8257 0.6697
8. Vinegar 
Manufacturer brand: Sarson’s Lidl Asda
Similarity of own brand to 
manufacturer 4.0580 2.9706 1.1324
Quality 4.1884
Suitability for intended use 3.9710
Expensive 4.3824
Value for money 4.0882
Likelihood of own brand 
having same origin as 
manufacturer brand
3.6765 3.4493 0.1912
9. Butter 
Manufacturer brand: Lurpak Aldi Tesco
Similarity of own brand to 
manufacturer
4.7475 2.8300 1.9091
Quality 3.9300
Suitability for intended use 3.9500
Expensive 4.4200
Value for money 3.6768
Likelihood of own brand 
having same origin as 
manufacturer brand
3.9600 2.8788 1.1111
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Product Own 
brand 1
Own brand 
2
Diff in own 
brands’ 
similarities to 
manufacturer
Own 
brand 1
Own 
brand 2
Diff in own 
brands’ 
similarities to 
manufacturer
Agreement 
that own 
brand 1 is 
better than 
own brand 2
10. Ibuprofen  
Manufacturer brand: Nurofen
Boots Sainsbury’s
Similarity of own brand to 
manufacturer
3.7500 1.9875 1.7625
Quality 3.9125
Suitability for intended use 3.7875
Expensive 4.5625
Value for money 3.8125
Likelihood of own brand 
having same origin as 
manufacturer brand
3.6707 3.0886 .6076
11. Skin care 
Manufacturer brand: Clerasil Boots Tesco
Similarity of own brand to 
manufacturer
5.0381 2.0000 3.0481
Quality 4.5047
Suitability for intended use 4.4486
Expensive 4.9252
Value for money 4.3738
Likelihood of own brand 
having same origin as 
manufacturer brand
3.7778 2.9720 0.8224
12. Shaving gel 
Manufacturer brand: Gillette Boots Morrison
Similarity of own brand to 
manufacturer
3.4783 2.0429 1.4348
Quality 4.1286
Suitability for intended use 4.2000
Expensive 4.4143
Value for money 4.1286
Likelihood of own brand 
having same origin as 
manufacturer brand
3.0857 2.6377 0.4638
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Product Perception that 
packaging of Own 
Brand 1 is similar-
dissimilar to 
manufacturer brand
Perception that 
packaging  of Own 
Brand 2 is similar-
dissimilar to 
manufacturer brand
Perception that Own 
Brand 1 is made by 
same company as 
manufacturer brand
Perception that Own 
Brand 2 is made by 
same company as 
manufacturer brand
1. Body Spray
Overall (n=119) 5.3252 2.3445 3.8468 3.0331
Users (n=36) 5.1053 2.5278 2.8421 4.9211
Non-users (n=82) 5.4578 2.2651 3.1220 5.2048
2. Body wash
Overall (n=76) 3.5395 2.9079 3.2235 3.1765
Users (n=49) 3.6939 2.9184 2.9796 3.0204
Non-users (n=27) 3.2593 2.8889 2.9630 3.1852
3. Cheese
Overall (n=87) 4.5747 2.7841 3.5632 3.2273
Users (n=65) 4.5606 2.7121 3.6154 3.2576
Non-users (n=20) 4.6000 2.9048 3.4762 3.0000
4. Razors
Overall (n=131) 3.5882 3.1527 3.7029 3.4104
Users (n=75) 3.4868 3.5132 3.7200 3.6579
Non-users (n=49) 3.7143 2.6531 3.7143 3.2041
5. Washing up liquid
Overall (n=83) 3.7831 3.4824 3.2235 3.1765
Users (n=73) 3.7808 3.5467 3.7808 3.5467
Non-users (n=6) 3.3333 3.1667 2.3333 2.3333
6. Shampoo
Overall (n=144) 4.3356 2.8819 3.8378 3.1862
Users (n=106) 4.4340 2.8208 3.9151 3.1509
Non-users (n=34) 4.0882 3.0000 3.8529 3.4118
7. Drinks
Overall (n=109) 3.7706 2.0000 3.4727 2.8257
Users (n=73) 3.7838 2.0405 3.5135 2.7671
Non-users (n=32) 3.7188 1.7576 3.3333 2.8485
8. Vinegar
Overall (n=68) 4.0580 2.9706 3.6765 3.4493
Users (n=13) 3.7455 3.5273 4.1818 2.9815
Non-users (n=54) 4.1818 2.9815 3.7455 3.5273
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Product Perception that 
packaging of Own 
Brand 1 is similar-
dissimilar to 
manufacturer brand
Perception that 
packaging  of Own 
Brand 2 is similar-
dissimilar to 
manufacturer brand
Perception that Own 
Brand 1 is made by 
same company as 
manufacturer brand
Perception that Own 
Brand 2 is made by 
same company as 
manufacturer brand
9. Butter
Overall (n=99) 4.7475 2.8300 3.9600 2.8788
Users (n=72) 4.5556 2.9167 4.0139 3.0278
Non-users (n=26) 5.2692 2.5926 3.8148 2.3846
10. Ibuprofen
Overall (n=79) 3.7500 1.9875 3.6707 3.0886
Users (n=66) 3.7463 1.8806 3.7015 3.0000
Non-users (n=13) 3.7692 2.5385 3.7692 3.5385
11. Skin care
Overall (n=105) 5.0381 2.0000 3.7778 2.9720
Users (n=42) 5.1905 2.0227 2.8409 3.06818
Non-users (n=62) 4.9355 1.9841 3.0323 3.30159
12. Shaving gel
Overall (n=69) 3.4783 2.0429 3.0857 2.6377
Users (n=28) 3.6786 2.0690 3.2069 2.9286
Non-users (n=41) 3.3415 2.0244 3.0000 2.4390
Note: the number of users and non users of each product are not always equivalent to the 
overall n due to missing data.
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Appendix F: Consumer 
Survey – Data from nationally 
representative survey
[See Chapter 7]
Proportion of respondents reporting different frequencies of having purchased a 
lookalike product accidentally/mistakenly
Country
Frequency of accidental/mistaken purchase of a lookalike product
Yes, frequently Yes, a few times Yes, once or twice No, never
UK (n=938) 2.2% 18.0% 37.0% 42.8%
USA (n=480) 10.8% 16.7% 33.1% 39.4%
Germany (n=426) 3.3% 18.3% 28.4% 50.0%
Proportion of respondents reporting extent of advantage and of disadvantage from 
having purchased a lookalike product accidentally/mistakenly
Country Effect
Accidental/mistaken purchase: extent of perceived advantage/
disadvantage 
Very much Somewhat Very little Not at all
UK (n=531)
Disadvantage 6.4% 37.7% 43.3% 12.6%
Advantage 3.8% 34.2% 45.9% 16.1%
USA (n=289)
Disadvantage 18.3% 31.8% 39.4% 10.4%
Advantage 15.5% 35.7% 35.3% 13.4%
Germany (n=208)
Disadvantage 5.8% 33.2% 36.1% 25.0%
Advantage 5.9% 35.1% 40.5% 18.5%
Proportion of respondents reporting different frequencies of having purchased a 
lookalike product deliberately
Country
Frequency of deliberate purchase of a lookalike product
Yes, frequently Yes, a few times Yes, once or twice No, never
UK (n=959) 8.4% 23.8% 27.1% 40.7%
USA (n=480) 17.5% 28.5% 25.6% 28.3%
Germany (n=468) 20.5% 37.0% 19.0% 23.5%
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Proportion of respondents reporting extent of advantage and of disadvantage from 
having purchased a lookalike product deliberately
Country Effect
Deliberate purchase: extent of perceived advantage/disadvantage 
Very much Somewhat Very little Not at all
UK (n=559)
Disadvantage 3.9% 17.2% 43.8% 35.1%
Advantage 11.3% 53.1% 29.8% 5.7%
USA (n=336)
Disadvantage 10.4% 17.6% 39.3% 32.7%
Advantage 22.8% 49.7% 23.4% 4.1%
Germany (n=353)
Disadvantage 2.0% 13.6% 37.4% 47.0%
Advantage 16.3% 56.6% 19.4% 7.7%
Proportion of respondents reporting to the following statement “across all products 
you buy, which of the following statements best describes your typical behaviour”
UK  
(n=995)
USA 
(n=491)
Germany 
(n=489)
... I tend to buy a specific brand/own-brand, but sometimes experiment with 
a different one
50.3% 53.0% 63.2%
... I tend to buy brands/ own-brands, and often switch brands 35.1% 28.1% 23.3%
... I tend to stick to a specific brand/own-brand, and never change 11.6% 14.9% 7.4%
... I tend not to buy brands/ own-brands 3.1% 4.1% 6.1%
Proportion of brands who mainly buy brand products or own-brand products
Brands Own brands Half and half
UK (n=956) 33.2% 14.6% 52.2%
USA (465) 42.2% 8.4% 49.5%
Germany (455) 23.3% 23.7% 53.0%
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The respondents responses to the ranking as to factors affecting the likelihood of 
your purchasing.
UK(n=1000) first second third fourth fifth
Best value for money 36% 26% 20% 14% 4%
Highest quality 21% 24% 28% 19% 8%
Lowest price 18% 16% 18% 22% 26%
Preferred brand/own brand 16% 12% 13% 21% 39%
Best fitness for purpose 11% 22% 21% 23% 23%
USA(n=500) first second third fourth fifth
Best value for money 29% 28% 21% 19% 3%
Highest quality 26% 27% 25% 16% 6%
Lowest price 22% 21% 17% 20% 20%
Preferred brand/own brand 20% 15% 16% 22% 27%
Best fitness for purpose 4% 9% 20% 24% 43%
DE(n=500) first second third fourth fifth
Highest quality 32% 27% 24% 12% 4%
Best value for money 30% 34% 20% 14% 2%
Lowest price 18% 13% 21% 21% 28%
Preferred brand/own brand 12% 10% 15% 25% 38%
Best fitness for purpose 8% 16% 20% 28% 58%
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Proportion of respondents ranking (from 1 to 6) different elements influencing their 
purchasing decisions (UK, USA, DE samples)
UK(n=1000) first second third fourth fifth sixth
Previous positive experience with the 
product itself 66% 17% 6% 3% 2% 5%
Product (Brand/own-brand) name 19% 34% 28% 12% 3% 3%
Product descriptions on the packag-
ing 8% 33% 28% 16% 7% 8%
Product branding/iconography (other 
than text) 3% 8% 24% 43% 12% 11%
Packaging shape 3% 4% 8% 13% 35% 37%
Packaging colour 1% 4% 6% 12% 41% 36%
USA(n=500) first second third fourth fifth sixth
Previous positive experience with the 
product itself 58% 17% 8% 3% 4% 8%
Product (Brand/own-brand) name 19% 38% 22% 11% 4% 22%
Product descriptions on the 
packaging 10% 26% 29% 15% 10% 29%
Packaging shape 7% 5% 12% 16% 34% 12%
Packaging colour 3% 7% 7% 13% 32% 7%
Product branding/iconography (other 
than text) 3% 7% 23% 42% 16% 23%
DE(n=500) first second third fourth fifth sixth
Previous positive experience with the 
product itself 70% 18% 4% 3% 1% 4%
Product descriptions on the 
packaging 14% 40% 20% 8% 8% 9%
Product (Brand/own-brand) name 11% 24% 35% 17% 8% 5%
Packaging shape 2% 7% 13% 20% 31% 28%
Packaging colour 1% 4% 7% 15% 38% 35%
Product branding/iconography (other 
than text) 1% 8% 21% 37% 15% 18%
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Proportion of respondents rating own-brand or manufacturer brand products to be 
better at providing lower prices, value for money, best fit for purpose and higher 
quality.  
...lower prices...
UK 
(n=968)
USA 
(n=478)
Germany 
(n=485)
Retailers 69.5% 54.8% 82.5%
Brand owners 17.0% 28.5% 4.3%
Roughly the same 13.4% 16.7% 13.2%
...value for money...
UK 
(n=963)
USA 
(n=479)
Germany 
(n=485)
Retailers 49.5% 37.9% 57.2%
Brand owners 23.4% 33.6% 13.0%
Roughly the same 27.1% 28.5% 29.8%
...best fit for purpose...
UK 
(n=963)
USA 
(n=479)
Germany 
(n=485)
Retailers 14.8% 20.9% 20.4%
Brand owners 34.1% 29.9% 20.6%
Roughly the same 51.1% 49.2% 58.9%
...higher quality...
UK 
(n=963)
USA 
(n=479)
Germany 
(n=485)
Retailers 13.3% 19.6% 4.3%
Brand owners 50.2% 43.6% 39.8%
Roughly the same 36.6% 36.7% 55.9%
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Appendix G: Sales data – 
Brand definition
[See Chapter 8]
Product Position
Kantar – Full Product Description
Kantar 
Code Bar Code
Bodyspray Brand Leader Charlie Pink Body Spray, Aerosol Can , 50ml 774625 5051389019140
Charlie Body Spray, For Women, Pink, Aero, 75ml 597482 5000386292872
Charlie Female Body Spray Aerosol Can Pink 150ml 743204 5051389009394
Lookalike Tesco Bodyspray Sweet 75ml For Women Aero 732406 5051790585166
Control Tesco  BodysprayFor Women  Pink 75ml 628124 5051008720747
Bodywash Brand Leader Original Source Lime Shower Gel  250ml 284563 5000101844997
Original Source Shower Gel Lime Pouch 500ml 343859 5000101028182
Lookalike Tesco Wake Up! Lime ShwrCreme 250ml 783588 5052003014558
Control Sainsburys Lime Body Wash Pl Btl 250ml 827465 01772449
Cheese Brand Leader Laughing Cow Cheese Spread 8 Triangle 140g 542502 3073780774130
Laughing Cow Processed Cheese Spread,16 Portion, 
280g,Chilled,France,Big Value Pack 346665 3073780574242
The Laughing Cow 24 Portion Processed Cheese 
Spread. Chilled. C/Board Box. 400g. France. Pm 1.99. 346666 3073780574310
Lookalike Milbona.Cheese Spread Portions 24 Triangles,Chilled,-
Box, 400g France 469760 20024949
Control Tesco 8 Cheese Triangles 140g 541437 5051140070304
Razors Brand Leader Gillette Mach3 Triple Blade Shaving System-1razor With 
Triple Action Blade. 293238 3014260251147
Gillette Mach 3 W/Rzr , 2 Pk 269324 3014260239626
Lookalike Boots Swivel Triple Bladed Razor With 2 Cartridges For 
Men 565384 5045095902261
Control Mrsn Triple Blasde Razor 1 + 2 Cart Aloe Vera &Botanical 
Oils Pivot Head 3 Blade Suit Sens Skin Pl Pck Female 834216 5010251380795
Washing Up 
Liquid
Brand Leader Fairy, Washing Up Liquid, “New”, Lemon, 1lt 362176 5413149051027
Fairy Washing Up Liquid Lemon 1 Ltr £1.56 362176 5413149008236
Fairy, Washing Up Liquid, Lemon, 433ml, Concentrated 807800 5413149980594
Fairy Liquid Cnc Lemon 500ml 362174 5413149836051
Fairy Liquid, Concentrated, Lemon, 900ml 824160 5410076213917
Lookalike Magnum (Aldi) Active Concentrated Washing Up Liquid 
Lemon Scented 1ltr PlstcBtl 444205
Control Tesco,Premium  Washing Up Liquid, Citrus, PltBtl, 500ml. 382902 5000436371854
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Product Position
Kantar – Full Product Description
Kantar 
Code Bar Code
Shampoos Brand Leader Head & Shoulders*New Look Bt-Classic Clean-For Nor-
mal Hair,For Frequent Use-Plastic Bt-200ml-Flip Top Lid 354704 5000174989694
Head And Shoulders Classic Clean Normal Hair Twin 
Pack~Shampoo 200ml PlstcBttl~Conditioner 200ml Plst-
cBttl___(Confirmed)
354704 5011008071478
Head & Shoulders Classic Clean   Shampoo 250ml 573134 5000174989922
Head & Shoulders Classic Clean Anti Dandruff Shampoo 
Normal Hair Frequent Use[Plbtl Flip Lid 250ml 573134 5410076229994
Head & Shoulders Classic Clean Shampoo, 400ml 391211 5000174990164
Head & Shoulder Classic Clean Conditioner 400ml 391211 5410076229406
Head And Shoulders Classic Clean, Medicated - Normal/
Greasy 500ml 420183 5000174206005
Head & Shoulders, Classic Clean, Shampoo, Normal To 
Greasy Hair, PltBtl, 500ml 420183 5000174990393
Head And Shoulder Classic Clean Shampoo Normal/
Greasy 500ml ** See Notes** 420183 5013965601057
Head And Shoulders Classic Clean Shampoo 500ml 420183 5410076230068
Head& Shoulders Anti Dandruff Shamp Classic Clean 
Nor HrFrq Use Plbt 750ml 376085 5000174990621
Lookalike Boots Anti Dandruff Shampoo For Normal Hair, Plastic 
Bottle,400 Ml 616444 5045093546047
Boots Anti- Dandruff Shampoo For Frequent Use Classic 
Care 400ml Pl Bttl 616444 5045095798949
Control Js Anti-Dandruff Shampoo For Normal Hair, 300ml 812355 01732528
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Product Position
Kantar – Full Product Description
Kantar 
Code Bar Code
Drinks Brand Leader Red Bull Stimulation Drink Carb With Flavourings Can 
Ring Pull 250mls Ambient 129865 90162602
Red Bull, Original Flavour, Can, 250ml 129865 90162909
Red Bull CrbndrnkFlvrscnt Can 250 ML 129865 9002490200077
X Red  Bull Energy Drink  Carbonated Can  250ml 129865 4030915000075
Red Bull Red Bull Can Value Not Available  00250 Ml 129865 9016260200006
Red Bull Fizzy Energy Drnk Can,250ml 129865 9002490100070
Red Bull, Energy Drink, Taurine, Can, 250ml 129865 9002490100094
Red Bull, Energy Drink, Can, 250ml 129865 90162541
Red Bull 250ml Can 129865 00674300
Red Bull Energy Drink W Caffeine &Taurine Carbonated 
Can 250ml Amb 129865 90376368
Red Bull Energy Drnk With Taurine 250ml Can 129865 90376337
Red Bull Enenry Drink Carbonated WthTaurine Can 
250ml UkAmb Pm 109 129865 90162497
Red Bull Energy Drink With Taurine Carbonated Can  
355ml 674584 9002490206000
Red Bull Energy Can 355ML 674584 9002490206741
Red Bull, Can, 355ml 674584 9002490206239
Red Bull Energy Drink Carbonated With Taurine Can 
473ml 751797
9002490210991
Lookalike Asda Blue Charge, High Impact Energy Drink, Fruit Fla-
vour, Can, 250ml, Carbonated, £0.67p 341668 21165689
Asda Blue Charge High Impact Stimulation Drink Carbon-
ated 440ml Can Amb Flashed 2 For £1__[ Fruit Flav Soft 
Drink ] 743861 5051413404591
Control Mixxed Up (Lidl) Stimulation Drink Carbonated  Drink Wth 
Blackcurrant Flvr Can 250ml Amb Single 731489
Mixxed Up Stimulation Drink Blackcurrant 250ml Car-
bonated Stimulation Drink Wth B/Currant FlvrWth Added 
Vitamins &Taurine Can Ambient 731489 20082819
Vinegar Brand 
Leader
Sarsons Brown Malt Vinegar Glass Bottle 250ml UK 90594 50222155
Sarsons Natural Spray Brown Malt Vinegar Spray 250ml 
Gls Btl Ambient Pump Dispenser 90594 5000354903045
Sarsons Malt Vinegar Brown Gl Bt Amb 250ml 90594 5000354900716
Sarsons Malt Vinegar 284ml 90595 5000354900617
Sarsons Brown Malt Vinegar 300ml 90596 50354283
Sarsons Brown Malt Vinegar,Pl Bt 300 Ml 90596 50222049
Sarsons Brown Malt  Glass Bottle 400ml 24228 5000354900723
Sarsons Brown Malt Vinegar,Glass Bottle 568ml 90597 5000354900631
Sarsons Malt Brown Vinegar  Glass Bottle 1.14lt 90598 5000354900662
Lookalike Samson (Lidl) Malt Vinegar Gls Btl 568ml 129831 20018078
Control Asda Malt Vinegar        10 OZ 90654 21004261
Asda Malt Vinegar, Glass Bottle,568ml.             90655 21004278`
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Kantar – Full Product Description
Kantar 
Code Bar Code
Butter Brand Leader Lurpak Danish  Butter Slightly Salted Chilled Foil Wrap 
250g Denmark 64828 5740900050303
Lurpak Butter Slightly Salted Danish Wrppd 500g 64830 5740900050402
Lurpak Danish Slightly Salted Butter,125gm,Pack 70313 5740900050204
Lookalike Norpek (Aldi) Spreadable Blend Butter And Veg Oil 
Slightly Salted Danish Style Pl Tub Chilled 500g 592048 25189353
Nrpak Spreadable(Aldi) (500g Tub Blend Of Butter & 
Vegetable Oil Slightly Salted Danish Style Spreadable 
Butter Frsh) 592048 25075465
Control Tesco Spreadable (Continental Style Butter Blended With 
Veg Oil)Salted Tub,500g,Chilled, 628778 5050179077025
Ibuprofen Brand Leader Nurofen Caplets, Easy To Swallow, 1/2 To Be Taken 
Every 4-6 Hours, 16s Box 311985 5000167056488
Lookalike Boots Ibuprofen Caplets, 16pk 313875 5045095384234
Control Sainsbury Ibuprofen 200mg Capsules Effective Pain 
Relieve 16 Capsules Bx Not Liquid Adults &Chuld Over 
12 Yrs No Approval Rqd 724837 770-01542431
Skin Care Brand Leader Clearasil Ultra Medicated Facial Scrub 125ml 684153 5000158100640
Lookalike Boots Facial Cleanser Scrub Plastic Tube All Skin Types 
150 Ml 200550 5045095798628
Control Tesco Clear Skin   Deep Cleansing  Wash, 150ml 127232 5000358227444
Shaving Gel Brand Leader Gillette Fusion Proglide Cooling Shave Gel 200ml Aero 822013 7702018073245
Gillette Fusion Proglide Hydrating Shave Gel 200ml Aero 
Can 821993 7702018073221
Lookalike Boots Blade 5 Sensitive Shave Foam Aerosol Can 250ml 852139 5045095793555
Control Morrisons Sensitive Shaving Gel 200ml Aerosol Can 326155 5010251251170
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Appendix H: Sales Data - Line 
Graphs
[Chapter 8]
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Chart H.1 Comparison of Sales Charlie Pink and Tesco Pink
Tesco Pink Charlie Pink (S) Charlie Pink (W)
Figure H.1 Comparison of Sales Charlie Pink and Tesco Pink
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Chart H.2 Comparison of Sales Charlie Pink and Tesco Sweet
Tesco Sweet Charlie Pink (S) Charlie Pink (W)
Figure H.2 Comparison of Sales Charlie Pink and Tesco Sweet
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Chart H.3 Comparison of Sales Original Source and Tesco's Wake Up
Tesco’s Wake Up Original Source Lime (S) Original Source Lime (W)
Figure H.3 Comparison of Sales Original Source and Tesco’s Wake Up
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Chart H.4 Comparison of Sales Original Source and Sainsbury's Body 
Wash
Sainsbury’s Lime Body Wash Original Source Lime (W) Original Source Lime (S)
Figure H.4 Comparison of Sales Original Source and Sainsbury’s Body Wash
282
Impact of Lookalikes
Cheese
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
Sa
le
s 
in
 W
ho
le
 M
ar
ke
t
Sa
le
s 
in
 S
up
er
m
ar
ke
t
Chart H.6 Comparison of Sales Laughing Cow and  Lidl's Tenery 
Cheese
Tenery Cheese (Lidl) The Laughing Cow (W)
Figure H.5 Comparison of Sales Laughing Cow and Lidl’s Tenery Cheese
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Chart H.7 Comparison of Sales Laughing Cow and  Tesco's Cheese 
Triangles
Tesco’s Cheese Triangles The Laughing Cow (W) The Laughing Cow (S)
Figure H.6 Comparison of Sales Laughing Cow and Tesco’s Cheese Triangles
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Chart H.8 Comparison of Sales Gillette Mach 3 and Boots Blade 3
Boots Blade 3 Gillette Mach 3 (W) Gillette Mach 3 (S)
Figure H.7 Comparison of Sales Gillette Mach 3 and Boots Blade 3
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Chart H.9 Comparison of Sales Gillette Mach 3 and Morrison's Triple 
Blade
Morrison’s Triple Blade Gillette Mach 3 (W) Gillette Mach 3 (S)
Figure H.8 Comparison of Sales Gillette Mach 3 and Morrison’s Triple Blade
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Washing Up Liquid
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Chart H.10 Comparison of Sales Fairy iquid an  Aldi Washing Up 
Liquid
Aldi Lemon Washing Up Liquid Fairy Lemon Washing Up Liquid (W)
Figure H.9 Comparison of Sales Fairy Liquid and Aldi Washing Up Liquid
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Chart H.11 Comparison of Sales Fairy Liquid and Tesco Citrus Washing 
Up Liquid
Tesco Citrus Washing Up Liquid Fairy Lemon Washing Up Liquid (W)
Fairy Lemon Washing Up Liquid (S)
Figure H.10 Comparison of Sales Fairy Liquid and Tesco Citrus Washing Up Liquid
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Shampoo
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Chart H.12 Comparison of Head & Shoulders and Boots Anti - Dandruff
Boots Anti-Dandruff Head & Shoulders (W) Head & Shoulders (W)
Figure H.11 Comparison of Head & Shoulders and Boots Anti-Dandruff
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Chart H.13 Comparison of Head & Shoulders and Sainsbury's Anti -
Dandruff
Sainsbury’s Anti-Dandruff Head & Shoulders (W) Head & Shoulders (S)
Figure H.12 Comparison of Head & Shoulders and Sainsbury’s Anti-Dandruff
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Drinks
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Chart H.12 Comparison of Red Bull and Asda Blue Charge
Asda Blue Charge Red Bull (W) Red Bull (S)
Figure H.13 Comparison of Red Bull and Asda Blue Charge
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Chart H.13 Comparison of Red Bull and Mixxed Up (Lidl)
Mixxed Up (Lidl) Red Bull (W) Red Bull (S)
Figure H.14 Comparison of Red Bull and Mixxed Up (Lidl)
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Vinegar
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Chart H.14 Comparison of Sarson's Brown Malt Vinegar and Samson's 
Malt Vinegar (Lidl)
Samson‘s Malt Vinegar(Lidl) Sarson‘s Brown Malt Vinegar (W)
Figure H.15 Comparison of Sarson’s Brown Malt Vinegar and Samson’s Malt Vinegar 
(Lidl)
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Chart H.15 Comparison of Sarson's Brown Malt Vinegar and Asda Malt 
Vinegar
Asda Malt Vinegar Sarson‘s Brown Malt Vinegar (W)
Sarson‘s Brown Malt Vinegar (S)
Figure H.16 Comparison of Sarson’s Brown Malt Vinegar and Asda Malt Vinegar
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Chart H.16 Comparison of Lurpak and Norpak Spreadable
Norpak Spreadable (Aldi) Lurpak (W) Lurpak (S)
Figure H.17 Comparison of Lurpak and Norpak Spreadable
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Chart H.17 Comparison of Lurpak and Butterpak Spreadable
Butterpak Spreadable (Tesco) Lurpak (W) Lurpak (S)
Figure H.18 Comparison of Lurpak and Butterpak Spreadable
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Ibuprofen
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Chart H.18 Comparison of Nurofen and Boots Ibuprofen
Boots Ibuprofen Caplets Nurofen Caplets (W) Nurofen Caplets (S)
Figure H.19 Comparison of Nurofen and Boots Ibuprofen
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Chart H.19 Comparison of Nurofen and Sainsbuty's Ibuprofen
Sainsbury’s Ibuprofen Caplets Nurofen Caplets (W) Nurofen Caplets (S)
Figure H.20 Comparison of Nurofen and Sainsbuty’s Ibuprofen
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Skin care
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Chart H.20 Comparison Clearasil Ultra and Boots Skin Clear
Boots Skin Clear Clearasil Ultra (W) Clearasil Ultra (S)
Figure H.21 Comparison Clearasil Ultra and Boots Skin Clear
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Chart H.21 Comparison Clearasil Ultra and Tesco Clear Skin
Tesco Clear Skin Clearasil Ultra (W) Clearasil Ultra (S)
Figure H.22 Comparison Clearasil Ultra and Tesco Clear Skin
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Shaving gel
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Chart H.22 Comparison Gillette Fusion Gel and Boots Blade 3
Boots Blade 3 Shaving Gel Gillette Fusion Shaving Gel (W)
Gillette Fusion Shaving Gel (S)
Figure H.23 Comparison Gillette Fusion Gel and Boots Blade 3
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Chart H.23 Comparison Gill;ette Fusion Gel and Morrison's Shaving Gel
Morrison’s Shaving Gel Gillette Fusion Shaving Gel (W)
Gillette Fusion Shaving Gel (S)
Figure H.24 Comparison Gillette Fusion Gel and Morrison’s Shaving Gel
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Appendix I: Sales Data - 
Scatter Charts
[Chapter 8]
Bodyspray
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Chart I.1.1: Charlie Pink and Tesco Sweet 24wks Whole Market
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Chart I.1.2: Charlie Pink and Tesco Pink 24 wks - Whole Market
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Chart I.1.3: Charlie Pink and Tesco Sweet 24wks - Supermarket
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Chart I.1.4: Charlie Pink and Tesco Pink 24wks - Supermarket
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Chart I.1.5: Charlie Pink and Tesco Sweet 12m - Whole market
0
5
10
15
20
25
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
Sa
le
s 
of
 T
es
co
 P
in
k
Sales of Charlie Pink
Chart I.1.6: Charlie Pink and Tesco Pink 12m - Whole Market
294
Impact of Lookalikes
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
Sa
le
s 
of
 T
es
co
 S
w
ee
t
Sales of Charlie Pink
Chart I.1.7: Charlie Pink and Tesco Sweet 12m - Supermarket
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Chart I.1.8: Charlie Pink and Tesco Pink 12m - Supermarket
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Chart I.1.9: Charlie Pink and Tesco Sweet All data - Whole Market
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Chart I.1.10: Charlie Pink and Tesco Pink All data - Whole market
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Chart I.1.11: Charlie Pink and Tesco Sweet All data - SuperMarket
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Chart I.1.12: Charlie Pink and Tesco Pink All data - Supermarket
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Bodywash
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Chart I.2.1: Original Source and Tesco Wake Up 24wks - Whole 
Market
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Chart I.2.2: Original Source and Sainsbury's Bodywash 24wks -
Whole Market
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Chart I.2.3: Original Source and Tesco Wake Up 24wks -
Supermarket
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Chart I.2.4: Original Source and Sainsbury's Bodywash 24wks -
SuperMarket
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Chart I.2.6: Original Source and Sainsbury's Bodywash 12m - Whole 
market
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350
Sa
le
s 
of
 T
es
co
's
 W
ak
e 
U
p
Sales of Original Source
Chart I.2.5: Original Source and Tesco Wake Up 12m - Whole 
market
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Chart I.2.7: Original Source and Tesco Wake Up 12m - Supermarket
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Chart I.2.8: Original Source and Sainsbury's Bodywash 12m -
Supermarket
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Chart I.2.9: Original Source and Tesco Wake Up All Data - Whole 
market
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Chart I.2.10: Original Source and Tesco Wake Up All Data -
Supermarket
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Cheese
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Chart I.3.1: the Laughing Cow and Tenery Cheese (Lidl) 24wks -
Whole Market 
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Chart I.3.2: the Laughing Cow and Tenery Cheese (Lidl) 12m - Whole 
Market 
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Chart I.3.3: the Laughing Cow and Tenery Cheese (Lidl) All data -
Whole Market 
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Chart I.3.4: the Laughing Cow and Tenery Cheese (Lidl) All data -
Whole Market 
0
10
20
30
40
50
0 10 20 30 40 50 60S
al
es
 o
f T
es
co
's
 C
he
es
e 
Tr
ia
ng
le
s
Sales of the Laughing Cow
Chart I.3.5: the Laughing Cow and Tenery Cheese (Lidl) All data -
Supermarket 
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Chart I.4.1: Gillette Mach 3 and Boots Blade 3 24wks - Whole 
Market 
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Chart I.4.2: Gillette Mach 3 and Morrison's Triple Blade 24wks -
Whole Market 
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Chart I.4.3: Gillette Mach 3 and Boots Blade 3 24wks - Supermarket 
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Chart I.4.4: Gillette Mach 3 and Morrison's Triple Blade 24wks -
Supermarket 
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Chart I.4.5: Gillette Mach 3 and Boots Blade 3 12m - Whole Market 
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Chart I.4.6: Gillette Mach 3 and Morrison's Triple Blade 12m -
Whole market 
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Chart I.4.7: Gillette Mach 3 and Boots Blade 3 12m - Supermarket
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Chart I.4.8: Gillette Mach 3 and Morrison's Triple Blade 12m -
Supermarket 
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Chart I.4.10: Gillette Mach 3 and Boots Blade 3 All Data -
Supermarket 
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Chart I.4.9: Gillette Mach 3 and Boots Blade 3 All Data - Whole 
market 
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Washing Up Liquid
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Chart I.5.1: Fairy Lemon Washing Up Liquid and Aldi Lemon 
Washing Up Liquid 24 wks - Whole Market 
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Chart I.5.2: Fairy Lemon Washing Up Liquid and Tesco Citrus 
Washing Up Liquid  24 wks - Whole Market 
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Chart I.5.3: Fairy Lemon Washing Up Liquid and Tesco Citrus 
Washing Up Liquid  24 wks - Supermarket 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
0 50 100 150 200 250 300
Sa
le
s 
of
 A
ld
i  
W
as
hi
ng
 U
p 
Sales of Fairy Lemon Washing Up Liquid
Chart I.5.4: Fairy Lemon Washing Up Liquid and Aldi Lemon 
Washing Up Liquid 12m - Whole Market 
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Chart I.5.5: Fairy Lemon Washing Up Liquid and Tesco Citrus 
Washing Up Liquid  12m - Whole Market 
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Chart I.5.6: Fairy Lemon Washing Up Liquid and Tesco Citrus 
Washing Up Liquid  12m - Supermarket 
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Chart I.5.7: Fairy Lemon Washing Up Liquid and Aldi Lemon 
Washing Up Liquid All data - Whole Market 
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Chart I.5.8: Fairy Lemon Washing Up Liquid and Tesco Citrus 
Washing Up Liquid  All data - Whole Market 
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350S
al
es
 o
f T
es
co
 C
itr
us
 W
as
hi
ng
 U
p 
Sales of Fairy Lemon Washing Up Liquid
Chart I.5.9: Fairy Lemon Washing Up Liquid and Tesco Citrus 
Washing Up Liquid  All data - Supermarket 
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Shampoo
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Chart I.6.1: Head & Shoulders and Sainsbury's Anti - Dandruff 24 wks 
- Whole Market 
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Chart I.6.2: Head & Shoulders and Sainsbury's Anti - Dandruff 24 wks 
- Supermarket 
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Chart I.6.3: Head & Shoulders and Sainsbury's Anti- Dandruff 12m -
Whole Market 
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Chart I.6.4: Head & Shoulders and Sainsbury's Anti - Dandruff 12m -
Supermarket 
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Chart I.6.7: Head & Shoulders and Boots Anti- Dandruff All Data -
Supermarket 
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Chart I.6.8: Head & Shoulders and Sainsbury's Anti-Dandruff All 
Data - Supermarket 
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Chart I.6.5: Head & Shoulders and Boots Anti - Dandruff All Data -
Whole Market 
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Chart I.6.6: Head & Shoulders and Sainsbury's Anti- Dandruff All 
Data - Whole Market 
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Chart I.7.1: Red Bull and Asda Blue Charge 24 wks - Whole Market 
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Chart I.7.2: Red Bull and Mixxed Up (Lidl) 24 wks - Whole Market 
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Chart I.7.3: Red Bull and Asda Blue Charge 24 wks - Supermarket 
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Chart I.7.4: Red Bull and Mixxed Up (Lidl) 24 wks - Supermarket 
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400 1600
Sa
le
s 
of
 A
sd
a 
B
lu
e 
C
ha
rg
e
Sales of Red Bull
Chart I.7.5: Red Bull and Asda Blue Charge 12m - Whole Market 
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Chart I.7.6: Red Bull and Mixxed Up (Lidl) 12m - Whole Market 
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Chart I.7.7: Red Bull and Asda Blue Charge 12m - Supermarket
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Chart I.7.8: Red Bull and Mixxed Up (Lidl) 12m - Supermarket 
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Chart I.7.9: Red Bull and Asda Blue Charge All data - Whole Market 
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Chart I.7.10: Red Bull and Mixxed Up (Lidl) All data - Whole Market 
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
0 50 100 150 200 250
Sa
le
s 
of
 A
sd
a 
B
lu
e 
C
ha
rg
e
Sales of Red Bull
Chart I.7.11: Red Bull and Asda Blue Charge All data - Supermarket 
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Chart I.7.12: Red Bull and Mixxed Up (Lidl) All data - Supermarket 
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Chart I.8.1: Sarson's Malt  Vinegar and Samson's Malt Vinegar 24 
wks - Whole Market 
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Chart I.8.2: Sarson's Malt  Vinegar and Samson's Malt Vinegar 12m -
Whole Market 
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Chart I.8.3: Sarson's Malt  Vinegar and Samson's Malt Vinegar All 
data - Whole Market 
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Chart I.8.4: Sarson's Malt  Vinegar and Asda Malt Vinegar All data -
Whole Market 
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Chart I.8.4: Sarson's Malt  Vinegar and Asda Malt Vinegar All data -
Supermarket 
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Chart I.9.1: Lurpak and Norpak  24 wks - Whole Market 
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Chart I.9.2: Lurpak and Butterpak 24 wks - Whole Market 
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Chart I.9.3 Lurpak and Butterpak 24 wks - Supermarket 
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Chart I.9.4: Lurpak and Norpak  12m - Whole Market 
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Chart I.9.5 Lurpak and Butterpak 12m - Whole Market 
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Chart I.9.6 Lurpak and Butterpak 12m - Supermarket 
308
Impact of Lookalikes
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
0 500 1000 1500 2000
Sa
le
s 
of
 N
or
pa
k
Sales of Lurpak
Chart I.9.7: Lurpak and Norpak  All Data - Whole Market 
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Chart I.9.8 Lurpak and Butterpak All Data - Whole Market 
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Chart I.9.9 Lurpak and Butterpak All Data - Supermarket
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Ibuprofen
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Chart I.10.1: Nurofen and Boots Ibuprofen  24 wks - Whole Market 
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Chart I.10.2: Nurofen and Sainsbury's Ibuprofen  24 wks - Whole 
Market 
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Chart I.10.3: Nurofen and Boots Ibuprofen  24 wks - Supermarket 
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Chart I.10.4: Nurofen and Sainsbury's Ibuprofen  24 wks -
Supermarket 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
0 50 100 150 200 250 300
Sa
le
s 
of
 S
ai
ns
bu
ry
's
 I
bu
pr
of
en
Sales of Nurofen
Chart I.10.5: Nurofen and Sainsbury's Ibuprofen  12m - Whole 
Market 
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Chart I.10.6: Nurofen and Sainsbury's Ibuprofen  12m -
Supermarket 
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Chart I.10.7: Nurofen and Sainsbury's Ibuprofen  All data - Whole 
Market 
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Chart I.10.8: Nurofen and Sainsbury's Ibuprofen  All data -
Supermarket 
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Skin Care
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Chart I.11.1: Clearasil and Boots Skin Clear All Data - Whole Market 
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Chart I.11.2: Clearasil and Tesco Skin Clear All Data - Whole Market 
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Chart I.11.3: Clearasil and Boots Skin Clear All Data - Supermarket 
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Chart I.11.4: Clearasil and Tesco Skin Clear All Data - Supermarket 
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Shaving Gel
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Chart I.12.1: Gillette Fusion and Boots Blade3 Gel 24 Wks - Whole 
Market 
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Chart I.12.2: Gillette Fusion and Morrison's Shaving Gel  24 wks -
Whole Market 
-2
0
2
4
6
8
0 5 10 15 20 25S
al
es
 o
f B
oo
ts
 B
la
de
 3
 G
el
Sales of Gillette Fusison Shaving Gel
Chart I.12.3: Gillette Fusion and Boots Blade3 Gel 24 Wks -
Supermarket 
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Chart I.12.4: Gillette Fusion and Morrison's Shaving Gel  24 wks -
Supermarket 
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Chart I.12.5: Gillette Fusion and Morrison's Shaving Gel  12m -
Whole Market 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
Sa
le
s 
of
 M
or
ris
on
's
 S
ha
vi
ng
 G
el
Sales of Gillette Fusison Shaving Gel
Chart I.12.6: Gillette Fusion and Morrison's Shaving Gel  12m -
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Chart I.12.8: Gillette Fusion and Morrison's Shaving Gel  All Data  -
Supermarket 
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Chart I.12.7: Gillette Fusion and Morrison's Shaving Gel  All Data  -
Whole Market 
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Appendix J: Sales Data - Raw 
data
[Chapter 8]
Bodyspray
(Charlie Pink/Tesco Sweet/Tesco Pink)
 Volume (‘000)
 
Lookalike Control
Whole market Supermarket only Whole market
Supermarket 
only
4 week 
period 
ending BP LP BP LP
4 week 
period 
ending BP CP BP LP
4 Nov 07 87 0 17 0 24 Apr 05 0 0 0 0
2 Dec 07 202 0 26 0 22 May 05 0 0 0 0
30 Dec 07 64 0 23 0 19 Jun 05 2 0 0 0
27 Jan 08 50 0 12 0 17 Jul 05 6 0 4 0
24 Feb 08 149 0 41 0 14 Aug 05 57 0 20 0
23 Mar 08 158 0 50 0 11 Sep 05 41 0 30 0
20 Apr 08 116 0 6 0 9 Oct 05 22 0 14 0
18 May 08 39 0 10 0 6 Nov 05 63 0 12 0
15 Jun 08 74 0 8 0 4 Dec 05 208 0 14 0
13 Jul 08 120 0 7 0 1 Jan 06 129 0 46 0
10 Aug 08 106 0 78 0 29 Jan 06 63 0 36 0
07 Sep 08 62(24) 2(28) 35(4) 2(28) 26 Feb 06 100 0 15 0
05 Oct 08 157(4) 13(17) 30(7) 13(17) 26 Mar 06 61(23) 20(24) 19(18) 20(24)
02 Nov 08 122(11) 13(17) 27(11) 13(17) 23 Apr 06 209(3) 34(9) 134(1) 34(9)
30 Nov 08 112(15) 23(13) 23(13) 23(13) 21 May 06 219(2) 27(19) 26(14) 27(19)
28 Dec 08 42(28) 10(21) 12(21) 10(21) 18 Jun 06 157(9) 22(22) 34(10) 22(22)
25 Jan 09 97(19) 10(21) 13(20) 10(21) 16 Jul 06 233(1) 39(6) 77(2) 39(6)
22 Feb 09 62(24) 10(21) 24(12) 10(21) 13 Aug 06 150(10) 34(9) 42(8) 34(9)
22 Mar 09 102(18) 10(21) 62(1) 10(21) 10 Sep 06 80(19) 30(17) 19(18) 30(17)
19 Apr 09 119(12) 32(7) 15(19) 32(7) 8 Oct 06 114(17) 25(20) 30(12) 25(20)
17 May 09 110(16) 109(1) 17(18) 109(1) 5 Nov 06 46(25) 66(1) 20(16) 66(1)
14 Jun 09 128(9) 88(3) 29(9) 88(3) 3 Dec 06 158(8) 34(9) 17(21) 34(9)
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Lookalike Control
Whole market Supermarket only Whole market
Supermarket 
only
4 week 
period 
ending BP LP BP LP
4 week 
period 
ending BP CP BP LP
6 Sep 09 114(14) 15(16) 21(15) 15(16) 25 Feb 07 120(16) 32(13) 24(15) 32(13)
4 Oct 09 129(8) 25(11) 34(5) 25(11) 25 Mar 07 126(13) 43(4) 50(5) 43(4)
1 Nov 09 289(2) 28(9) 28(10) 28(9) 22 Apr 07 58(24) 59(2) 17(21) 59(2)
29 Nov 09 312(1) 45(4) 1(25) 45(4) 20 May 07 100(18) 49(3) 12(26) 49(3)
27 Dec 09 50(26) 13(17) 0(27) 13(17) 17 Jun 07 160(7) 35(7) 67(4) 35(7)
24 Jan 10 93(20) 9(26) 0(27) 9(26) 15 Jul 07 132(11) 35(7) 73(3) 35(7)
21 Feb 10 45(27) 7(27) 2(24) 7(27) 12 Aug 07 194(4) 42(5) 14(25) 42(5)
21 Mar 10 103(17) 27(10) 3(22) 27(10) 9 Sep 07 40(27) 19(26) 18(20) 19(26)
18 Apr 10 85(21) 24(12) 3(22) 24(12) 7 Oct 07 122(15) 31(14) 49(6) 31(14)
16 May 10 81(22) 10(21) 23(13) 10(21) 4 Nov 07 126(13) 31(14) 17(21) 31(14)
13 Jun 10 116(13) 19(14) 20(16) 19(14) 2 Dec 07 79(20) 21(23) 15(24) 21(23)
11 Jul 10 143(7) 18(15) 45(2) 18(15) 30 Dec 07 178(6) 18(27) 32(11) 18(27)
8 Aug 10 126(10) 11(20) 42(3) 11(20) 27 Jan 08 63(22) 20(24) 20(16) 20(24)
5 Sep 10 69(23) 29(8) 1(25) 29(8) 24 Feb 08 43(26) 25(20) 12(26) 25(20)
3 Oct 10 152(5) 36(6) 30(7) 36(6) 23 Mar 08 127(12) 34(9) 41(9) 34(9)
Charlie Pink (BP), Tesco Sweet (LP), Tesco Pink (CP)
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Bodyspray (Charlie Pink/Tesco Sweet/Tesco Pink)
Volume (‘000) – Mean and Standard Deviation
Lookalike (4 w/e) Control (4 w/e)
Period 1 04 Nov 07 – 10 Aug 08 24 Apr 05 – 26 Feb 06
Period 2 07 Sep 08 – 09 Aug 09 26 Mar 06 – 25 Feb 07
Period 3 06 Sep 09 – 08 Aug 10 25 Mar 07 – 24 Feb 08
 Whole Market
 Lookalike Control
 Charlie Pink Tesco Sweet Charlie Pink Tesco Pink
 X SD x SD X SD x SD
Period 1 105.9091 49.83865 0 0 57.58333 62.89018 0 0
Period 2 112.5385 43.08444 35.38462 37.29732 138.8462 62.17696 32.61538 11.32503
Period 3 129.6923 81.23565 21.23077 11.53367 109.3077 50.56083 32.92308 12.6719
 Supermarket
 Lookalike Control
 Charlie Pink Tesco Sweet Charlie Pink Tesco Pink
 X SD x SD X SD x SD
Period 1 25.27273 22.64107 0 0 15.91667 14.92075 0 0
Period 2 25.92308 13.17486 35.38462 37.29732 39.76923 32.6143 32.61538 11.32503
Period 3 17.07692 16.66064 19.30769 10.49908 30.46154 21.77772 32.92308 12.6719
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Bodyspray (Charlie Pink/Tesco Sweet/Tesco Pink)
Volume (‘000) – Correlations
Correlations Pearson’s r
R  Lookalike Control
df Whole S/Market Whole S/Market
24wks 4 0.502671 -0.21177 0.7067 0.658262
12m 11 0.399379 -0.12543 -0.18566 0.053436
All 26 0.308888 -0.00128 -0.03861 0.048676
Correlations Spearman’s rank 
Lookalike Control
n Whole S/Market n Whole S/Market
28 0.63472 -0.01745 27 0.21491 0.15352
Kendall’s tau b
Lookalike Control
n Whole S/Market n Whole S/Market
28 0.44554 -0.01357 27 0.18898 0.13471
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Bodyspray (Charlie Pink/Tesco Sweet/Tesco Pink)
Value (‘000)
Lookalike Control
Whole market Supermarket only Whole market
Supermarket 
only
4 week 
period 
ending BP LP BP LP
4 week 
period 
ending BP CP BP CP
04 Nov 07   101 0 28 0 24 Apr 05 0 0 0 0
02 Dec 07 346 0 32 0 22 May 05 0 0 0 0
30 Dec 07 73 0 24 0 19 Jun 05 2 0 0 0
27 Jan 08 84 0 19 0 17 Jul 05 7 0 4 0
24 Feb 08 176 0 44 0 14 Aug 05 74 0 27 0
23 Mar 08 188 0 58 0 11 Sep 05 41 0 31 0
20 Apr 08 128 0 10 0 09 Oct 05 29 0 19 0
18 May 08 49 0 16 0 06 Nov 05 94 0 21 0
15 Jun 08 104 0 13 0 04 Dec 05 274 0 18 0
13 Jul 08 166 0 11 0 01 Jan 06 161 0 61 0
10 Aug 08 122 0 84 0 29 Jan 06 69 0 36 0
07 Sep 08 86 2 45 2 26 Feb 06 109 0 18 0
05 Oct 08 161 9 30 9 26 Mar 06 89 10 30 10
02 Nov 08 133 10 37 10 23 Apr 06 244 17 137 17
30 Nov 08 117 16 22 16 21 May 06 236 14 30 14
28 Dec 08 46 5 12 5 18 Jun 06 168 11 34 11
25 Jan 09 120 7 20 7 16 Jul 06 243 19 77 19
22 Feb 09 76 7 30 7 13 Aug 06 160 17 42 17
22 Mar 09 112 7 70 7 10 Sep 06 110 15 27 15
19 Apr 09 126 19 22 19 08 Oct 06 151 12 44 12
17 May 09 127 59 27 59 05 Nov 06 63 33 30 33
14 Jun 09 141 47 29 47 03 Dec 06 174 17 26 17
12 Jul 09 213 27 18 27 31 Dec 06 236 19 50 19
09 Aug 09 156 50 43 50 28 Jan 07 90 15 30 15
06 Sep 09 119 10 26 10 25 Feb 07 160 16 33 16
04 Oct 09 153 18 39 18 25 Mar 07 158 21 54 21
01 Nov 09 329 20 44 20 22 Apr 07 75 32 25 32
29 Nov 09 328 32 2 32 20 May 07 136 24 20 24
27 Dec 09 55 9 0 9 17 Jun 07 171 21 70 21
24 Jan 10 106 6 0 6 15 Jul 07 151 24 73 24
21 Feb 10 47 5 2 5 12 Aug 07 228 27 17 27
21 Mar 10 107 21 4 21 09 Sep 07 64 12 30 12
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Lookalike Control
Whole market Supermarket only Whole market
Supermarket 
only
4 week 
period 
ending BP LP BP LP
4 week 
period 
ending BP CP BP CP
13 Jun 10 117 15 20 15 02 Dec 07 91 13 24 13
11 Jul 10 140 13 45 13 30 Dec 07 284 12 38 12
08 Aug 10 122 8 42 8 27 Jan 08 71 14 22 14
05 Sep 10 75 21 1 21 24 Feb 08 73 17 19 17
03 Oct 10 176 26 47 26 23 Mar 08 147 23 45 23
Charlie Pink (BP), Tesco Sweet (LP), Tesco Pink (CP)
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Bodyspray (Charlie Pink/Tesco Sweet/Tesco Pink)
Value (‘000) – Mean, Standard Deviation and Pearson’s Coefficient
Lookalike (4 w/e) Control (4 w/e)
Period 1 04 Nov 07 – 10 Aug 08 24 Apr 05 – 26 Feb 06
Period 2 07 Sep 08 – 09 Aug 09 26 Mar 06 – 25 Feb 07
Period 3 06 Sep 09 – 08 Aug 10 25 Mar 07 – 24 Feb 08
 Whole Market
 Lookalike Control
 Charlie Pink Tesco Sweet Charlie Pink Tesco Pink
 X SD x SD x SD x SD
Period 1 139.7273 81.18016 0 0 71.66667 81.40397 0 0
Period 2 124.1538 41.57092 20.38462 19.34571 163.3846 62.94116 16.53846 5.695252
Period 3 139.3846 88.97709 15.46154 8.402533 138.2308 65.82192 19.76923 6.112199
 Whole Market
 Lookalike Control
 Charlie Pink Tesco Sweet Charlie Pink Tesco Pink
 X SD x SD x SD x SD
Period 1 30.81818 23.02094 0 0 19.58333 18.01746 0 0
Period 2 31.15385 15.08778 20.38462 19.34571 45.38462 30.78295 16.53846 5.695252
Period 3 19.23077 18.43074 14 7.713624 35.76923 20.44568 19.76923 6.112199
Correlations (r)
R  Lookalike Control
 df Whole S/Market Whole S/Market
24wks 4 0.500816 -0.25455 0.716332 0.608536
12m 11 0.453155 -0.07531 -0.16452 0.064316
All 26 0.391631 0.038352 -0.09503 0.018963
Notes
Charlie Pink was launched on a short time before Tesco Pink and so the brand leader was 
only gaining market share at the time the control was launched. Otherwise, this data presents 
the best example as the lookalike and the control were both sold by the same retailer and 
were at some point on sale at the same time. It also has the full range of data sought.
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Bodywash
(Original Source Lime/Tesco’s Wake Up Lime Body Wash/Sainsbury’s 
Lime Body Wash)
Volume (‘000)
 
Lookalike Control
Whole market Supermarket only Whole market
Supermarket 
only
4 week 
period 
ending BP LP BP LP
4 week 
period 
ending BP CP BP CP
25 Jan 09 185 0 153 0 18 Apr 10 23 0 4 0
22 Feb 09 111 0 37 0 16 May 10 94 0 5 0
22 Mar 09 166 0 32 0 13 Jun 10 76 0 5 0
19 Apr 09 69 0 8 0 11 Jul 10 77 0 12 0
17 May 09 134 0 98 0 08 Aug 10 180 0 9 0
14 Jun 09 126 0 81 0 05 Sep 10 183 0 123 0
12 Jul 09 306 0 263 0 03 Oct 10 231 0 6 0
09 Aug 09 277 0 28 0 31 Oct 10 290 0 74 0
06 Sep 09 206 0 78 0 28 Nov 10 68 0 13 0
04 Oct 09 90 0 39 0 26 Dec 10 72 0 6 0
01 Nov 09 233 0 161 0 23 Jan 11 349 0 44 0
29 Nov 09 224 0 30 0 20 Feb 11 275 0 115 0
27 Dec 09 127(16) 3(26) 33(14) 3(26) 20 Mar 11 243 0 63 0
24 Jan 10 73(23) 7(23) 8(25) 7(23) 17 Apr 11 137(8) 3(12) 53(4) 3(12)
21 Feb 10 117(17) 11(21) 38(11) 11(21) 15 May 11 342(3) 4(11) 92(1) 4(11)
21 Mar 10 87(21) 16(16) 36(12) 16(16) 12 Jun 11 120(10) 11(6) 10(11) 11(6)
18 Apr 10 26(27) 33(4) 10(23) 33(4) 10 Jul 11 348(2) 7(7) 86(3) 7(7)
16 May 10 98(19) 18(13) 66(6) 18(13) 07 Aug 11 165(7) 5(10) 50(5) 5(10)
13 Jun 10 88(20) 26(7) 25(18) 26(7) 04 Sep 11 357(1) 7(7) 30(7) 7(7)
11 Jul 10 85(22) 38(2) 32(15) 38(2) 02 Oct 11 260(5) 18(3) 88(2) 18(3)
08 Aug 10 187(10) 25(8) 53(8) 25(8) 30 Oct 11 55(13) 27(1) 7(12) 27(1)
05 Sep 10 181(11) 16(16) 4(27) 16(16) 27 Nov 11 100(11) 14(4) 6(13) 14(4)
03 Oct 10 227(9) 17(15) 29(17) 17(15) 25 Dec 11 136(9) 13(5) 12(10) 13(5)
31 Oct 10 308(5) 8(22) 146(3) 8(22) 22 Jan 12 266(4) 6(9) 27(8) 6(9)
28 Nov 10 64(25) 27(5) 22(19) 27(5) 19 Feb 12 76(12) 1(13) 15(9) 1(13)
26 Dec 10 70(24) 14(18) 34(13) 14(18) 18 Mar 12 177(6) 13(2) 32(6) 13(2)
23 Jan 11 320(4) 6(25) 20(21) 6(25)
20 Feb 11 252(7) 20(11) 86(5) 20(11)
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Lookalike Control
Whole market Supermarket only Whole market
Supermarket 
only
4 week 
period 
ending BP LP BP LP
4 week 
period 
ending BP CP BP CP
15 May 11 337(3) 6(25) 158(1) 6(25)
12 Jun 11 128(15) 13(20) 21(20) 13(20)
10 Jul 11 347(2) 51(1) 64(7) 51(1)
07 Aug 11 162(12) 35(3) 15(22) 35(3)
04 Sep 11 359(1) 24(9) 151(2) 24(9)
02 Oct 11 257(6) 7(23) 9(24) 7(23)
30 Oct 11 51(26) 18(13) 6(26) 18(13)
27 Nov 11 110(18) 27(5) 31(16) 27(5)
25 Dec 11 147(13) 19(12) 40(10) 19(12)
Original Source Lime (BP), Tesco’s Wake Up Lime Body Wash (LP), Sainsbury’s Lime Body 
Wash (CP)
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Impact of Lookalikes
Bodywash (Original Source Lime/Tesco’s Wake Up Lime Body Wash/
Sainsbury’s Lime Body Wash)
Volume (‘000) – Mean and Standard Deviation
Lookalike (4 w/e) Control (4 w/e)
Period 1 25 Jan 09 – 29 Nov 09 18 Apr 10 – 20 Feb 11
Period 2 27 Dec 09 – 28 Nov 10 20 Mar 11 – 19 Feb 12
Period 3 26 Dec 10 – 27 Nov 11 18 Mar 12
 Whole Market
 Lookalike Control
 Original Source Tesco Original Source Sainsbury’s 
 X SD x SD X SD x SD
Period 1 177.25 74.49847 0 0 166.2308 104.6734 0 0
Period 2 128.3077 77.54932 18.84615 10.463 195.3077 106.8514 9.923077 7.146812
Period 3 214 108.8033 19.84615 12.73346 - - - -
 Supermarket
 Lookalike Control
 Original Source Tesco Original Source Sainsbury’s
 X SD x SD x SD x SD
Period 1 84 74.91692 0 0 36.84615 43.41437 0 0
Period 2 38.61538 36.60496 18.84615 10.463 39.07692 31.97515 9.923077 7.146812
Period 3 59.15385 53.84986 19.84615 12.73346 - - - -
Impact of Lookalikes 
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Bodywash (Original Source Lime/Tesco’s Wake Up Lime Body Wash/
Sainsbury’s Lime Body Wash)
Volume (‘000) – Correlations
Pearson’s Correlation (r)
R  Lookalike Control
 df Whole S/Market Whole S/Market
24wks 4 -0.81289 -0.11946 -0.1215 -0.62106
12m 11 -0.42133 -0.27932 -0.33062 -0.26837
All 25 -0.09198 -0.1175 - -
Correlations Spearman’s rank
Lookalike Control
n Whole S/Market n Whole S/Market
26 -0.15329 0.10505 13 -0.18982 -0.36314
Kendall’s tau b
Lookalike Control
n Whole S/Market N Whole S/Market
26 -0.12404 0.06822 13 -0.11613 -0.27097
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Impact of Lookalikes
Bodywash (Original Source Lime/Tesco’s Wake Up Lime Body Wash/
Sainsbury’s Lime Body Wash) –
Value (‘000)
 
Lookalike Control
Whole market Supermarket only Whole market
Supermarket 
only
4 week 
period 
ending BP LP BP LP
4 week 
period 
ending BP CP BP CP
25 Jan 09 212 0 158 0 18 Apr 10 39 0 6 0
22 Feb 09 153 0 49 0 16 May 10 163 0 11 0
22 Mar 09 199 0 55 0 13 Jun 10 113 0 12 0
19 Apr 09 80 0 13 0 11 Jul 10 122 0 29 0
17 May 09 164 0 112 0 08 Aug 10 248 0 21 0
14 Jun 09 154 0 91 0 05 Sep 10 223 0 129 0
12 Jul 09 265 0 202 0 03 Oct 10 256 0 10 0
09 Aug 09 315 0 51 0 31 Oct 10 294 0 61 0
06 Sep 09 224 0 82 0 28 Nov 10 113 0 16 0
04 Oct 09 115 0 43 0 26 Dec 10 127 0 11 0
01 Nov 09 257 0 163 0 23 Jan 11 403 0 66 0
29 Nov 09 280 0 47 0 20 Feb 11 295 0 108 0
27 Dec 09 168 3 50 3 20 Mar 11 246 0 59 0
24 Jan 10 119 7 18 7 17 Apr 11 162 2 66 2
21 Feb 10 205 11 68 11 15 May 11 384 4 98 4
21 Mar 10 135 16 58 16 12 Jun 11 149 11 19 11
18 Apr 10 45 33 17 33 10 Jul 11 383 7 81 7
16 May 10 167 18 104 18 07 Aug 11 192 5 51 5
13 Jun 10 130 26 37 26 04 Sep 11 391 8 34 8
11 Jul 10 137 38 48 38 02 Oct 11 269 15 93 15
08 Aug 10 258 25 82 25 30 Oct 11 111 20 13 20
05 Sep 10 201 16 7 16 27 Nov 11 173 10 12 10
03 Oct 10 252 17 37 17 25 Dec 11 192 10 24 10
31 Oct 10 305 8 140 8 22 Jan 12 351 5 49 5
28 Nov 10 107 27 40 27 19 Feb 12 119 1 23 1
26 Dec 10 123 14 58 14 18 Mar 12 232 10 51 10
23 Jan 11 366 6 38 6
20 Feb 11 269 20 111 20
20 Mar 11 252 14 122 14
17 Apr 11 174 23 57 23
15 May 11 370 6 161 6
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Lookalike Control
Whole market Supermarket only Whole market
Supermarket 
only
4 week 
period 
ending BP LP BP LP
4 week 
period 
ending BP CP BP CP
07 Aug 11 186 35 29 35
04 Sep 11 386 24 157 24
02 Oct 11 265 7 11 7
30 Oct 11 101 18 12 18
27 Nov 11 187 25 57 25
25 Dec 11 209 17 59 17
Original Source Lime (BP), Tesco’s Wake Up Lime Body Wash (LP), Sainsbury’s Lime Body 
Wash (CP)
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Impact of Lookalikes
Bodywash (Original Source Lime/Tesco’s Wake Up Lime Body Wash/
Sainsbury’s Lime Body Wash)
Value (‘000) – Mean, Standard Deviation and Pearson’s Coefficient
Lookalike (4 w/e) Control (4 w/e)
Period 1 25 Jan 09 – 29 Nov 09 18 Apr 10 – 20 Feb 11
Period 2 27 Dec 09 – 28 Nov 10 20 Mar 11 – 19 Feb 12
Period 3 26 Dec 10 – 27 Nov 11 18 Mar 12
 Whole Market
 Lookalike Control
 Original Source Tesco Original Source Sainsbury’s
 X SD x SD x SD x SD
Period 1 201.5 70.73574 0 0 203.2308 100.3578 0 0
Period 2 171.4615 71.28185 18.84615 10.463 239.0769 104.8590 8.307692 5.266001
Period 3 248.5385 103.5854 19.69231 12.65164 - - - -
 Supermarket
 Lookalike Control
 Original Source Tesco Original Source Sainsbury’s 
 X SD x SD x SD x SD
Period 1 88.83333 58.34355 0 0 41.46154 40.38897 0 0
Period 2 54.30769 37.18285 18.84615 10.463 47.23077 29.87238 8.307692 5.266001
Period 3 73.07692 51.74692 19.69231 12.65164 - - - -
Pearson’s Correlations (r)
R  Lookalike Control
 df Whole S/Market Whole S/Market
24wks 4 -0.70789 -0.13572 0.013108 -0.69238
12m 11 -0.43577 -0.24491 -0.2193 -0.25477
All 25 -0.06407 -0.03191 - -
Notes
The Sainsbury’s Lime body wash’s launch event was in April 2011 and so it was not possible 
to get data for the full 24 months after launch.
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Cheese
(The Laughing Cow/Tenery Cheese (Lidl)/Tesco’s Cheese Triangles)
Volume (‘000)
 
Lookalike Control
Whole market Supermarket only Whole market
Supermarket 
only
4 week 
period 
ending BP LP BP LP
4 week 
period 
ending BP CP BP CP
03 Mar 02 133 0 0 0 27 Apr 03 109(8) 13(27) 40(10) 13(27)
31 Mar 02 104 0 0 0 25 May 03 98(15) 21(7) 26(34) 21(7)
28 Apr 02 103 0 0 0 22 Jun 03 127(3) 15(19) 33(23) 15(19)
26 May 02 118 0 0 0 20 Jul 03 98(15) 14(24) 31(29) 14(24)
23 Jun 02 103 0 0 0 17 Aug 03 116(4) 18(12) 46(4) 18(12)
21 Jul 02 101 0 0 0 14 Sep 03 135(1) 15(19) 40(10) 15(19)
18 Aug 02 115 0 0 0 12 Oct 03 111(7) 12(29) 32(25) 12(29)
15 Sep 02 95 0 0 0 09 Nov 03 133(2) 15(19) 45(5) 15(19)
13 Oct 02 84 0 0 0 07 Dec 03 102(12) 17(16) 34(20) 17(16)
10 Nov 02 115 0 0 0 04 Jan 04 115(11) 25(4) 50(1) 25(4)
08 Dec 02 109 0 0 0 01 Feb 04 102(9) 14(24) 44(7) 14(24)
05 Jan 03 70 0 0 0 29 Feb 04 104(11) 17(16) 37(13) 17(16)
02 Feb 03 103 0 0 0 28 Mar 04 106(9) 14(24) 32(25) 14(24)
02 Mar 03 106 0 0 0 25 Apr 04 115(5) 19(10) 28(31) 19(10)
30 Mar 03 115 0 0 0 23 May 04 91(18) 18(12) 35(16) 18(12)
27 Apr 03 107(7) 36(22) 0(2) 36(22) 20 Jun 04 76(28) 18(12) 25(26) 18(12)
25 May 03 96(13) 59(9) 0(2) 59(9) 18 Jul 04 96(17) 13(27) 50(1) 13(27)
22 Jun 03 120(2) 35(23) 0(2) 35(23) 15 Aug 04 106(10) 17(16) 38(12) 17(16)
20 Jul 03 92(16) 53(13) 0(2) 53(13) 12 Sep 04 86(21) 21(7) 34(20) 21(7)
17 Aug 03 117(3) 37(21) 0(2) 37(21) 10 Oct 04 82(23) 18(12) 34(20) 18(12)
14 Sep 03 112(5) 39(19) 0(2) 39(19) 07 Nov 04 73(31) 21(7) 36(15) 21(7)
12 Oct 03 95(14) 42(17) 0(2) 42(17) 05 Dec 04 81(24) 15(19) 37(13) 15(19)
09 Nov 03 121(1) 39(19) 0(2) 39(19) 02 Jan 05 66(35) 15(19) 35(16) 15(19)
07 Dec 03 100(12) 41(18) 1(1) 41(18) 30 Jan 05 79(26) 23(6) 32(25) 23(6)
04 Jan 04 104(9) 50(14) 0(2) 50(14) 27 Feb 05 99(14) 44(1) 48(3) 44(1)
01 Feb 04 103(11) 50(14) 0(2) 50(14) 27 Mar 05 84(22) 24(5) 45(5) 24(5)
29 Feb 04 104(9) 55(11) 0(2) 55(11) 24 Apr 05 89(20) 19(10) 30(30) 19(10)
28 Mar 04 111(6) 58(10) 0(2) 58(10) 22 May 05 75(29) 26(3) 33(23) 26(3)
25 Apr 04 113(4) 81(3) 0(2) 81(3) 19 Jun 05 81(24) 30(2) 44(7) 30(2)
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Lookalike Control
Whole market Supermarket only Whole market
Supermarket 
only
4 week 
period 
ending BP LP BP LP
4 week 
period 
ending BP CP BP CP
18 Jul 04 94(15) 86(1) 0(2) 86(1) 11 Sep 05 91(18) 4(38) 43(9) 4(38)
15 Aug 04 106(8) 69(6) 0(2) 69(6) 09 Oct 05 73(31) 6(32) 32(25) 6(32)
12 Sep 04 91(17) 60(8) 0(2) 60(8) 06 Nov 05 79(26) 6(32) 35(16) 6(32)
10 Oct 04 87(18) 72(5) 0(2) 72(5) 04 Dec 05 74(30) 6(32) 35(16) 6(32)
07 Nov 04 74(20) 75(4) 0(2) 75(4) 01 Jan 06 63(38) 6(32) 28(31) 6(32)
05 Dec 04 73(21) 49(16) 0(2) 49(16) 29 Jan 06 65(37) 12(29) 23(37) 12(29)
02 Jan 05 64(22) 55(11) 0(2) 55(11) 26 Feb 06 66(36) 4(38) 20(38) 4(38)
26 Mar 06 53(39) 6(32) 17(39) 6(32)
The Laughing Cow (BP), Tenery Cheese (Lidl) (LP), Tesco’s Cheese Triangles (CP)
Impact of Lookalikes 
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Cheese (The Laughing Cow/Tenery Cheese (Lidl)/Tesco’s Cheese 
Triangles)
Volume (‘000) – Mean and Standard Deviation
Lookalike (4 w/e) Control (4 w/e)
Period 1 03 Mar 02 – 30 Mar 03 27 Apr 03 – 28 Mar 04
Period 2 27 Apr 03 – 28 Mar 04 25 Apr 04 – 27 Mar 05
Period 3 25 Apr 04 – 02 Jan 05 24 Apr 05 – 26 Mar 06
 Whole Market
 Lookalike Control
 Laughing cow Lidl Laughing cow Tesco 
 X SD X SD x SD X SD
Period 1 104.2143 15.08019 0 0 112 12.6557 16.15385 3.555422
Period 2 106.6154 9.682789 45.69231 8.731023 87.23077 13.77893 20.46154 7.752584
Period 3 91.8 14.79339 69.8 12.37201 72.84615 10.55814 10.61538 8.742029
 Supermarket
 Lookalike Control
 Laughing cow Lidl Laughing cow Tesco 
 X SD x SD x SD x SD
Period 1 0 0 0 0 37.69231 7.110844 16.15385 3.555422
Period 2 0.076923 0.27735 45.69231 8.731023 36.69231 7.250111 20.46154 7.752584
Period 3 0 0 69.8 12.37201 30.23077 8.032785 10.61538 8.742029
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Impact of Lookalikes
Cheese (The Laughing Cow/Tenery Cheese (Lidl)/Tesco’s Cheese 
Triangles)
Volume (‘000) – Correlations
Volume (‘000) Correlations (r)
R  Lookalike Control
 Df Whole S/Market Whole S/Market
24wks 4 0.356187 - - -
12m 11 0.076355 -0.16148 - -
All 21 -0.31393 -0.20775 - -
36m 37 - - 0.27009 0.449926
Correlations Spearman’s rank
Lookalike Control
n Whole S/Market n Whole S/Market
23 -0.50458 - 39 0.27429 0.33735
Correlations Kendall’s tau b
Lookalike Control
n Whole S/Market n Whole S/Market
23 -0.36727 - 39 0.15046 0.23100
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Cheese (The Laughing Cow/Tenery Cheese (Lidl)/Tesco’s Cheese 
Triangles)
Value (‘000)
 
Lookalike Control
Whole market Supermarket only Whole market
Supermarket 
only
4 week 
period 
ending BP LP BP LP
4 week 
period 
ending BP CP BP CP
03 Mar 02 396 0 0 0 27 Apr 03 321 30 110 30
31 Mar 02 299 0 0 0 25 May 03 271 49 74 49
28 Apr 02 304 0 0 0 22 Jun 03 376 35 92 35
26 May 02 347 0 0 0 20 Jul 03 279 34 86 34
23 Jun 02 304 0 0 0 17 Aug 03 332 42 130 42
21 Jul 02 300 0 0 0 14 Sep 03 365 35 114 35
18 Aug 02 348 0 0 0 12 Oct 03 303 30 91 30
15 Sep 02 283 0 0 0 09 Nov 03 371 34 128 34
13 Oct 02 246 0 0 0 07 Dec 03 286 40 93 40
10 Nov 02 339 0 0 0 04 Jan 04 334 59 141 59
08 Dec 02 319 0 0 0 01 Feb 04 297 34 123 34
05 Jan 03 208 0 0 0 29 Feb 04 291 40 105 40
02 Feb 03 304 0 0 0 28 Mar 04 305 33 90 33
02 Mar 03 315 0 0 0 25 Apr 04 322 46 79 46
30 Mar 03 334 0 0 0 23 May 04 254 44 97 44
27 Apr 03 314 51 0 51 20 Jun 04 222 43 70 43
25 May 03 266 83 0 83 18 Jul 04 258 30 126 30
22 Jun 03 352 50 0 50 15 Aug 04 261 40 105 40
20 Jul 03 264 76 0 76 12 Sep 04 227 50 85 50
17 Aug 03 333 52 0 52 10 Oct 04 209 44 85 44
14 Sep 03 306 54 0 54 07 Nov 04 189 52 90 52
12 Oct 03 271 59 0 59 05 Dec 04 213 36 91 36
09 Nov 03 346 54 0 54 02 Jan 05 171 36 88 36
07 Dec 03 281 58 3 58 30 Jan 05 207 40 79 40
04 Jan 04 301 70 0 70 27 Feb 05 256 76 120 76
01 Feb 04 301 70 0 70 27 Mar 05 217 40 111 40
29 Feb 04 289 77 0 77 24 Apr 05 233 33 74 33
28 Mar 04 318 82 0 82 22 May 05 198 45 82 45
25 Apr 04 316 112 0 112 19 Jun 05 210 52 110 52
23 May 04 260 90 0 90 17 Jul 05 169 13 68 13
20 Jun 04 219 113 0 113 14 Aug 05 184 9 64 9
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Lookalike Control
Whole market Supermarket only Whole market
Supermarket 
only
4 week 
period 
ending BP LP BP LP
4 week 
period 
ending BP CP BP CP
18 Jul 04 252 115 0 115 11 Sep 05 231 7 107 7
15 Aug 04 260 93 0 93 09 Oct 05 191 10 80 10
12 Sep 04 242 80 0 80 06 Nov 05 205 10 87 10
10 Oct 04 224 96 0 96 04 Dec 05 188 10 87 10
07 Nov 04 192 102 0 102 01 Jan 06 165 11 69 11
05 Dec 04 193 65 0 65 29 Jan 06 170 21 58 21
02 Jan 05 167 74 0 74 26 Feb 06 170 7 50 7
26 Mar 06 143 10 44 10
The Laughing Cow (BP), Tenery Cheese (Lidl) (LP), Tesco’s Cheese Triangles (CP)
Impact of Lookalikes 
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Cheese (The Laughing Cow/Tenery Cheese (Lidl)/Tesco’s Cheese 
Triangles)
Value (‘000) – Mean, Standard Deviation and Pearson’s Coefficient
Lookalike (4 w/e) Control (4 w/e)
Period 1 03 Mar 02 – 30 Mar 03 27 Apr 03 – 28 Mar 04
Period 2 27 Apr 03 – 28 Mar 04 25 Apr 04 – 27 Mar 05
Period 3 25 Apr 04 – 02 Jan 05 24 Apr 05 – 26 Mar 06
 Whole Market
 Lookalike Control
 Laughing cow Lidl Laughing cow Tesco 
 X SD x SD x SD x SD
Period 1 309.7333 44.14985 0 0 317.7692 35.54376 38.07692 8.19005
Period 2 303.2308 29.02055 64.30769 12.37864 231.2308 38.84189 44.38462 11.1769
Period 3 232.5 43.0768 94 17.15291 189 26.33439 18.30769 15.19531
 Supermarket
 Lookalike Control
 Laughing cow Lidl Laughing cow Tesco 
 x SD x SD x SD x SD
Period 1 0 0 0 0 105.9231 20.25858 38.07692 8.19005
Period 2 0.230769 0.83205 64.30769 12.37864 94.30769 16.75005 44.38462 11.1769
Period 3 0 0 94 17.15291 75.38462 19.77177 18.30769 15.19531
Correlations (r)
r  Lookalike Control
 df Whole S/Market Whole S/Market
24wks 4 -0.90708 - - -
12m 11 -0.5718 -0.1531 - -
All 21 -0.47442 -0.20192 - -
36m 37 - - 0.406151 0.489317
Notes
Tesco’s Cheese Triangles, the control, was on sale when Kantar data on its barcode began 
and so the only comparison possible was to examine the effect of the control product on the 
brand leader during a 36 month of simultaneous sales. Furthermore, the brand leader was 
not on sale in the same supermarket as the lookalike and so this means there would be no 
side by side comparisons. 
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Impact of Lookalikes
Razor
(Gillette Mach 3/Boots Blade 3/Morrison’s Triple Blade)
Volume (‘000)
 
Lookalike Control
Whole market Supermarket only Whole market
Supermarket 
only
4 week 
period 
ending BP LP BP LP
4 week 
period 
ending BP CP BP CP
17 Aug 03 18 0 0 0 13 Jun 10 12 0 0 0
14 Sep 03 41 0 7 0 11 Jul 10 9 0 1 0
12 Oct 03 81 0 59 0 08 Aug 10 8 0 0 0
09 Nov 03 14 0 3 0 05 Sep 10 15 0 0 0
07 Dec 03 30 0 2 0 03 Oct 10 14 0 2 0
04 Jan 04 47 0 12 0 31 Oct 10 19 0 2 0
01 Feb 04 19 0 0 0 28 Nov 10 13 0 1 0
29 Feb 04 11 0 5 0 26 Dec 10 17 0 1 0
28 Mar 04 15 0 5 0 23 Jan 11 14 0 2 0
25 Apr 04 28 0 5 0 20 Feb 11 17 0 0 0
23 May 04 22 0 7 0 20 Mar 11 12 0 3 0
20 Jun 04 20 0 0 0 17 Apr 11 13 0 1 0
18 Jul 04 51 0 0 0 15 May 11 45 0 0 0
15 Aug 04 32(7) 25(1) 6(6) 25(1) 12 Jun 11 7(8) 1(3) 2(4) 1(3)
12 Sep 04 4(26) 3(2) 0(14) 3(2) 10 Jul 11 5(10) 1(3) 0(10) 1(3)
10 Oct 04 35(5) 0(14) 2(10) 0(14) 07 Aug 11 10(6) 0(7) 2(4) 0(7)
07 Nov 04 28(10) 0(14) 0(14) 0(14) 04 Sep 11 4(11) 2(1) 0(10) 2(1)
05 Dec 04 16(19) 3(7) 0(14) 3(7) 02 Oct 11 7(8) 1(3) 4(2) 1(3)
02 Jan 05 37(4) 0(14) 0(14) 0(14) 30 Oct 11 15(3) 0(7) 1(7) 0(7)
30 Jan 05 15(21) 12(2) 7(5) 12(2) 27 Nov 11 10(6) 0(7) 1(7) 0(7)
27 Feb 05 24(11) 0(14) 6(6) 0(14) 25 Dec 11 16(2) 0(7) 4(2) 0(7)
27 Mar 05 35(5) 6(4) 9(3) 6(4) 22 Jan 12 13(4) 2(1) 1(7) 2(1)
24 Apr 05 23(12) 0(14) 14(1) 0(14) 19 Feb 12 11(5) 0(7) 2(4) 0(7)
22 May 05 51(2) 4(5) 1(13) 4(5) 18 Mar 12 21(1) 1(3) 14(1) 1(3)
19 Jun 05 12(24) 3(7) 0(14) 3(7)
17 Jul 05 54(1) 0(14) 5(9) 0(14)
14 Aug 05 20(14) 4(5) 6(6) 4(5)
11 Sep 05 38(3) 3(7) 12(2) 3(7)
09 Oct 05 13(23) 0(14) 0(14) 0(14)
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Lookalike Control
Whole market Supermarket only Whole market
Supermarket 
only
4 week 
period 
ending BP LP BP LP
4 week 
period 
ending BP CP BP CP
01 Jan 06 21(13) 0(14) 0(14) 0(14)
29 Jan 06 12(24) 0(14) 0(14) 0(14)
26 Feb 06 19(16) 2(12) 0(14) 2(12)
26 Mar 06 20(14) 0(14) 0(14) 0(14)
23 Apr 06 17(18) 2(12) 8(4) 2(12)
21 May 06 14(22) 0(14) 0(14) 0(14)
18 Jun 06 32(7) 3(7) 2(10) 3(7)
16 Jul 06 19(16) 0(14) 2(10) 0(14)
Gillette Mach 3(BP), Boots Blade 3 (LP), Morrison’s Triple Blade (CP)
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Impact of Lookalikes
Razor (Gillette Mach 3/Boots Blade 3/Morrison’s Triple Blade)
Volume (‘000) – Mean, Standard Deviation and Pearson’s Coefficient
Lookalike (4 w/e) Control (4 w/e)
Period 1 17 Aug 03 – 18 Jul 04 13 Jun 10 – 15 May 11
Period 2 15 Aug 04 – 17 Jul 05 12 Jun 11 – 18 Mar 12
Period 3 14 Aug 05 – 16 Aug 06 -
 Whole Market
 Lookalike Control
 Gillette Boots  Gillette Morrison’s
 x SD x SD x SD x SD
Period 1 30.53846 19.83942 0 0 16 9.237604 0 0
Period 2 28.15385 14.67904 4.307692 7.110844 10.81818 5.134553 0.727273 0.786245
Period 3 21 8.041559 1.846154 2.853248 - - - -
 Supermarket
 Lookalike Control
 Gillette Boots  Gillette Morrison’s
 x SD x SD x SD x SD
Period 1 8.076923 15.71338 0 0 1 1 0 0
Period 2 3.846154 4.43182 4.307692 7.110844 2.818182 3.945077 0.727273 0.786245
Period 3 2.307692 3.902662 1.846154 2.853248 - - - -
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Razor (Gillette Mach 3/Boots Blade 3/Morrison’s Triple Blade)
Volume (‘000) – Correlations
Pearson’s Correlations (r)
r  Lookalike Control
 df Whole S/Market Whole S/Market
24wks 4 0.118424 0.913097 -0.86347 -0.26278
12m (11m) 11(9) -0.06915 0.202596 -0.31076 -0.01759
All 24 0.124174 0.22505 -0.31076 -0.01759
Correlations Spearman’s rank
Lookalike Control
n Whole S/Market n Whole S/Market
26 0.27515 0.26622 11 -0.39905 -0.26352
Correlations Kendall’s tau b
Lookalike Control
n Whole S/Market n Whole S/Market
26 0.00728 0.20877 11 -0.35653 -0.18930
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Impact of Lookalikes
Razor (Gillette Mach 3/Boots Blade 3/Morrison’s Triple Blade)
Value (‘000)
 
Lookalike Control
Whole market Supermarket only Whole market
Supermarket 
only
4 week 
period 
ending BP LP BP LP
4 week 
period 
ending BP CP BP CP
17 Aug 03 57 0 0 0 13 Jun 10 64 0 0 0
14 Sep 03 135 0 29 0 11 Jul 10 44 0 9 0
12 Oct 03 296 0 228 0 08 Aug 10 40 0 0 0
09 Nov 03 42 0 9 0 05 Sep 10 69 0 0 0
07 Dec 03 93 0 6 0 03 Oct 10 91 0 15 0
04 Jan 04 154 0 35 0 31 Oct 10 97 0 12 0
01 Feb 04 57 0 0 0 28 Nov 10 72 0 9 0
29 Feb 04 34 0 15 0 26 Dec 10 81 0 7 0
28 Mar 04 46 0 16 0 23 Jan 11 66 0 11 0
25 Apr 04 108 0 21 0 20 Feb 11 97 0 0 0
23 May 04 82 0 28 0 20 Mar 11 70 0 22 0
20 Jun 04 75 0 0 0 17 Apr 11 74 0 9 0
18 Jul 04 199 0 0 0 15 May 11 238 0 0 0
15 Aug 04 117 84 23 84 12 Jun 11 42 4 13 4
12 Sep 04 13 9 0 9 10 Jul 11 26 2 0 2
10 Oct 04 124 0 9 0 07 Aug 11 60 0 17 0
07 Nov 04 97 0 0 0 04 Sep 11 32 5 0 5
05 Dec 04 55 9 0 9 02 Oct 11 48 3 29 3
02 Jan 05 132 0 0 0 30 Oct 11 100 0 11 0
30 Jan 05 52 38 23 38 27 Nov 11 60 0 7 0
27 Feb 05 88 0 24 0 25 Dec 11 96 0 31 0
27 Mar 05 123 21 34 21 22 Jan 12 92 7 7 7
24 Apr 05 94 0 61 0 19 Feb 12 76 0 18 0
22 May 05 177 14 6 14 18 Mar 12 166 4 108 4
19 Jun 05 50 10 0 10
17 Jul 05 197 0 17 0
14 Aug 05 79 12 23 12
11 Sep 05 146 10 48 10
09 Oct 05 48 0 0 0
06 Nov 05 63 0 0 0
04 Dec 05 129 34 0 34
01 Jan 06 78 0 0 0
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Lookalike Control
Whole market Supermarket only Whole market
Supermarket 
only
4 week 
period 
ending BP LP BP LP
4 week 
period 
ending BP CP BP CP
29 Jan 06 44 0 0 0
26 Feb 06 73 8 0 8
21 May 06 62 0 0 0
18 Jun 06 140 10 8 10
16 Jul 06 84 0 9 0
Gillette Mach 3(BP), Boots Blade 3 (LP), Morrison’s Triple Blade (CP)
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Impact of Lookalikes
Razor (Gillette Mach 3/Boots Blade 3/Morrison’s Triple Blade)
Value (‘000) – Mean, Standard Deviation and Pearson’s Coefficient
Lookalike (4 w/e) Control (4 w/e)
Period 1 17 Aug 03 – 18 Jul 04 13 Jun 10 – 15 May 11
Period 2 15 Aug 04 – 17 Jul 05 12 Jun 11 – 18 Mar 12
Period 3 14 Aug 05 – 16 Aug 06 -
 Whole Market
 Lookalike Control
 Gillette Boots  Gillette Morrison’s
 x SD x SD x SD x SD
Period 1 106 74.88102 0 0 84.84615 49.18307 0 0
Period 2 101.4615 51.89351 14.23077 23.74571 72.54545 40.11076 2.272727 2.493628
Period 3 84.53846 33.20295 6.307692 9.621024 - - - -
 Supermarket
 Lookalike Control
 Gillette Boots  Gillette Morrison’s
 x SD x SD x SD x SD
Period 1 29.76923 60.79495 0 0 7.230769 6.989919 0 0
Period 2 15.15385 18.10086 14.23077 23.74571 21.90909 30.30991 2.272727 2.493628
Period 3 9.384615 15.78258 6.307692 9.621024 - - - -
Correlations (r)
r  Lookalike Control
 df Whole S/Market Whole S/Market
24wks 4 0.167743 0.894219 -0.70664 -0.21448
12m (11m) 11(9) -0.05365 0.155209 0.01836 0.095622
All 24 0.124935 0.186758 0.01836 0.095622
Notes
The number of units of razors sold was very small indeed both the lookalike and the control 
had periods were “no” sales were recorded. This may significantly distort any statistical 
analysis.
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Washing Up Liquid
(Fairy Lemon Washing Up Liquid/Aldi Lemon Washing Up Liquid/Tesco 
Citrus Washing Up Liquid)
Volume (‘000)
 
Lookalike Control
Whole market Supermarket only Whole market
Super-
market 
only
4 week 
period 
ending BP LP BP LP
4 week 
period 
ending BP CP BP CP
03 Feb 02 560 0 0 0 28 May 00 0 0 0 0
03 Mar 02 363 0 0 0 25 Jun00 0 0 0 0
31 Mar 02 133 0 0 0 23 Jul 00 0 0 0 0
28 Apr 02 145 0 0 0 20 Aug 00 0 0 0 0
26 May 02 104 0 0 0 17 Sep 00 0 0 0 0
23 Jun 02 152 0 0 0 15 Oct 00 0 0 0 0
21 Jul 02 213 0 0 0 12 Nov 00 56 0 10 0
18 Aug 02 220 0 0 0 10 Dec 00 277 0 83 0
15 Sep 02 153 0 0 0 07 Jan 01 567 0 66 0
13 Oct 02 138 0 0 0 04 Feb 01 184 0 74 0
10 Nov 02 86(27) 35(22) 0 35(22) 04 Mar 01 623 0 77 0
08 Dec 02 93(25) 48(16) 0 48(16) 01 Apr 01 187 0 113 0
05 Jan 03 195(3) 19(28) 0 19(28) 29 Apr 01 232 0 104 0
02 Feb 03 147(15) 17(29) 0 17(29) 27 May 01 240(9) 184(7) 101(8) 184(7)
02 Mar 03 280(1) 38(21) 0 38(21) 24 Jun 01 337(6) 146(10) 237(2) 146(10)
30 Mar 03 212(4) 30(27) 0 30(27) 22 Jul 01 400(2) 129(14) 308(1) 129(14)
27 Apr 03 240(2) 31(26) 0 31(26) 19 Aug 01 248(8) 398(1) 170(3) 398(1)
25 May 03 156(13) 35(23) 0 35(23) 16 Sep 01 193(12) 128(15) 93(10) 128(15)
22 Jun 03 162(11) 63(10) 0 63(10) 14 Oct 01 367(4) 124(17) 74(14) 124(17)
20 Jul 03 168(10) 33(25) 0 33(25) 11 Nov 01 160(13) 227(2) 59(16) 227(2)
17 Aug 03 108(23) 36(22) 0 36(22) 09 Dec 01 306(7) 217(3) 104(7) 217(3)
14 Sep 03 114(22) 43(19) 0 43(19) 06 Jan 02 377(3) 213(4) 154(4) 213(4)
12 Oct 03 197(5) 41(20) 0 41(20) 03 Feb 02 535(1) 134(13) 140(6) 134(13)
09 Nov 03 217(3) 84(4) 0 84(4) 03 Mar 02 363(5) 115(18) 144(5) 115(18)
07 Dec 03 173(9) 77(5) 0 77(5) 31 Mar 02 132(18) 102(19) 46(18) 102(19)
04 Jan 04 157(12) 61(11) 0 61(11) 28 Apr 02 141(16) 132(11) 58(17) 132(11)
01 Feb 04 81(28) 44(18) 0 44(18) 26 May 02 105(19) 211(5) 44(19) 211(5)
29 Feb 04 90(26) 47(17) 0 47(17) 23 Jun 02 150(13) 153(9) 77(13) 153(9)
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Lookalike Control
Whole market Supermarket only Whole market
Super-
market 
only
4 week 
period 
ending BP LP BP LP
4 week 
period 
ending BP CP BP CP
23 May 04 183(7) 95(3) 0 95(3) 15 Sep 02 155(14) 134(11) 95(9) 134(11)
20 Jun 04 134(18) 77(5) 0 77(5) 13 Oct 02 138(17) 126(16) 69(15) 126(16)
18 Jul 04 174(8) 56(14) 0 56(14) 10 Nov 02 84(20) 200(6) 30(20) 200(6)
15 Aug 04 148(14) 100(2) 0 100(2)
12 Sep 04 132(19) 76(7) 0 76(7)
10 Oct 04 116(21) 65(9) 0 65(9)
07 Nov 04 98(24) 66(8) 0 66(8)
05 Dec 04 136(17) 112(1) 0 112(1)
02 Jan 05 73(29) 60(12) 0 60(12)
Fairy Lemon Washing Up Liquid (BP),Aldi Lemon Washing Up Liquid (LP), Tesco Citrus Washing 
Up Liquid (CP)
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Washing Up Liquid (Fairy Lemon Washing Up Liquid/Aldi Lemon 
Washing Up Liquid/ Tesco Citrus Washing Up Liquid)
Volume (‘000) – Mean and Standard Deviation
Lookalike (4 w/e) Control (4 w/e)
Period 1 03 Feb 02 – 13 Oct 02 28 May 00 – 29 Apr 01
Period 2 10 Nov 02 – 12 Oct 03 27 May 01 – 28 Apr 02
Period 3 09 Nov 03 – 10 Oct 04 26 May 02 – 10 Nov 02
 Whole Market
 Lookalike Control
 Fairy Aldi Fairy Tesco
 x SD x SD x SD x SD
Period 1 218.1 140.8502 0 0 163.5385 216.8812 0 0
Period 2 166 58.21512 36.07692 11.80721 292.2308 119.4049 173 79.52777
Period 3 144.4615 37.46024 68.92308 17.54262 152.2857 50.84196 154.2857 40.98664
 Supermarket
 Lookalike Control
 Fairy Aldi Fairy Tesco 
 x SD x SD x SD x SD
Period 1 0 0 0 0 40.53846 45.61728 0 0
Period 2 0 0 36.07692 11.80721 129.8462 75.77802 173 79.52777
Period 3 0 0 68.92308 17.54262 68.28571 23.07751 154.2857 40.98664
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Washing Up Liquid (Fairy Lemon Washing Up Liquid/Aldi Lemon 
Washing Up Liquid/ Tesco Citrus Washing Up Liquid)
Volume (‘000) – Correlations
Pearson’s Correlations (r)
r  Lookalike Control
 Df Whole S/Market Whole S/Market
24wks 4 -0.20266 - -0.36689 -0.00067
12m 11 -0.20113 - -0.13001 0.083866
All 27( 18) -0.10386 - -0.07691 0.077762
Correlations Spearman’s rank
Lookalike Control
n Whole S/Market n Whole S/Market
29 -0.13173 - 20 -0.06020 0.06318
Kendall’s tau b 
Lookalike Control
n Whole S/Market n Whole S/Market
29 -0.05700 - 20 -0.01058 0.05805
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Washing Up Liquid (Fairy Lemon Washing Up Liquid/Aldi Lemon 
Washing Up Liquid/ Tesco Citrus Washing Up Liquid)
Value (‘000)
 
Lookalike Control
Whole market Supermarket only Whole market
Supermarket 
only
4 week 
period 
ending BP LP BP LP
4 week 
period 
ending BP CP BP CP
03 Feb 02 702 0 0 0 28 May 00 0 0 0 0
03 Mar 02 493 0 0 0 25 Jun 00 0 0 0 0
31 Mar 02 222 0 0 0 23 Jul 00 0 0 0 0
28 Apr 02 239 0 0 0 20 Aug 00 0 0 0 0
26 May 02 175 0 0 0 17 Sep 00 0 0 0 0
23 Jun 02 252 0 0 0 15 Oct 00 0 0 0 0
21 Jul 02 337 0 0 0 12 Nov 00 89 0 15 0
18 Aug 02 341 0 0 0 10 Dec 00 364 0 120 0
15 Sep 02 258 0 0 0 07 Jan 01 616 0 95 0
13 Oct 02 233 0 0 0 04 Feb 01 278 0 129 0
10 Nov 02 144 26 0 26 04 Mar 01 658 0 130 0
08 Dec 02 154 36 0 36 01 Apr 01 309 0 186 0
05 Jan 03 295 14 0 14 29 Apr 01 397 0 174 0
02 Feb 03 228 13 0 13 27 May 01 411 127 170 127
02 Mar 03 421 29 0 29 24 Jun 01 577 102 402 102
30 Mar 03 351 22 0 22 22 Jul 01 671 88 512 88
27 Apr 03 393 22 0 22 19 Aug 01 420 269 285 269
25 May 03 251 23 0 23 16 Sep 01 321 87 156 87
22 Jun 03 263 41 0 41 14 Oct 01 510 80 124 80
20 Jul 03 272 22 0 22 11 Nov 01 267 126 99 126
17 Aug 03 176 23 0 23 09 Dec 01 455 148 187 148
14 Sep 03 189 28 0 28 06 Jan 02 532 149 257 149
12 Oct 03 331 27 0 27 03 Feb 02 715 92 244 92
09 Nov 03 349 54 0 54 03 Mar 02 535 78 249 78
07 Dec 03 285 49 0 49 31 Mar 02 219 69 78 69
04 Jan 04 258 40 0 40 28 Apr 02 233 89 98 89
01 Feb 04 132 29 0 29 26 May 02 175 124 73 124
29 Feb 04 153 30 0 30 23 Jun02 248 104 129 104
28 Mar 04 223 38 0 38 21 Jul 02 338 110 136 110
25 Apr 04 220 36 0 36 18 Aug02 370 65 139 65
23 May 04 293 62 0 62 15 Sep 02 261 91 159 91
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Lookalike Control
Whole market Supermarket only Whole market
Supermarket 
only
4 week 
period 
ending BP LP BP LP
4 week 
period 
ending BP CP BP CP
15 Aug 04 227 64 0 64
12 Sep 04 193 49 0 49
10 Oct 04 187 42 0 42
07 Nov 04 163 43 0 43
05 Dec 04 224 73 0 73
02 Jan 05 114 39 0 39
Fairy Lemon Washing Up Liquid (BP),Aldi Lemon Washing Up Liquid (LP), Tesco Citrus Washing 
Up Liquid (CP)
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Washing Up Liquid (Fairy Lemon Washing Up Liquid/Aldi Lemon 
Washing Up Liquid/ 
Tesco Citrus Washing Up Liquid)
Value (‘000) – Mean and Standard Deviation
Lookalike (4 w/e) Control (4 w/e)
Period 1 03 Feb 02 – 13 Oct 02 28 May 00 – 29 Apr 01
Period 2 10 Nov 02 – 12 Oct 03 27 May 01 – 28 Apr 02
Period 3 09 Nov 03 – 10 Oct 04 26 May 02 – 10 Nov 02
 Whole Market
 Lookalike Control
 Fairy Aldi Fairy Tesco
 x SD x SD x SD x SD
Period 1 325.2 159.701 0 0 208.5385 244.5852 0 0
Period 2 266.7692 89.26006 25.07692 7.675302 451.2308 159.622 115.6923 53.08544
Period 3 231.1538 60.03866 44.53846 11.22212 252.1429 81.90529 102.2857 23.99107
 Supermarket
 Lookalike Control
 Fairy Aldi Fairy Tesco 
 x SD x SD x SD x SD
Period 1 0 0 0 0 65.30769 74.5077 0 0
Period 2 0 0 25.07692 7.675302 220.0769 126.4875 115.6923 53.08544
Period 3 0 0 44.53846 11.22212 114.5714 39.02502 102.2857 23.99107
Pearson’s Correlations (r)
r  Lookalike Control
 df Whole S/Market Whole S/Market
24wks 4 -0.17457 - -0.29268 0.015296
12m 11 -0.14484 - -0.03183 0.139351
All 27( 18) -0.09196 - -0.00054 0.136214
Notes
The data provided by Kantar, in relation to the control, includes a period before the launch of 
the brand leader. This has meant the sales data after the “launch event” is more restricted 
than should be the case.
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Shampoo
(Head & Shoulders/Boots Anti-Dandruff/Sainsbury’s Anti-Dandruff)
Volume (‘000)
 
Lookalike Control
Whole market Supermarket only Whole market
Supermarket 
only
4 week 
period 
ending BP LP BP LP
4 week 
period 
ending BP CP BP CP
04 Dec 05 204(17) 0(27) 6(29) 0(27) 04 Oct 09 811 0 90 0
01 Jan 06 183(27) 7(11) 4(34) 7(11) 01 Nov 09 818 0 72 0
29 Jan 06 158(35) 0(27) 8(26) 0(27) 29 Nov 09 905 0 113 0
26 Feb 06 180(29) 0(27) 5(32) 0(27) 27 Dec 09 855 0 220 0
26 Mar 06 210(15) 14(3) 21(9) 14(3) 24 Jan 10 999 0 241 0
23 Apr 06 170(33) 15(1) 4(34) 15(1) 21 Feb 10 1147 0 261 0
21 May 06 186(26) 15(1) 25(8) 15(1) 21 Mar 10 1057 0 200 0
18 Jun 06 187(24) 4(16) 15(18) 4(16) 18 Apr 10 891 0 198 0
16 Jul 06 248(5) 2(22) 33(3) 2(22) 16 May 10 948 0 239 0
13 Aug 06 172(32) 14(3) 6(29) 14(3) 13 Jun 10 972 0 258 0
10 Sep 06 268(3) 3(20) 19(11) 3(20) 11 Jul 10 885 0 265 0
08 Oct 06 153(38) 4(16) 12(22) 4(16) 08 Aug 10 675 0 142 0
05 Nov 06 227(10) 2(22) 41(1) 2(22) 05 Sep 10 632 0 160 0
03 Dec 06 230(8) 2(22) 6(29) 2(22) 03 Oct 10 793 0 225 0
31 Dec 06 161(34) 0(27) 11(24) 0(27) 31 Oct 10 685(1) 11(16) 212(1) 11(16)
28 Jan 07 232(7) 6(14) 14(21) 6(14) 28 Nov 10 609(4) 33(14) 141(5) 33(14)
25 Feb 07 198(18) 0(27) 17(15) 0(27) 26 Dec 10 523(17) 57(10) 68(12) 57(10)
25 Mar 07 229(9) 12(6) 16(16) 12(6) 23 Jan 11 560(12) 65(6) 89(15) 65(6)
22 Apr 07 193(21) 0(27) 18(13) 0(27) 20 Feb 11 580(11) 69(4) 150(3) 69(4)
20 May 07 251(4) 4(16) 26(7) 4(16) 20 Mar 11 510(18) 78(1) 129(8) 78(1)
17 Jun 07 215(14) 1(26) 16(16) 1(26) 17 Apr 11 590(9) 74(2) 126(9) 74(2)
15 Jul 07 193(21) 0(27) 27(6) 0(27) 15 May 11 540(14) 59(8) 59(20) 59(8)
12 Aug 07 189(23) 2(22) 30(4) 2(22) 12 Jun 11 583(10) 56(12) 97(14) 56(12)
09 Sep 07 241(6) 3(20) 15(18) 3(20) 10 Jul 11 491(20) 60(7) 101(13) 60(7)
07 Oct 07 217(13) 8(10) 19(11) 8(10) 07 Aug 11 596(7) 70(3) 119(10) 70(3)
04 Nov 07 176(30) 14(3) 4(34) 14(3) 04 Sep 11 537(15) 59(8) 77(16) 59(8)
02 Dec 07 195(19) 12(6) 8(26) 12(6) 02 Oct 11 532(16) 68(5) 60(19) 68(5)
30 Dec 07 218(11) 9(9) 11(24) 9(9) 30 Oct 11 593(8) 57(11) 138(7) 57(11)
27 Jan 08 174(31) 0(27) 35(2) 0(27) 27 Nov 11 619(3) 39(13) 144(4) 39(13)
24 Feb 08 154(37) 7(11) 5(32) 7(11) 25 Dec 11 599(6) 11(16) 156(2) 11(16)
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Lookalike Control
Whole market Supermarket only Whole market
Supermarket 
only
4 week 
period 
ending BP LP BP LP
4 week 
period 
ending BP CP BP CP
18 May 08 273(2) 4(16) 12(23) 4(16) 18 Mar 12 624(2) 9(18) 117(11) 9(18)
15 Jun 08 156(36) 11(8) 18(13) 11(8) 15 Apr 12 600(5) 33(15) 141(5) 33(15)
13 Jul 08 182(28) 0(27) 20(10) 0(27)
10 Aug 08 195(19) 0(27) 15(18) 0(27)
07 Sep 08 187(24) 0(27) 13(22) 0(27)
05 Oct 08 209(16) 0(27) 29(5) 0(27)
02 Nov 08 274(1) 0(27) 4(34) 0(27)
Head & Shoulders (BP), Boots Anti-Dandruff (LP), Sainsbury’s Anti-Dandruff (CP)
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Impact of Lookalikes
Shampoo (Head & Shoulders/Boots Anti-Dandruff/Sainsbury’s Anti-
Dandruff)
Volume (‘000) – Mean and Standard Deviation
Lookalike (4 w/e) Control (4 w/e)
Period 1 04 Dec 05 – 05 Nov 06 04 Oct 09 – 03 Oct 10
Period 2 03 Dec 06 – 04 Nov 07 31 Oct 10 – 02 Oct 11
Period 3 02 Dec 07 – 02 Nov 08 30 Oct 11 – 15 Apr 12
 Whole Market
 Lookalike Control
 Head & Shoulders Boots Head & Shoulders Sainsbury’s
 x SD x SD x SD x SD
Period 1 195.8462 34.47184 6.153846 6.108002 884.5871 138.8513 0 0
Period 2 209.6154 26.89343 4 4.708149 564.3077 51.0333 58.38462 18.05796
Period 3 199 39.89152 4.230769 4.585373 584.5714 43.59991 21.28571 21.94474
 Supermarket
 Lookalike Control
 Head & Shoulders Boots Head & Shoulders Sainsbury’s
 x SD x SD x SD x SD
Period 1 15.30769 11.947 6.153846 6.108002 191.7143 65.39634 0 0
Period 2 16.84615 7.61409 4 4.708149 109.8462 43.11582 58.38462 18.05796
Period 3 14.23077 9.283981 4.230769 4.585373 126 27.38613 21.28571 21.94474
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Shampoo (Head & Shoulders/Boots Anti-Dandruff/Sainsbury’s Anti-
Dandruff)
Volume (‘000) – Correlations
Pearson’s Correlations (r)
r  Lookalike Control
 Df Whole S/Market Whole S/Market
24wk 4 - - -0.89364 -0.64184
12m 11 - - -0.67454 -0.54214
19m 18 - - -0.3331 -0.29606
36m 37 -0.17182 -0.24137 - -
Correlations Spearman’s rank
Lookalike Control
n Whole S/Market n Whole S/Market
39 -0.08142 -0.20865 20 -0.36432 -0.14727
Correlations Spearman’s rank
Lookalike Control
n Whole S/Market n Whole S/Market
39 -0.03925 -0.16621 20 -0.25996 -0.112
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Shampoo (Head & Shoulders/Boots Anti-Dandruff/Sainsbury’s Anti-
Dandruff)
Value (‘000)
 
Lookalike Control
Whole market Supermarket only Whole market
Supermarket 
only
4 week 
period 
ending BP LP BP LP
4 week 
period 
ending BP CP BP CP
04 Dec 05 592 0 13 0 04 Oct 09 1788 0 244 0
01 Jan 06 504 16 6 16 01 Nov 09 1663 0 185 0
29 Jan 06 483 0 24 0 29 Nov 09 1848 0 204 0
26 Feb 06 489 0 16 0 27 Dec 09 1691 0 409 0
26 Mar 06 531 31 42 31 24 Jan 10 2064 0 500 0
23 Apr 06 481 32 12 32 21 Feb 10 2497 0 619 0
21 May 06 525 33 73 33 21 Mar 10 2333 0 539 0
18 Jun 06 496 10 26 10 18 Apr 10 2088 0 491 0
16 Jul 06 644 4 66 4 16 May 10 1809 0 409 0
13 Aug 06 427 31 16 31 13 Jun 10 1888 0 445 0
10 Sep 06 641 7 44 7 11 Jul 10 1781 0 442 0
08 Oct 06 410 8 27 8 08 Aug 10 1718 0 371 0
05 Nov 06 550 4 92 4 05 Sep 10 1657 0 424 0
03 Dec 06 644 5 27 5 03 Oct 10 2000 0 609 0
31 Dec 06 440 0 22 0 31 Oct 10 1696 9 564 9
28 Jan 07 524 11 27 11 28 Nov 10 1559 23 386 23
25 Feb 07 494 0 44 0 26 Dec 10 1439 38 227 38
25 Mar 07 624 23 37 23 23 Jan 11 1615 44 291 44
22 Apr 07 480 0 45 0 20 Feb 11 1689 50 482 50
20 May 07 646 10 59 10 20 Mar 11 1495 60 424 60
17 Jun 07 546 3 40 3 17 Apr 11 1754 57 405 57
15 Jul 07 456 0 10 0 15 May 11 1671 45 195 45
12 Aug 07 489 5 85 5 12 Jun 11 1886 48 314 48
09 Sep 07 637 3 35 3 10 Jul 11 1696 50 329 50
07 Oct 07 573 8 70 8 07 Aug 11 1994 59 383 59
04 Nov 07 443 13 15 13 04 Sep 11 1797 45 262 45
02 Dec 07 519 12 29 12 02 Oct 11 1733 52 206 52
30 Dec 07 569 9 36 9 30 Oct 11 1901 43 391 43
27 Jan 08 477 0 89 0 27 Nov 11 1962 30 404 30
24 Feb 08 422 7 12 7 25 Dec 11 2018 8 455 8
23 Mar 08 393 7 25 7 22 Jan 12 1843 0 282 0
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Lookalike Control
Whole market Supermarket only Whole market
Supermarket 
only
4 week 
period 
ending BP LP BP LP
4 week 
period 
ending BP CP BP CP
15 Jun 08 382 11 46 11 15 Apr 12 2147 25 461 25
13 Jul 08 533 0 52 0
10 Aug 08 544 0 41 0
07 Sep 08 465 0 34 0
05 Oct 08 563 0 77 0
02 Nov 08 688 0 9 0
Head & Shoulders (BP), Boots Anti-Dandruff (LP), Sainsbury’s Anti-Dandruff (CP)
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Impact of Lookalikes
Shampoo (Head & Shoulders/Boots Anti-Dandruff/Sainsbury’s Anti-
Dandruff)
Value (‘000) – Mean, Standard Deviation and Pearson’s Coefficient
Lookalike (4 w/e) Control (4 w/e)
Period 1 04 Dec 05 – 05 Nov 06 04 Oct 09 – 03 Oct 10
Period 2 03 Dec 06 – 04 Nov 07 31 Oct 10 – 02 Oct 11
Period 3 02 Dec 07 – 02 Nov 08 30 Oct 11 – 15 Apr 12
 Whole Market
 Lookalike Control
 Head & Shoulders Boots Head & Shoulders Sainsbury’s
 x SD x SD x SD x SD
Period 1 521 71.68566 13.53846 13.39537 1916.071 254.5553 0 0
Period 2 538.1538 78.8647 6.230769 6.747269 1694.154 150.6231 44.61538 14.43687
Period 3 523 96.28517 4.230769 4.585373 2035.857 146.7531 16.14286 16.64761
 Supermarket
 Lookalike Control
 Head & Shoulders Boots Head & Shoulders Sainsbury’s
 x SD x SD x SD x SD
Period 1 35.15385 26.81059 13.53846 13.39537 420.7857 130.3467 0 0
Period 2 39.69231 21.49955 6.230769 6.747269 343.6923 110.469 44.61538 14.43687
Period 3 37.76923 23.85775 4.230769 4.585373 403 59.34082 16.14286 16.64761
Correlations (r)
r  Lookalike Control
 df Whole S/Market Whole S/Market
24wk 4 - - -0.35099 -0.3232
12m 11 - - 0.288637 -0.3102
19m 18 - - -0.47425 -0.31961
36m 37 -0.12168 -0.08212 - -
Notes
N/A
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Drinks
(Red Bull/Asda Blue Charge/Mixxed Up (Lidl))
Volume (‘000)
 
Lookalike Control
Whole market Supermarket only Whole market
Supermarket 
only
4 week 
period 
ending BP LP BP LP
4 week 
period 
ending BP CP BP CP
27 Jun 99 427 0 36 0 07 Oct 07 334 0 0 0
25 Jul 99 331 0 55 0 04 Nov 07 279 0 1 0
22 Aug 99 491 0 32 0 02 Dec 07 395 0 0 0
19 Sep 99 587 0 138 0 30 Dec 07 312 0 0 0
17 Oct 99 424 0 81 0 27 Jan 08 325 0 11 0
14 Nov 99 503 0 97 0 24 Feb 08 464 0 14 0
12 Dec 99 454 0 99 0 23 Mar 08 357 0 11 0
09 Jan 00 1082 0 131 0 20 Apr 08 349 0 10 0
06 Feb 00 642 0 144 0 18 May 08 356 0 36 0
05 Mar 00 749 0 80 0 15 Jun 08 422 0 57 0
02 Apr 00 953 0 207 0 13 Jul 08 426 0 52 0
30 Apr 00 974 0 183 0 10 Aug 08 271 0 56 0
28 May 00 1275 0 139 0 07 Sep 08 307 0 25 0
25 Jun 00 1173(2) 119(3) 197(2) 119(3) 05 Oct 08 405(8) 57(5) 30(11) 57(5)
23 Jul 00 840(8) 119(3) 238(1) 119(3) 02 Nov 08 272(19) 29(10) 11(23) 29(10)
20 Aug 00 974(4) 243(1) 67(12) 243(1) 30 Nov 08 304(16) 73(3) 10(24) 73(3)
17 Sep 00 837(9) 138(2) 139(3) 138(2) 28 Dec 08 218(26) 45(6) 10(24) 45(6)
15 Oct 00 1077(3) 97(6) 136(4) 97(6) 25 Jan 09 283(18) 43(7) 21(17) 43(7)
12 Nov 00 1347(1) 80(8) 94(6) 80(8) 22 Feb 09 393(10) 88(1) 32(10) 88(1)
10 Dec 00 966(6) 34(20) 73(10) 34(20) 22 Mar 09 451(6) 41(8) 27(12) 41(8)
07 Jan 01 969(5) 101(5) 76(9) 101(5) 19 Apr 09 382(11) 65(4) 24(14) 65(4)
04 Feb 01 631(19) 62(10) 48(19) 62(10) 17 May 09 473(5) 36(9) 67(1) 36(9)
04 Mar 01 648(17) 19(23) 63(14) 19(23) 14 Jun 09 620(1) 16(15) 26(13) 16(15)
01 Apr 01 814(10) 44(19) 72(11) 44(19) 12 Jul 09 255(22) 18(14) 14(21) 18(14)
29 Apr 01 853(7)
59(11) 
(11) 88(8)
59(11) 
(11) 09 Aug 09 234(23) 26(11) 36(8) 26(11)
27 May 01 680(13) 53(15) 40(23) 53(15) 06 Sep 09 337(14) 0(20) 18(19) 0(20)
24 Jun 01 612(22) 68(9) 62(15) 68(9) 04 Oct 09 230(25) 77(2) 34(9) 77(2)
22 Jul 01 780(11) 48(16) 114(5) 48(16) 01 Nov 09 234(23) 15(16) 10(24) 15(16)
19 Aug 01 618(21) 19(23) 48(19) 19(23) 29 Nov 09 341(13) 22(12) 14(21) 22(12)
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Lookalike Control
Whole market Supermarket only Whole market
Supermarket 
only
4 week 
period 
ending BP LP BP LP
4 week 
period 
ending BP CP BP CP
11 Nov 01 574(24) 58(12) 35(25) 58(12) 21 Feb 10 372(12) 10(18) 54(4) 10(18)
09 Dec 01 658(15) 54(14) 61(17) 54(14) 21 Mar 10 522(2) 0(20) 61(3) 0(20)
06 Jan 02 649(16) 13(26) 92(7) 13(26) 18 Apr 10 269(20) 0(20) 54(4) 0(20)
03 Feb 02 675(14) 18(25) 36(24) 18(25) 16 May 10 397(9) 1(19) 46(6) 1(19)
03 Mar 02 612(22) 46(18) 41(22) 46(18) 13 Jun 10 287(17) 0(20) 22(15) 0(20)
31 Mar 02 567(25) 57(13) 57(18) 57(13) 11 Jul 10 502(3) 0(20) 67(1) 0(20)
28 Apr 02 748(12) 34(20) 62(15) 34(20) 08 Aug 10 451(6) 0(20) 22(15) 0(20)
26 May 02 430(26) 86(7) 12(26) 86 05 Sep 10 478(4) 0(20) 45(7) 0(20)
Red Bull (BP), Asda Blue Charge (LP), Mixxed Up (Lidl) (CP)
Impact of Lookalikes 
359
Drinks (Red Bull/Asda Blue Charge/Mixxed Up (Lidl))
Volume (‘000) – Mean and Standard Deviation
Lookalike (4 w/e) Control (4 w/e)
Period 1 27 Jun 99 – 28 May 00 07 Oct 07 – 07 Sep 08
Period 2 25 Jun 00 – 27 May 01 05 Oct 08 – 06 Sep 09
Period 3 24 Jun 01 – 26 May 02 04 Oct 09 – 05 Sep 10
 Whole Market
 Lookalike Control
 Red Bull Asda Red Bull Lidl
 x SD x SD x SD x SD
Period 1 684 297.309 0 0 353.6154 58.7034 0 0
Period 2 908.3846 208.3237 89.84615 58.50334 355.9231 114.1764 41.30769 24.68598
Period 3 629.3077 85.4092 44.07692 21.60811 358.8462 103.1292 12.30769 21.20293
 Supermarket
 Lookalike Control
 Red Bull Asda Red Bull Lidl
 x SD x SD x SD x SD
Period 1 109.3846 53.67423 0 0 21 22.01515 0 0
Period 2 102.3846 59.32051 89.84615 58.50334 25.07692 15.26686 41.30769 24.68598
Period 3 56.23077 25.76869 44.07692 21.60811 35.76923 19.63481 12.30769 21.20293
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Drinks (Red Bull/Asda Blue Charge/Mixxed Up (Lidl))
Volume (‘000) – Correlations
Pearson’s Correlations (r)
r  Lookalike Control
 df Whole S/Market Whole S/Market
6m 4 -0.43375 -0.41592 0.640477 0.511169
12m 11 0.323421 0.31614 -0.01359 0.031994
24m 24 0.455173 0.394466 -0.2126 -0.27021
Correlations Spearman’s rank
Lookalike Control
n Whole S/Market N Whole S/Market
26 0.38976 0.36995 26 -0.27233 -0.26587
Kendall’s tau b
Lookalike Control
n Whole S/Market N Whole S/Market
26 0.21706 0.24534 26 -0.20138 -0.19007
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Drinks (Red Bull/Asda Blue Charge/Mixxed Up (Lidl))
Value (‘000)
 
Lookalike Control
Whole market Supermarket only Whole market
Supermarket 
only
4 week 
period 
ending BP LP BP LP
4 week 
period 
ending BP CP BP CP
27 Jun 99 450 0 38 0 07 Oct 07 312 0 0 0
25 Jul 99 346 0 58 0 04 Nov 07 263 0 1 0
22 Aug 99 515 0 34 0 02 Dec 07 391 0 0 0
19 Sep 99 618 0 145 0 30 Dec 07 302 0 0 0
17 Oct 99 454 0 85 0 27 Jan 08 300 0 10 0
14 Nov 99 535 0 102 0 24 Feb 08 448 0 12 0
12 Dec 99 642 0 105 0 23 Mar 08 331 0 10 0
09 Jan 00 1405 0 138 0 20 Apr 08 329 0 8 0
06 Feb 00 995 0 152 0 18 May 08 307 0 30 0
05 Mar 00 1216 0 84 0 15 Jun 08 379 0 49 0
02 Apr 00 1571 0 218 0 13 Jul 08 382 0 43 0
30 Apr 00 1211 0 162 0 10 Aug 08 259 0 48 0
28 May 00 1402 0 124 0 07 Sep 08 300 0 21 0
25 Jun 00 1307 80 174 80 05 Oct 08 362 20 32 20
23 Jul 00 1102 79 211 79 02 Nov 08 279 10 15 10
20 Aug 00 1461 163 59 163 30 Nov 08 298 26 9 26
17 Sep 00 1077 93 121 93 28 Dec 08 220 15 10 15
15 Oct 00 1643 63 134 63 25 Jan 09 320 15 20 15
12 Nov 00 1809 53 99 53 22 Feb 09 449 30 31 30
10 Dec 00 1464 23 151 23 22 Mar 09 445 14 25 14
07 Jan 01 2016 67 138 67 19 Apr 09 405 22 19 22
04 Feb 01 980 42 67 42 17 May 09 459 12 53 12
04 Mar 01 1228 13 92 13 14 Jun 09 592 5 24 5
01 Apr 01 1387 29 114 29 12 Jul 09 279 6 14 6
29 Apr 01 1285 39 140 39 09 Aug 09 225 9 29 9
27 May 01 1215 35 63 35 06 Sep 09 341 0 14 0
24 Jun 01 1116 45 68 45 04 Oct 09 236 30 27 30
22 Jul 01 1124 32 171 32 01 Nov 09 244 6 8 6
19 Aug 01 945 13 73 13 29 Nov 09 381 8 11 8
16 Sep 01 1129 16 85 16 27 Dec 09 314 6 13 6
14 Oct 01 1030 32 84 32 24 Jan 10 366 8 17 8
11 Nov 01 1205 39 57 39 21 Feb 10 435 4 48 4
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Lookalike Control
Whole market Supermarket only Whole market
Supermarket 
only
4 week 
period 
ending BP LP BP LP
4 week 
period 
ending BP CP BP CP
03 Feb 02 1286 11 180 11 16 May 10 521 0 40 0
03 Mar 02 1440 26 130 26 13 Jun 10 388 0 22 0
31 Mar 02 928 32 206 32 11 Jul 10 603 0 65 0
28 Apr 02 1254 19 234 19 08 Aug 10 593 0 24 0
26 May 02 739 49 57 49 05 Sep 10 655 0 49 0
Red Bull (BP), Asda Blue Charge (LP), Mixxed Up (Lidl) (CP)
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Drinks (Red Bull/Asda Blue Charge/Mixxed Up (Lidl))
Value (‘000) – Mean, Standard Deviation and Pearson’s Coefficient
Lookalike (4 w/e) Control (4 w/e)
Period 1 27 Jun 99 – 28 May 00 07 Oct 07 – 07 Sep 08
Period 2 25 Jun 00 – 27 May 01 05 Oct 08 – 06 Sep 09
Period 3 24 Jun 01 – 26 May 02 04 Oct 09 – 05 Sep 10
 Whole Market
 Lookalike Control
 Red Bull Asda Red Bull Lidl
 x SD x SD x SD x SD
Period 1 873.8462 436.8304 0 0 331 54.54814 0 0
Period 2 1382.615 297.9176 59.92308 39.25868 359.5385 107.0628 14.15385 8.600835
Period 3 1155.154 219.0585 27.61538 13.1183 435.6154 142.5146 4.769231 8.267949
 Supermarket
 Lookalike Control
 Red Bull Asda Red Bull Lidl
 x SD x SD x SD x SD
Period 1 111.1538 52.73652 0 0 17.84615 18.62725 0 0
Period 2 120.2308 44.83145 59.92308 39.25868 22.69231 11.90507 14.15385 8.600835
Period 3 133.2308 68.63813 27.61538 13.1183 32.23077 18.32646 4.769231 8.267949
Pearson’s Correlations (r)
r  Lookalike Control
 df Whole S/Market Whole S/Market
6m 4 -0.24374 -0.51931 0.704609 0.373738
12m 11 0.078244 -0.03844 0.045242 0.079445
24m 24 0.177134 -0.19443 -0.42077 -0.29774
Notes
The control product was temporarily taken off the market towards the end of the data set. 
Again this restricts the analysis that can be undertaken.
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Vinegar
(Sarson’s Brown Malt Vinegar/Samson‘s Malt Vinegar(Lidl)/Asda Malt 
Vinegar)
Volume (‘000)
 
Lookalike Control
Whole market Supermarket only Whole market
Supermarket 
only
4 week 
period 
ending BP LP BP LP
4 week 
period 
ending BP CP BP CP
25 Sep 94 768 0 0 0 17 Jan 93 645(15) 96(31) 67(6) 96(31)
23 Oct 94 621 0 0 0 14 Feb 93 527(32) 106(25) 47(17) 106(25)
20 Nov 94 533 0 0 0 14 Mar 93 491(39) 83(37) 57(9) 83(37)
18 Dec 94 709 0 0 0 11 Apr 93 603(22) 97(30) 74(3) 97(30)
15 Jan 95 500 0 0 0 09 May 93 610(18) 100(29) 92(1) 100(29)
12 Feb 95 610 0 0 0 06 Jun 93 651(14) 76(39) 63(7) 76(39)
12 Mar 95 608 0 0 0 04 Jul 93 751(5) 121(16) 48(16) 121(16)
09 Apr 95 521 0 0 0 01 Aug 93 777(2) 150(3) 71(5) 150(3)
07 May 95 735 0 0 0 29 Aug 93 837(1) 118(17) 75(2) 118(17)
04 Jun 95 553 0 0 0 26 Sep 93 667(13) 146(6) 25(37) 146(6)
02 Jul 95 624 0 0 0 24 Oct 93 744(6) 114(19) 53(12) 114(19)
30 Jul 95 549 0 0 0 21 Nov 93 587(24) 128(13) 57(9) 128(13)
27 Aug 95 757 0 0 0 19 Dec 93 531(31) 116(18) 33(30) 116(18)
24 Sep 95 717(2) 27(23) 0 27(23) 16 Jan 94 495(37) 111(23) 38(23) 111(23)
22 Oct 95 733(1) 34(20) 0 34(20) 13 Feb 94 552(28) 94(32) 49(15) 94(32)
19 Nov 95 609(7) 31(22) 0 31(22) 13 Mar 94 512(34) 133(11) 39(21) 133(11)
17 Dec 95 584(10) 19(26) 0 19(26) 10 Apr 94 495(37) 88(34) 33(30) 88(34)
14 Jan 96 498(21) 20(25) 0 20(25) 08 May 94 511(35) 87(35) 45(18) 87(35)
11 Feb 96 454(23) 41(14) 0 41(14) 05 Jun 94 577(26) 101(28) 35(25) 101(28)
10 Mar 96 421(26) 53(6) 0 53(6) 03 Jul 94 591(23) 93(33) 28(34) 93(33)
07 Apr 96 518(20) 40(16) 0 40(16) 31 Jul 94 670(12) 112(21) 34(28) 112(21)
05 May 96 559(14) 39(18) 0 39(18) 28 Aug 94 694(11) 114(19) 30(32) 114(19)
02 Jun 96 527(18) 46(11) 0 46(11) 25 Sep 94 768(3) 148(4) 28(34) 148(4)
30 Jun 96 573(11) 48(9) 0 48(9) 23 Oct 94 621(17) 137(10) 16(39) 137(10)
28 Jul 96 550(16) 55(4) 0 55(4) 20 Nov 94 533(30) 133(11) 29(33) 133(11)
25 Aug 96 637(6) 79(2) 0 79(2) 18 Dec 94 709(10) 102(27) 41(20) 102(27)
22 Sep 96 676(5) 55(4) 0 55(4) 15 Jan 95 500(36) 123(15) 23(38) 123(15)
20 Oct 96 683(3) 48(9) 0 48(9) 12 Feb 95 610(18) 152(2) 39(21) 152(2)
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Lookalike Control
Whole market Supermarket only Whole market
Supermarket 
only
4 week 
period 
ending BP LP BP LP
4 week 
period 
ending BP CP BP CP
12 Jan 97 554(15) 53(6) 0 53(6) 07 May 95 735(7) 193(1) 35(25) 193(1)
09 Feb 97 483(23) 34(20) 0 34(20) 04 Jun 95 553(27) 84(36) 73(4) 84(36)
09 Mar 97 432(25) 25(24) 0 25(24) 02 Jul 95 624(16) 83(37) 51(13) 83(37)
06 Apr 97 586(9) 41(14) 0 41(14) 30 Jul 95 549(29) 124(14) 43(19) 124(14)
04 May 97 566(12) 49(8) 0 49(8) 27 Aug 95 757(4) 103(26) 51(13) 103(26)
01 Jun 97 566(12) 45(12) 0 45(12) 24 Sep 95 717(9) 142(8) 58(8) 142(8)
29 Jun 97 491(22) 71(3) 0 71(3) 22 Oct 95 733(8) 110(24) 27(36) 110(24)
27 Jul 97 522(19) 42(13) 0 42(13) 19 Nov 95 609(20) 140(9) 35(25) 140(9)
24 Aug 97 683(3) 103(1) 0 103(1) 17 Dec 95 584(25) 112(21) 54(11) 112(21)
Sarson‘s Brown Malt Vinegar (BP), Samson‘s Malt Vinegar(Lidl) (LP), Asda Malt Vinegar (CP)
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Vinegar (Sarson‘s Brown Malt Vinegar/Samson‘s Malt Vinegar(Lidl)/
Asda Malt Vinegar)
Volume (‘000) – Mean and Standard Deviation
Lookalike (4 w/e) Control (4 w/e)
Period 1 25 Sep 94 – 27 Aug 95 17 Jan 93 – 19 Dec 93
Period 2 25 Sep 95 – 25 Aug 96 17 Jan 94 – 18 Dec 94
Period 3 26 Sep 96 – 24 Aug 97 15 Jan 95 – 17 Dec 95
 Whole Market
 Lookalike Control
 Sarsons Lidl Sarsons Asda
 x SD x SD x SD x SD
Period 1 622 92.86293 0 0 648 105.0763 112 21.91363
Period 2 568 91.47427 41 16.08545 594 90.78179 112 20.25984
Period 3 568 78.89129 49 19.70078 623 86.43216 127 30.39458
 Supermarket
 Lookalike Control
 Sarsons Lidl Sarsons Asda
 x SD x SD x SD x SD
Period 1 0 0 0 0 59 18.06771 112 21.91363
Period 2 0 0 41 16.08545 34 8.366752 112 20.25984
Period 3 0 0 49 19.70078 43 13.88494 127 30.39458
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Vinegar (Sarson‘s Brown Malt Vinegar/Samson‘s Malt Vinegar(Lidl)/
Asda Malt Vinegar)
Volume (‘000) – Correlations
Pearson’s Correlations (r)
r  Lookalike Control
 df Whole S/Market Whole S/Market
24wk 4 -0.07016 - - -
12m 11 -0.12511 - - -
24m 24 0.198752 - - -
36m 37 - - 0.296617 -0.34891
Correlations Spearman’s rank
Lookalike Control
n Whole S/Market n Whole S/Market
26 0.92466 - 39 0.32164 -0.34329
Kendall’s tau b
Lookalike Control
n Whole S/Market n Whole S/Market
26 0.07188 - 39 0.23745 -0.23449
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Vinegar (Sarson‘s Brown Malt Vinegar/Samson‘s Malt Vinegar(Lidl)/
Asda Malt Vinegar)
Value (‘000)
 
Lookalike Control
Whole market Supermarket only Whole market
Supermarket 
only
4 week 
period 
ending BP LP BP LP
4 week 
period 
ending BP CP BP CP
25 Sep 94 93 0 0 0 17 Jan 93 362 44 40 44
23 Oct 94 76 0 0 0 14 Feb 93 312 53 28 53
20 Nov 94 75 0 0 0 14 Mar 93 322 39 39 39
18 Dec 94 52 0 0 0 11 Apr 93 422 52 47 52
15 Jan 95 55 0 0 0 09 May 93 376 51 51 51
12 Feb 95 60 0 0 0 06 Jun 93 403 36 45 36
12 Mar 95 58 0 0 0 04 Jul 93 473 53 36 53
09 Apr 95 59 0 0 0 01 Aug 93 514 71 55 71
07 May 95 73 0 0 0 29 Aug 93 556 67 44 67
04 Jun 95 44 0 0 0 26 Sep 93 452 69 16 69
02 Jul 95 39 0 0 0 24 Oct 93 498 59 32 59
30 Jul 95 68 0 0 0 21 Nov 93 382 68 43 68
27 Aug 95 55 0 0 0 19 Dec 93 350 48 22 48
24 Sep 95 72 8 0 8 16 Jan 94 281 51 25 51
22 Oct 95 60 10 0 10 13 Feb 94 338 51 30 51
19 Nov 95 77 9 0 9 13 Mar 94 324 58 26 58
17 Dec 95 63 6 0 6 10 Apr 94 296 40 19 40
14 Jan 96 56 6 0 6 08 May 94 315 47 36 47
11 Feb 96 52 12 0 12 05 Jun 94 393 49 24 49
10 Mar 96 50 15 0 15 03 Jul 94 377 48 16 48
07 Apr 96 52 16 0 16 31 Jul 94 416 61 23 61
05 May 96 41 11 0 11 28 Aug 94 486 58 17 58
02 Jun 96 49 13 0 13 25 Sep 94 574 93 15 93
30 Jun 96 73 14 0 14 23 Oct 94 415 76 9 76
28 Jul 96 77 16 0 16 20 Nov 94 355 75 16 75
25 Aug 96 69 23 0 23 18 Dec 94 508 52 22 52
22 Sep 96 81 16 0 16 15 Jan 95 333 55 13 55
20 Oct 96 90 14 0 14 12 Feb 95 389 60 22 60
17 Nov 96 84 10 0 10 12 Mar 95 409 58 25 58
15 Dec 96 56 12 0 12 09 Apr 95 320 59 22 59
12 Jan 97 46 16 0 16 07 May 95 474 73 24 73
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Lookalike Control
Whole market Supermarket only Whole market
Supermarket 
only
4 week 
period 
ending BP LP BP LP
4 week 
period 
ending BP CP BP CP
06 Apr 97 59 12 0 12 30 Jul 95 371 68 25 68
04 May 97 60 14 0 14 27 Aug 95 474 55 29 55
01 Jun 97 53 13 0 13 24 Sep 95 595 72 34 72
29 Jun 97 54 21 0 21 22 Oct 95 513 60 16 60
27 Jul 97 66 12 0 12 19 Nov 95 466 77 20 77
24 Aug 97 67 32 0 32 17 Dec 95 404 63 31 63
Sarson‘s Brown Malt Vinegar (BP), Samson‘s Malt Vinegar(Lidl) (LP), Asda Malt Vinegar (CP)
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Vinegar (Sarson‘s Brown Malt Vinegar/Samson‘s Malt Vinegar(Lidl)/
Asda Malt Vinegar)
Value (‘000) – Mean, Standard Deviation and Pearson’s Coefficient
Lookalike (4 w/e) Control (4 w/e)
Period 1 25 Sep 94 – 27 Aug 95 17 Jan 93 – 19 Dec 93
Period 2 25 Sep 95 – 25 Aug 96 17 Jan 94 – 18 Dec 94
Period 3 26 Sep 96 – 24 Aug 97 15 Jan 95 – 17 Dec 95
 
 Whole Market
 Lookalike Control
 Sarsons Lidl Sarsons Asda
 x SD x SD x SD x SD
Period 1 62 14.61779 0 0 417 76.6224 55 11.46572
Period 2 61 11.87562 12 4.758164 391 88.2174 58 14.63699
Period 3 60 17.40133 15 6.200562 428 75.5402 60 10.97447
 Supermarket
 Lookalike Control
 Sarsons Lidl Sarsons Asda
 x SD x SD x SD x SD
Period 1 0 0 0 0 38 11.22847 55 11.46572
Period 2 0 0 12 4.758164 21 7.109242 58 14.63699
Period 3 0 0 15 6.200562 26 7.798468 60 10.97447
 
Pearson’s Correlations (r)
r  Lookalike Control
 df Whole S/Market Whole S/Market
24wk 4 -0.19057 - - -
12m 11 0.034904 - - -
24m 24 0.155724 - - -
36m 37 - - 0.535606 -0.29341
Notes
The brand leader was not on sale in the same supermarket as the lookalike and so this 
means there would be no side by side comparisons. 
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Butter
 (Lurpak/NorpakSpreadable (Aldi)/Butterpak Spreadable (Tesco))
Volume (‘000)
 
Lookalike Control
Whole market Supermarket only Whole market Supermarket only
4 week 
period 
ending BP LP BP LP
4 week 
period 
ending BP CP BP CP
28 Mar 04 1470 0 0 0 28 Apr 02 1548 0 377 0
25 Apr 04 1262 0 5 0 26 May 02 1447 0 316 0
23 May 04 1397 0 5 0 23 Jun 02 1474 0 347 0
20 Jun 04 1387 0 0 0 21 Jul 02 1251 0 349 0
18 Jul 04 1288 0 0 0 18 Aug 02 1355 0 258 0
15 Aug 04 1280 0 0 0 15 Sep 02 1274 0 201 0
12 Sep 04 1266 0 6 0 13 Oct 02 1533 0 215 0
10 Oct 04 1285 0 0 0 10 Nov 02 1309 0 327 0
07 Nov 04 1460 0 0 0 08 Dec 02 1408 0 302 0
05 Dec 04 1406 0 23 0 05 Jan 03 1666 0 233 0
02 Jan 05 1796 0 0 0 02 Feb 03 1208 0 197 0
30 Jan 05 1395 0 0 0 02 Mar 03 1295 0 198 0
27 Feb 05 1327 0 0 0 30 Mar 03 1383 0 280 0
27 Mar 05 1218(10) 22(24) 3(2) 22(24) 27 Apr 03 1694(8) 55(13) 269(21) 55(13)
24 Apr 05 1348(4) 20(26) 0(5) 20(26) 25 May 03 2349(1) 50(18) 334(12) 50(18)
22 May 05 1334(5) 21(25) 0(5) 21(25) 22 Jun 03 1584(9) 37(26) 392(4) 37(26)
19 Jun 05 1219(9) 23(23) 0(5) 23(23) 20 Jul 03 1994(2) 41(22) 386(5) 41(22)
17 Jul 05 1241(7) 52(22) 0(5) 52(22) 17 Aug 03 1195(25) 47(15) 252(24) 47(15)
14 Aug 05 1266(6) 56(21) 0(5) 56(21) 14 Sep 03 1445(13) 38(25) 259(22) 38(25)
11 Sep 05 1113(18) 100(14) 0(5) 100(14) 12 Oct 03 1811(4) 41(22) 315(15) 41(22)
09 Oct 05 1145(14) 79(20) 0(5) 79(20) 09 Nov 03 1716(7) 92(1) 286(19) 92(1)
06 Nov 05 1226(8) 107(12) 0(5) 107(12) 07 Dec 03 1727(6) 80(3) 306(17) 80(3)
04 Dec 05 1395(3) 99(25) 0(5) 99(25) 04 Jan 04 1885(3) 59(10) 308(16) 59(10)
01 Jan 06 1560(2) 83(19) 2(3) 83(19) 01 Feb 04 1187(26) 74(4) 234(26) 74(4)
29 Jan 06 1115(17) 92(18) 0(5) 92(18) 29 Feb 04 1480(10) 54(14) 378(7) 54(14)
26 Feb 06 1187(12) 108(11) 0(5) 108(11) 28 Mar 04 1470(11) 54(14) 279(20) 54(14)
26 Mar 06 1025(22) 148(3) 0(5) 148(3) 25 Apr 04 1262(23) 45(20) 251(25) 45(20)
23 Apr 06 1205(11) 144(4) 0(5) 144(4) 23 May 04 1397(15) 59(10) 329(13) 59(10)
21 May 06 1099(19) 127(10) 0(5) 127(10) 20 Jun 04 1387(17) 65(8) 419(3) 65(8)
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Lookalike Control
Whole market Supermarket only Whole market Supermarket only
4 week 
period 
ending BP LP BP LP
4 week 
period 
ending BP CP BP CP
13 Aug 06 969(25) 96(16) 0(5) 96(16) 12 Sep 04 1266(22) 73(5) 328(14) 73(5)
10 Sep 06 1035(21) 129(9) 0(5) 129(9) 10 Oct 04 1285(20) 51(17) 479(1) 51(17)
08 Oct 06 1099(19) 133(8) 2(3) 133(8) 07 Nov 04 1460(12) 44(21) 372(8) 44(21)
05 Nov 06 987(24) 140(7) 4(1) 140(7) 05 Dec 04 1406(14) 71(7) 382(6) 71(7)
03 Dec 06 1128(16) 165(1) 0(5) 165(1) 02 Jan 05 1796(5) 60(9) 461(2) 60(9)
31 Dec 06 1642(1) 141(6) 0(5) 141(6) 30 Jan 05 1395(16) 59(10) 360(10) 59(10)
28 Jan 07 892(20) 165(1) 1(4) 165(1) 27 Feb 05 1327(18) 72(6) 336(11) 72(6)
25 Feb 07 1012(23) 142(5) 0(5) 142(5) 27 Mar 05 1218(24) 83(2) 368(9) 83(2)
Lurpak (BP), NorpakSpreadable (Aldi) (LP), Butterpak Spreadable (Tesco) (CP)
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Butter (Lurpak/NorpakSpreadable (Aldi)/Butterpak Spreadable (Tesco))
Volume (‘000) – Mean, and Standard Deviation
Lookalike (4 w/e) Control (4 w/e)
Period 1 28 Mar 04 – 27 Feb 05 28 Apr 02 – 30 Mar 03
Period 2 27 Mar 05 – 26 Feb 06 27 Apr 03 – 28 Mar 04
Period 3 26 Mar 06 – 25 Feb 07 25 Apr 04 – 17 Mar 05
 Whole Market
 Lookalike Control
 Lurpak Aldi Lurpak Tesco
 x SD x SD X SD x SD
Period 1 1386.077 143.0422 0 0 1396.231 133.6894 0 0
Period 2 1259 125.0393 66.30769 35.40806 1656.692 319.9996 55.53846 16.98831
Period 3 1106.692 182.636 132.8462 23.09706 1366.692 147.7201 59.76923 12.74202
 Supermarket
 Lookalike Control
 Lurpak Aldi Lurpak Tesco
 x SD x SD X SD x SD
Period 1 3 6.442049 0 0 276.9231 64.09428 0 0
Period 2 0.384615 0.960769 66.30769 35.40806 307.5385 52.14182 55.53846 16.98831
Period 3 0.538462 1.198289 132.8462 23.09706 357.4615 68.63383 59.76923 12.74202
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Butter (Lurpak/NorpakSpreadable (Aldi)/Butterpak Spreadable (Tesco))
Volume (‘000) – Correlations
Pearson’s Correlations (r)
r  Lookalike Control
 df Whole S/Market Whole S/Market
24wk 4 -0.27788 -0.30025 0.253775 -0.43412
12m 11 -0.16422 -0.24383 -0.08337 -0.36302
All 24 -0.39282 0.023484 -0.14432 -0.01701
Correlations Spearman’s rank
Lookalike Control
n Whole S/Market n Whole S/Market
26 -0.58125 0.18815 26 -0.21000 -0.16787
Kendall’s tau b
Lookalike Control
n Whole S/Market n Whole S/Market
26 -0.42679 0.15519 26 -0.16226 -0.01248
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Butter (Lurpak/NorpakSpreadable (Aldi)/Butterpak Spreadable (Tesco))
Value (‘000)
 
Lookalike Control
Whole market Supermarket only Whole market
Supermarket 
only
4 week 
period 
ending BP LP BP LP
4 week 
period 
ending BP CP BP CP
28 Mar 04 1730 0 0 0 28 Apr 02 1650 0 430 0
25 Apr 04 1566 0 4 0 26 May 02 1546 0 353 0
23 May 04 1698 0 5 0 23 Jun 02 1535 0 396 0
20 Jun 04 1662 0 0 0 21 Jul 02 1362 0 396 0
18 Jul 04 1538 0 0 0 18 Aug 02 1377 0 287 0
15 Aug 04 1538 0 0 0 15 Sep 02 1369 0 240 0
12 Sep 04 1547 0 6 0 13 Oct 02 1567 0 240 0
10 Oct 04 1587 0 0 0 10 Nov 02 1385 0 353 0
07 Nov 04 1849 0 0 0 08 Dec 02 1551 0 346 0
05 Dec 04 1764 0 22 0 05 Jan 03 1759 0 275 0
02 Jan 05 2058 0 0 0 02 Feb 03 1320 0 241 0
30 Jan 05 1706 0 0 0 02 Mar 03 1411 0 238 0
27 Feb 05 1631 0 0 0 30 Mar 03 1496 0 344 0
27 Mar 05 1496 28 3 28 27 Apr 03 1681 76 332 76
24 Apr 05 1615 26 0 26 25 May 03 2349 74 353 74
22 May 05 1544 27 0 27 22 Jun 03 1685 55 365 55
19 Jun 05 1427 30 0 30 20 Jul 03 1989 60 388 60
17 Jul 05 1426 67 0 67 17 Aug 03 1228 69 257 69
14 Aug 05 1455 73 0 73 14 Sep 03 1542 57 327 57
11 Sep 05 1307 129 0 129 12 Oct 03 1890 61 389 61
09 Oct 05 1345 102 0 102 09 Nov 03 1928 110 359 110
06 Nov 05 1450 137 0 137 07 Dec 03 1990 118 397 118
04 Dec 05 1610 127 0 127 04 Jan 04 2092 94 399 94
01 Jan 06 1677 107 2 107 01 Feb 04 1426 117 307 117
29 Jan 06 1290 118 0 118  29 Feb 04 1838 86 470 86
26 Feb 06 1390 140 0 140 28 Mar 04 1730 86 360 86
26 Mar 06 1235 191 0 191 25 Apr 04 1566 71 318 71
23 Apr 06 1352 186 0 186 23 May 04 1698 93 431 93
21 May 06 1253 164 0 164 20 Jun 04 1662 103 496 103
18 Jun 06 1299 132 0 132 18 Jul 04 1538 65 369 65
16 Jul 06 1320 134 0 134 15 Aug 04 1538 86 315 86
13 Aug 06 1141 124 0 124 12 Sep 04 1547 117 435 117
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Lookalike Control
Whole market Supermarket only Whole market
Supermarket 
only
4 week 
period 
ending BP LP BP LP
4 week 
period 
ending BP CP BP CP
10 Sep 06 1160 166 0 166 10 Oct 04 1587 81 566 81
03 Dec 06 1310 213 0 213 02 Jan 05 2058 95 589 95
31 Dec 06 1550 182 0 182 30 Jan 05 1706 95 466 95
28 Jan 07 1002 213 1 213 27 Feb 05 1631 114 449 114
25 Feb 07 1225 184 0 184 27 Mar 05 1496 132 500 132
Lurpak (BP), NorpakSpreadable (Aldi) (LP), Butterpak Spreadable (Tesco) (CP)
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Butter (Lurpak/NorpakSpreadable (Aldi)/Butterpak Spreadable (Tesco))
Value (‘000) – Mean, Standard Deviation and Pearson’s Coefficient
Lookalike (4 w/e) Control (4 w/e)
Period 1 28 Mar 04 – 27 Feb 05 28 Apr 02 – 30 Mar 03
Period 2 27 Mar 05 – 26 Feb 06 27 Apr 03 – 28 Mar 04
Period 3 26 Mar 06 – 25 Feb 07 25 Apr 04 – 17 Mar 05
 Whole Market
 Lookalike Control
 Lurpak Aldi Lurpak Tesco
 x SD x SD X SD X SD
Period 1 1682.615 148.408 0 0 1486.769 129.9462 0 0
Period 2 1464 120.6103 85.46154 45.52951 1797.538 295.8385 81.76923 22.41337
Period 3 1247.769 130.4206 172.4615 28.41542 1664.615 156.1695 94.92308 20.30789
 Supermarket
 Lookalike Control
 Lurpak Aldi Lurpak Tesco
 x SD x SD X SD x SD
Period 1 2.846154 6.162334 0 0 318.3846 68.26851 0 0
Period 2 0.384615 0.960769 85.46154 45.52951 361.7692 51.59159 81.76923 22.41337
Period 3 0.538462 1.198289 172.4615 28.41542 458.8462 85.70963 94.92308 20.30789
Pearson’s Correlations (r)
r  Lookalike Control
 df Whole S/Market Whole S/Market
24wk 4 -0.58938 -0.30888 0.211284 -0.33732
12m 11 -0.3217 -0.24634 0.100135 0.100194
All 24 ` 0.020376 -0.05631 0.354945
Notes
The brand leader was not on sale in the same supermarket as the lookalike and so this 
means there would be no side by side comparisons. 
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Ibuprofen
 (Nurofen Caplets/Boots Ibuprofen Caplets/Sainsbury’s Ibuprofen 
Caplets)
Volume (‘000)
 
Lookalike Control
Whole market Supermarket only Whole market
Supermarket 
only
4 week  
period  
ending BP LP BP LP
4 week 
period 
ending BP CP BP CP
19 Apr 09 278 0 23 0 12 Aug 07 173 0 52 0
17 May 09 224 0 3 0 09 Sep 07 181 0 33 0
14 Jun 09 235 0 5 0 07 Oct 07 178 0 38 0
12 Jul 09 321 0 5 0 04 Nov 07 197 0 27 0
09 Aug 09 375 0 0 0 02 Dec 07 214 0 28 0
06 Sep 09 237 0 12 0 30 Dec 07 271 0 35 0
04 Oct 09 198 0 10 0 27 Jan 08 192 0 16 0
01 Nov 09 204 0 0 0 24 Feb 08 306 0 42 0
29 Nov 09 186 0 5 0 23 Mar 08 237 0 20 0
27 Dec 09 219 0 17 0 20 Apr 08 281 0 48 0
24 Jan 10 214 0 4 0 18 May 08 320 0 67 0
21 Feb 10 147 0 0 0 15 Jun 08 163 0 17 0
21 Mar 10 151 0 2 0 13 Jul 08 233(6) 3(20) 27(11) 3(20)
18 Apr 10 155 0 16 0 10 Aug 08 202(12) 14(21) 19(24) 14(21)
16 May 10 266 0 35 0 07 Sep 08 148(22) 55(2) 32(8) 55(2)
13 Jun 10 227 0 3 0 05 Oct 08 172(18) 14(21) 30(10) 14(21)
11 Jul 10 139 0 7 0 02 Nov 08 148(22) 4(25) 21(20) 4(25)
08 Aug 10 169 0 11 0 30 Nov 08 147(24) 21(16) 31(9) 21(16)
05 Sep 10 199 0 0 0 28 Dec 08 179(16) 35(7) 21(20) 35(7)
03 Oct 10 192 0 11 0 25 Jan 09 236(5) 16(19) 37(4) 16(19)
31 Oct 10 215 0 25 0 22 Feb 09 156(20) 1(27) 36(6) 1(27)
28 Nov 10 186 0 0 0 22 Mar 09 193(13) 11(24) 22(17) 11(24)
26 Dec 10 183 0 0 0 19 Apr 09 263(3) 26(11) 43(1) 26(11)
23 Jan 11 188 0 0 0 17 May 09 219(9) 28(8) 21(20) 28(8)
20 Feb 11 137 0 3 0 14 Jun 09 210(11) 26(11) 23(16) 26(11)
20 Mar 11 141 0 8 0 12 Jul 09 308(2) 53(3) 43(1) 53(3)
17 Apr 11 196 0 4 0 09 Aug 09 366(1) 27(9) 37(4) 27(9)
15 May 11 208 0 49 0 06 Sep 09 228(7) 42(6) 34(7) 42(6)
Impact of Lookalikes 
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Lookalike Control
Whole market Supermarket only Whole market
Supermarket 
only
4 week  
period  
ending BP LP BP LP
4 week 
period 
ending BP CP BP CP
07 Aug 11 163 0 9 0 29 Nov 09 170(19) 25(14) 25(14) 25(14)
04 Sep 11 204 0 0 0 27 Dec 09 212(10) 50(4) 41(3) 50(4)
02 Oct 11 184 0 23 0 24 Jan 10 179(16) 17(18) 22(17) 17(18)
30 Oct 11 198 0 33 0 21 Feb 10 137(26) 13(23) 20(23) 13(23)
27 Nov 11 266 0 59 0 21 Mar 10 142(25) 26(11) 15(26) 26(11)
25 Dec 11 267 0 23 0 18 Apr 10 150(21) 22(15) 13(27) 22(15)
22 Jan 12 201(2) 13(4) 8(3) 11(4) 16 May 10 255(4) 27(9) 24(15) 27(9)
19 Feb 12 159(4) 34(3) 2(4) 34(3) 13 Jun 10 222(8) 15(20) 22(17) 15(20)
18 Mar 12 240(1) 93(1) 18(2) 93(1) 11 Jul 10 129(27) 18(17) 19(24) 18(17)
15 Apr 12 196(3)) 43(2) 23(1) 43(2)
Nurofen Caplets (BP), Boots Ibuprofen Caplets (LP), Sainsbury’s Ibuprofen Caplets (CP)
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Impact of Lookalikes
Ibuprofen (Nurofen Caplets/Boots Ibuprofen Caplets/Sainsbury’s 
Ibuprofen Caplets)
Volume (‘000) – Mean and Standard Deviation
 
Lookalike (4 w/e) Control (4 w/e)
Period 1 19 Apr 09 – 25 Dec 11 12 Aug 07 – 15 Jun 08
Period 2 22 Jan 12 – 15 Apr 12 13 Jul 08 – 14 Jun 09
Period 3 - 12 Jul 09 – 11 Jul 10
 Whole Market
 Lookalike Control
 Nurofen Boots Nurofen Sainsbury’s
 x SD x SD X SD x SD
Period 1 205.9722 51.21243 0 0 226.0833 55.31309 0 0
Period 2 199 33.13608 45.75 33.91534 192.7692 38.26041 19.53846 14.88632
Period 3 - - - - 204.9286 67.91676 32.57143 17.66228
 Supermarket
 Lookalike Control
 Nurofen Boots Nurofen Sainsbury’s
 x SD x SD X SD x SD
Period 1 11.77778 14.09987 0 0 35.25 15.27401 0 0
Period 2 12.75 9.5 45.25 34.56757 27.92308 7.576956 19.53846 14.88632
Period 3 - - - - 26.28571 9.243947 32.57143 17.66228
Impact of Lookalikes 
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Ibuprofen (Nurofen Caplets/Boots Ibuprofen Caplets/Sainsbury’s 
Ibuprofen Caplets)
Volume (‘000) – Correlations
Pearson’s Correlations (r)
r  Lookalike Control
 df Whole S/Market Whole S/Market
16 (24) wks 2 (4) 0.697027 0.518943 -0.49049 0.57778
12m 11 - - -0.06721 0.058026
All 25 - - 0.187148 0.305407
Correlations Spearman’s rank
Lookalike Control
n Whole S/Market n Whole S/Market
4 0.4 0.6 27 0.2965 0.32895
Kendall’s tau b
Lookalike Control
n Whole S/Market N Whole S/Market
4 0.33333 0.33333 27 0.21614 0.21866
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Impact of Lookalikes
Ibuprofen (Nurofen Caplets /Boots Ibuprofen Caplets /Sainsbury’s 
Ibuprofen Caplets)
Value (‘000)
 
Lookalike Control
Whole market Supermarket only Whole market
Supermarket 
only
4 week 
period 
ending BP LP BP LP
4 week 
period 
ending BP CP BP CP
19 Apr 09 502 0 36 0 12 Aug 07 287 0 82 0
17 May 09 428 0 6 0 09 Sep 07 319 0 54 0
14 Jun 09 444 0 9 0 07 Oct 07 327 0 76 0
12 Jul 09 602 0 9 0 04 Nov 07 411 0 47 0
09 Aug 09 502 0 0 0 02 Dec 07 464 0 59 0
06 Sep 09 388 0 23 0 30 Dec 07 553 0 61 0
04 Oct 09 377 0 20 0 27 Jan 08 406 0 35 0
01 Nov 09 331 0 0 0 24 Feb 08 607 0 95 0
29 Nov 09 311 0 7 0 23 Mar 08 455 0 32 0
27 Dec 09 370 0 32 0 20 Apr 08 500 0 94 0
24 Jan 10 410 0 7 0 18 May 08 536 0 129 0
21 Feb 10 288 0 0 0 15 Jun 08 300 0 28 0
21 Mar 10 300 0 4 0 13 Jul 08 445 2 58 2
18 Apr 10 305 0 32 0 10 Aug 08 373 10 35 10
16 May 10 502 0 64 0 07 Sep 08 268 38 56 38
13 Jun 10 416 0 6 0 05 Oct 08 331 9 55 9
11 Jul 10 264 0 15 0 02 Nov 08 299 3 48 3
08 Aug 10 331 0 22 0 30 Nov 08 315 15 78 15
05 Sep 10 355 0 0 0 28 Dec 08 376 24 51 24
03 Oct 10 385 0 23 0 25 Jan 09 498 11 90 11
31 Oct 10 416 0 48 0 22 Feb 09 317 1 86 1
28 Nov 10 357 0 0 0 22 Mar 09 386 7 54 7
26 Dec 10 356 0 0 0 19 Apr 09 477 18 101 18
23 Jan 11 369 0 0 0 17 May 09 417 19 41 19
20 Feb 11 264 0 5 0 14 Jun 09 397 18 44 18
20 Mar 11 271 0 15 0 12 Jul 09 577 35 81 35
17 Apr 11 324 0 4 0 09 Aug 09 490 18 68 18
15 May 11 362 0 90 0 06 Sep 09 372 28 52 28
12 Jun 11 350 0 20 0 04 Oct 09 347 33 54 33
10 Jul 11 306 0 17 0 01 Nov 09 306 48 52 48
07 Aug 11 313 0 17 0 29 Nov 09 284 17 48 17
Impact of Lookalikes 
383
 
Lookalike Control
Whole market Supermarket only Whole market
Supermarket 
only
4 week 
period 
ending BP LP BP LP
4 week 
period 
ending BP CP BP CP
30 Oct 11 362 0 59 0 21 Feb 10 268 9 41 9
27 Nov 11 487 0 116 0 21 Mar 10 281 17 30 17
25 Dec 11 496 0 44 0 18 Apr 10 295 15 26 15
22 Jan 12 383 16 16 14 16 May 10 482 18 48 18
19 Feb 12 288 45 5 45 13 Jun 10 408 10 43 10
18 Mar 12 423 91 30 91 11 Jul 10 244 12 38 12
15 Apr 12 356 44 39 44
Nurofen Caplets (BP), Boots Ibuprofen Caplets (LP), Sainsbury’s Ibuprofen Caplets (CP)
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Impact of Lookalikes
Ibuprofen (Nurofen Caplets/Boots Ibuprofen Caplets/Sainsbury’s 
Ibuprofen Caplets)
Value (‘000) – Mean, Standard Deviation and Pearson’s Coefficient
Lookalike (4 w/e) Control (4 w/e)
Period 1 19 Apr 09 – 25 Dec 11 12 Aug 07 – 15 Jun 08
Period 2 22 Jan 12 – 15 Apr 12 13 Jul 08 – 14 Jun 09
Period 3 - 12 Jul 09 – 11 Jul 10
 Whole Market
 Lookalike Control
 Nurofen Boots Nurofen Sainsbury’s
 x SD x SD X SD x SD
Period 1 377.3333 78.38003 0 0 430.4167 106.8512 0 0
Period 2 362.5 56.78321 49 31.05908 376.8462 70.05218 13.46154 10.26008
Period 3 - - - - 361.4286 97.1911 21.71429 11.72393
 Supermarket
 Lookalike Control
 Nurofen Boots Nurofen Sainsbury’s
 x SD x SD X SD x SD
Period 1 21.97222 26.60664 0 0 66 30.28651 0 0
Period 2 22.5 15.02221 48.5 31.77525 61.30769 20.62921 13.46154 10.26008
Period 3 - - - - 50 16.07674 21.71429 11.72393
Pearson’s Correlations (r)
r  Lookalike Control
 df Whole S/Market Whole S/Market
16 (24) wks 2 (4) 0.414863 0.370111 -0.64109 0.180704
12m 11 - - -0.1585 -0.10191
All 25 - - 0.052322 0.094924
Notes
The lookalike was only launched very recently and so the data available is very restricted 
indeed. 
Impact of Lookalikes 
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Skin Care
(Clearasil Ultra/Boots Skin Clear/Tesco Clear Skin)
Volume (‘000)
 
Lookalike Control
Whole market Supermarket only Whole market
Supermarket 
only
4 week 
period 
ending BP LP BP LP
4 week 
period 
ending BP CP BP CP
19 Apr 09 62(9) 4(36) 3(18) 4(36) 19 Apr 09 62(9) 18(33) 23(4) 18(33)
17 May 09 38(18) 0(38) 0(24) 0(38) 17 May 09 38(18) 14(34) 17(13) 14(34)
14 Jun 09 101(2) 24(17) 17(5) 24(17) 14 Jun 09 101(2) 1(36) 14(17) 1(36)
12 Jul 09 60(11) 9(29) 0(24) 9(29) 12 Jul 09 60(11) 0(37) 18(11) 0(37)
09 Aug 09 83(5) 9(29) 17(5) 9(29) 09 Aug 09 83(5) 0(37) 8(23) 0(37)
06 Sep 09 77(6) 28(12) 5(16) 28(12) 06 Sep 09 77(6) 2(35) 28(2) 2(35)
04 Oct 09 76(7) 8(32) 12(9) 8(32) 04 Oct 09 76(7) 0(37) 26(3) 0(37)
01 Nov 09 35(20) 26(14) 0(24) 26(14) 01 Nov 09 35(20) 37(24) 9(20) 37(24)
29 Nov 09 84(4) 7(34) 23(3) 7(34) 29 Nov 09 84(4) 85(1) 19(9) 85(1)
27 Dec 09 43(15) 5(35) 0(24) 5(35) 27 Dec 09 43(15) 46(12) 21(5) 46(12)
24 Jan 10 33(22) 73(1) 18(4) 73(1) 24 Jan 10 33(22) 54(6) 6(27) 54(6)
21 Feb 10 20(28) 32(9) 4(17) 32(9) 21 Feb 10 20(28) 30(29) 6(27) 30(29)
21 Mar 10 169(1) 21(22) 31(2) 21(22) 21 Mar 10 169(1) 38(22) 18(11) 38(22)
18 Apr 10 43(15) 15(26) 13(7) 15(26) 18 Apr 10 43(15) 33(26) 9(20) 33(26)
16 May 10 29(25) 9(29) 10(12) 9(29) 16 May 10 29(25) 54(6) 7(24) 54(6)
13 Jun 10 93(3) 22(20) 53(1) 22(20) 13 Jun 10 93(3) 53(8) 21(5) 53(8)
11 Jul 10 38(18) 22(20) 10(12) 22(20) 11 Jul 10 38(18) 70(3) 15(15) 70(3)
08 Aug 10 8(37) 19(24) 0(24) 19(24) 08 Aug 10 8(37) 70(3) 7(24) 70(3)
05 Sep 10 44(14) 51(3) 0(24) 51(3) 05 Sep 10 44(14) 43(15) 15(15) 43(15)
03 Oct 10 62(9) 12(28) 13(7) 12(28) 03 Oct 10 62(9) 45(14) 12(19) 45(14)
28 Nov 10 7(39) 42(5) 0(24) 42(5) 28 Nov 10 7(39) 46(12) 6(27) 46(12)
26 Dec 10 13(36) 26(14) 0(24) 26(14) 26 Dec 10 13(36) 24(30) 7(24) 24(30)
23 Jan 11 35(30) 27(13) 11(11) 27(13) 23 Jan 11 35(30) 47(11) 5(30) 47(11)
20 Feb 11 16(35) 24(17) 3(18) 24(17) 20 Feb 11 16(35) 72(2) 4(35) 72(2)
20 Mar 11 17(32) 25(16) 0(24) 25(16) 20 Mar 11 17(32) 43(15) 5(30) 43(15)
17 Apr 11 18(31) 34(8) 3(18) 34(8) 17 Apr 11 18(31) 31(28) 5(30) 31(28)
15 May 11 17(32) 61(2) 0(24) 61(2) 15 May 11 17(32) 40(20) 3(36) 40(20)
12 Jun 11 8(37) 0(38) 0(24) 0(38) 12 Jun 11 8(37) 38(22) 0(38) 38(22)
10 Jul 11 17(32) 14(27) 0(24) 14(27) 10 Jul 11 17(32) 21(32) 2(37) 21(32)
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Impact of Lookalikes
 
Lookalike Control
Whole market Supermarket only Whole market
Supermarket 
only
4 week 
period 
ending BP LP BP LP
4 week 
period 
ending BP CP BP CP
02 Oct 11 32(23) 42(5) 3(18) 42(5) 02 Oct 11 32(23) 37(24) 0(38) 37(24)
30 Oct 11 24(27) 18(25) 3(18) 18(25) 30 Oct 11 24(27) 51 (9) 5(30) 51 (9)
27 Nov 11 30(24) 3(37) 0(24) 3(37) 27 Nov 11 30(24) 32(27) 21(5) 32(27)
25 Dec 11 19(30) 42(5) 0(24) 42(5) 25 Dec 11 19(30) 40(20) 9(20) 40(20)
22 Jan 12 46(12) 8(32) 7(15) 8(32) 22 Jan 12 46(12) 41(18) 17(13) 41(18)
19 Feb 12 26(26) 20(23) 0(24) 20(23) 19 Feb 12 26(26) 56(5) 19(9) 56(5)
18 Mar 12 24(27) 24(17) 3(18) 24(17) 18 Mar 12 24(27) 42(17) 21(5) 42(17)
15 Apr 12 45(13) 31(10) 0(24) 31(10) 15 Apr 12 45(13) 41(18) 13(18) 41(18)
Clearasil Ultra (BP), Boots Skin Clear (LP), Tesco Clear Skin (CP)
Impact of Lookalikes 
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Skin Care (Clearasil Ultra/Boots Skin Clear/Tesco Clear Skin)
Volume (‘000) – Mean and Standard Deviation
Lookalike (4 w/e) Control (4 w/e)
Period 1 19 Apr 09 – 21 Mar 10 19 Apr 09 – 21 Mar 10
Period 2 18 Apr 10 – 20 Mar 11 18 Apr 10 – 20 Mar 11
Period 3 17 Apr 11 – 15 Apr 12 17 Apr 11 – 15 Apr 12
 Whole Market
 Lookalike Control
 Clearasil Boots Clearasil Tesco 
 x SD x SD X SD x SD
Period 1 67.76923 38.89977 18.92308 19.34538 67.76923 38.89977 25 26.41023
Period 2 33.75 25.12921 24.5 11.85902 33.75 25.12921 50 14.83852
Period 3 29.28571 15.08656 26.42857 17.39458 29.28571 15.08656 38.64286 9.723937
 Supermarket
 Lookalike Control
 Clearasil Boots Clearasil Tesco 
 x SD x SD X SD x SD
Period 1 10 10.35213 18.92308 19.34538 16.38462 7.365895 25 26.41023
Period 2 9.416667 14.81067 24.5 11.85902 9.416667 5.230302 50 14.83852
Period 3 2.857143 3.88007 26.42857 17.39458 11.07143 10.2991 38.64286 9.723937
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Impact of Lookalikes
Skin Care (Clearasil Ultra/Boots Skin Clear/Tesco Clear Skin)
Volume (‘000) – Correlations
Pearson’s Correlations (r)
r  Lookalike Control
 df Whole S/Market Whole S/Market
36m 37 -0.18846 -0.02843 -0.25501 -0.15125
Correlations Spearman’s rank
Lookalike Control
n Whole S/Market n Whole S/Market
39 -0.23011 -0.03608 39 -0.23260 -0.07172
Kendall’s tau b
Lookalike Control
n Whole S/Market n Whole S/Market
39 -0.15754 -0.03474 39 -0.15458 -0.04164
Impact of Lookalikes 
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Skin Care (Clearasil Ultra/Boots Skin Clear/Tesco Clear Skin)
Value (‘000)
 
Lookalike Control
Whole market Supermarket only Whole market
Supermarket 
only
4 week 
period 
ending BP LP BP LP
4 week 
period 
ending BP CP BP CP
19 Apr 09 276 12 18 12 19 Apr 09 276 34 104 18
17 May 09 178 0 0 0 17 May 09 178 26 77 14
14 Jun 09 325 56 90 56 14 Jun 09 325 2 65 1
12 Jul 09 204 26 0 26 12 Jul 09 204 0 58 0
09 Aug 09 405 26 86 26 09 Aug 09 405 0 40 0
06 Sep 09 247 88 0 88 06 Sep 09 247 3 93 2
04 Oct 09 261 17 25 17 04 Oct 09 261 0 85 0
01 Nov 09 152 72 0 72 01 Nov 09 152 41 31 37
29 Nov 09 312 23 81 23 29 Nov 09 312 57 64 85
27 Dec 09 214 11 0 11 27 Dec 09 214 32 102 46
24 Jan 10 150 222 75 222 24 Jan 10 150 43 30 54
21 Feb 10 98 94 23 94 21 Feb 10 98 22 32 30
21 Mar 10 845 56 180 56 21 Mar 10 845 27 92 38
18 Apr 10 183 48 42 48 18 Apr 10 183 24 39 33
16 May 10 144 33 55 33 16 May 10 144 40 34 54
13 Jun 10 394 58 203 58 13 Jun 10 394 50 100 53
11 Jul 10 128 47 32 47 11 Jul 10 128 65 49 70
08 Aug 10 32 50 0 50 08 Aug 10 32 71 27 70
05 Sep 10 145 160 0 160 05 Sep 10 145 32 50 43
03 Oct 10 200 42 69 42 03 Oct 10 200 32 39 45
28 Nov 10 21 146 0 146 28 Nov 10 21 33 16 46
26 Dec 10 54 84 0 84 26 Dec 10 54 21 23 24
23 Jan 11 130 74 43 74 23 Jan 11 130 53 21 47
20 Feb 11 51 76 10 76 20 Feb 11 51 77 12 72
20 Mar 11 77 91 0 91 20 Mar 11 77 47 15 43
17 Apr 11 65 97 10 97 17 Apr 11 65 35 16 31
15 May 11 60 175 0 175 15 May 11 60 40 12 40
12 Jun 11 31 0 0 0 12 Jun 11 31 58 0 38
10 Jul 11 64 36 0 36 10 Jul 11 64 36 10 21
07 Aug 11 136 95 44 95 07 Aug 11 136 39 20 23
04 Sep 11 219 156 30 156 04 Sep 11 219 60 119 48
02 Oct 11 109 150 14 150 02 Oct 11 109 35 0 37
390
Impact of Lookalikes
 
Lookalike Control
Whole market Supermarket only Whole market
Supermarket 
only
4 week 
period 
ending BP LP BP LP
4 week 
period 
ending BP CP BP CP
25 Dec 11 67 147 0 147 25 Dec 11 67 35 24 40
22 Jan 12 216 29 35 29 22 Jan 12 216 66 84 41
19 Feb 12 138 60 0 60 19 Feb 12 138 50 105 56
18 Mar 12 81 84 18 84 18 Mar 12 81 35 63 42
15 Apr 12 246 74 0 74 15 Apr 12 246 24 73 41
Clearasil Ultra (BP), Boots Skin Clear (LP), Tesco Clear Skin (CP)
Impact of Lookalikes 
391
Skin Care (Clearasil Ultra/Boots Skin Clear/Tesco Clear Skin)
Value (‘000) – Mean, Standard Deviation and Pearson’s Coefficient
Lookalike (4 w/e) Control (4 w/e)
Period 1 19 Apr 09 – 21 Mar 10 19 Apr 09 – 21 Mar 10
Period 2 18 Apr 10 – 20 Mar 11 18 Apr 10 – 20 Mar 11
Period 3 17 Apr 11 – 15 Apr 12 17 Apr 11 – 15 Apr 12
 Whole Market
 Lookalike Control
 Clearasil Boots Clearasil Tesco 
 x SD x SD X SD x SD
Period 1 282.0769 188.4704 54.07692 58.97664 282.0769 188.4704 22.07692 19.41847
Period 2 129.9167 101.8648 75.75 40.31495 129.9167 101.8648 45.41667 18.37715
Period 3 116.6429 67.0942 83.92857 56.22819 116.6429 67.0942 44.57143 16.32702
 Supermarket
 Lookalike Control
 Clearasil Boots Clearasil Tesco 
 x SD x SD X SD x SD
Period 1 44.46154 54.66659 54.07692 58.97664 67.15385 27.4343 25 26.41023
Period 2 37.83333 57.64757 75.75 40.31495 35.41667 24.06604 50 14.83852
Period 3 11.42857 15.0216 83.92857 56.22819 43.85714 41.14488 38.64286 9.723937
Pearson’s Correlations (r)
r  Lookalike Control
 df Whole S/Market Whole S/Market
36m 37 -0.25008 -0.07976 -0.31938 -0.13392
Notes
The control and the lookalike were both on the market before the lookalike. Accordingly, the 
36 months of comparison data was used.
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Impact of Lookalikes
Shaving Gel
(Gillette Fusion Shaving Gel/Boots Blade 3 Shaving Gel/Morrison’s 
Shaving Gel)
Volume (‘000)
 
Lookalike Control
Whole market Supermarket only Whole market
Supermarket 
only
4 week 
period 
ending BP LP BP LP
4 week 
period 
ending BP CP BP CP
19 Apr 09 0 0 0 0 19 Apr 09 0 34 0 34
17 May 09 0 0 0 0 17 May 09 0 21 0 21
14 Jun 09 0 0 0 0 14 Jun 09 0 12 0 12
12 Jul 09 0 0 0 0 12 Jul 09 0 25 0 25
09 Aug 09 0 0 0 0 09 Aug 09 0 33 0 33
06 Sep 09 0 0 0 0 06 Sep 09 0 29 0 29
04 Oct 09 0 0 0 0 04 Oct 09 0 23 0 23
01 Nov 09 0 0 0 0 01 Nov 09 0 21 0 21
29 Nov 09 0 0 0 0 29 Nov 09 0 24 0 24
27 Dec 09 0 0 0 0 27 Dec 09 0 13 0 13
24 Jan 10 0 0 0 0 24 Jan 10 0 23 0 23
21 Feb 10 0 0 0 0 21 Feb 10 0 22 0 22
21 Mar 10 0 0 0 0 21 Mar 10 0 16 0 16
18 Apr 10 0 0 0 0 18 Apr 10 0 24 0 24
16 May 10 0 0 0 0 16 May 10 0 30 0 30
13 Jun 10 0 0 0 0 13 Jun 10 0 28 0 28
11 Jul 10 0 0 0 0 11 Jul 10 0 104 0 104
08 Aug 10 0 0 0 0 08 Aug 10 0 50 0 50
05 Sep 10 0 0 0 0 05 Sep 10 0 30 0 30
03 Oct 10 0 0 0 0 03 Oct 10 0 26 0 26
31 Oct 10 0 0 0 0 31 Oct 10 0 31 0 31
28 Nov 10 0 0 0 0 28 Nov 10 0 34 0 34
26 Dec 10 0 0 0 0 26 Dec 10 0 44 0 44
23 Jan 11 0 0 0 0 23 Jan 11 0 34 0 34
20 Feb 11 184 0 31 0 20 Feb 11 184(9) 27(13) 3(15) 27(13)
20 Mar 11 342 0 73 0 20 Mar 11 342(1) 21(14) 57(2) 21(14)
17 Apr 11 187 0 4 0 17 Apr 11 187(8) 42(4) 16(8) 42(4)
15 May 11 231 0 30 0 15 May 11 231(3) 33(10) 11(9) 33(10)
Impact of Lookalikes 
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Lookalike Control
Whole market Supermarket only Whole market
Supermarket 
only
4 week 
period 
ending BP LP BP LP
4 week 
period 
ending BP CP BP CP
07 Aug 11 74 0 9 0 07 Aug 11 74(16) 33(10) 22(5) 33(10)
04 Sep 11 285 0 92 0 04 Sep 11 285(2) 38(6) 68(1) 38(6)
02 Oct 11 192 0 0 0 02 Oct 11 192(6) 36(8) 6(12) 36(8)
30 Oct 11 109 0 13 0 30 Oct 11 109(14) 55(1) 19(6) 55(1)
27 Nov 11 142(4) 7(1) 7(5) 7(1) 27 Nov 11 142(11) 31(12) 4(14) 31(12)
25 Dec 11 189(2) 0(3) 22(1) 0(3) 25 Dec 11 189(7) 40(5) 29(3) 40(5)
22 Jan 12 206(1) 0(3) 19(2) 0(3) 22 Jan 12 206(4) 38(6) 11(9) 38(6)
19 Feb 12 135(5) 0(3) 16(3) 0(3) 19 Feb 12 135(13) 19(16) 18(7) 19(16)
18 Mar 12 84(6) 7(1) 3(6) 7(1) 18 Mar 12 84(15) 36(8) 1(16) 36(8)
15 Apr 12 157(3) 0(3) 14(4) 0(3) 15 Apr 12 157(10) 45(2) 5(13) 45(2)
Gillette Fusion Shaving Gel (BP), Boots Blade 3 Shaving Gel (LP), Morrison’s Shaving Gel (CP)
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Impact of Lookalikes
Shaving Gel (Gillette Fusion Shaving Gel/Boots Blade 3 Shaving Gel/ 
Morrison’s Shaving Gel)
Volume (‘000) – Mean and Standard Deviation
Lookalike (4 w/e) Control (4 w/e)
Period 1 20 Feb 11 – 30 Oct 11 19 Apr 09 – 23 Jan 11
Period 2 27 Nov 11 – 15 Apr 12 20 Feb 11 – 22 Jan 12
Period 3 - 19 Feb 12 – 15 Apr 12
 Whole Market
 Lookalike Control
 Gillette Boots Gillette Morrison’s
 X SD x SD X SD x SD
Period 1 194.7 79.19884 0 0 0 0 20.45833 17.90793
Period 2 152.1667 43.18063 2.333333 3.614784 0 0 35.23077 9.292953
Period 3     191.0769 70.24892 33.33333 13.20353
 Supermarket
 Lookalike Control
 Gillette Boots Gillette Morrison’s
 x SD x SD X SD x SD
Period 1 29.4 30.12271 0 0 0 0 30.45833 17.90793
Period 2 13.5 7.231874 2.333333 3.614784 0 0 35.23077 9.292953
Period 3 - - - - 21.53846 20.05665 33.33333 13.20353
Impact of Lookalikes 
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Shaving Gel (Gillette Fusion Shaving Gel/Boots Blade 3 Shaving Gel/ 
Morrison’s Shaving Gel)
Volume (‘000) – Correlations
Pearson’s Correlations (r)
r  Lookalike Control
 df Whole S/Market Whole S/Market
24wk 4 -0.70259 -0.91042 -0.2325 -0.58662
12m 11 - - -0.28418 -0.17375
15m 14 - - -0.17914 -0.19008
Correlations Spearman’s rank
Lookalike Control
n Whole S/Market n Whole S/Market
6 -0.62106 -0.82808 16 0.06637 -0.06937
Kendall’s tau b
Lookalike Control
n Whole S/Market N Whole S/Market
6 -0.54772 -0.73030 16 0.01695 -0.04256
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Impact of Lookalikes
Shaving Gel (Gillette Fusion Shaving Gel/Boots Blade 3 Shaving Gel/ 
Morrison’s Shaving Gel)
Value (‘000)
 
Lookalike Control
Whole market Supermarket only Whole market
Supermarket 
only
4 week 
period 
ending BP LP BP LP
4 week 
period 
ending BP CP BP CP
19 Apr 09 0 0 0 0 19 Apr 09 0 39 0 39
17 May 09 0 0 0 0 17 May 09 0 24 0 24
14 Jun 09 0 0 0 0 14 Jun 09 0 14 0 14
12 Jul 09 0 0 0 0 12 Jul 09 0 26 0 26
09 Aug 09 0 0 0 0 09 Aug 09 0 31 0 31
06 Sep 09 0 0 0 0 06 Sep 09 0 28 0 28
04 Oct 09 0 0 0 0 04 Oct 09 0 22 0 22
01 Nov 09 0 0 0 0 01 Nov 09 0 20 0 20
29 Nov 09 0 0 0 0 29 Nov 09 0 23 0 23
27 Dec 09 0 0 0 0 27 Dec 09 0 12 0 12
24 Jan 10 0 0 0 0 24 Jan 10 0 22 0 22
21 Feb 10 0 0 0 0 21 Feb 10 0 22 0 22
21 Mar 10 0 0 0 0 21 Mar 10 0 16 0 16
18 Apr 10 0 0 0 0 18 Apr 10 0 24 0 24
16 May 10 0 0 0 0 16 May 10 0 26 0 26
13 Jun 10 0 0 0 0 13 Jun 10 0 27 0 27
11 Jul 10 0 0 0 0 11 Jul 10 0 88 0 88
08 Aug 10 0 0 0 0 08 Aug 10 0 50 0 50
05 Sep 10 0 0 0 0 05 Sep 10 0 25 0 25
03 Oct 10 0 0 0 0 03 Oct 10 0 25 0 25
31 Oct 10 0 0 0 0 31 Oct 10 0 26 0 26
28 Nov 10 0 0 0 0 28 Nov 10 0 33 0 33
26 Dec 10 0 0 0 0 26 Dec 10 0 41 0 41
23 Jan 11 0 0 0 0 23 Jan 11 0 30 0 30
20 Feb 11 397 0 69 0 20 Feb 11 397 27 12 27
20 Mar 11 701 0 157 0 20 Mar 11 701 21 137 21
17 Apr 11 472 0 15 0 17 Apr 11 472 41 48 41
15 May 11 522 0 90 0 15 May 11 522 33 43 33
12 Jun 11 289 0 76 0 12 Jun 11 289 22 51 22
10 Jul 11 427 0 38 0 10 Jul 11 427 46 15 46
07 Aug 11 205 0 28 0 07 Aug 11 205 35 43 35
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Lookalike Control
Whole market Supermarket only Whole market
Supermarket 
only
4 week 
period 
ending BP LP BP LP
4 week 
period 
ending BP CP BP CP
30 Oct 11 226 0 11 0 30 Oct 11 226 55 38 55
27 Nov 11 298 11 10 11 27 Nov 11 298 31 9 31
25 Dec 11 427 0 37 0 25 Dec 11 427 40 97 40
22 Jan 12 471 0 35 0 22 Jan 12 471 38 31 38
19 Feb 12 285 0 40 0 19 Feb 12 285 20 36 20
18 Mar 12 180 10 6 10 18 Mar 12 180 39 2 39
15 Apr 12 328 0 39 0 15 Apr 12 328 45 20 45
Gillette Fusion Shaving Gel (BP), Boots Blade 3 Shaving Gel (LP), Morrison’s Shaving Gel (CP)
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Shaving Gel (Gillette Fusion Shaving Gel/Boots Blade 3 Shaving Gel/ 
Morrison’s Shaving Gel)
Value (‘000) – Mean, Standard Deviation and Pearson’s Coefficient
Lookalike (4 w/e) Control (4 w/e)
Period 1 20 Feb 11 – 30 Oct 11 19 Apr 09 – 23 Jan 11
Period 2 27 Nov 11 – 15 Apr 12 20 Feb 11 – 22 Jan 12
Period 3 - 19 Feb 12 – 15 Apr 12
 Whole Market
 Lookalike Control
 Gillette Boots Gillette Morrison’s
 x SD x SD x SD x SD
Period 1 420.7 156.8644 0 0 0 0 28.91667 15.10519
Period 2 331.5 104.7182 3.5 5.43139 0 0 35.84615 9.397217
Period 3     415.6154 141.0517 34.66667 13.05118
 Supermarket
 Lookalike Control
 Gillette Boots Gillette Morrison’s
 x SD x SD x SD x SD
Period 1 66.8 62.44429 0 0 0 0 28.91667 15.10519
Period 2 27.83333 15.51021 3.5 5.43139 0 0 35.84615 9.397217
Period 3 - - - - 52.53846 43.56722 34.66667 13.05118
Correlations (r)
r  Lookalike Control
 df Whole S/Market Whole S/Market
24wk 4 -0.66231 -0.98407 -0.12727 -0.556
12m 11 - - -0.26863 -0.17503
15m 14 - - -0.18565 -0.17814
Notes
The sales of the lookalike shaving gel were very low indeed, sometimes being recorded as 
zero. This would affect the quality of the data analysis.
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